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THE MECENT REVOLUTION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY* 
Held midway through the decade that has 
witnessed the launching of a co-operative pro-
gramme to combat under-development through-
out the length and breadth of the Latin American 
continent, it is incumbent upon this meeting of 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
to review the events of the last five years and 
to define the characteristics and problems of 
the current economic and social situation. The 
useful document presented by the Secretariat 
on The future development of iMtin America 
and the Alliance for Progress, in common with 
those prepared by other organs of the inter-
American system, make a valuable contribution 
to the work of comparison which should be the 
preamble to political action on the lines sug-
gested by the findings of the analysis. On this 
occasion, as in the past, the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America would 
like to add its points of view to this concerted 
search for the right path to lead Latin America 
towards progress and equity. 
The recent evolution of the Latin American 
economies, which have shown, as a whole, a 
fairly high rate of over-all growth for two con-
secutive years, is a good augury for the future 
and it behooves us to reflect on its significance. 
The appreciable fluctuations in the rate of the 
growth, and the short-lived advances followed 
by equally short-lived recessions, are no new 
phenomenon in the history of Latin America. 
Even the favourable growth rate of the do-
mestic product in 1964 and 1965, which twice 
exceeded 6 per cent annually, was largely a 
recovery after the adverse trends of the two 
preceding years. In fact, the product's average 
" Statement by Mr. José Antonio Mayobre, Executive 
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, at the fourth annual meeting at the ministerial 
level of the Inter-American Economic and Social Coun-
cil (Buenos Aires, 15 March to 1 April 1966). 
annual rate of growth for the whole period 
1960-65 was only 4.5 per cent, or 1.6 per cent 
per capita, which is slightly below the figure 
of 1.7 per cent recorded in 1955-60 and lower 
still than that of 2.2 per cent for 1950-55. 
But the expansion of the last two years cannot 
legitimately be regarded as simply a part of the 
see-saw movement that has characterized the 
evolution of the Latin American economy in the 
post-war period, since the development process 
has clearly departed from its past pattern and 
has come to embody a series of goals, decisions 
and instruments whose purpose is to bring about 
a radical transformation of the basic aspects of 
economic and social development in Latin 
America. 
Because of our very understanding of the 
underlying causes of the obstacles to the region's 
development an examination of the results 
achieved in the first half of the sixties cannot 
be confined to the still inadequate levels of 
over-all growth. The efforts that are being made 
are aimed not merely at increasing the pace of 
economic expansion in quantitative terms, but 
at transforming the Latin American economies 
by modernizing and reshaping them so as to 
make the benefits of development equally acces-
sible to all sectors of the population. It is as 
instruments in the service of Üiis ideal that the 
work of planning and of structural reform ac-
quires its full significance, and these are the 
aims that justify more intensive action to in-
crease domestic savings and the fullest possible 
financial and technical aid from abroad. 
Great headway has mideniably been made 
since 1960. Whatever the degree of formal ac-
ceptance given to the work of planning and the 
emphasis laid on a particular instrument or 
approach, it has helped to rationalize action in 
the public sector and to make better use of the 
resources available; the regional economic inte-
gration structures can boast of a large and 
rapidly increasing flow of trade; new channels 
have been opened for external co-operation; 
and Latin America has participated, together 
with other developing regions, in the formula-
tion of basic guide-lines for international trade. 
These and other factors engender forces that 
are potentially capable of maintaining a reason-
able rate of economic growth in our countries 
and of making it possible to fulfil the other 
aims of the development policy laid down. It 
v/ould be unrealistic, however, to overlook the 
fact that, in many of its aspects, this task has 
only recently been embarked upon, and that for-
midable obstacles still remain whose removal 
wiU depend partly on the Latin American coun-
tries themselves and partly on decisions taken 
outside the region. 
The effects of foreign trade 
Although the endogenous factors that stimulate 
Latin American growth have become much 
stronger, the external sector continues to exert 
enormous influence. 
In 1960-65 the domestic product and the pur-
chasing power of export rose at almost the same 
rates (about 4.5 per cent on an annual average), 
but the similarity between the fluctuations of 
the two variables during that period is even 
more marked, particularly if Argentina and 
Brazil are excluded because of the special fea-
tures distinguishing the recent evolution of their 
respective economies. If Cuba is also excepted 
for want of comparable data, the highest rates 
of growth in the other Latin American countries 
were recorded in 1963 and 1964, when exports 
increased in volume and also commanded better 
market prices; in 1965, on the other hand, the 
growth rate of the purchasing power of exports 
plunged to 1.7 per cent from 8.3 per cent in the 
previous year, and was immediately followed 
by a steep drop in the growth rates of the 
product and income. 
The instability of export earnings and their 
generally inadequate rate of growth thus con-
tinue to be a disrupting factor with a powerful 
influence on the tempo of economic development 
in the Latin American countries. This is all the 
more important in that the efforts to reverse 
the downward trend of Latin America's partici-
pation in world trade have proved unsuccessful. 
In current values, world trade expanded 45 per 
cent between 1960 and 1965, while exports from 
Latin America (excluding Cuba) rose by only 
28 per cent. 
The reduction of Latin America's relative 
share of world trade, as reflected in the above 
increases, occurred in most of the industrialized 
markets that used to be traditional buyers from 
Latin America. The contraction has been modest 
in the countries of the European Economic Com-
munity (from 6 to 5.2 per cent) and Canada 
(from 5.5 to 5 per cent) larger in the European 
Free-Trade Area (from nearly 5.4 to slightly 
over 4 per cent) and particularly serious, be-
cause of the absolute figures involved, in the 
United States (from 21.3 to 17.2 per cent be-
tween the same years, always excluding Cuban 
exports). The only attenuating factors that 
averted an even sharper plunge were the sub-
stantial increase in sales to Japan and the rapid 
development of intra-regional trade. 
The full import of this will be better under-
stood if it is borne in mind that, had Latin 
America's proportion of United States purchases 
remained the same in 1965 as in 1960, its sales 
to that country would have exceeded those 
actually made by about 900 million dollars, 
while it may also be assured that its exports to 
the European Free-Trade Area would have risen 
by nearly 500 million dollars. 
In the case of the United States, the reduction 
in its purchases from Latin America affects 
several of the region's main export items. For 
instance, between 1960 and January-November 
1965, the relative share of our countries in the 
United States market shrank from 87 to less 
than 75 per cent for coffee, from 64 to under 
35 per cent for iron ore, from 54 to 47 per cent 
for crude oil and petroleum products combined 
and from 48 to 31 per cent for non-ferrous 
metals. In some instances, the contraction was 
due to changes in consumer habits and lack of 
sales promotion on the part of the Latin Ameri-
can producers. This phenomenon should, how-
ever, be explored in depth since it is paradoxical 
that the relative decline in Latin America's share 
of the United States market should coincide with 
the years in which the greatest efforts v/ere 
made to achieve economic co-operation between 
the two areas. 
Latin American action to counterbalance these 
trends and reduce short-term fluctuations is still 
a matter of urgency and fundamental impor-
tance. But commodity agreements, which are 
one of the instruments for achieving this, are 
not progressing satisfactorily. 
Of the four commodity agreements of impor-
tance to Latin America—^those on wheat, sugar, 
coffee and tin—^the coffee agreement has ob-
tained good results, in spite of the difficulties 
it has experienced, while the sugar agreement 
became inoperative a few years ago when it 
proved impossible to make satisfactory arrange-
ments for the distribution of export quotas. The 
negotiations for a cocoa agreement broke down 
entirely at the end of 1%3 after five years of 
preliminary discussions owing to diiferences of 
opinion on the floor and ceiling prices to be 
fixed by the agreement. Talks on cocoa and 
sugar are again being held, but they are unlikely 
to lead, in the near future, to the signature of the 
respective agreements. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development in 1964 considerably enlarged the 
scope and functions of the commodity agree-
ments on the grounds that they could play a 
vital part in expanding trade and fostering the 
powth of the developing countries. To that end, 
it recommended the negotiation of arrangements 
of another kind from the purely formal agree-
ments currently in force, such as study groups 
or other types of organization through which 
the countries could hold inter-governmental con-
sultations. But the majority of countries are still 
imbued by the idea which they inherited from 
the Havana Charter that commodity agreements 
are special measures to be resorted to solely in 
an emergency of the sort that occurs when large 
production surpluses have been built up. It is 
precisely in an emergency, however, that it be-
comes most difiGcult to reconcile the respective 
interests of importer and exporter countries, 
which although seemingly in opposition, are not 
invariably so. When tíie market is highly un-
stable, some countries often try to turn the situa-
tion to immediate account even at the risk of 
foregoing the more lasting benefits to be ob-
tained from stable and flourishing trade. 
There is nothing to be gained from a repeti-
tion of this pattern. On the contrary, everything 
points to the need for a decided effort to in-
crease the number of commodities on which the 
negotiation of an agreement would effectively 
contribute to stabilizing the markets and keeping 
prices at satisfactory levels. 
In some cases, the effectiveness of action to 
regulate the commodity market depends on the 
domestic policy of the industrialized countries. 
In the Final Act of the Conference on Trade 
and Development the signatory States under-
took not to raise additional trade barriers or 
to increase those already in existence with re-
spect to imports of primary commodities of 
interest to the developing countries. Even so, 
maintenance of the status quo in the matter of 
restrictions is no guarantee that the developing 
countries will succeed in maintaining their 
present share of the developed markets, so long 
as policies designed to promote domestic pro-
duction continue to be applied as is the case in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
European Economic Community. Certain meas-
ures adopted by the industrialized countries in 
1965, particularly in respect of sugar, meat and 
wheat, are therefore incompatible with the spirit 
of the commitments they have accepted. Ever 
since the entry into force of the Rome Treaty, 
the Latin American countries have been making 
constant representations to the European Eco-
nomic Community with respect to the restrictive 
and discriminatory effects of its common agri-
cultural policy and of the preferences granted 
to associate countries to the detriment of Latin 
American exports. Latin America's position is 
under consideration, but its interests are not yet 
given suflSicient weight in the EEC's policy 
decisions. 
Although we still lack a vantage point from 
which to judge the influence of the EEC's agri-
cultural policy on current trade flows, it should 
be pointed out that, despite the absolute increase 
in Latin American exports to the Community, 
its share of the market is less than that of other 
areas. Furthermore, the financial assistance given 
to the associate countries and the agricultural 
development programmes that are being carried 
out there will help them to break through present 
supply limitations and to emerge as strong com-
petitors of Latin America, with the added ad-
vantage of the preferential treatment established 
by the articles of association. 
The uncertainty to which these developments 
give rise combined with the structural charac-
teristics of demand for primary commodities 
increase the need for necessary unstinted action 
designed to achieve growing diversification of 
Latin American exports. The views propounded 
at the Trade Conference itself on access for 
manufactured goods from developing countries 
to the markets of the industrialized countries are 
still fully valid. This is, however, a longer-term 
objective, whose achievement will depend both 
on the decisions of the developed countries and 
on the unsparing efforts that we must make to 
relate our industrial production capacity to the 
opportunities that are opening before us. 
The first and essential step is to bolster and 
organize the activities initiated at Brasilia and 
Alta Gracia in 1964 to harmonize the trade 
policies of the Latin American countries, their 
action in international organizations and their 
relations with importer countries and regional 
groups. Agreements on general principles is not 
enough; what is needed is concerted and un-
remitting action at all negotiatory meetings and 
collective support for the legitimate interests of 
each country. The mechanisms that exist are still 
embryonic, and their powers are therefore very 
limited. It is up to us to turn them into more 
efficient tools. 
Economic integration movements in Latin 
America 
Closely associated with foreign trade problems 
are the movements towards the establishment of 
economic integration in Latin America. 
The action taken in this respect has already 
had highly encouraging results. Between 1960 
and 1965, reciprocal trade expanded consider-
ably in both absolute and relative terms, with 
the increase in imports between the member 
countries of ALALC from 375 million to 735 
million dollars and in exports among the coun-
tries of the Central American Common Market 
from 33 million to 142 million dollars. At the 
same time, the progress achieved in relation to 
some institutional aspects of integration was 
consolidated. 
In the case of Central America, the advances 
made have brought about a certain amount of 
economic interdependence among the five coun-
tries and thus made integration a structural part 
of the development of their production systems. 
Having placed a number of regional agreements 
and institutions on a sound footing, their main 
concern is now to improve the legal basis and 
its instruments of action, to give the Common 
Market an economic infrastructure to suit its 
scope and to co-ordinate internal policies on 
taxes, monetary matters, foreign investment, in-
dustrial incentives, imports from third countries 
and even the progress of social programmes, so 
as to be able to deal effectively with the new 
problems that are bound to arise as integration 
moves forward. 
In the last few years ALALC has also made 
important headway in institutional and technical 
matters. Its achievements include the establish-
ment of a Council of Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, the multilateral agreement on compen-
sation of balances concluded among the central 
banks, the provisions for making the Standing 
Executive Committee more dynamic and the 
adoption of measures conducing to the institu-
tion of a system of ad valorem duties, the prepa-
ration of joint customs instruments and me-
chanisms, the formulation of a programme for 
modernizing and remodelling industries, and 
the development of credit facilities for exports. 
Side by side with these, however, there are 
also areas in which little progress is being made. 
The concessions provided for in the Montevideo 
Treaty are not being negotiated on a satisfactory 
scale, and there are entire chapters and sections 
of the Customs Nomenclature in which no con-
cession whatsoever has been agreed upon. More-
over, only 25 per cent of the concessions granted 
are for industrial products, the remaining 75 per 
cent being for raw materials and intermediate 
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goods. The sole complementarity agreements in 
force are concerned with electronic valves, and 
certain types of data-processing machine and 
similar equipment. Nor has much headway been 
made with the attempt to make the operation 
of the trade liberalization programme more 
automatic. 
However substantial the volume of reciprocal 
trade already built up its scale and content must 
be measured against development requirements 
rather than past achievements. And, in this sense, 
the results still leave much to be desired. 
To view the question from the standpoint of 
Latin America as a whole we have still to devise 
suitable procedures for formalizing what would 
be a fruitful relationship between ALALC and 
the Central American Common Market. The 
recent talks between Mexico and the Central 
American countries on the possibilities of in-
creasing their reciprocal trade are a useful con-
tribution in this respect. Any progress made 
towards this goal is also a step towards the 
establishment of a structure that would include 
the whole of Latin America, and also provides 
a yardstick for making a surer assessment of 
the potential benefits and risks involved in other 
sub-regional arrangements that might be set up 
in future. 
Planning 
Among the established factors that are in-
creasing Latin America's capacity to maintain 
steady and rising rates of economic growth by 
virtue of its own efforts, a place must un-
doubtedly be given to the development of plan-
ning activities. In the space of a few years, all 
the Latin American countries have set up plan-
ning offices, eighteen of them have prepared 
specific plans, one is shortly to conclude its plan 
and another is well advanced with the prepa-
ratory work. At the same time, much has been 
done to improve basic statistics, programming 
methods and personnel training, with ample 
technical co-operation from international organi-
zations. Thus, over-all development policy and, 
in particular, public action, is gradually be-
coming rationalized—an irreversible process 
which cannot but perfect itself with the passage 
of time. 
This work has naturally not been without its 
vicissitudes; misunderstandings still persist and 
there are difficulties to be overcome. 
In some cases, the full potential of these activi-
ties has been deliberately reduced and planning 
has been used as an instrument for rationalizing 
traditional activities or facilitating the distribu-
tion of external resources rather than as a tool 
for shaping a new development policy and carry-
ing out with efficiency the reforms it would 
entail. In others, there has not been enough 
determination to make planning into a con-
tinuing activity that does not come to an end 
with the formulation of a single plan and from 
which comprehensive and dramatic results cannot 
be expected all at once. In many instances, the 
work of planning has been kept in a separate 
compartment from the machinery of public 
decision-making, with the result that a false and 
prejudicial distinction has grown up between 
economic plans and policy. Central planning 
offices often fail to make the necessary effort 
—or have lacked support—^to share their task 
with decentralized bodies of a sectoral or re-
gional type, and planning is thus superimposed 
on the traditional Government activities instead 
of becoming the normal method of work through-
out the national administration. The want of 
adequate contact and participation on the part 
of the private sector—both employers and 
workers—has deprived planning of their useful 
assistance, has introduced an element of uncer-
tainty into the achievement of targets that are 
not directly dependent on action by the public 
sector and has reduced the possibility of trans-
forming plans into a means of marshalling the 
country's forces in support of the aims of de-
velopment. In more than one instance, the work 
has been vitiated by fruitless discussions of 
apparent alternatives which have no real basis, 
such as the desirability of over-all rather than 
partial plans, for the long rather than the short 
term, and of general planning rather than spe-
cific projects. With respect to this last point, 
which has unfortunately been taken up by cer-
tain groups abroad, the opinions set forth in 
the excellent document submitted to this meet-
ing by the experts of the Panel of Nine should 
be unreservedly endorsed. 
All in all, however, the subsistence of these 
problems does not detract from the value of the 
achievements to our credit. On the contrary, it 
adds to our experience and clearly indicates the 
type of obstacle that can and must be overcome 
in the near future if planning is to be given the 
content and scope that it needs to become the 
instrument par excellence of development policy. 
Agrarian reform and progress in agriculture 
Over the long term, the value of planning will 
depend on the extent to which it is used as an 
instrument for increasing internal efforts and 
promoting the structural reforms that are essen-
tial in order to accelerate and reorient Latin 
America's development. In this respect, it must 
be admitted that little progress has been made in 
agrarian reform. 
The broad measures applied earlier by Mexico 
and Bolivia have been supplemented by the ac-
tion taken in recent years by Cuba and Vene-
zuela. However, after the Charter of Punta del 
Este, agrarian reform laws were enacted by 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Peru; but real progress in many of these coun-
tries has come up against a great many obstacles 
which have slowed down the process. 
The economic reasons for assigning urgent 
priority to agrarian reform and to the moderni-
zation of agriculture are well known and have 
been confirmed anew by the fact that the 1965 
per capita agricultural production figures are 
practically the same as those recorded in 1957-
59. However, it is important to note, too, that 
over and above this realization there is a grow-
ing consensus of opinion in Latin America re-
garding certain basic questions relating to the 
patterns and objectives of land reform, although 
their relative importance must be judged in 
the light of the conditions prevailing in each 
country. 
It is recognized, for instance, that agrarian 
reform does not consist solely of changes in the 
systems of land tenure, but must be accompanied 
by economic and social investment to step up 
agricultural productivity and improve the living 
conditions of the rural population, with far-
reaching effects on urban life and industri-
alization. Agricultural policy, investment in 
agriculture and the transformation of the rural 
environment could be powerful instruments in 
combating one of the region's gravest social 
problems: excessive migration to the cities and 
the disproportionate growth of the marginal 
population. 
The transcendental nature of the process natu-
rally aggravates the difficulties hampering it, 
but does not detract from its urgency. Moreover, 
it entails the mobilization of huge financial re-
sources, inasmuch as the structural changes in 
the land tenure system must be accompanied by 
simultaneous efforts to improve and modernize 
agricultural techniques and procedures. The 
financing of land reform and the system for 
distributing the resources among compensation 
to former owners, social services for the rural 
population benefiting from land reform, infra-
structural works, machinery and equipment, the 
granting of credit and the purchase of inputs, 
etc. are problems which should command par-
ticular attention at the present time and some 
of them are particularly fruitful fields for inter-
national financial and technical assistance. 
Tax reform 
Nor can the progress hitherto made in tax 
reform be regarded as satisfactory, although 
5 
some appreciable advances are noted. In general, 
since 1960, tax revenue has followed an upward 
trend, which is particularly marked in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela, where 
real growth rates fluctuated on an average 
around 9 and 10 per cent annually. These ad-
vances are all the more significant if it is borne 
in mind that in several cases they have occurred 
in countries where inflationary pressures make 
it more difficult to maintain a flexible tax sys-
tem and where the stabilization policy itself 
sometimes leads to a lack of monetary liquidity 
which tends to accentuate tax evasion. 
However, the legal changes and administrative 
improvements introduced in the last five years 
have been confined mainly to the immediate ob-
jective of raising public tax revenue; but this 
has not always been accompanied by the longer-
term aims of using taxation to influence the 
structure of demand, guide the private sector's 
activities and contribute towards a more pro-
gressive distribution of income. In other words, 
it has been a separate efl'ort rather than part 
of a general development policy. 
Progress and limitations in the social sector 
A distinguishing feature of recent develop-
ment policy has been the decision to give in-
creasing importance to social questions, as de-
fined, in some cases, in the more restricted sense 
of specific public services and, in others, in the 
broader terms of population, employment and 
income distribution, and full participation in the 
life of the nation. 
The results of that decision are not easy to 
assess in quantitative terms. As a field that has 
come to enjoy priority in international financial 
assistance, there is no doubt that a larger flow 
of resources has been channelled into educa-
tional, health and housing projects, primarily 
through the public sector, and that the respective 
indexes have improved as a result. It is not so 
clear, however, whether the rate of that pro-
gress is compatible with the magnitude of the 
problem, or how significant it might be in the 
absence of simultaneous advances in other basic 
economic and social questions. 
The former consideration relates to the diffi-
culties hampering the expansion of the social 
services within the context of an increasingly 
rapid population growth and of even faster rates 
of urbanization. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the world-wide concern at the present 
growth of the population should be felt also in 
Latin America; that some family planning meas-
ures are already in force; and that this sphere 
of action has begun to be included in external 
assistance programmes. Needless to say, it is a 
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subject which each country will examine in the 
light of thoroughly worthy considerations, and 
in any case it will have to be considered within 
the over-all framework of a development policy 
rather than as an alternative to greater efforts to 
expedite growth and structural changes. 
As regards the second consideration, it is 
worth while reflecting on whether the long-term 
projects to expand particular social services, 
which are now under way, will be really effective 
unless equally forceful policies provide con-
currently for an increase in employment oppor-
tunities, income redistribution, manpower train-
ing, etc. There is a risk that if the problem is 
approached too much from a sectoral angle it 
might sometimes be forgotten that certain deficit 
indexes are the reflection of a broader and 
deeper picture of social marginality. If not cor-
rected simultaneously, this might have the effect 
of excluding large sectors of Latin America's 
population from access to housing, or deprive 
them of the opportunity to translate the benefits 
of education into real improvements in their 
living conditions, if it is considered that develop-
ment cannot be sustained without the effective 
inclusion of the low-income sectors in economic 
life. 
The magnitude and orientation of the industrial 
development process 
Nearly all the major problems, both internal 
and external, affecting Latin America's develop-
ment eventually lead to the industrial sector, im-
posing new and heavier tasks on industriali-
zation. The diversification of exports largely 
implies strengthening the outflows of sales of 
manufactured products; Latin American integra-
tion primarily involves industrial development 
as oriented towards reciprocal trade in manufac-
tures and adaptation of the industrial base in 
order to obtain the best possible results from 
technical progress and the resources available; 
the dramatic nature of the employment problem 
demands that a solution be sought in the ac-
celeration and new patterns of industrialization; 
even the continuing improvement of social con-
ditions might be jeopardized if unaccompanied 
by efforts in the industrial sector that would 
ensure the internal capacity to maintain it. 
Industry is therefore having to shoulder un-
precedented responsibilities, in addition to the 
traditional function of import substitution. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to its increasing respon-
sibilities, recent experience has shown a dis-
quieting reduction in the rate of industrial de-
velopment. The growth rate of the manufacturing 
product has dropped from an annual average of 
6 per cent in 1950-55 and 6.6 per cent in 1955-60 
to only 5.6 per cent in 1960-65. Hence, the 
latter period marks the least change in the struc-
ture of the Latin American economy taken as 
a whole, from the standpoint of the sectoral 
composition of the product. Although the total 
product rose by about 30 per cent—enough to 
warrant considerable structural changes—manu-
facturing industry's share went up from 21.7 
per cent in 1960 to only 22.7 per cent in 1965, 
a relative increase which was far below that 
registered in the second half of the fifties. 
These over-all figures are certainly influenced 
by the recent characteristics of Brazil's economic 
development. Its industrial sector expanded 
nearly twice as fast as agriculture in 1950-55, 
and more than three times as fast in 1955-60, 
while the first half of the present decade wit-
nessed a reversal of the ratio, to the extent that 
agricultural growth—favoured by exceptional 
weather conditions at the end of the period— 
easily outstripped the development of manufac-
turing industry. But even with those reservations, 
the signs of a tapering off in the industrializa-
tion process have spread to other countries, 
associated in large measure with the weaker 
traditional impetus of import substitution and 
the inability of other factors as yet to oiFer 
a new dynamic impulse. 
To face the task now lying before the indus-
trial sector with determination also affords the 
opportunity to tackle equally forcefully, within 
the framework of a more accelerated industrial 
development, the changes it is imperative to 
make in certain unfavourable patterns that have 
characterized past industrial growth. Some of 
the adverse features of existing Latin American 
industry are well known, and are largely the 
result of factors that have nothing to do with 
the industrial sector itself. However, the re-
orientation of industrial development not only 
means that new criteria must be adopted for 
allocating resources—including those earmarked 
for production, location, absorption of tech-
niques, etc.—for new manufacturing projects, 
but it also involves an effort to adapt and mod-
ernize the whole of the existing industrial base. 
The very interdependence between the various 
branches of industry, and between them and 
other sectors of the economy, would preclude 
the possibility of attaining competitive levels of 
productivity, efficiency and capacity in only a 
few manufacturing lines without the technical 
progress spreading throughout the national 
economies. The approach adopted to industriali-
zation, i.e., an integrated Latin American market, 
the introduction of keener competition and con-
certed regional action in the basic industries 
with a view to investment programming, thus 
become indispensable factors of a new Latin 
American industrial policy. 
The relative delay in industrial planning is 
incompatible with those needs. While in infra-
structural investment planning the instruments 
which were used in a piecemeal fashion for many 
years have gradually been brought into full 
operation, and while the planning of social 
services has been given a powerful stimulus, 
industrial planning seems in most cases to be 
a particularly weak point in Latin America's 
development programmes. Although this state 
of affairs is in part understandable, it should 
be remedied immediately in order to meet more 
effectively the imperative need to accelerate and 
reorient industrial development. 
Stabilization measures 
The long-term goals—like those reviewed un-
der the head of industrialization—are contingent 
upon the surmounting of intermediate and over-
whelming problems whose persistence represents 
additional obstacles to the achievement of these 
objectives. This applies to inflationary pres-
sures, which have continued to afí'ect the recent 
economic development trends in several Latin 
American countries. Two highly favourable de-
velopments in this period are the greater readi-
ness on the part of the economic authorities to 
adopt decisive action against inflation, and the 
growing tendency to consider stabilization pro-
grammes strictly in relation to economic develop-
ment requirements. By way of clarifying this 
assertion, I might add that although inflation is 
still the object of attention almost everywhere, 
it is no longer considered a separate problem 
which can be tackled without taking into account 
all the factors involving various threats to gen-
eral equilibrium, and still less without con-
sidering the repercussions that any action might 
have on development trends. In other words, 
economic policy has made great strides in the 
sense of integrating its principal aim and of so 
using and co-ordinating the various instruments 
as to prevent any possibility of conflict, all of 
which finds specific expression in development 
programmes with clearly defined aims and means 
of implementation. 
In recent years, perhaps more so than previ-
ously, inflation has presented different charac-
teristics in each country and group of countries. 
Some of them—nearly all the Central American 
States, Panama, Venezuela and, to a certain ex-
tent, Mexico—have enjoyed virtual stability. 
Others, like Peru and Colombia, have registered 
fairly modest but steady price increases, with 
noticeable fluctuations in Colombia and a 
marked acceleration in 1965 in Peru. The infla-
tionary pressures in Bolivia, Ecuador and Para-
guay have eased in the last few years. The 
southern-zone countries, on the other hand, pre-
sent sharp contrasts. Argentina and Chile still 
record relatively high price increases, but there 
has been no acceleration of the movement, espe-
cially in Chile where 1965 witnessed a consider-
able slackening in the rate of inflation. Brazil, 
which reached an acute state of imbalance in 
1963 and 1964, made good progress in 1965, 
although it still registers a fairly high rate of 
price increases. As to Uruguay, the present stage 
of disequilibrium seems to be as marked as that 
which afi'ected some of the neighbouring coun-
tries in the last few years. 
Although the difficulties inherent in anti-
inflationary policy cannot be under-estimated, 
there might be grounds for viewing the prospects 
in the immediate future with a certain amount 
of optimism. Now that it is no longer time for 
unilateral approaches, which often caused as 
many setbacks as it was wished to overcome, the 
decision to combine all the parts of economic 
policy within the framework of development 
programmes leads to the assumption that some 
progress can be made towards that oft-proclaimed 
and elusive aim of maximum development and 
minimum disequilibrium. 
Capital formation and the expansion of produc-
tion capacity. External financing 
It is not hard to associate persistent instability 
and the indirect effects of the policies adopted 
to counteract it, with one of the factors of 
gravest concern in the recent development of 
the Latin American economies, i.e., the rate of 
capital formation and of the growth of produc-
tion capacity. 
Gross capital formation, which still falls short 
of the levels that would ensure a satisfactory 
and lasting growth, has experienced fresh set-
backs in the last few years by lagging behind 
the domestic product. In fact, the investment 
coeflicient—or gross investment as a percentage 
of the total product—dropped from 17.3 per 
cent in 1960 to 16.3 per cent in 1965. 
At the same time, there have been significant 
changes in the composition of investment ac-
cording to its institutional channelling and dis-
tribution by sectors. Generally speaking, public 
investment has increased appreciably, in contrast 
to a steady decline in the private sector's con-
tributions to capital formation. This is a serious 
matter, since it means that the greater efforts 
made through the public sector and external 
financial co-operation have in part proved sterile 
inasmuch as private investment has not increased 
in line with the over-all rate of economic growth. 
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Its consequences also extend to the structure 
of production capacity. The heavier accent on 
public investment in infrastructural works and 
social services, combined with the relative de-
cline in private investment, may result in serious 
delays in the channelling of resources intended 
to expand the industrial base and other goods-
producing sectors. 
In the light of those considerations, it may be 
concluded that part of the economic growth 
registered in recent years has been attained 
through improvements in the use of existing 
production capacity. As a sign of greater effi-
ciency in the use of available capital, it may be 
regarded as a positive development; but the fact 
remains that the process has its limits, and unless 
the present trends followed by capital formation 
improve, they will inevitably jeopardize the 
possibilities of ultimate growth. 
The unsatisfactory evolution of the investment 
rate in the last few years does not necessarily 
mean that efforts to tap domestic savings have 
not increased, but is basically the result of 
opposite trends followed by domestic and exter-
nal savings. 
In 1961, after a period in which it rose 
steadily, external savings came to finance over 
9 per cent of the region's gross investment, with 
a total of 1,300 million dollars; but since then, 
domestic savings has been increasingly offset by 
the contraction of net external financing, until 
in 1965 it represented 98 per cent of total invest-
ment. It should be recognized that this regional 
trend is strongly influenced by the trend in 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. In the 1964 
and 1965 balances of payments, the first two 
countries showed a surplus on current account, 
following periods of persistent deficits; while in 
Venezuela the petroleum industry has been 
operating as a next exporter of capital. The re-
maining sixteen Latin American countries—that 
is, excluding the three abeady mentioned and 
Cuba—maintained relatively high but not in-
creasing levels of external savings in 1960-65, 
with an annual average of nearly 800 million 
dollars, which served to finance about 15 per 
cent of their gross domestic investment. 
In any event, it is significant that since 1961 
Latin America as a whole has been steadily in-
creasing the proportion of domestic savings in 
the financing of regional investment. That fact, 
in turn, is influenced by the critical payments 
situation confronting the region as a result of 
the levels reached by the external debt. The re-
strictive policies that had to be adopted are 
reflected in a reduction in the deficit on current 
account from 1,100 million dollars in 1960 to 
only about 300 million in 1965, which took place 
chiefly in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and, to a 
lesser extent, Chile. 
The region's total capacity to import has re-
mained constantly below total exports of goods 
and services, owing to the fact that total external 
factor payments have exceeded the net autono-
mous movement of capital. Venezuela, again, is 
the special case determining this situation, since 
if it is excluded the relationship will be reversed; 
but in the remaining countries of the region it 
will be noted that the increase in the capacity 
to import as represented by the autonomous 
movement of capital has taken a marked down-
ward turn, to the point where in 1965 it became 
a negative factor. That trend has been influenced 
by the movement of direct private investment, 
which, after playing a predominating role in the 
previous decade, has declined sharply, being 
replaced largely by long-term loans from inter-
national financing institutions and the United 
States. 
The net external financial position in 1965 
reflects the present serious backlog of commit-
ments deriving from the external debt, which, 
moreover, is showing signs of increasing in the 
next few years. It would be advisable, therefore, 
to analyse carefully how far the situation can 
be significantly eased in terms of refinancing 
the external debt, as has been done in some 
countries of the region, through bilateral or 
plurilateral agreements with creditor countries. 
In doing so, it would be as well to take into 
account that the problem is becoming wide-
spread in Latin America and that relatively 
short-term arrangements might not suffice once 
the situation becomes really critical. It seems that 
this is essentially a regional problem, which 
might call for a pattern of external co-operation 
involving co-ordinated action and procedures for 
contributing along lines different from those 
used in the past. While on the subject I should 
mention the valuable document on external 
financing presented at this meeting by the Panel 
of Nine, which should serve as a basis for a 
complete review of the patterns and procedures 
that have hitherto predominated in this field. 
I said at the beginning that the best result 
that could be obtained from the present meeting 
would be to bring development policy into line 
with the conclusions of the analysis of the exist-
ing situation in the region. Economic policy 
cannot remain static: actual developments and 
the appraisal of the results obtained indicate the 
weak points and throw light on the instruments 
and measures that should be adopted if the 
objectives are to be accomplished in full. We 
hope and trust that our deliberations will cul-
minate in bold and energetic action, both on the 
home front and in international co-operation. 
Even so, the Latin American nations will gain 
little if they remain isolated from the rest of 
the world. To strengthen and improve our instru-
ments of co-operation is an indispensable re-
quisite if our problems are to be solved and our 
just claims satisfied. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 
by Robert Triffin, Yale University^ 
INTRODUCTION 
I feel very much honoured by ECLA's request 
to present a summary of the problem of inter-
national monetary reform, the current position 
of the negotiations now in progress, and the 
implications of alternative solutions for Latin 
America. 
I understand this task as a very limited and 
practical one. It excludes from consideration 
the various improvements in Latin American 
monetary arrangements which are theoretically 
conceivable, but unrelated to the present nego-
tiation of international monetary reforms. It also 
eschews any attempt to push fonvard specific 
Latin American interests that might be included 
in the so-called "negotiating position" presented 
at the conference table by the Latin American 
countries, but which could not be defended and 
justified as legitimate world-wide objectives, 
of interest to all the participating countries. 
Diplomats are all too prone, by training, to 
regard an international negotiation primarily as 
* The views expressed by the author are his own and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America. The designations employed 
and the presentation of the material in this article do 
not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on 
the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
concerning the legal status of any counti-y or territory, 
or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers. 
a bargaining process seeking horse-trading com-
promises between divergent national interests, 
rather than as a constructive attempt to discover, 
and give operational significance to, the con-
vergent interests of all their countries in the 
adjustment (aggiornamento) of outdated inter-
national institutions and policies to the realities 
of an increasingly interdependent world. It is 
only by approaching the problem in the latter 
spirit that we can hope to disentangle negotiable 
solutions serving the highest—rather than a much 
lower—common denominator of all the interests 
at stake. It is my sincere hope that the present 
paper will confirm this thesis and demonstrate 
that the interests of the Latin American coun-
tries, as well as of others, emerge far more 
clearly from a rational examination of the essen-
tial requirements of a world monetary system 
aiming exclusively at exploiting to the fullest 
the opportunities for non-inflationary growth of 
the world economy, rather than from a narrowly 
inspired investigation of the "concessions" that 
Latin American countries might attempt—real-
istically or not—to wring out of other countries 
in the course of the negotiations now in progress.^ 
1 Readers familiar with the current negotiations and 
their background can safely skip the first two sections 
of this paper, and turn directly to Section C. 
A . FUNCTIONING OF T H E GOLD-EXCHANGE STANDARD IN RECENT YEARS 
(1950-June 1965) 
1. Reserve requirements in an expanding world 
economy 
The demand for money is determined by the 
aggregate amount of the "cash balances" or 
"working balances" which firms and households 
find convenient to maintain, in a highly liquid 
form, in view of the diflferent—and unpredict-
able—^timing of their receipts and expenditures. 
these national monetary authorities in order to 
bridge, similarly, the gaps between the foreign 
expenditures and foreign receipts of each coun-
try's residents and avoid unwanted fluctuations in 
exchange rates between the national currency of 
which they are in charge and foreign currencies. 
Whenever the over-all receipts—on current and 
capital account—of the country's residents ex-
It is supplied today by more than 100 national 
banking systems, operating in each country un-
der the general guidance and responsibility of 
national monetary authorities. 
International monetary reserves are essentially 
the cash or working balances accumulated by 
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ceed their payments abroad, the monetary au-
thorities have to sell additional amounts of their 
national currency to the market in order to pre-
vent an appreciation of its exchange rate, and 
to accept either gold or foreign currencies in 
exchange. In the opposite case—of an excess of 
payments over receipts—^tliey must redeem in 
gold or foreign exchange the overflow of their 
national currency on the market, in order to 
prevent a depreciation of the country's exchange 
rate. International monetary reserves are built up 
in the first case, and drawn upon in the second, 
in order to preserve exchange rate stability. 
Undesirable and/or unsustainable—downward— 
movements in a country's exchange reserves are 
one of the factors that induce—or force— 
changes in the country's policies, in order to 
correct the imdesired consequences of an 
excessive rate of accumulation of monetary 
reserves—inflationary pressures on the domestic 
economy—or of an excessive rate of depletion— 
internal deflationary pressures, and ultimately 
the inability of the monetary authorities to 
provide the market with foreign exchange needed 
to avoid exchange depreciation or restrictions. 
These considerations do not lend themselves 
to any scientific determination of an "ideal" 
level of reserves, either for an individual coun-
try or for the world at large. There is certainly 
a very wide range of actual reserve levels which 
might be regarded as satisfactory, or acceptable 
by the monetary authorities and which would not 
induce them to modify their policies in such a 
way as to sacrifice other and more fundamental 
policy goals, such as desirable rates of employ-
ment and economic growth, price stability, etc. 
All that may be said in this respect is that richer 
countries will generally be more able and 
desirous than poorer countries to accumulate 
relatively high levels of monetary reserves, some 
of which could be used instead for foreign 
purchases of consumption or investment goods. 
(This brings out again the similarity of a coun-
try's reserves to the cash balances of an in-
dividual. Reserves, just as cash balances, are—at 
least within a very wide range—a luxury good 
whose normal holdings rise more than propor-
tionately to income.) 
The ratio of gross reserves to imports 
averaged 47 per cent for the developed countries 
in 1964, compared with 31 per cent for the less 
developed countries, and 91 per cent for the 
former in 1949 as against 47 per cent for the 
latter. (See table 1.) The spread of restrictions 
and devaluation in this second group of coun-
tries would further suggest that ratios much 
below 30 per cent are certainly less than ideal 
for countries subject to considerable instability 
in their export prices and proceeds. Currency 
convertibility was not restored after the war by 
European countries with a far more balanced 
economy until the ratio of reserves to imports 
had reached or exceeded, in most cases, this 
relatively low level. Yet some highly developed 
coimtries—such as Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, for instance—^have traditionally shown 
less aversion to lower reserve levels—20 to 25 
per cent in most years since the war—^than the 
continental countries of Western Europe where 
ratios of 35 per cent or more would not be 
regarded as excessive. 
Desirable rates of increase in monetary 
reserves may be both easier to define and more 
important operationally than absolute levels at 
any given point in time. One might except such 
rates of increase to be roughly related, for in-
stance, to the average growth of a country's 
foreign trade and other international transac-
tions. The growth of production in general, 
however, might be equally valuable as a rough 
guideline, since its long-run maintenance nor-
mally involves a parallel^ expansion in money 
supply and in the demand liabilities of central 
banks. These will feel reluctant to see such 
liabilities increase at a much faster rate than 
the international reserves needed to underwrite 
them in a régime of free convertibility and fixed 
exchange rates. 
These broad generalizations require con-
siderable qualifications before they can be ap-
plied to any individual country. Faster rates of 
expansion may be aimed at to reconstitute 
previously depleted reserve levels, or to finance 
foreseeable or unpredictable repayments of 
foreign debts, etc. Conversely, some countries 
may prefer, or accept, lower rates of reserve 
increases if they feel their reserves to be ex-
cessively ample already, or if they assign a lower 
priority to the policy independence and other 
advantages derivable from high reserve levels 
than to other national increased imports, etc. 
Expected ability to borrow abroad, in case of 
need, at acceptable financial and political costs, 
may also play a role in such decisions. 
These complex considerations obviously pre-
clude the adoption of rigid and automatic 
guidelines as to the desirable rate of increase 
in world reserves, just as the complexities of 
national monetary management have always 
precluded the adoption by any country of rigid 
and automatic rules governing desirable in-
creases of national money supply, Milton Fried-
man notwithstanding. The authorities in charge 
of either problem cannot escape the responsibility 
of formulating policies appropriate to varied and 
unpredictable conditions, in the light of the in-
2 Parallel, but of course not equal: money supply 
tends in fact to rise more than proportionately to the 
Gross National Product in the developing countries, 
untU a more advanced stage of development is reached 
in which substitute forms of liquidity increasingly 




GROSS MONETARY RESERVES AS A PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS 
AND OF MONEY SUPPLY, 1949-1964 
As a percentage As a percentage 
of imports of money supply 
1949 1964 1949 1964 
1. Developed areas 91 47 
A. Reserve centres 173 S3 21 10 
1. United States 345 82 24 10 
2. United Kingdom 21 15 8 7 
B. European Economic Community 26 49 14 28 
1. France 18 66 7 17 
2. Germany 9 54 6 47 
3. Italy 39 53 17 19 
4. Netherlands 24 33 23 55 
5. Belgium 54 37 31 36 
C. Other Paris Club countries 31 39 34 21 
1. Canada 42 38 33 37 
2. Japan 25 25 9 8 
3. Switzerland 192 87 66 48 
4. Sweden 23 26 22 29 
D. Other Europe 33 36 
E. Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 47 43 
II. Less developed areas 47 31 
A. Latin America 54 33 
B. Middle East 62 44 
C. Other Asia 56 29 
D. Other Africa 9 20 
HI. Jforld 77 43 
A. Gold 57 26 
B. Foreign exchange 18 15 
C. Reserve positions in the Fund 3 3 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics. 
flationary or deflationary pressures which it is 
their task to observe, anticipate and combat. Yet, 
one might accept, as a rough and presumptive 
guideline for world reserve increases over the 
long run, an average growth rate of some 4 or 
5 per cent annually, similar to that suggested 
by Professor Friedman for national money sup-
ply in the United States. 
This does not mean, of course, that inter-
national monetary policies and institutions could 
ever underwrite such a growth rate—or any 
other, for that matter—to any individual coun-
try, irrespective of the wisdom or folly of its 
national policies. What may properly be asked 
of international monetary management is only 
to aim at a growth of the world's reserve pool 
that should enable countries to earn the increases 
in reserves deemed necessary or desirable to 
sustain feasible and non-inflationary rates of 
economic activity and development, provided 
that they follow appropriate policies aiming at 
the same objective. This would clearly rule out 
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—subject to the qualification below—a negative 
rate of average growth for world reserves, or 
even a rate far below the 4 or 5 per cent 
presumptive target mentioned above. 
Some countries, at least, would then be forced 
into unnecessarily restrictive or deflationary 
policies, or into devaluation of their currency, 
to protect themselves against a raid on their 
reserves by others, even if all of them geared 
their policy to reserve increases consonant with 
economic growth but higher than available in-
creases in the world reserve pool. 
Increases of world reserves even far in excess 
of 4 or 5 per cent would not, on the other hand, 
force inflationary policies on any country. They 
would, however, weaken or eliminate the barriers 
which reserve losses erect against such policies 
and which can already be circumvented far too 
easily through trade or exchange restrictions or 
currency devaluation. Moderation in the ex-
pansion of world reserves can at least prevent 
some countries from financing their own in-
flationary excesses through unwanted transfers 
of real resources from the countries which pursue 
non-inflationary—or even simply less infla-
tionary—policies. 
A final qualification must be mentioned. High 
rates of world reserve increases might be neces-
sary, or at least desirable, to make up for an 
initial shortage, or to offset an excessive hoarding 
of reserves by some countries, due to their 
pursuit of needlessly deflationary or restrictive 
policies. Lower levels of increase, on the other 
hand, may prove suffcient if they happen to 
be supplemented, for the countries pursuing 
reasonable policies, by large reserve losses from 
countries whose reserves were initially excessive, 
or which pursue inflationary policies at the cost 
of unwanted reserve losses. The importance of 
this qualification will be made apparent presently. 
Reserve increases, for the world as a whole 
(see table 2) , have averaged the very modest 
level of 2.8 per cent a year over the last fifteen 
years (1950-1964) in spite of much higher rates 
of increase of money supply in most countries 
and of world trade itself: 6.8 per cent for world 
imports over the same fifteen years, and 8.5 per 
cent over the last five years (1960-1964). Yet 
the United Nations indices of import prices, ex-
pressed in dollars—as the reserve increases 
quoted above—show average price rises of less 
than 0.5 per cent a year for the period as a 
whole, although substantially higher ones—about 
2 per cent a year for the developed areas—in the 
last two years of the period (1963 and 1964). 
All in all, world reserve increases well below 
the presumptive target of 4 to 5 per cent a year 
mentioned above do not seem therefore to have 
elicited any pervasive deflationary tendencies in 
the world economy. A large part of the explana-
tion, however, may lie in the fact that reserve 
increases for countries other than the United 
States were sustained at a much higher average 
level over this period—6.8 per cent a year, in fact 
exactly the growth rate of world trade—by the 
enormous net reserve losses of the United States. 
These account indeed for more than two thirds 
of the gross reserve increases of other countries. 
This vast redistribution of United States reserves 
to the rest of the world—well in excess of needs 
at the beginning of the period—corresponded, 
Dartly by design but largely by accident, to the 
ast qualification ventured above regarding the 
calculation of desirable increases in the pool of 
world reserves. 
It also explains the opposite views put forward 
by the United States and the United Kingdom, 
on the one hand, and by the continental European 
countries on the other, regarding the adequacy 
or shortage of international reserves in relation 
to needs. 
2, Factors determining reserve creation 
The factors determining reserve creation under 
our present monetary system do not bear any 
relation whatsoever to any rational criteria of 
legitimate reserve requirements. Gold remains, 
in theory, the base of the system, but has been 
increasingly supplemented by foreign exchange 
reserves, held primarily in the form of short-term 
dollar and sterling claims on the United States 
and United Kingdom banks and Treasuries. Net 
claims of member countries on the International 
Monetarv Fund, accumulated through gold sub-
T A W ® 2 
AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH RATES OF RESERVES, IMPORTS 
AND MONEY SUPPLY, 1950-64 
L Reserve centres 
A. United States 
B. United Kingdom 
IL All other countries 
A. European Economic Community 
B. Other Paris Club countries 
C. Other developed areas 

























SOURCE: Basic estimates are taken uniformly from International Financial Statistics, and 
expressed in United States dollars. 
NOTE: Money supply estimates are recalculated in terms of United States dollars, in order 
to permit aggregation and comparability with other estimates. This time-consuming process has 
not been carried out here for all countries, particularly in view of the added difficulties resulting 
from multiple rate practices in a large number of them. 
l.q; 
scriptions to the Fund's capital and net drawings 
of a member's currency by other members, con-
stitute a third, and lesser, source of international 
reserves.® 
1. Annual increases in gold reserves are 
determined by the hazards of gold production 
in the West minus the gold absorbed by the 
arts, industry, hoarding, and speculation, plus 
the gold sales (or minus the gold purchases) of 
the USSR, China and other communist countries, 
in Western markets. 
(a) The sharp increase of private gold 
purchases in recent years, and particularly since 
1960—more than 1,000 million dollars a year, 
or about 82 per cent of gross production—has 
reduced to a mere trickle the amounts of gold 
contributed by Western production to the gold 
reserve pool: about 405 million dollars a year 
in the 1950's, but only 235 million dollars, on 
the average, in 1960-64, representing no more 
than 10 per cent of reserve increases over these 
years, and fluctuating widely between 130 and 
300 million dollars a year. 
(b) Communist countries' gold sales in West-
ern markets have contributed nearly 50 per cent 
more than Western gold production to central 
banks' reserves in 1960-64: about 340 million 
dollars a year, with lows of 200 million dollars 
in 1960 and 1962, and as much as 550 million 
dollars in 1963. 
2. The contribution of gold to the world 
reserve pool has been dwarfed by that of foreign 
exchange holdings, fed mostly by United States 
and United Kingdom deficits: about 7,390 mil-
lion dollars in all over the years 1960-64, i.e. 
1,480 million dollars a year, or 65 per cent 
of gross reserve accumulation over the period 
as a whole. This dominant source of reserve 
creation, however, is also the most volatile of 
all, depending as it does not only on the balance-
of-payments fluctuations of the United States 
and the United Kingdom, but also on the will-
ingness or reluctance of central banks to retain 
dollars and sterling balances in their reserves 
rather than convert them into gold. The con-
tribution of short-term foreign exchange debts 
to the world reserve pool was as high, for in-
stance, as 2,560 million dollars in 1960, owing 
primarily to huge United States deficits in that 
year, but actually negative—and for opposite 
reasons—in 1957 and in the first six months 
of 1965. In 1957, ephemeral United States 
surpluses, associated with the Suez crisis, reduced 
the supply of United States foreign exchange 
3 International Monetary Fund credit tranches and 
standby agreements and bilateral swap and swap stand-
by agreements are classified as "credit facilities" rather 
than as reserves proper. See below p. 17. 
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debts to the world reserve pool by nearly 800 
million dollars. In the first half of 1965, on the 
other hand, a massive contraction of 2,175 mil-
lion dollars in foreign exchange reserves reflected 
the massive liquidation of dollar and sterling 
balances accumulated by central banks over 
many years past. 
3. Net reserve positions in the International 
Monetary Fund—minus gold purchases or plus 
gold sales by the Fimd and the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements—constitute a third, and 
lesser source of reserve increases: about 80 
million dollars a year, on the average, in the 
1950's and 210 million dollars a year in 1960-64 
accounting for only 9 per cent of total reserve 
increases over the latter period. It may be called 
upon to play an increasing role in the future, 
but can do so only as the result of profound 
reforms in the present gold-exchange standard, 
to be discussed in later sections of this paper 
(see table 3 ) . 
3. The adjustment of supplies to needs 
It is hardly necessary to conclude that the 
system described above does not provide any 
rational methods of adjustment of reserve sup-
plies to reserve needs. The hazards of gold 
production—particularly in a country threatened 
with racial war—^of the whims or policies of 
the Kremlin, of United States and United King-
dom balance-of-payments deficits, of private gold 
purchases for industrial, artistic, hoarding, and 
speculative purposes, and of central bankers' 
preferences as between gold, sterling and the 
dollar, would hardly be expected to add up to 
the amounts of reserves needed annually to 
sustain non-inflationary rates of economic ex-
pansion. 
Total increases in world reserves from these 
various sources have indeed fluctuated, for in-
stance, from less than 400 million dollars in 
1962 to more than 3,400 million dollars in 1963. 
The basic erraticness and irrationality of such 
a system of reserve creation are the first and 
most blatant defects calling for correction and 
reform. 
A second, and closely related, problem is that 
of the short-run vulnerability and long-run un-
viability of the large and growing foreign ex-
change component of world reserves. Central 
banks are legally free to shift, at any time, from 
dollars, sterling, or other foreign exchange as-
sets, into gold. They did so, indeed on a massive 
scale in the first half of 1965, when the developed 
countries other than the two reserve centres—^the 
United States and United Kingdom—^liquidated, 
over the short space of six months 3,200 milUon 
dollars of their foreign exchange holdings. Less 
SOURCES OF WORLD RESERVE INCREASES, 1950-JUNE 1965 
ÍAí average yearly rates) 
In millions of 
United States dollars 
As a percentage 
of totals I and 11 
1950-59 60-64 Jan.-June 1965 50-59 60-64 
Jan.-June 
1965 
Countries other than reserve centres 1556 3 324 —200 100 100 —100 
A. Western gold 406 234 —60 26 7 —30 
1. Production 939 1289 1400 60 39 700 
2. Private absorption (—) —533 —1 056 —1460 —34 —32 —730 
B. USSR gold sales 116 340 — 7 10 — 
C. International institutions" 35 46 528 2 1 264 
D. United States and United Kingdom 
net reserve losses 999 2 461 620 64 74 310 
1. United States 1205 2 065 —128 77 62 —64 
(a) Gross assets 452 966 1820 29 29 910 
(fa) Reserve liabilities 753 97 —1948 48 33 —974 
2. United Kingdom —206 396 748 —13 12 374 
(a) Gross assets —105 97 —952 —7 3 —M6 
(b) Reserve liabilities —101 299 1700 —6 9 850 
E. Other foreign exchange, errors and 
omissions — 243 —1288 — 7 —644 
, IF arid gross reserves 1209 2 261 —1068 100 100 —100 
A. Liabilities of reserve centres 
(ID lb and 2b) 652 1398 —248 54 62 —23 
B. Other sources (lA, B, C and E) 557 863 —820 46 38 —77 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics. 
® Increases of reserve positions in the International Monetary Fund, minus increases in Fund and Bank for 
International Settlements gold holdings and United Kingdom and United States liabilities to the Fund (the latter 
being included in United States and United Kingdom net reserve losses, but not in gross reserves). 
than 700 million dollars of this amount cor-
responded to gross reserve losses associated with 
over-all balance-of-payments settlements. The 
largest portion by far (more than 2,500 million 
dollars) represented a shift from foreign ex-
change holdings in national currencies—pri-
marily dollars and pounds sterling—into gold 
(1,545 million dollars) and gold-value guaran-
teed claims on the International Monetary Fund 
(965 million dollars) (see table 4 ) . 
The threat posed to the reserve currencies—and 
thus to the international reserve system itself— 
by such sudden and massive conversions would 
be bound to rise year after year if the growth 
of world reserves continued to be fed, in the 
future as it has been in the past, by the pre-
carious piling up of United States and United 
Kingdom lOU's in the books of other central 
banks. The Group of Ten unanimously came, 
more than a year ago,^ to the obvious conclusion 
that this process could not continue indefinitely. 
Yet its cessation would—as we have seen above 
—dry up at the source the foreign exchange 
inflows on which the world has come to depend 
for as much as two thirds of total reserve growth 
over recent years. 
The gold-exchange standard mechanism thus 
carries within itself the seeds of its own destruc-
tion. Its process of reserve creation is not only 
highly erratic and increasingly vulnerable, but 
is bound to lead, sooner or later, either to a 
sudden collapse, as in 1931, or to a gradual 
tapering off of the reserve increases necessary to 
sustain feasible rates of growth in world trade 
and production. 
^Ministerial Statement of the Group of Ten and 
Annex Prepared by the Deputies, August 1964. 
B . A L T E R N A T I V E R E F O R M PLANS 
The reforms needed for the survival of an 
orderly international monetary system have been, 
over the last five years, a constant topic for 
studies and negotiations, at the highest level. 
among national and international experts and 
officials. A nimiber of steps have been taken 
already, and served the crucial function of 
gaining time for the more protracted discussions 
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Table 1 
LIQUIDATION (—) OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1965 















I. Industrial Europe —2125 +20 +2145 +1435 +700 
Germany —706 —430 +276 +130 +146 
France —459 +429 +887 +704 +183 
Italy —346 +128 +474 +277 +197 
Switzerland —178 —113 + 6 4 + 6 4 
Netherlands —142 —10 +132 + 6 8 + 6 4 
Belgitun —103 + 7 2 +175 +112 + 6 3 
Denmark —167 —135 + 3 0 + 5 + 2 5 
Austria —96 —33 + 6 3 + 6 3 — 
Sweden + 3 3 + 7 7 + 4 3 + 1 3 + 3 0 
Norway + 3 5 + 3 5 — — — 
II. Other Europe —490 —235 +255 +220 + 3 5 
Spain - 2 6 2 —63 +198 +164 + 3 4 
Finland —83 —84 _ — — 
Ireland —47 —46 +1 - f l 
Portugal —21 + 2 4 + 2 4 — 
Other countries —50 —20 + 3 0 + 3 0 — 
III. Other developed areas —585 —4S0 +110 —110 +220 
Canada —258 —66 +191 + 6 3 +128 
Japan —82 + 6 + 8 8 + 2 3 + 6 5 
Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa —247 —418 —170 —195 + 2 5 
IV. Total —3 200 —695 +2510 +1545 +965 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics. 
NOTE: Total reserve switches (column c) into gold (column d) and reserve position in the 
International Monetary Fund (column e) equal, with reverse signs, total sales (—) of foreign 
exchange (column a) minus the portion absorbed by the settlement of over-all balance-of-payments 
deficits, or plus the foreign exchange currently accruing from balance-of-payments surpluses 
(column b). 
necessary to agree on the fundamental reforms 
whose long-run indispensability is no longer 
denied. Bilateral swap and swap stand-by agree-
ments have been concluded by the United States 
with a dozen major countries, in order to 
provide, with maximum speed and discretion, 
short-term credits in case of need. Agreements 
have also been reached among the main central 
banks to co-ordinate somewhat their interven-
tions in the London gold market. Medium-term 
bonds, carrying guarantees against exchange 
risks, have been placed by the United States with 
a number of central banks in order to bolster 
their willingness to refrain from excessive con-
versions of unrequired dollars into gold. Recur-
rent sterling crises have been plugged by large 
purchases of sterling by central banks, un-
dertaken on a multilateral but extremely short-
term basis, and liquidated a few months later 
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through United Kingdom drawings on the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (sterling claims being 
exchanged, in effect, for claims on the Fund). 
The General Arrangements to Borrow were 
negotiated to replenish the Fund's holdings in 
the currencies of the major creditor countries, 
when depleted as a result of these, and other, 
operations. Finally, some modest increases in 
Fund quotas have been agreed by members and 
should come into operation in the near future. 
These and other measures and policy actions 
have enabled the world to live dangerously over 
the last few years, but are obviously far short 
of the reforms needed to consolidate and improve 
the long-run functioning of the international 
monetary system, and which are now under 
active consideration by the Fund, the Group of 
Ten, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 
1. An emerging consensus 
The first report of the Group of Ten, in 
August 1964, and the 1964 Annual Report of 
the International Monetary Fund gave most 
encouraging signs of the revolutionary progress 
of oiEcial thinking on the major issues involved. 
The diagnosis of the problem revealed a unani-
mous consensus regarding the basic defects of 
the present system, very much along the lines 
summarized in the first section of this paper. 
Both reports agreed that gold production had 
long been, and would remain, vastly insufficient 
to assure a satisfactory growth of world reserves 
and that the United States dollar could not be 
expected to continue to fill the whole gap be-
tween available gold supplies and the minimum 
reserve requirements of an expanding world 
•economy.® 
Both reports were still somewhat vague and 
tentative with regard to the exact nature of the 
reforms that might be proposed later. Yet agree-
ment was also reached on a number of important 
conclusions, both negative and positive. 
Among the possible solutions of the problem, 
two were firmly and unanimously discarded at 
the very outset of the investigation: a revaluation 
of the price of gold and a recourse to flexible ex-
change rates. The "communiqué" of 2 October 
1963, recording the establishment of the Group 
of Ten had stated: "In reviewing the longer-run 
prospects, the Ministers and Governors agreed 
that the underlying structure of the present 
monetary system—based on fixed exchange rates 
and the established price of gold—has proven 
its value as the foundation for present and future 
arrangements." The same view was quoted and 
xefiirmed in the August 1964 Report. 
The Deputies also rejected as a solution any 
proliferation of the reserve currencies: "There 
is no immediate prospect of any other currency 
assuming the function of an international reserve 
currency. Indeed, at the present juncture such 
a. development could raise problems without 
substantially strengthening the system."® Indeed 
by opening the door to reserve shifts from one 
currency into another—as well as from cur-
rencies into gold—such a proliferation would 
increase the instability of the system. 
5 See Annex Prepared by Deputies, sub-paragraphs 
25 (a) and (b) and 1964 Annual Report of the IMF, 
p. 31. Sterling was not mentioned in this connexion 
in either report. 
® See Annex Prepared by Deputies, sub-paragraph 25 
(c ) . Since this follows a sub-paragraph lb) referring 
to the reserve role of the dollar alone, the words "any 
other currency" mean "any currency other than the 
dollar" and would imply a recognition by all—including 
the United Kingdom—that sterling has already ceased 
to be acceptable as a truly international reserve 
currency. 
"Recently developed bilateral facilities for 
swaps and ad hoc support operations have 
already, in periods of stress, been effective in 
maintaining orderly conditions for international 
payments in the exchange market. They should 
. . . continue to play an essential role " Ex-
tremely important, however, are the two pas-
sages deleted by me from this quotation and now 
cited separately to highlight their importance: 
"within a suitable framework for multilateral 
surveillance" and "for short-term purposes."'^ The 
International Monetary Fund Report spelled 
out more bluntly the meaning of "short-term" 
by stating that bilateral swap arrangements "are 
not appropriate to meet disequilibria for more 
than a few months." The Fund also stressed the 
fact that "the possibility of undertaking such 
arrangements is in practice open only to a 
relatively restricted group of, countries. By con-
trast, multilateral institutions can extend the 
scope of their operations to a world-wide 
membership".® 
Both reports, therefore, clearly rejected bi-
lateral arrangements of this sort as meeting the 
need for long-run, permanent reserve increases. 
They were grouped, in the Deputies Report, with 
the Fund's transactions themselves, not as sources 
of reserve creation, but as "credit facilities" 
that "will continue to play an essential part in 
financing imbalances. Particularly for medium-
term credit, the IMF fulfils a valuable and 
unique function and should continue in its 
central role". 
Turning now to the more positive and con-
structive recommendations of the report, we 
must take notice of two bold recommendations 
unanimously endorsed by both reports. 
The first is that "the need may in time be 
felt for some additional kind of reserve asset. 
We think it would be timely to investigate the 
problems raised by the creation and use of such 
an asset, the possible forms it might take and 
the institutional aspects associated with it".^ ® 
While this revolutionary conclusion was un-
derstandably couched in extremely cautious 
language, a "Study Group on the Creation of 
''Ibid., sub-paragraph 25 ( / ) . 
8 1964 Annual Report of the IMF, p. 33. 
^ Annex Prepared by Deputies, sub-paragraph 25 (e). 
Italics are mine. It was also noted later, however, under 
sub-paragraph 25 (g) that "when credits provided by 
monetary authorities are availed of by the debtor, a 
form of reserve asset is created in the process." This 
qualification opens the door to the use of the Fund 
for reserve creation purposes, but would, of course, 
require new resources and procedures to meet this 
objective—unforeseen in the Articles of Agreement— 
and particularly to avoid—or compensate for—the 
"reserve destruction" implicit in medium-term repay-
ment obligations. 
Ibid., sub-paragraph 25 (d). 
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Reserve Assets" had nevertheless been established 
already by the time the report was issued. 
The second major conclusion of the Group 
of Ten was that "the process of adjustment and 
the need for international liquidity are closely 
interrelated... The need being to supply suf-
ficient liquidity to finance temporary payments 
imbalances without frustrating the required 
process of international adjustment in individual 
countries, it is desirable to bring under multila-
teral review and appraisal the various means 
of financing surpluses or deficits". Various steps 
were therefore taken by the Group to "provide 
a basis for multilateral surveillance of the various 
elements of liquidity creation".^^ 
The Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund, Mr. Schweitzer, rightly in-
terpreted this conclusion, in several speeches, 
as indicating "the emerging consensus among 
the international community that the creation 
of international liquidity, like the creation of 
domestic liquidity, should become a matter of 
deliberate decision". 
2. Negotiating divergences among the Ten 
(a) Basic differences 
The agreement skilfully reached and worded 
in the August 1964 report of the Group of Ten 
disguised, however, fundamental diiferences be-
tween the two reserve currencies debtors—^the 
United States and the United Kingdom—and the 
major reserve currencies creditors—the con-
tinental European countries, particularly France. 
The reserve currencies debtors focused at-
tention on the shortage of liquidity and viewed 
any new reserve asset to be created only as a 
supplement, but not as a substitute, for already 
existing forms of liquidity creation. It would 
be absurd, they argued, to put upon this new 
and untried liquidity asset any more burden 
than would prove strictly necessary. As long 
and in so far as dollars and pounds can fill the 
gap between insufficient gold supplies and 
legitimate liquidity requirements, this traditional 
and familiar form of reserve-holding should be 
encouraged, rather than discouraged. The new 
reserve asset should be used only to supplement 
it, in case of need. 
The Europeans, on the other hand—particu-
larly the French Minister of Finance, Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing, disagreed both with this diagnosis 
and with the prescription following from it. The 
major defect of the present system of reserve 
creation is its haphazardness, which may trigger 
inflationary excesses as well as deflationary short-
ages, and has indeed done so in recent years and 
11 Ibid., paragraphs 5, 25 (A), and paragraph 37. 
continues to do so today, owing primarily to 
its monetization of huge and persistent deficits 
of the reserve currency countries. The mere in-
sertion of an additional type of reserve asset 
into the system would not remedy this situation 
and might indeed aggravate it if it were used, 
under powerful political pressure by the United 
States and/or the United Kingdom, to mop up 
ex post the dollar and sterling balances arising 
from further deficits of these two countries 
whenever central banks refused to accumulate 
and retain them voluntarily as reserves. 
These economic arguments of the French 
Finance Minister were blown up into a major 
political argument by President de Gaulle in his 
press conference of 4 February 1965. Why 
should the two richest countries of the world be 
allowed to monopolize the benefits of inter-
national reserve creation for the financing of 
their own deficits? Why should the Bank of 
France be expected to participate—^by its pur-
chases of dollars—in the financing of United 
States policies in which France has no voice, and 
with which she might be in fundamental disagree-
ment? Are not the United States deficits as-
cribable, at least in part, to the flurry of United 
States private investments abroad—substituting 
United States for French ownership—^to United 
States assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, to the 
escalation of the war in South-east Asia, etc.? 
If new reserve assets are to be created, it 
should be by joint decisions, for agreed purposes, 
and to replace—^rather than merely supplement: 
—the economically irrational and politically 
unacceptable privilege now enjoyed in this 
respect by the two Anglo-Saxon currencies. 
A second major source of disagreement within 
the Group of Ten related to the distribution of 
voting power in the collective decision-making 
process to be adopted. The United Kingdom 
and the United States, finding themselves in a 
small minority in the Group of Ten, argued 
that since the decisions called for would affect 
the interests of the world at large, they should 
be taken by a • world body, the International 
Monetary Fund, rather than by any restricted 
group increasingly dubbed "the rich nations' 
club". The countries of the European Economic 
Community, on the other hand, were unwilling 
to run the risk of being too easily outvoted in the 
Fund's Executive Board in which they hold only 
about one fifth of the voting power, while con-
tributing currently more than 70 per cent of 
the resources actually used by the Fund. They 
were understandably reluctant to abandon vital 
decisions as to the size and management of their 
additional contributions to an Executive Board 
in which present—and prospective?—net bor-
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¡rowers control nearly two thirds of the total 
voting power (see table 5) . 
The Europeans thus favoured retaining control 
within the Group of Ten itself, in which they 
commanded a clear majority. The most con-
servative of the countries' representatives even 
insisted, in spite of this majority, that future 
decisions would continue to require a unanimous 
vote, thus allowing even a single country to 
veto any creation of new reserve assets which 
it might regard as inflationary. 
(b) Initial negotiating proposals and approaches 
These basic divergences—and others—are 
reflected in the diversity of proposals advanced 
by the participating members of the Group of 
Ten, which are briefly summarized below.^^ 
The only concrete and detailed plan presented 
to the Group of Ten is that of the French. It 
initially envisaged the possible future creation 
of so called "composite reserve units" (CRU) 
distributed among the members of the group 
only, in strict proportion to each country's gold 
reserves. Later reserve settlements among the 
participating countries would be effected through 
simultaneous transfers of gold and CRU reserves, 
in accordance with the over-all proportions of 
these two types of reserve assets outstanding at 
the time of such settlements as a result of the 
cumulative creation of CRU's in the past. Dollar, 
sterling and other foreign exchange balances 
would be excluded from such settlements among 
the participating countries, and outstanding 
balances would be gradually replaced also by 
CRU balances. Other countries, regarded as 
belonging to the dollar or sterling areas could 
continue however, to accumulate and retain 
dollar or sterling balances in reserves if they 
so wished. Finally, all decisions relating to the 
creation of new composite reserve units would 
be taken by unanimous vote, and each country 
would retain the right to convert its accumulated 
CRU balances into gold at any time, even though 
this would presumably entail, in effect, its with-
drawal from the system and, if imitated by other 
members, might trigger off its enforced liquida-
tion.i3 
A fuller account is precluded by the secrecy sur-
rounding the negotiations and would be of little value 
anyway in view of the highly precarious significance of 
mutuaUy incompatible "negotiating positions", recon-
cilable only through radical alterations in the course 
of future negotiations. For a painstaking record and 
analysis of these negotiating divergences, see the 
Report of the Study Group on the Creation of Reserve 
Assets, released on 31 May 1965, and referred to 
below as the "Ossola Report". 
1® While the CRU technique as such was closely 
modelled upon the original proposals of E. M. Bernstein, 
they were inserted by the latter in an extremely ex-
pansionist—rather than conservative—framework, pre-
The French plan seems to have been sub-
stantially endorsed by the Dutch, but to be ac-
ceptable only in part by the other countries of 
the European Economic Community. All of them 
agreed on the need to erect strong barriers 
against inflationary abuses of any new technique 
for reserve creation and to isolate the creation 
of "earned", "owned", "unconditional" reserves 
"to hold", from the creation of "borrowed", 
"conditional" reserves "to spend" and thus 
finance any individual country's balance-of-
payments deficits. They also wished to keep the 
creation of new reserve assets under the effective 
control of the Ten, but recognized on the other 
hand the desirability of inserting it within the 
world-wide framework of the International 
Monetary Fund. The German and Italian repre-
sentatives, moreover, showed particular interest 
for proposals aiming at a more "harmonious" 
composition of reserves as between gold and 
foreign exchange. While logically attractive, of 
course, this position also corresponded to their 
own interest, since they held a relatively smaller 
proportion of their total reserves in gold than 
the other EEC countries, and a larger one in 
"unrequired" foreign exchange balances. Finally, 
Belgium pressed particularly for the adoption of 
legal techniques aimed at strengthening—and 
making more obvious—^the fully liquid and 
transferable character of the new reserve assets, 
and their unquestionable eligibility as a normal 
component of monetary reserves. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Canada, and Japan generally stressed 
the need for reserve expansion and for weighted 
IMF voting rather than for unanimous decisions 
restricted to the Group of Ten. The first two 
countries—particularly the United States—in-
sisted particularly on the need to avoid any 
weakening of the traditional role of their own 
currencies in the process of reserve creation. The 
British, however, were more willing than the 
United States to grant exchange-value and even 
gold-value guarantees on reserve currency hold-
ings, to the extent necessary to induce foreign 
central banks to accumulate and retain them in 
settlement of their future surpluses, and refrain 
from "de-stabilizing" and "deflationary" con-
versions of such holdings into gold-metal. 
(c) Prospective compromises? 
These opposite views hardened into a monetary 
"cold war" culminating in the "summit clash" 
between President de Gaulle and President 
serving a large role for dollar and/or sterling balances, 
and supplemented by substantial increases in the amount 
and automaticity of IMF lending. See my article on 
"The Bizarre Proposals of Dr. Bernstein for Inter-




NET FUND POSITIONS AND VOTING POWER 
(As a percentage of total net claims and voting power) 
Net claims. Voting rights^ 
or By By executive 
debts country directors 
I. Net claims on IMF 100 33J 36.1 
A. European Commimity 72 16.0 20.8 
B. Other developed areas 28 17.5 15.3 
II. Net debts to IMF 64 66.5 63.9 
A. United States and United Kingdom 49 33.2 33.2 
B. Less developed areas 16 33.3 30.7 
III. IMF gold 43 
IV. IMF profits = II - f III — I 7 ... 
a As of 30 September 1965. 
b As of 30 April 1965. Since the voting power of small countries is pooled and exercised in fact 
by an executive director elected jointly by them, but who casts a single vote for all the countries 
which elected him the latter column redistributes voting rights in accordance with the nationality 
of the executive directors. 
Johnson in their respective press conferences of 
February 1965, and in massive gold conversions 
by the French and other European countries 
(2,300 million dollars in nine months, from 
October 1964 through June 1965). 
Some signs of a renewed effort toward negotia-
tions and compromises emerged, during the 
following months, from the European tour of 
Secretary Fowler in the summer, the annual 
meeting of the International Monetary Fund in 
September, and the reunion of the Group of Ten 
in Paris in November. 
A communiqué of the Ministers and Gov-
ernors of the Group of Ten, issued on 28 Sep-
tember, revealed three substantial concessions 
of the Europeans to the Anglo-American points 
of view: 
(1) Agreement that the General Arrangements 
to Borrow should be renewed for a second period 
of four years (from October 1966 to October 
1970), subject to review and adaptation in Oc-
tober 1968, or later; 
(2) Agreement to intensify, in a first phase, 
their discussions of "contingency planning" 
regarding the "improvements needed in the in-
ternational monetary system, including arrange-
ments for the future creation of reserve assets, 
as and when needed, so as to permit adequate 
provision for the reserve needs of the world 
economy. The Deputies should report to the 
Ministers in the spring of 1966 on the progress 
of their deliberations and the scope of agreement 
that they have found". 
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(3) Recognition that "as soon as a basis for 
agreement on essential points has been reached, 
it will be necessary to proceed from this first 
phase to a broader consideration of the questions 
that affect the world economy as a whole. They 
[the Ministers and Governors] have agreed that 
it would be very useful to seek ways and means 
by which the efforts of the Executive Board of 
the Fund and those of the Deputies of the Group 
of Ten can be directed toward a consensus as to 
desirable lines of action, and they have instructed 
their Deputies to work out during the coming 
year, in close consultation with the Managing 
Director of the Fund, procedures to achieve this 
aim, with a view to preparing for the final 
enactment of any new arrangements at an ap-
propriate forum for international discussions". 
The statement of the French Minister of 
Finance at the IMF meeting was largely directed 
at drawing support from the under-developed 
countries and relaxed, for the first time, the 
rigid link which France had previously ad-
vocated between the new reserve asset and gold: 
"An agreement could be made to establish a 
relationship between the creating of additional 
reserve assets and the organizing of the 
markets for certain commodities.. . It is 
conceivable that a distribution of additional 
reserve assets could take into account, among 
various criteria, the actual efforts made by 
each country in favor of developing countries.' 
Convergent—^and obviously concerted—state-
ments of the spokesmen for the other EEC coun-
tries put considerable emphasis on another aspect 
of the problem which had been carefully avoided 
throughout most of the previous debates. Gov-
ernor Holtrop, of the Netherlands, referred to 
"the instability of the system, which is partly due 
to the freedom of conversion from one reserve 
medium into another". He had himself applauded 
this instability at the IMF Vienna Meeting of 
1961 as a protection both against excessive and 
inflationary accumulation of foreign currency 
reserves and against their massive and defla-
tionary liquidation into gold-metal. "Now, with 
the benefit of recent experience, there is reason 
again to ask the question whether it might not 
be preferable to replace—at least within a 
limited group of industrialized countries—liberty 
of action in regard to switching from one reserve 
medium to another by certain rules of behaviour 
with respect to the proportion of difl'erent reserve 
media to be held in official reserves. And also to 
investigate whether the present unilateral respon-
sibility of reserve currency countries for the 
consequences of fluctuations in the total volume 
of reserve currency held by third countries in 
official and non-official balances, might not be 
replaced by some collective sharing of that 
responsibility. I am convinced that the solution 
of these two problems should form an integral 
part of any future reform of the international 
monetary system." 
Governor Blessing, of Germany, stated the 
view that "the most acute problem is not the 
artificial creation of new liquidity, but rather 
the danger that existing liquidity could be 
destroyed by a sudden run on one country or a 
group of countries". 
The most detailed, concrete, and constructive 
•discussion of this problem was that of Minister 
Colombo of Italy. Stressing also the urgent need 
to protect the stability of the international 
•monetary system against the immediate danger 
that the volume of reserve may contract as a 
result of sudden or massive switches from 
reserve currencies into gold, he advocated con-
certed moves toward a more harmonious com-
position or reserves as between gold and credit 
assets, and the conversion of unrequired cur-
rency balances either into IMF claims or mutual 
•currency accounts. 
Finally, Governor Ansiaux, of Belgium, pro-
pounded changes in the Fund's Articles of 
Agreement designed to enhance the acceptability 
and attractiveness of credit claims on the Fund 
as international reserves for central banks: ex-
change-value guarantees, unconditional and 
liquid usability for balance-of-payments set-
tlements, free transferability, etc. 
The statements of the United States and 
United Kingdom Governors were far less ex-
plicit, Secretary Fowler emphasizing that "the 
United States is wedded to no specific plan,.. . 
are impressed with the wide variety of technical 
possibilities which have been developed in the 
writings of distinguished economists here and 
abroad;" and Chancellor Callaghan "making 
it clear that we in the United Kingdom are ready 
to consider with an open mind all of these 
proposals that have been brought forward. The 
major requirement in my view is that we should 
make a maximum effort to secure the agreement 
of all parties legitimately concerned on the way 
the international monetary system should de-
velop. There is no advantage to the world in all 
of us holding fast to our particular preferences 
for achieving such evolution if the result should 
be that we were not ready to meet the need 
deliberately to create more reserves as that need 
arises". 
These indications of flexibility in the United 
States and United Kingdom approaches to future 
negotiations were reinforced by the publication 
of former Under Secretary of the Treasury 
Roosa's volume on Monetary Reform for the 
World Economy (Harper and Row, 1965), which 
was widely regarded—rightly or wrongly—^as 
reflecting the trend of official thinking in the 
United States and suggested a possible relaxation 
of former United States opposition to: 
(1) Exchange-value or even gold-value guar-
antees on United States indebtedness to central 
banks; 
(2) Special voting-power provisions reinforc-
ing the influence of prospective European con-
tributors in aU decisions regarding the size and 
management of any additional reserve asset to 
be created in the future; 
(3) The acceptance of some sort of CRU 
formula for the creation and distribution of this 
new reserve asset. 
3. The International Monetary Fund proposals 
The views of the Fund itself on a problem 
so central to its responsibilities and objectives 
are set forth most authoritatively, but also most 
cautiously and guardedly, in the 1964 and 1965 
annual report of its Executive Board. The 
Executive Directors, however, could hardly be 
expected to disagree with the positions adopted 
in the Group of Ten negotiations by the coun-
tries of which they are themselves the representa-
tives in the Fund. Nor could they be expected 
to agree on any specific proposals on which their 
countries were still at loggerheads in these 
negotiations. Given these constraints, the com-
ments of the Executive Directors may be regarded 
as remarkably positive and suggestive. 
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They refer to the focus placed by the Group 
of Ten studies "on the deliberate creation of 
reserves by collective international action in the 
light of an appraisal of the general need for 
reserves rather than on their creation in response 
to immediate needs of particular countries for 
balance of payments assistance".^^ While recog-
nizing that "the task of influencing the total level 
of world reserves could be carried out by a 
new institution..." they stress the arguments 
that can reasonably be offered to support the 
view that "a matter which is of concern to all 
countries should be handled in an institution 
that has been organized as an instrument of 
financial co-operation on a world-wide basis''.^® 
- After noting the agreements already reached, 
or in prospect, regarding quota increases and 
the renewal of the General Arrangements to 
Borrow, they focus on the specific contributions 
which the Fund could make toward the supply 
of "unconditional" liquidity.^® Unconditional 
liquidity is already created, under the present 
system of operations of the Fund, for any 
member whose "automatic" gold tranche, or 
reserve position, with the Fund increases as a 
result of drawing of its currency by other 
members. This creation of unconditional li-
quidity, however, occurs "only as a by-product 
of drawings, and in amounts that are small 
compared with total quotas".^'' 
Three new techniques are mentioned as pos-
sible ways for the Fund to expand systematically 
unconditional liquidity if and when this is 
deemed desirable. 
The first would be to enlarge automatic bor-
rowing rights beyond the gold tranche, into 
some portion of the present credit tranches. The 
second would be "to substitute for a portion of 
the gold subscription of the Fund an alternative 
method of payment, e.g., by means of gold 
certificates".^® 
Either of these two methods, however, would 
enlarge automatic drawing rights on the Fund 
without supplying it with the resources neces-
sary to honour such drawings in the creditor 
currencies needed by members for balance-of-
payments settlements. By the end of October 
1965, for instance, the Fund had already been 
forced to replenish its depleted holdings of EEC 
currencies through gold sales and GAB borrow-
ings for a total amount of more than 1,600 
million dollars. Yet in spite of this, its total 
1965 Annual Report of the IMF, p. 15. 
IB IhU., p. 18. 
1® The distinction properly drawn by the Group of Ten 
between the creation of liquidity and the provision of 
credit facilities was referred to on p. 18, above. 
17 7964 Annual Repon of the IMF, p. 38. 
18/6IU, p. 38. 
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holdings of these currencies had dropped to less 
than 500 million dollars. Any enlargement of 
the Fund's lending commitments might quickly 
prove unsustainable and illusory, therefore, if 
it were not accompanied by a parallel expansion 
of its access to the creditor currencies needed 
to finance such lendings. 
The third technique suggested by the Fund 
is directly inspired by the nature of the problem 
to be solved—i.e. the prospective shortage of 
liquidity—rather than by efforts to meet it in-
directly as a by-product of its traditional lending 
operations. Fund investments, in currency or 
in gold, would be undertaken on the initiative of 
the Fund, rather than of any individual country, 
for the very purpose of creating liquidity, 
rather than in response to any particular balance-
of-payments need. They might be distributed 
among all member countries, or on a selective 
basis to support jointly agreed policies. 
The resources needed to finance such invest-
ments would be provided under negotiated lines 
of credit, by "deposits" according to suitable 
criteria, or in other ways. "In order that the 
Fund's investment should in fact increase un-
conditional liquidity, it would be essential that 
members treat the resulting liquid claims on 
the Fund as reserves The precise nature of 
these Fund liabilities (i.e. members' reserves 
assets) would have to be worked out, but could 
include at least the following: (1) the facility 
of the asset to be cashed in for useful currency 
at least as freely as gold tranche position or, 
alternatively, to be transferred directly to other 
members; (2) a gold-value guarantee; (3) in-
terest at a modest rate reflecting the gold value 
of the claim. It will be noted that claims under 
the General Arrangements to Borrow have these 
three characteristics."^® 
4. Report of UNCTAD's experts 
The Report of the Group of Experts^'^ ap-
pointed by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development draws essentially—as 
pointed out in paragraph 70—on the studies 
under way in the Fund and in the Group of Ten, 
facilitating thereby the dialogue between them 
and the under-developed countries which had, 
so far, played little or no role in a negotiation 
in which their interests are also vitally involved. 
It gives only lukewarm endorsment, "as a 
preliminary or interim stage in the process of 
deliberate reserve creation" to the Fund's sug-
gestion for "the extension of automatic drawing 
191964 Annual Report of the IMF, p. 39, and 1965 
Annual Report, p. 19. 
20 International Monetary Issues and the Developing 
Countries, Doc. TD/B/32 and TD/B/C.3/6, 1 November 
1965. 
rights, of the type now applied in the gold 
tranche, into the credit tranches," (paragraphs 84 
and 85) and reserves its main fire for the ways 
and means ensuring maximum benefits for the 
under-developed countries from the setting up 
of a mechanism... "devised for the 'deliberate 
creation of reserves by collective international 
action in the light of an appraisal of the general 
need for reserves,' in place of primary reliance 
[as of now] upon largely fortuitous accretions 
of monetary stocks of gold and upon reserve 
currency holdings arising from the deficits of 
reserve centres" (paragraph 67 ( a ) ) . 
While the words quoted in this passage are 
taken from the J965 Annual Report of the Fund 
(p. 15), the concrete mechanism later pro-
pounded by the UNCTAD experts is essentially 
based on the French CRU proposal, considerably 
revamped to fit the under-developed coimtries' 
objectives. Participation would be extended 
beyond the Group of Ten to all members of the 
Fund (paragraph 77) and even to "countries 
not now members, if they are prepared to take 
part in both the benefits and the obligations of 
new monetary arrangements designed to serve 
the interests of the international community as 
a whole" (paragraph 68 ( d ) ) . 
The mechanism is operated by the Fund, 
rather than by a separate Agent and presumably 
[italics mine] the rule of unanimity gives way 
to weighted voting. The CRU units are re-
baptized "Fund units in the new context. . . 
Otherwise the system could conceivably be re-
produced exactly as before" (paragraph 74). 
That is to say, Fund units, endowed with a 
gold guarantee, would be created in amounts 
•determined each year by the participating coun-
tries, and distributed among them in accordance 
with some agreed formula, against counterpart 
•deposits of their own national currencies. They 
would be held exclusively by the monetary 
authorities and used only for balance-of-payments 
settlements, together with gold and in a uniform 
ratio with it, this ratio being equal to the ag-
gregate ratio of outstanding Fund units to gold 
reserves at the time of settlement. Gold and 
Fund units would be reshuffled periodically 
among the participants in order to restore the 
agreed proportion of Fund units to gold in the 
global reserves of each country.^^ Finally, "the 
counterpart deposits of national currencies would 
be called upon only in the event of the with-
drawal of a member, the liquidation of the 
system or a decision to cancel part of the out-
standing total of CRU's" (paragraph 71). 
21 See my article on "The Bizarre Proposals of Dr. 
Bernstein for International Monetary Reform" in Kyhlos, 
1964, Fasc. 3, pp. 333-337. 
The final provision just quoted, however, 
glosses over—to say the least—^the crucial re-
vamping of the CRU plan entailed by the ex-
perts' later proposal that the counterpart deposits 
of the developed countries be lent by the Fund 
"to the World Bank and its affiliates for inv^t-
ment in the developing countries, receiving 
IBRD bonds in exchange. This would not alter 
the total of Fund Units created in the light of 
the world monetary situation nor to any sig-
nificant extent the distribution of these Units 
between developed and developing countries, 
taken as a whole. But it would mean that each 
developed country would have to compete for 
the additional orders for development goods 
engendered by the World Bank investments, in 
order to retain the full addition to its reserves 
represented by the initial distribution of Fund 
Units. To the extent that each country's share in 
the additional orders (or, more strictly, in the 
aggregate trading surplus corresponding to the 
Bank finance) matched the share of its currency 
in the Bank loan expenditure, the initial dis-
tribution would remain intact; otherwise there 
would be some reshuffling of reserves amongst 
developed countries according to the pattern of 
excesses and short falls between orders secured 
and currencies contributed. This reshuffling 
could, of course, affect only that part of the 
original reserve creation in respect of which 
the counterpart currencies were lent to the Bank, 
and not that part in respect of which the counter-
part currencies were retained by the Fund," 
(paragraph 81). 
This proposed link between the creation of 
reserves needed for monetary purposes, on the 
one hand, and international development financ-
ing, on the other, constitutes to my mind the 
most valid and significant aspect, by far, of the 
experts' recommendations. A whole chapter of 
their report (Chapter IV) is devoted to further 
clarification of the complex issues involved, and 
to defence of the "propriety" of such a link 
against traditional and obvious objections, in-
spired by deep-rooted confusions between the 
restraint within which an individual banking 
firm must operate to safeguard its solvency and 
liquidity, and the totally different criteria that 
should guide the policies of national monetary 
authorities and, even more, those of inter-
national reserve creation within a world-wide 
framework.^^ 
Far more controversial to my mind—for 
reasons that will be made clearer in the last 
section of this paper—is the experts' endorse-
ment of the CRU proposal for the initial distri-
bution of Fund units on the basis of a rigid 
22 For a fuller discussion, see pp. 26-28, below. 
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formula, bearing little or no relation to the 
actual need for—and usability of—the counter-
part deposits to be handed over to the Fund. 
Among the three alternative formulas men-
tioned in this respect in the Ossola Report, the 
UNCTAD experts retain the one—i.e. the pro-
portionate share of each participating country 
in the IMF quotas—which would maximize the 
share allotted to the under-developed coun-
tries. (See table 6.) Even then, the share allotted 
to all the under-developed countries, taken to-
gether, is no more than 24 per cent, of which 
9 per cent is for Latin America as a whole. If the 
more defensible test of "total reserves" prevailed 
in fact in the negotiations, these ratios would 
drop further to 15 per cent and 4 per cent, 
respectively. 
Table 6 
ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR DISTRIBUTION 
OF FUND UNITS 
(As a percentage of world totals, as of mid-1965) 
Gold Total IMF reserves quotas 
I. Under-developed countries l 7 15 24 
Latin America 3 4 9 
Others 4 11 15 
II. Developed countries 93 85 76 
Group of Ten" 86 73 66 
Others 8 12 10 
III. World Totals 100 100 100 
«Including Switzerland in first two columns. 
This provides a first—even if purely cyclical 
and nationalistic—reason for the under-de-
veloped countries not to waste their negotiating 
ammunition on such a feeble objective, but to 
direct it instead toward the use of a sizable por-
tion, at least, of counterpart deposits for de-
velopment financing. 
The second reason justifying this strategy, on 
broader grounds, is that the only currencies 
really useful and usable for this purpose, as 
well as for the monetary stabilization purposes 
of the IMF, are those of the surplus countries to 
which settlements have to be made by the others. 
The allocation of Fund units to a country should 
not be regarded as a privilege, but as compen-
sation for its willingness and ability to transfer 
real resources to the countries in deficit. The 
currencies which the Fund should purchase 
against Fund units are those which the deficit 
countries need and of which the Fund is run-
ning short: not Brazilian cruzeiros, Argentine 
pesos, Chilean escudos, Indian rupees, etc. with 
which its coffers are already overflowing, but 
French francs, German marks, Italian lire, Aus-
trian schillings, etc. 
This is not to say that this situation may not 
change in the future. On the contrary, the 
volatility of balances of payments over time 
assures that it will, and that the currencies 
needed by the Fund tomorrow will not be exactly 
the same as those which it needs today. This, 
however, is precisely the reason why no rigid 
formula, such as the relative size of IMF quotas, 
should serve as a criterion for the distribution 
of Fund units. This distribution should adjust 
instead to the actual needs that wiU develop 
over future years, as reflected in the countries' 
balances of payments, changes in monetary re-
serves, and net position in the Fund. 
C . CONVERGENT INTERESTS AND OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
The Ossola Report sets forth, most clearly 
and usefully, the various arguments with which 
the Group of Ten negotiators justify their op-
posite answers and solutions to the basic ques-
tions on which they will have to agree, in the 
end, if the present system is not to drift inexor-
ably toward collapse and chaos. 
The same questions will be examined below 
—although in different order—in the light of 
the convergent interests of all countries, under-
developed as well as developed, debtors as well 
as creditors, in the long overdue readjustment 
of our haphazard, vuhierable, and outdated in-
ternational monetary system to the operational 
requirements of orderly, non-inflationary, growth 
of the world economy. This examination may 
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best be divided into two parts: (1) long-run 
objectives and solutions the negotiation of which 
should not be hurried unduly at the cost of 
accepting "second-best" compromises for the 
sake of quick agreement; and (2) the most im-
mediate and less divisive issues on which early 
agreement is both most urgent and most feasible. 
1. Long-run objectives and solutions 
(a) Aggregate volume of reserve creation 
This is a question on which a broad con-
sensus has already been reached but cannot—un-
fortunately—be made fully operational before 
many other questions, relating to its concrete 
implementation, have also been solved to the 
satisfaction of all participants. 
The basic consensus has been aptly sum-
marized in the 1965 Annual Report of the IMF 
(p. 15) as a recognition of the need for "the 
deliberate creation of reserves by collective in-
ternational action in the light of an appraisal 
of the general need for reserves rather than 
on their creation in response to immediate needs 
of particular countries for balance of payments 
assistance," and—we might add—as the further 
haphazard result of gold production, USSR gold 
sales, and speculation on the future rate of ex-
change between gold and the reserve currencies. 
It is further agreed that this will involve, at 
some future stage, the creation of a new type 
of international reserve asset, supplementing—or 
replacing—the predominant role assigned today 
to national reserve currencies, and primarily the 
dollar, in the process of reserve creation.^® This 
need is felt more urgently today by the United 
States and the United Kingdom, whose gross 
reserve losses and increasing indebtedness to 
other countries' central banks have supplied 
nearly two thirds of these countries' total reserve 
increases over the ten years 1950-1959, and three 
fourths over the years 1960-1964. The countries 
of the European Economic Community, on the 
other hand, whose gross reserves have increased, 
as a result, by as much as 15 per cent a year, 
on the average, over this fifteen year period, 
consider the adoption of any new type of reserve 
asset as likely to add further inflationary fuel 
to an already excessive level of reserve creation, 
as long as it is superimposed upon large and 
continuing United States and United Kingdom 
deficits. 
The United States and the United Kingdom 
have agreed with the Europeans to compromise 
their differences of views on this issue by initiat-
ing right now "contingency planning" on meas-
ures that will be put into actual operation only 
if and when needed to combat the deflationary 
consequences which would follow from a durable 
elimination of the United States and United 
Kingdom deficits. In the meantime, however, 
the Europeans have not only ceased to accumu-
late further dollar and sterling balances as 
reserves, but have begun to convert massively 
into gold and gold-guaranteed claims on the 
Fund some of the dollar and sterling balances 
accumulated by them in the past. 
A different approach would, of course, be far 
more logical as an answer to the problem, and 
far less dangerous to the stability of the dollar 
and the pound and of the international monetary 
system itself. Rather than postpone agreement 
on deliberate reserve creation until equilibrium 
in the United States and United Kingdom bal-
ance of payments has been achieved and main-
tained for some time—how long?—the new 
machinery could have been put into place right 
away, with the understanding that it would be 
used, irrespective of United States and United 
Kingdom deficits or surpluses, but only: 
(1) Automatically—or at least by simple 
majority decisions—to prevent the actual decline 
in reserves entailed in the liquidation of out-
standing dollar and sterling balances by central 
banks, or private gold purchases in excess of 
newly available supplies from current produc-
tion and USSR sales; 
(2) By qualified vote—^two thirds or more 
of the total voting power—to supplement or 
replace other sources of reserve increases, in 
the event of a recognized deficiency in relation 
to needs. 
The criteria for the discretionary decisions 
called forth under (b) are necessarily imprecise, 
and inseparable—as in the case of national 
monetary management—from human and fallible 
judgement. Significant and agreed symptoms of 
a developing strain and generalized scarcity of 
reserves are listed in paragraph 10 of the Ossola 
Report. 
One need not wait, however, for such develop-
ments to forecast confidently large and impera-
tive needs for concerted reserve creation over 
the long-run future. National money supply wiU 
have to grow to sustain feasible growth of pro-
duction, even in the absence of any inflationary 
price rises; and international reserves will have 
to grow both to underwrite such increases in 
national money stocks, in a world of convertible 
currencies, and to cushion temporary disequi-
libria in expanding levels of world trade. 
National money supply—^translated into United 
States dollars as a common unit of measure-
ment—^has nearly doubled, over the last fifteen 
years, for the Group of Ten countries taken 
together, i.e., by about 4.7 per cent a year, on 
the average. World imports have risen, over the 
same period, at an average pace of 6.8 per cent 
a year.^^ The projection of much lower rates of 
increase than these, let us say 3 or 4 per cent a 
year, over the next fifteen years, would require 
an expansion of 38,000 million dollars to 55,000 
million dollars of the world reserve pool, of 
which less than 10,000 million dollars is likely 
to become available from new gold production 
23 See Ministerial Statement of the Group of Ten and 
Annex Prepared by the Deputies (referred to below 
as "Group of Ten Report"), paragraph 25 (a), (6 ) , 
(c ) and {d), and 1964 Annual Report of the IMF, p. 31. 
Exactly equal to the growth rate of international 
reserves outside the two reserve centre countries whose 
net reserve losses made such a growth rate compatible 
with the much lower growth rate of only 2.8 per cent 
a year for world reserves as a whole. 
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and USSR gold sales. The enormity of such 
figures makes it easier to understand the im-
portance attached by all countries to the rules 
that will determine their relative influence and 
voting power in the collective decisions govern-
ing the creation, distribution, and uses of re-
serves in the future. 
(b) Participation and voting rights 
The arguments for and against world-wide 
membership are summarized in paragraphs 117-
122 of the Ossola Report, and the weight of 
opinion within the Group of Ten itself—but 
obviously not outside it—is fairly reflected in 
the following conclusion: "Any discrimination 
in the choice of participants is obviously absurd. 
But it is also absurd that countries should par-
ticipate which, because of their past behaviour, 
do not provide adequate guarantees of financial 
solidity and solvency."^® 
This, again, suggests a limping compromise 
between opposite viewpoints, calling for a most 
controversial forecast of future behaviour, dis-
tinguishing sheep and goats on the basis of an 
equally controversial appraisal of past per-
formance. A more logical line of approach would 
recognize that: 
(1) All countries have vital and legitimate 
interests in the problem and should be associ-
ated, in some form, in its solution; 
(2) Diiferent countries may be called upon, 
at different times, to grant the international 
community immediately effective claims on their 
real resources—in the form of balances in their 
national currency required to settle their current 
surpluses with the rest of the world—in exchange 
for future claims on other countries' resources— 
in the form of national reserves usable only to 
settle their own deficits in the future; 
(3) The voting power of participating coun-
tries in the management of the system must be 
related, at least in part, to the relative size of 
their contributions, if these are to be elicited 
from them on the appropriate—and vast—scale 
required for the fulfilment of its basic objectives. 
Such an approach would substitute objective 
and operational criteria for the controversial 
appraisals and guesswork suggested in the Ossola 
Report. These criteria would be determined 
essentially by the developing pattern of balances 
of payments and official settlements between the 
25 This sentence does not appear as such in the pros 
and cons of the report itself, but on page 84 of a 
most faithful, lucid and convenient summary by Mr. 
Ossola himself, which appears under the title "On the 
Creation of New Reserve Assets: the Report of the 
Study Group of Ten" in the Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 74 (September 1965), 
pp. 272-292. 
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larticipating countries. Surplus countries would 
lave to limit their claims to gold settlement to 
the available supplies, at most, and to accept 
partial settlement of their claims in the form of 
the new reserve asset to be created. 
This general principle could be implemented 
in a variety of ways, the simplest of which would 
be the obligation for each country to keep, in 
the form of Fund reserve deposits an agreed 
proportion, at least, of either its total reserves 
or of its future reserve increases, this proportion 
being determined in the light of the ratio of 
available gold supplies to the total amount of 
reserves needed to sustain feasible rates of non-
inflationary growth in world trade and produc-
tion. The guidelines presently applied by the 
Fund in the selection of currencies to be used 
in drawings and repayments already approxi-
mate this result. As pointed out in the 1965 An-
nual Report (p. 17), "the F u n d . . . strives to 
ensure an equitable distribution of reserve posi-
tions in the Fund in the light of the balance of 
payments and reserve positions of the countries 
whose currencies are considered for drawing. 
Over the long-run, the reserve positions in the 
Fund of members whose currencies are suitable 
for drawing have, as a result of this arrange-
ment, tended to approximate a uniform propor-
tion of their total reserves". (Italics mine.) This 
procedure could be simplified, if desired, and 
extended to all members if: 
(1) The full liquidity and transferability of 
Fund reserve positions were spelled out in the 
manner suggested by Governor Ansiaux at the 
last Fund meeting;^® and 
(2) Capital subscriptions to the Fund were 
dispensed with, and replaced by the minimum 
deposit obligations suggested above. 
In the meantime, pending such a drastic over-
haul of the Fund's machinery, contributions 
might be called and accepted, in exchange for 
IMF reserve positions, only from those countries 
whose currency threatens to become scarce in 
the Fund. Such a procedure would be based on 
Article V n of the present Articles of Agreement 
and would build on the precedent created by the 
General Arrangements to Borrow. 
(c) Reserve deposits with the Fund as source of 
Fund financing 
Reserve deposits would not be created for the 
purpose of financing credit operations, and their 
global amounts would be determined in the light 
of over-all reserve requirements rather than of 
any particular country's or countries' balance-
of-payments deficits. They would, however, in-
26 See p. 21, above. 
crease as an inevitable by-product the lending 
capacity of the Fund. How should this lending 
capacity be used? 
It could, of course, be used in normal drawing 
operations in so far as legitimate and approved 
needs for such drawings exceed the normal lend-
ing capacity of the Fund, derived from the 
present Articles of Agreement. A special form 
of this use, extremely important under con-
vertibility conditions, would be that contem-
plated under the General Arrangements to 
Borrow, i.e. the need to offset, through official 
compensatory financing by the Fund, perturbing 
but reversible movements of short-term capital 
between major financial centres. This need might 
better be served, however, through a reshuffling 
of the IMF investments to be discussed presently 
than by the traditional drawing procedure of 
the Articles of Agreement. Temporary flights of 
short-term capital from London to New York, 
for instance, could be offset, in routine manner, 
by corresponding shifts in the IMF investment 
assets from United States dollars into pounds 
sterling, without necessitating a United King-
dom request for drawings susceptible of weaken-
ing confidence in the pound. 
In the long-run, however, a sizable proportion 
of the Fund's added resources should most use-
fully be channelled in such a way as to con-
tribute to the financing of the less developed 
countries' development needs. Indeed, if Fund 
lending were to remain constricted—as it has 
been so far under its normal drawings pro-
cedures—to medium-term loans, of three to five 
years' maturity, the gross lending that would 
prove necessary, year after year, to offset re-
payments and feed desired increases in world 
reserves would soon exceed all reasonable needs 
and uses for such medium-term assistance, while 
far more crying needs for longer-term develop-
ment financing would remain starved for ade-
quate sources of funds. 
I am well aware, of course, of the traditional 
objections to the use of liquid monetary deposits 
for long-term financing of this sort, either by 
commercial banks, or even by national central 
banks. These objections, however, would be 
totally irrevelant—as brilliantly and wittily 
shown by Professor Machlup^''—^to the opera-
tions of a world-wide reserve centre, such as 
See "The Cloakroom Rule of International Reserves: 
Reserve Creation and Resources Transfer", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX, No. 3 (August 
1965), p. 343; "For international payments in the same 
world, the assets (amounts, quality, composition, li-
quidity) of the international reserve bank (or an appro-
priately organized IMF) are irrelevant; they become 
relevant only for payments to persons, banks, or 
reserve banks on other planets, that is, for interplanetary 
payments." 
recommended here. The inflationary dangers of 
long-term lending—as well as of short-term lend-
ing, for that matter—should be adequately 
guarded against through the limitation of over-
all reserve creation by the Fund to recognized 
non-inflationary growth needs for reserve in-
creases. Further protection against inflationary 
abuses by the Fund of its new lending potential 
could be established by treaty in the form of 
presumptive ceilings on annual increases of the 
Fund's outstanding credits, qualified votes of 
two thirds, four fifths, or more, being required 
to approve increases beyond such ceilings. 
As for the danger of illiquidity, usually as-
sociated with long-term loans, it could not arise 
under the proposed system. The world pool of 
reserves being destined to grow over time, with 
little or no probability that circumstances would 
ever require a sudden or massive contraction, 
the Fund should never have to face any drastic 
reduction of its deposit liabilities, forcing it to 
liquidate any substantial portion of its global 
assets. Balance-of-payments settlements among 
IMF reserve holders will reshuffle the Fund's 
deposit liabilities among its members, but should 
not reduce their total amount. 
Yet there exist some valid reasons to limit 
the maturity of Fund loans and investments. 
The first is that such limitations will provide 
added flexibility for shifting the Fund's assist-
ance from some countries to others, whose needs 
may be greater and exceed what the Fund can 
currently contribute from desirable increases in 
the total pool of world credit reserves. 
A second reason why the Fund should not 
engage directly in long-term development lend-
ing is that such lending requires a very different 
type of knowledge and expertise than those that 
should be relevant to its primary tasks and 
purposes, i.e.: 
(1) A rate of creation of over-all wotld re-
serves most appropriate to sustain non-infla-
tionary rates of economic growth; 
(2) A distribution of its corresponding lend-
ing power designed to stimulate the adoption 
and implementation of desirable readjustment 
policies by the beneficiaries; 
(3) The reshuffling of such lending that may 
be needed to compensate large, but reversible, 
movements of private capital, particularly among 
major monetary and financial markets whose 
general policies are consonant with longer-term 
equilibrium in their balance of payments. 
The bulk of the Fund's assistance to long-term 
development financing should thus, in all proba-
bility, be channelled through—and cushioned by 
—intermediary institutions, specializing in such 
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long-term lending. The Fund might, for instance, 
distribute its investment portfolio between 
marketable obligations of international institu-
tions, such as the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, and other short-term 
or medium-term investments in the major finan-
cial centres—New York, London, Paris, Frank-
furt, Amsterdam, etc.—enabling these to engage 
more boldly and actively in long-term lending, 
in the knowledge that temporary pressures on 
the country's reserves would be offset by a re-
shuffling of the Fund's own investment portfolio. 
As already noted before, such reshuffling would 
be particularly appropriate to meet the objectives 
now served by the Fund's General Arrangements 
to Borrow. 
(d) Pressures for balance-of-payments adjust-
ment, and their distribution between surplus 
countries and deficit countries 
A recurrent theme of the Group of Ten dis-
cussions is the desirability of isolating the 
process of reserve creation from the financing of 
balance-of-payments deficits. Reserves should be 
"earned, owned, unconditional, and to hold" 
rather than "borrowed, conditional, and to 
spend". 
The first two of these criteria are certainly 
irreconcilable with the automatic distribution of 
the new reserve assets to be created among eleven 
countries, in accordance with some arbitrary for-
mula, and against the assumption of equivalent 
liabilities—in their national currencies—^by the 
beneficiaries, as advocated in the CRU pro-
posals. CRU's would be neither earned nor fully 
owned, and would leave the net reserves of the 
group unchanged, increasing gross reserves only 
mri passu with equivalent increases in reserve 
labilities. 
The only way, indeed, in which net reserves 
can increase in a form other than gold^® is 
through the accumulation of "credit-reserves", 
i.e. of reserve claims entailing international 
credit operations in one form or another. The 
suggestions outlined above would fit far better 
28 Or other "commodity-reserves", as proposed in a 
former report to UNCTAD by Messrs. Hart, Kaldor, 
and Tinbergen, and in a recent speech of Mendes-
France. In order not to lengthen even further an already 
overlong paper, I have refrained from discussing here 
a proposal which obviously has no chance to rally 
agreement, or even to be seriously considered in the 
present negotiations. While superior to a pure gold 
reserve system, a commodity reserve system would seem 
to me highly wasteful and too blindly automatic—along 
largely arbitrary lines—to be defensible on economic 
grounds. This is not to say, however, that some of the 
Fund lending and investments should not be properly 
aimed at supporting international efforts to avoid ex-
cessive fluctuations in the prices of the major com-
modities entering international trade. 
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the very criteria insisted upon by the CRU propo-
nents. While any country might, tomorrow as 
today, increase its gross reserves through bor-
rowings—from the Fund or other sources—the 
net reserve claims accumulated on the Fund 
would have to be "earned" through balance-of-
payments surpluses—rather than be received 
automatically—and would be fully owned and 
unconditional. Such reserves, moreover, would 
be accumulated only by countries ready and 
able to do so, and to "hold" them. 
It would be absurd, however, to bar coun-
tries from "spending" reserves previously earned 
by them, or even to "borrow" reserves in order 
to meet temporary balance-of-payments deficits. 
This is indeed what owned reserves and Fund 
drawings are for. 
As for the "automatic" distribution among 
eleven countries—or more— of the newly created 
CRU reserve assets, it would also contravene 
directly the other cardinal principle, repeatedly 
emphasized in the Group of Ten discussions, 
i.e. the close interrelationship between the 
process of adjustment and the need for inter-
national liquidity (paragraph 5 of the Group 
of Ten Report), the desirability "to bring under 
multilateral review and appraisal the various 
means of financing surpluses or deficits" (para-
graph 25 { h ) ) , and the need "for multilateral 
surveillance of the various forms of liquidity 
creation (italics mine), with a view to avoiding 
excesses or shortages in the means of financing 
existing or anticipated surpluses and deficits in 
the balance-of-payments, and to discussing 
measures appropriate for each country in ac-
cordance with the general economic outlook" 
(paragraph 37). 
The improvement of the present adjustment 
mechanism should indeed be an essential ob-
jective of the proposed reform, and the distribu-
tion of the credits which are the counterpart of 
any accumulation of fiduciary reserves should 
be determined in that light rather than by any 
automatic and arbitrary formula. Let us consider 
separately the nature of the pressures which the 
present system puts on debtors to eliminate their 
deficits, and on creditors to eliminate their 
surpluses. 
The pressures on the deficit countries are ob-
vious enough. Their ability to finance deficits 
is limited by the size of their owned reserves 
and by their access to credit. The owned reserves 
of deficit-prone countries are, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, smaller than might be desirable 
for the legitimate purpose of offsetting temporary 
deficits and providing the breathing space needed 
for the successful working-out of the most 
desirable, but relatively slow-acting, domestic 
readjustment policies. Access to credit should 
encourage, but be subordinated to, the adoption 
and implementation of such policies, as the only 
alternative to undesirable and unnecessary trade 
and exchange restrictions and/or devaluation. 
Currency devaluation may, however, be proved 
desirable, or even unavoidable, if cost and price 
disparities have been allowed to develop up to 
the point where the domestic fiscal and credit 
policies needed to restore external equilibrium 
would entail an unacceptable slowdown of em-
ployment and production growth. 
The financing of even temporary deficits, 
however, involves some transfer of real resources 
by the surplus countries to the deficit countries. 
The over-all amount of credit facilities available 
for this purpose for the world as a whole derives 
from two sources: 
(1) The willingness of private and official in-
vestors to limit their own immediate claims on 
goods and services in exchange for deferred 
claims, through lending and investment opera-
tions; 
(2) The desire of monetary authorities, par-
ticularly in the more affluent countries, to earn 
and accumulate unconditional, owned monetary 
reserves, in order to retain greater freedom for 
their own policies in the event of later deficits 
in their international transactions. 
It is this second source which is most directly 
at stake in the discussion of our present inter-
national monetary institutions, and the need 
for international monetary reform. Conservative 
estimates of non-inflationary requirements for 
world reserve increases over the next fifteen 
years range from 38,000 million dollars to 
74,000 million dollars, i.e. from 2,500 million 
dollars to 5,000 million dollars a year, and for 
fiduciary reserve increases (i.e. increases in 
reserves other than gold-metal) from 29,000 
million dollars to 65,000 million dollars, i.e. 
roughly from 2,000 million dollars to 4,000 mil-
lion dollars a year. These requirements have 
been met primarily, under the gold-exchange 
standard as it has functioned in recent years, 
by massive and persistent lending to the United 
States and the United Kingdom by the monetary 
authorities of other countries. This, in turn, 
allowed the United States and the United King-
dom to sustain much larger capital exports to 
other countries—developed as well as under-
developed—than they would have been able to 
do otherwise, but at the cost of making them-
selves increasingly vulnerable to unpredictable 
conversions into gold of the growing indebted-
ness accumulated by them, in the process, toward 
foreign central banks. 
The advocacy of a new type of reserve asset 
derives from the fact that future reserve creation 
can no longer be fed, on an appropriate scale, 
by a method involving indefinite increases, by 
2,000 million dollars a year at the very least, 
in United States and United Kingdom lOU's 
convertible at any time into gold-metal. The 
adoption of a new system of collective, concerted 
reserve creation should not, however, entail any 
substantial reduction in the volume of non-
inflationary requirements for world reserve 
growth. 
Turning now from the deficit countries to the 
surplus countries, it is equally obvious that the 
present system does not p ace as stringent limita-
tions on their ability to accumulate large and 
persistent surpluses as on the ability of the deficit 
countries to finance large and persistent deficits. 
It allows each of them, moreover, to expand, 
or contract, the portion of the world reserve pool 
available by deciding unilaterally at any point 
in time: 
(1) Either to accept fiduciary reserve assets 
in settlement of its current surpluses, and/or in 
exchange of previously accumulated gold re-
serves; or, on the contrary; 
(2) To exact from other countries excessive 
amounts of limited gold supplies by insisting on 
gold settlement of its current surpluses, and 
even of fiduciary reserves accumulated over 
many years past. 
The forthcoming reform of the international 
monetary system should distribute more equitably 
and rationally between surplus and deficit coun-
tries the burden of balance-of-payments adjust-
ments. The over-all pace of reserve creation, or 
destruction, should be a matter for concerted, 
collective decisions between all the interested 
countries. Surplus countries, taken as a group, 
should be required to accumulate and retain in 
the form of fiduciary reserve assets the portion 
of their surpluses which exceeds available gold 
supplies. Any individual surplus country, how-
ever, would retain a free choice between three 
possible lines of action: 
(1) To decrease its current account surpluses 
by pursuing more expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies; or, if this subjects it to un-
desirable inflationary price pressures, by liberal-
izing its tariff and other import restrictions, or, 
ultimately, by revaluing its exchange rate up-
ward. (The more frequent use of this latter 
technique would combat the bias toward devalua-
tion—as opposed to revaluation—characteristic 
of the present system.) 
(2) Expand its foreign lending, private and/ 
or oflicial. 
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(3) Accumulate fiduciary reserves, with full 
exchange—value and liquidity guarantees, but 
at correspondingly low rates of interest, and in 
a form susceptible of helping finance the long-
term development needs of less developed coun-
tries29 
(e) Regional monetary integration 
I doubt whether any negotiable aspect of the 
proposed reform of the international monetary 
system is as crucial to the interests of the less 
developed countries as the more rational and 
equitable distribution of balance-of-payments 
pressures between surplus and deficit countries 
advocated under (d) above. It involves, how-
ever, the acceptance of considerable discretion 
by the Fund authorities in appraising the re-
adjustment policies which deficit countries should 
follow in order to qualify for Fund assistance. 
This, of course, is not new: borrowers—nations 
as well as individuals—have always had to 
discuss with the lenders the purposes for which 
loans are granted and the conditions attached 
to them. Yet, the Fund's lending policies have 
been subject to considerable—and, at times, 
valid—criticism on this score, and prospective 
borrowers would undoubtedly welcome some 
extension of their automatic borrowing rights, 
as suggested, for example, by Dr. Bernstein, the 
UNCTAD report and the IMF itself. 
While welcoming myself some move in that 
direction, I cannot but feel that automatic bor-
rowing rights should be limited to moderate 
amounts, and relatively short maturities, designed 
to meet unforeseen situations and to provide 
the time necessary for a deliberate examination 
of a country's problem and for the reaching of 
joint agreements on the amounts and purposes 
of the Fund's assistance. But it would be revo-
lutionary and Utopian, indeed, to expect the 
lenders to accept large automatic commitments 
to finance blindly the future deficits of all and 
any country, without regard for the wisdom or 
folly of the policies which may be at the root of 
these deficits. 
The acceptance of full-fledged discussion with 
the Fund, as a condition for its assistance, does 
not involve any surrender of existing national 
sovereignty. Any country remains free, of course, 
to reject the Fund's advice, together with the 
financing facilities subordinated to it. Yet a 
greater decentralization of the international 
monetary system, building upon the growing 
movement toward regional monetary co-opera-
tion and integration in many parts of the world. 
29 See CD. 27-28, above. 
might help avoid unnecessary conflicts between , 
borrowing members and the IMF, and assuage 
at the same time the objections of prospective 
surplus countries against, surrendering to the 
Fund full control over the large contributions 
which they should be called upon to make, in 
the future, to the required expansion of the 
world reserve pool. 
These contributions would be reduced to a 
more manageable size if they were designed 
only to finance disequilibria between each 
regional group and the rest of the world, and 
if disequilibria within each group itself were 
financed from resources contributed to it and 
on which it retained full control. This is, indeed, 
the system envisaged for the EEC countries by 
article 108 of the Treaty of Rome, and which 
would be most logically implemented—and 
probably will be some day—^through the cre-
ation of the European Reserve Fund, long ad-
vocated by Jean Monnet's Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe. 
The Central American countries have already 
made greater progress in this direction with the 
establishment of the Central American Clearing 
House in 1961 (Cámara de Compensación Cen-
troamericana) and the 1964 Agreement for the 
Establishment of the Central American Monetary 
Union (Acuerdo para el Establecimiento de la 
Unión Monetaria Centroamericana). While more 
modest in scope, the agreements already con-
cluded among the ALALC countries could serve 
as a basis for similar co-operation in the future. 
The maintenance by each Latin American 
central bank of an agreed portion of its total 
reserves in the form of deposits with a central 
clearing house would provide the latter with 
some lending potential enabling it to provide 
partial assistance at least, even though on a 
modest and insufficient scale in most cases, to 
any member in balance-of-payments difficulties. 
The conditions attached to such lending would 
be discussed among the Latin American coun-
tries themselves, and might be more realistically 
conceived than those imposed at times by the 
IMF Executive Board. If a further approach to 
the Fund proved necessary—as would undoubt-
edly often be the case—^to supplement the scant 
resources of the Latin American Clearing House, 
it could take the form of a "concerted action" 
by all members, as foreseen in article 108, 2(a) 
of the Rome Treaty. Such support would carry 
all the more weight as it would have been un-
derwritten in advance by other members' wil-
lingness to commit their own resources to the ^  
support of the readjustment policies of the bor- i 
rowing coimtry. 
If, on the other hand, the policies of the pro-
spective borrower were deemed inadequate by 
its Latin American partners to justify their own 
financial assistance, they could not then blame 
the IMF for insisting also on further policy 
action as a condition for its own lending.®" 
2. An urgent first step 
(a) Arguments for negotiating priority 
The solution of the long-run problems dis-
cussed above—the adjustment of reserve creation 
to the monetary requirements of economic 
growth, and the use of the resulting lending 
potential to reinforce desirable pressures for 
adjustment on both surplus and deficit countries 
—will exercise a crucial influence, for better or 
for worse, on the future of our world, for many 
years to come. They are also problems, however, 
which still raise complex and divisive issues 
among the negotiators, in view of conflicting 
economic, political, and emotional reactions 
regarding the desirable pace and legitimate 
purposes of reserve increases, the role of gold 
in the system, the necessary surrenders—or 
rather mergers—of national monetary sover-
eignty that may be required, the selection of 
countries that should participate in these deci-
sions, their relative voting power, the degree of 
automaticity that might prove acceptable as an 
alternative to continuous negotiations in cases 
of disagreement, etc., etc. Any practical recon-
ciliation of views of these matters is most likely 
to require considerable time still, and undue 
haste in reaching agreement would most probably 
entail undesirable compromises centring on the 
lowest—rather than the highest—common de-
nominator between the opposite objective and 
techniques now favoured by the major reserve-
so For further discussion of these issues and cf 
alternative methods for implementation, see: "Inte-
gration économique et politique monétaire", in La Res-
tauration des monnaies européennes (special issue of 
the Revue d'économie politique, December 1960), Sirey, 
Paris, pp. 58-81; translated as "Integración Económica 
Europea y Política Monetaria", in Coordinación Mone-
taria Regional, CEMLA, Mexico, 1963, pp. 43-63; La 
Communauté économique européenne et la cooperation 
monétaire internationale (report to the Tenth Round 
Table on Europe's Problems, Basle, November 1962), 
reproduced in Problemes de VEurope, 1963; "Una Cá-
mara de Compensación y Unión de Pagos Latinoameri-
cana" in Cooperación Financiera en América Latina, 
CEMLA, Mexico, 1963, pp. 95-117; "Hacia una Orga-
nización Monetaria Latinoamericana" in La Integración 
de América Latina: Experiencias y Perspectivas, Miguel 
Wionczek, ed., Fondo de Cultura, México and Buenos 
Aires, 1964; "International Monetary Arrangements, 
Capital Markets, and Economic Integration in Latin 
America", Journal of Common Market Studies, Oxford, 
1965; Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the 
Expert Group on an African Payments Union; ( E / 
CN.14/262, 4 February 1964), Annex VI. 
debtors and reserve-creditors of the Group of 
Ten.31 
The major reserve holders of Continental 
Europe, without whom an optimum agreement 
on these long-term issues remains impossible, 
continue to view with suspicion any discussion of 
concerted reserve increases that might be used 
to underwrite in advance future international 
rescue operations in favour of the reserve cur-
rencies, whenever their central banks refuse to 
add further amounts of dollar and sterling lOU's 
to holdings which they deem already far in ex-
cess of their requirements. 
The removal of this obstacle to a negotiated 
agreement depends primarily on the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, 
and the major reserve holders of continental 
Europe, on the other, rather than any action that 
could be undertaken by the less developed coun-
tries. Yet, any agreement that could be reached 
to protect the dollar and the pound against un-
necessary devaluation would also be of major 
interest to them, since they hold in fact most of 
their monetary reserves in the form of dollar and 
sterling balances. Moreover, concrete agreement 
on ways and means to expand reserves, when 
needed, in the most rational and efficient manner, 
would be greatly facilitated if a machinery had 
already been established previously—along the 
lines suggested below—to prevent their con-
traction. 
Such an agreement should be given the highest 
priority in the current negotiations, as it is both 
far more urgent and should prove far easier to 
negotiate rapidly, than measures aiming at future 
reserve increases. 
It is more urgent in view of the large mass of 
foreign exchange reserves (about 22,000 million 
dollars) legally convertible at any time into 
gold-metal by their holders, directly or indirectly. 
Such conversions could be triggered by political 
as well as strictly economic development: fears 
of blocking, refusal to ease the financing of the 
debtor countries' deficits, fears of a change in 
gold parities, etc. The liquidation of 3,200 mil-
31 The danger of some such undesirable compromise 
looms larger indeed as this manuscript goes to press, 
and adds to the urgency of a more active and forceful 
participation by the less developed countries in the 
forthcoming IMF debate. The major issue at stake is 
the link between reserve creation and development 
financing (see B <4) and C (1) (C) IIIA3 above) 
advocated by UNCTAD, but strongly opposed so far by 
the Group of Ten. Support for such a "link" may be 
building up in the United States Congress. See the 
recent Report to the Joint Economic Committee by 
Representatives Henry S. Reuss (Chairman of the Sub-
committee on International Exchange and Payments) 
and Robert F. Ellsworth: 01} Dead Center-. Some Pro-
posals to Strengthen Free IForU Economic Cooperation 
(Washington, D.C., December 1965). 
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lion dollars of foreign exchange reserve assets 
by developed countries other than the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the first six 
months of this year (1965) testifies to the reality 
of this danger. (See above, pp. 14-15.) 
Such measures should also be far easier to 
negotiate, as they do not require any reconcilia-
tion of views about the desirable pace of 
reserve increases, the geographical distribution 
of such increases, the policies which they would 
support, etc. All that is involved is avoidance of 
any massive contraction of already outstanding 
foreign exchange claims and debts, accumulated 
over many years past and long incorporated into 
the existing structure of world reserves.®^ 
(b) Broad features of proposed initial agreement 
Eight countries (United States, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, France, West Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands) have long 
held traditionally in gold-metal a much larger 
proportion of their total monetary reserves than 
other countries. As of last June, for instance, 
gold accounted for about 85 per cent, and 
foreign exchange for only 15 per cent, of their 
combined gold and foreign exchange holdings. 
In contrast, other countries held only 33 per 
cent of their reserves in gold, and 67 per cent 
in foreign exchange. The gold holdings of these 
eight countries accounted, as of the same date, 
for more than four fifths of the total for all 
the countries in the world outside the Com-
munist bloc. 
Future compatibility between global demand 
and supply of monetary gold, at present gold 
prices, is crucially dependent on concerted action 
by these coimtries, limiting their total demand 
for gold to available supplies. Any agreement of 
this sort, however, would clearly be unnegotiable 
at the present juncture, if it implied the obliga-
tion for the six continental European countries 
to accumulate and retain in the currencies of 
the other two (the United Kingdom and the 
United States) all or most of any future ac-
cruals to their present monetary reserves. This 
would hardly be in the interests of the un-
der-developed countries themselves, and would 
clash directly with the "multilateral surveillance" 
principle repeatedly affirmed in the Group of 
Ten report, since it would earmark quasi-
automatically the largest portion of prospective 
reserve accumulation for loans—required or 
unrequired—to the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
If this is to be avoided, and if the use of the 
lending counterpart of reserve accumulation is 
32 For a more detailed discussion of negotiability, see 
sub-section (c) below, pp. 33-34. 
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to be brought under multilateral surveillance, 
reserve-holders should be provided with an 
alternative reserve asset, sufficiently safe and at-
tractive to serve as a substitute for gold itself 
as well as for dollars and sterling. 
The agreement outlined in the appendix would 
set up for this purpose a Gold Conversion Ac-
count, administered jointly by the participating 
countries. Each of these would deposit with this 
Gold Conversion Account any excess of foreign 
currency balances accumulated by its monetary 
authority over and above normal working 
balances needed for stabilization interventions 
in the exchange markets and anticipated needs 
for debt repayments to the country (or coun-
tries) in the currency of which such balances 
are held. 
Deposits with the Gold Conversion Account 
would carry full gold-value guarantees®^ and a 
modest rate of interest. They would be used 
primarily and on sight (or short notice) to 
replenish depleted working balances in any 
participating currency. They could, moreover, 
also be converted at any time into gold-metal 
by any depositor whose ratio of gold to total 
reserves (defined as the monetary authorities' 
holdings of gold, foreign exchange, and deposits 
with the Account) is lower than the average 
ratio for the participating countries taken 
together. Conversely, the countries whose gold 
ratio is the highest would agree to sell gold to 
the Account—against equivalent increases in 
their gold-guaranteed deposits with the Ac-
count—to the extent necessary to meet the actual 
gold withdrawals of other members. 
Future currency balances accruing to any 
country and turned over by it to the Account 
would be automatically and immediately re-
payable in gold to the Account by the debtor 
countries, in so far as they exceeded the foreign 
currency balances turned over by these countries 
themselves to the Account. This rule, however, 
would not be applied to the currency balances 
already outstanding at the time the agreement 
entered into force, and accumulated over long 
years of functioning of the present gold-exchange 
standard. Indeed, one of the primary purposes 
of the agreement would be to guard against the 
sudden and immediate contraction of the world 
reserve pool, the unsustainable gold losses by the 
reserve currency countries, and the consequent 
33 Other guarantees against default, blocking, etc., are 
spelled out in my paper on "The International Monetary 
System" in Moorgate and If all Street (summer 1965), 
pp. 33-34, reprinted in Guidelines for International 
Monetary Reform (Hearings before the Subcommittee 
,on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
1965), Part 2: Supplement, pp. 358-359. 
threat of collapse of the international monetary 
system, which such conversions might entail. The 
outstanding currency balances initially trans-
ferred to the Account would therefore be re-
tained by it, subject to agreement with the 
debtors on full gold-value guarantees and modest 
interest payments. They would be gradually 
amortized over a period of years: 
(1) As a minimum, to reduce excessive 
demands by the debtors for conversion into gold 
of the surpluses accumulated by them in the 
future; 
(2) If needed to reach agreement, by periodic 
instalments, at a rate not exceeding 2 or 3 per 
cent a year, such contractual amortization to be 
postponed, however, whenever deemed in con-
flict with the general stabilization objectives of 
the Fund. 
(c) Negotiability of such an agreement 
The last column of table 7 shows the maximum 
amounts of gold reshuiSings which might have 
been entailed by the proposed agreement, if it 
had come into operation as of 30 June 1965. 
While a different date would, of course, modify 
these estimates, they can be used nevertheless 
as a rough indication of the magnitudes involved 
and of the privileges and commitments involved 
for the prospective participants. 
(i) Acceptability to the reserve currency 
creditors of continental Europe. The reserve 
currency creditors of continental Europe, taken 
as a group, would limit to about 1,600 mil-
lion dollars theoretical gold conversion rights 
totalling, as of June 30, 1965, more than 5,000 
million dollars (columns 6 and 2, respectively, 
table 7) . 
TaM® 7 
WORLD MONETARY RESERVES AND IMPACT OF PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION 
fAs of 30 June 1965) 
In millions of 






In millions of 







Major gold holders 33 844 6180 40024 15 6180 — 
A. Reserve currency debtors 16 534 1112 17646 6 2 724 —i 612 
1. United States 14 308 546 14 854 4 2 293 —1747 
2. United Kingdom 2 226 566 2 792 20 431 +135 
B. Reserve currency creditors 17310 5 068 22378 23 3 456 +1612 
3. Switzerland 2 789 220 3 009 7 465 —245 
4. Netherlands 1763 254 2017 13 311 —57 
5. France 4 433 917 5 350 17 826 + 9 1 
6. Belgium 1563 437 2 000 22 309 + l 2 8 
7. West Germany 4 378 2 015 6 393 32 987 + 1028 
8. Italy 2 384 1225 3 609 34 557 +668 
Other countries 7555 15520 23 075 67 
A. In Group of Ten 1618 3534 5152 69 
9. Canada 1089 1400 2 489 56 
10. Sweden 202 721 923 78 
11. Japan 327 1413 1740 81 
B. Other developed areas 3117 4 616 7 733 60 
1. In Europe 2 511 3 019 5 530 55 
2. Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa 606 1597 2203 72 
C. Less developed areas 2 820 7 370 10190 72 
1. Latin America 1070 1865 2 935 64 
2. Middle East 785 1775 2 560 69 
3. Other Asia 665 2 545 3 210 79 
4. Other Africa 155 1 185 1340 88 
II. 
'Proportionate holdings 
a Basic estimates in columns 1-3 are derived from the December 1965 issue of International Financial 
Statistics (pp. 16-17). 
b Column 4 = (column 2 column 3) X 100. 
c Column 5 — column 3 multiplied by average foreign exchange ratio for the 8 major gold holders taken 
together (15.44 per cent rounded up to 15 per cent on first line of column 4). 
d Column 6 = column 2 minus column 1, and shows the maximum limit of gold reshufflings under the pro-
posed agreement. 
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This would leave most of them free to convert 
into gold, if they wished, substantial amounts 
of foreign exchange reserves (up to more than 
1,000 million dollars in the case of West 
Germany). Only two countries (Switzerland and 
the Netherlands) might be forced to sell minor 
amounts of their gold holdings to the Account, 
and this only in the unlikely case in which the 
first countries all used to the full their gold 
conversion rights. 
Actual gold conversions, however, would be 
likely to be far more modest than these maximum 
estimates would indicate. A substantial portion 
of their outstanding foreign exchange assets 
would have to be retained by them in any case 
as working balances needed for daily stabiliza-
tion interventions on the exchange markets. 
These "required" foreign exchange reserves may 
be roughly estimated at somewhere between 5 
per cent and 10 per cent of their total reserve 
holdings of 22,000 million dollars, i.e. at about 
1,000 million dollars to 2,000 million dollars. 
This would reduce to between 3,000 million 
dollars and 4,000 million dollars, at most, the 
amounts that they might transfer into Gold 
Conversion Account deposits. 
The availability of both interest-earnings and 
full guarantees against devaluation, default, 
blocking, etc. on these new Gold Account de-
posits would hardly induce massive conversions 
of such deposits into gold-metal by countries 
which previously refrained from converting into 
gold unguaranteed foreign exchange assets ex-
posed to all these risks. Actual conversions into 
gold would, therefore, be most likely to remain 
well below the maximum figures shown in 
column 6 of table 7. In the course of time, after 
sufiicient experience had been gained with the 
new system, one should even expect opposite 
shifts to take place, i.e. to have participating 
countries sell gold voluntarily to the Account 
in exchange for gold-guaranteed and interest-
earning Gold Account deposits, as freely usable 
as gold itself for balance-of-payments settlements. 
(ii) Acceptability to the reserve currency 
debtors. The United Kingdom's gold reserves 
were slightly smaller, as of 30 June 1965, than 
the amoimts which it would be entitled to require 
and retain under the proposed agreement. Its 
position was, therefore, in this respect, similar 
to that of the majority of the continental Euro-
pean participants discussed above. 
The United States, on the other hand, would 
expose itself to gold conversions, totalling as a 
maximum, about 1,750 million dollars,®^ but 
In view of the guarantees attached to the Gold 
Account deposits which the United States would require 
in exchange, these could properly continúe to be re-
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likely to be far smaller in fact—or even nil— 
for the reasons brought forth under (i) above. 
It would also, however, be fully guaranteed 
against the much larger gold conversions—up to 
a theoretical maximum of 5,600 million dol-
lars—^that the other seven participating coun-
tries might legally exact from it today or to-
morrow, either in anticipation of a revaluation 
of gold, or because of their refusal to participate 
in the financing of United States deficits and 
policies with which they disagree, or as a 
bludgeoning weapon to force the United States 
to change such policies, or in order to protect 
themselves against possible United States block-
ing of their dollar accounts in the extreme case 
of more acute political divergences, etc. 
This is only one of the reasons why the United 
States should regard such an agreement as of 
major benefit to itself, independently of its in-
terest in the other, and broader, objectives of 
international monetary reform. Another reason 
is the fact that the consequent abatement of any 
expectation of a forced revaluation of gold—as 
a result of massive dollar conversions by the 
increasingly reluctant holders of continental 
Europe—would almost certainly induce a spec-
tacular reversal in gold and currency specula-
tion which is probably responsible today for 
most, or all, of the residual deficits in the United 
States balance of payments. Hoarding and specu-
lative gold purchases—not accounted for by in-
dustrial and artistic uses—more than doubled, 
following the gold flare-up of October 1960, and 
were running in the first half of 1965 at nearly 
four times their average amounts in the decade 
of the 1950's. Speculative gold stocks have thus 
risen by a total amount of 5,000 million dollars 
or more, in the last six years alone. An agree-
ment—such as suggested here—^making both 
obvious and operational the determination of 
the major gold-holding countries to avoid any 
change in gold prices would undoubtedly dis-
hearten the gold speculators and induce them 
to unload several billions of the enormous and 
costly gold hoards accumulated by them in an-
ticipation of a proximate revaluation of the price 
of gold. The funds released by such dishoarding 
would have to be reinvested, and the largest 
portion of them would have to seek such re-
investment in the major financial markets of the 
world, i.e. in New York, and even London, thus 
reversing the heavy flights of short-term capital 
to which these countries have been exposed in 
recent years. 
garded as part of the United States gold reserves, 
just as no deduction is now made from them for the 
amounts due to foreign or international monetary 
authorities, even when these entail a full gold commit-
ment (as is the case, e.g., for the 800 million dollars 
of IMF gold invested in United States securities). 
The over-all deficits of the United States bal-
ance of payments today are far smaller indeed 
than the 2,600 million dollar reversal in average 
yearly short-term capital movements experienced 
by the United States beginning with the spread 
of revaluation rumours in 1960, and which 
replaced about 1,000 million dollars a year of 
normal inflows toward a major financial centre 
in the late 1950's (1955-1959) with abnormal 
outflows of 1,600 million dollars a year in the 
first half of the 1960's (1960-1964).®® 
Two possible United States objections to the 
proposed agreement require a final word of 
comment. 
The first is the cost of the gold-value guar-
antee on the short-term dollar balances initially 
transferred to the Account and consolidated by 
it into long-term obligations. Such a guarantee 
would, of course, be a prerequisite for such con-
solidation, but it should prove costless in fact, 
if it helps us honour our repeatedly reiterated 
pledge to maintain the stability of the dollar, by 
removing a major threat to our ability to do so. 
We would, moreover, effect right away sub-
stantial savings on the balances so transferred, 
since interest costs would be far lower on such 
gold-guaranteed obligations than on present un-
guaranteed dollar balances. 
The second objection is that we would have 
to give up the expectation of having our fu-
ture deficits financed in large part and quasi-
automatically by further piling-up of dollar 
balances as reserves by the participating coun-
tries. Such an expectation, however, would 
hardly seem realistic at this stage and its aban-
donment would be a small price to pay for the 
protection gained against far more likely con-
versions into gold of our outstanding indebted-
ness to them. It would, moreover, clash head-on 
with the "multilateral surveillance" principle 
under which such financing should be subject 
to multilateral consultation and remain available 
to us, on a vast scale indeed, through the Fund, 
the General Arrangements to Borrow, and the 
further provisions that might expand, in a second 
stage of negotiations, the functions of the Gold 
Conversion Account itself (see under (e) be-
low). In any case, our present gross reserve 
assets—equivalent to about 75 per cent of an-
nual imports—should amply cover any legiti-
mate needs for future deficit financing, if they 
could be earmarked for this purpose alone and 
35 A more sophisticated econometric study of Jerome 
L. Stein • similarly estimates at about 2,500 million 
dollars a year the impact of speculative capital move-
ments on the United States balance of payments in 
the absence of interest-rate differentials. See his "Inter-
national Short-Term Capital Movements", in the Ameri-
can Economic Review, March 1965, pp. 40-66. 
protected against sudden or massive liquidation 
of our most vulnerable reserve liabilities. 
(d) Extension to other countries 
The adoption of the proposed agreement by 
the eight countries listed above would, in itself, 
benefit all other countries—with the main excep-
tion of South Africa, of course—by removing 
one of the main and most immediate threats to 
the stability of the currency in which they hold 
the bulk of their reserves and, as a consequence, 
to the stability of the international monetary 
system itself. 
Yet other countries might wish to join the 
Agreement, and the accession of some of them 
at least would be highly desirable to enlarge 
the scope of multilateral surveillance. 
The main difficulty to be faced arises from 
the fact that the accession of many other coun-
tries, on similar terms, might lead to a substan-
tial lowering of the minimum gold ratio that 
could be guaranteed to members. As long as 
the eight initial members of the Agreement re-
tain their traditional attachment to gold reserves, 
they might resist the dilution of their gold ratio 
that might be entailed by the accession of other 
countries to the system. 
This obstacle would become weaker, however, 
and should indeed be totally overcome in time 
if, as foreseen above, familiarity with the ad-
vantage of Gold Account deposits gradually in-
duces a preference for them as a more attractive 
meditmi than sterile gold hoards for reserve 
holding. 
In the meantime, it could be overcome through 
the negotiation of separate agreements regard-
ing the maximum use which a new member 
might wish, or be able, to make of its gold con-
version rights, particularly with regard to its 
already outstanding foreign currency reserves. 
Both desire and ability to request such conver-
sions would be far lower in any case than might 
be suggested by the estimates reported in col-
umns 2 and 4 of table 7: 
(1) Because the global reserves of most coun-
tries other than the initial signatories are far 
closer to minimum working levels needed for 
interventions in the market, and leave therefore 
relatively little room for conversion into Gold 
Account deposits; 
(2) Because a substantial portion of these 
reserves is derived from relatively short-term 
borrowings in New York or London, which 
might not be renewed if their central banks 
decreased their deposits in these centres; 
(3) Because preference for gold is tradi-
tionally much weaker in most of these countries, 
and more than offset by their desire to maximize 
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earnings (available from foreign exchange re-
serves and, at a much lower rate from Gold 
Account deposits, but not from gold reserves) ; 
(4) In the case of the so-called sterling area, 
because of somewhat more formal arrangements 
inducing the overseas sterling members to retain 
a large portion of their reserves in the form of 
sterling balances in London. 
Finally, the abatement of gold revaluation 
fears and the gold-value guarantees offered on 
Gold Account deposits would also contribute to 
decreasing even further the likelihood of any 
sudden and irrational desire for gold, on the 
part of countries in which the gold thirst is not 
deeply rooted in past habits, routines and tradi-
tion. In their case, even more than in the case 
of Europe, one might expect opposite shifts from 
sterile gold hoards into voluntarily held Gold 
Account deposits. 
(e) Link to long-term objectives 
The implementation of the initial Agreement 
suggested above would not solve, admittedly, 
the long-run problem of providing for ade-
quate reserve increases in an expanding world 
economy. It would, however, facilitate later nego-
tiation of the measures required for this purpose 
and which could, most easily and logically, be 
grafted upon the machinery put in place to guard 
against the threat of a sudden decline in already 
existing reserve levels. 
Three such lines of development may be men-
tioned briefly here, even though it would be wise 
to postpone such "contingency planning" until 
the problem becomes actual—and evident to 
all—and sufficient confidence has been built in 
the new Gold Conversion Account deposits as a 
safe, liquid, and highly attractive medium for 
reserve accumulation by central banks. 
(i) Integration of the GAB into the Gold Con-
version Account Agreement 
(1) Whenever circumstances arose under 
which the participating countries would agree to 
resort to the present GAB provisions, they could 
instead direct the Gold Conversion Account to 
invest an appropriate portion of its gold assets 
in gold-guaranteed obligations of the country 
requesting an exchange transaction or stand-by 
arrangement "necessary in order to forestall or 
cope with an impairment of the international 
monetary system.. . in the new conditions of 
widespread convertibility, including greater 
freedom for short-term capital movements.. ." 
(GAB, paragraph 6 and preamble). 
(2) The increasing preference of members for 
Gold Account deposits rather than gold-metal 
reserves should provide ample resources for such 
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operations. If, however, and to the extent that 
the gold resources of the Account might become 
inadequate for this purpose, recourse would be 
taken to paragraph 6 of the proposed Gold Con-
version Account Agreement, preferably under 
the more flexible voting provisions suggested for 
the operation of the latter. (It might still be 
possible, if no agreement on voting rules could 
be reached otherwise, to recognize the right of 
minority countries to abstain from participation 
in an operation decided by majority vote. Only 
the majority countries would, in that case, agree 
to raise the proportion of their total reserves 
to be held in the form of deposits with the Gold 
Conversion Account.) 
(ii) Exactly the same procedures (as under 
( i ) , 1 and 2, immediately above) could be used 
whenever the participating countries agreed on 
the need to increase world reserves, by any given 
amount. 
I have long argued myself that such a decision 
might then best be carried out through invest-
ments in IBRD obligations or in gold-guaranteed 
obligations of the countries most able and will-
ing to engage in long-term financing of the de-
velopment needs of the under-developed areas 
of the world. (See, e.g., The Evolution of the 
International Monetary System: Historical Re-
appraisal and Future Perspectives, Princeton, 
1964, pp. 33-35.) This, after all, is the only way 
in which the richer industrial countries could 
increase their "earned" net reserves, as opposed 
to "mutually borrowed" gross reserves. Official 
opinion, in continental Europe at least, still 
seems to incline toward other and more auto-
matic solutions, distributing the new reserve 
assets pro rata of each country's gold holdings, 
or IMF quotas, or other pre-determined criteria. 
To my mind, this would be incompatible with 
their repeatedly asserted objective of linking in-
creases in world reserves to the improvement of 
the present balance-of-payments adjustment me-
chanism and policies. 
In any case, I see no reason to try to force an 
immediate, once-and-for-all resolution of these 
conflicting views in favour of a single formula. 
The choice between the above alternatives—and 
indeed others—could be left to the ad hoc deci-
sion of the participating countries at the time 
when they agree on need for a reserve increase, 
and might differ with each individual case, in the 
light of prevailing conditions and major policy 
objectives at that time. Whatever reserve increase 
is then deemed desirable could be implemented 
in a variety of ways, including not only those 
briefly summarized above, but also, for instance. 
Gold Conversion Account gold or currency de-
posits with the IMF designed to enlarge the 
capacity of the Fund to finance normal draw-
ings under the Articles of Agreement. 
(iii) A third possible use of Gold Conversion 
Account investment might occasionally arise in 
connection with the repayment of IMF drawings 
at the end of the maximum three to five year 
period specified in the Executive Board's deci-
sions of 13 February 1952, and 23 December 
1953. Circumstances might arise under which 
such repayment might be deemed undesirable 
both from the point of view of the country con-
cerned—in the light of its circumstances and 
policies at the time—and from that of the evolu-
tion of world reserves themselves. The members 
of the Gold Conversion Account might then 
deem it appropriate to offset the unwanted im-
pact of such repayment through investments in 
the obligations of the repaying country. Such 
investments would not, by themselves, lead to 
any new increases, but merely avoid a decline 
in the outstanding level of world reserves. 
(Such a procedure might, for instance, prove 
useful to smooth out over a longer period of 
time the United Kingdom's large IMF repay-
ment obligations, in view of the extremely low 
and inadequate reserve levels of that country.) 
( f ) On the relation of the above proposals to 
other current proposals for international 
monetary reform 
The proposals above combine into a single 
package various suggestions made in the past 
by the negotiators of the Group of Ten, and 
particularly: 
(1) Mr. Roosa's suggestion for a less asym-
metrical system of assuring the convertibility 
of the major currencies used in world trade. 
Only the United States and France now redeem 
directly into gold-metal excess holdings of their 
currencies presented for conversion by central 
banks. This, however, is due to the fact that 
these two countries hold the bulk of their mone-
tary reserves in gold, and relatively little in 
foreign exchange. If other countries were to be 
asked to redeem their currency in gold—rather 
than as now in dollars—this might induce them 
to convert much of their present dollars into gold. 
This is obviously not what Mr. Roosa wants. 
My alternative suggestion for a Gold Con-
version Account would restore full symmetry 
between all participating currencies with respect 
to their conversion rights and obligations, with-
out entailing massive losses of gold by the 
present reserve currency countries. 
(2) French, German, and Dutch suggestions 
for a more harmonious and equitable distribu-
tion of gross reserves between gold and foreign 
currencies. 
(3) Belgian suggestions aiming at making 
fully liquid—and thus acceptable as monetary 
reserves—central banks' assets other than gold-
metal alone. 
(4) Italian and other suggestions—from Mr. 
Roosa, for instance—for applying this technique 
to the consolidation of the excessive short-term 
indebtedness of the United Kingdom, while pre-
serving the liquidity of such claims. 
(5) French suggestions to base such assets 
upon adequate gold-value and gold-convertibility 
guarantees. 
(6) Former Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Maudling's plan, with three modifications de-
signed (i) to mop up ex ante, rather than ex 
post, unrequired foreign currency reserves whose 
sudden unloading may at any time trigger crises 
for the debtor country, (ii) to ensure the full 
acceptability and transferability of his "mutual 
currency accounts", and (iii) to clarify the re-
payment obligations of the debtor countries. 
(7) The IMF proposals for Fund investments, 
decided at the initiation of the Fund, and 
financed by members' reserve deposits. 
D . S U M M A R Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main interest of the Latin American 
countries in the monetary negotiations now in 
process coincides with that of other countries. 
In the short run it lies in a speedy agreement 
among the major gold-holding countries, re-
moving the major threat to the existing level of 
reserves and to the stability of the present inter-
national monetary system, i.e. the danger of 
wanton liquidations into gold-metal of the ex-
cessive short term indebtedness accumulated by 
the reserve centres over many years of function-
ing of the gold-exchange standard. 
This objective could be met by assigning first 
priority in the current negotiations to the estab-
lishment of a Gold Conversion Account, limiting 
such conversions to available gold supplies, and 
providing a more appropriate and highly at-
tractive medium for reserve holdings, superior 
in many ways to gold itself. 
In the longer run the essential interests of all 
lie in a more rational organization of the process 
of reserve creation: 
(1) Substituting world-wide requirements for 
non-inflationary growth of trade and production 
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as the main criterion for the over-all pace of 
reserve increases, in lieu of the totally irrelevant 
and haphazard factors which determine it pri-
marily today, i.e. the profitability of gold-mining, 
the USSR gold sales in Western markets, pri-
vate gold absorption into arts, industry, hoard-
ing, and speculation, and central banks' switches 
from gold into reserve currencies, or vice versa; 
(2) Bringing under multilateral surveillance 
and collective decisions the use of the lending 
potential deriving from future accumulation of 
the fudiciary reserve (or "credit-reserves") that 
will be needed, on an increasing scale, over 
future years to supplement inadequate gold sup-
plies (or even to replace them entirely) when 
central bank officials have acquired sufficient 
familiarity with, and confidence in, the qualities 
of the new type of reserve asset to be estalDlished. 
Among the multiple aspects of such an "aggior-
namento" of our outdated international monetary 
system, two are of crucial importance to all 
countries, but particularly to the less developed 
areas of the world: 
(1) A more effective and equitable distribu-
tion of necessary adjustment pressures and dis-
ciplines between surplus countries and deficit 
countries, in the light of the deflationary, or in-
flationary, trends that need to be combated by 
monetary action; 
(2) A proper allocation of a substantial por-
tion of the lending counterpart of needed reserve 
accumulation in ways that can contribute to 
long-term development financing, without en-
dangering in the least the liquid character 
of reserve holdings for balance-of-payments 
settlements. 
The Latin American countries, and other 
under-developed countries, would best serve their 
own interests, as well as as those of other coun-
tries, by focusing their negotiating influence on 
the achievement of these objectives rather than 
by frittering it away in futile efforts to extract 
from other countries unilateral concessions of one 
sort or another, but less directly related to the 
convergent interests of all countries in the 




EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RESERVES 
Table A 
SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RESERVES, 1949-JUNE 1965 





I. World monetary gold 34 975 40193 43 062 42 997 
n . IMF and BIS 153 937 1983 3639 
A. Reserve positions in IMF 1658 3 250 4155 5 276 
B. Minus IMF and BIS gold holdings 1505 —2 313 2172 1637 
III. Foreign exchange 10 390 16470 23 860 21730 
A. Dollars 3 360 10 393 15 585 14611 
B. Sterling^ 7 019 6 066 7046 6504 
C. Other and discrepancies (including Euro-
dollars and Euro-sterling) 11 11 1229 615 
Total gross reserves 45518 57 600 68905 68 366 
I. Reserve centres (net) 17338 7346 -4J959 —5269 
A. United States 22664 10 611 287 351 
1. Gross assets 26 024 21504 16 672 15 762 
a. Gold 24563 19507 15 471 14308t> 
b. Reserve position in IMF 1461 1997 769 9081» 
c. Foreign exchange — — 432 546 
2. Liabilities (—) to: —3 360 —10 893 —16385 —15 411 
a. IMF — —500 —800 —800 
b. Foreign monetary authorities —3 360 —10 393 —15585 —14611 
B. United Kingdom —5 326 —3 265 —5 246 —5 620 
1. Gross assets 1752 2 801 2 316 2 792 
a. Gold 1321 2 514 2136 2226 
b. Reserve position in IMF — 65 — — 
c. Foreign exchange 431 222 179 566 
2. Liabilities ( — ) to: —7 078 —6 066 —7562 —8412 
a. IMF —59 — —516 —1908 
b. Foreign monetary authorities —7 019 —6 066 —7046 —6504 
II. Other countries (gross) 17 742 33295 49917 49812 
III. Subtotal (I + II) 35 080 40 641 44 958 44 543 
IV. Liabilities of reserve centres® 10438 16959 23947 23823 
SOURCES: All estimates are derived from International Financial Statistics, the Survey of Current Business, the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, and (for Russian gold sales in table B) the 
Annual Report of the BIS. 
Industrial and artistic uses of gold and ofEcial sterling holdings for 1949 are only rough estimates derived 
from a variety of sources. 
Reserve liabilities for countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom are not available, 
but are relatively minor except for their net debt to the IMF (about 900 million dollars in all at the end of 1964). 
8 Including both sterling holdings (6 846 million dollars in December 1964, and 6 504 million dollars in 
June 1965) and foreign currency deposits (200 million dollars in December 1964) of foreign central monetary 
institutions. 
bThe 259 million dollars of gold actually paid in June to the IMF in anticipation of Fund quota increase 
is still included here under "Gold" rather than under "Reserve Position in IMF". 
c Sum of items I A 2 and I B 2 above. 
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Table 1 
SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
RESERVES, 1950-JUNE 1965 
(Annual rates of change, in millions of United States dollars) 
Period January-June 
1950-59 1960-64 1965 
I. World monetary gold from: 522 574 —130 
A. USSR sales HI 340 — 
B. Western sources 411 234 —130 
1. Production 939 1289 1400 
2. Private absorption (—): —527 —1056 —1530 
a. Arts and industry —200 —300 —350 
b. Hoarding and speculation —327 —756 —1180 
II. IMF and BIS 78 209 3 312 
A. Net reserve positions in IMF 159 181 2 242 
B. Minus IMF and BIS gold holdings —81 28 1070 
III. Foreign exchange 608 1478 - 4 260 
A. Dollars 703 1038 —1948 
B. Sterling —95 196 —1084 
C. Other and discrepancies (including 
Euro-dollars and Euro-sterling) — 244 —1228 
Total: Changes in gross reserves 1 208 2261 —1078 
I. Reserve centres (net) —999 —2461 —620 
A. United States —1 205 —2 065 128 
B. United iCingdom 206 —396 —748 
II. Other countries (gross) 1 555 3324 —210 
III. Subtotal (I + II) 556 863 -330 
IV. Liabilities of reserve centres 652 1398 —248 
SOURCE: Same as for table A. The figures on USSR gold sales are taken from the Annual Report of the Bank 
for International Settlements. 
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T H E E S T A B U S H M E N T O F A 
C O N V E R S I O N A C C O U N T A M O N G M A J O E G O L D R E S E M V E H O L D E M S 
1. Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States will establish and administer jointly a "Gold 
Conversion Account", using the IMF (or the BIS?) as 
Agent. 
2. Each participating country will deposit with this 
Gold Conversion Account any excess of foreign currency 
balances accumulated by its monetary authorities over 
and above working balances needed for stabilization 
interventions in the exchange markets and anticipated 
needs for debt repayments to the country (or countries) 
in the currency of which such balances are held. 
(It might be deemed desirable to specify maximum 
ceilings on retained holdings, in order to implement 
the "multilateral surveillance" objective affirmed in the 
report of the Group of Ten, and to avoid excessive 
monetary financing, by unilateral decisions or bilateral 
negotiations, of any participating country's deficits, 
susceptible of imposing unwanted inflationary pressures 
on other countries.) 
3. Deposits with the Gold Conversion Account will 
carry full gold-value guarantees and a modest rate of 
interest. They will be used primarily and on sight (or 
short notice) to replenish depleted working balances 
in any participating currency, but may also be with-
drawn at any time in gold-metal by the depositor, 
subject to provisions 4 and 6, (6), (3) below. 
4. Outstanding currency balances initially transferred 
to the Account will be retained by it, subject to agree-
ment with the debtor on full gold-value guarantees 
and modest interest payments. They will be subject to: 
(a) Regular amortization at a rate not exceeding (2, 
3 or 5?) per cent a year, such amortization to be post-
poned, however, whenever deemed in conflict with the 
general stabilization objectives of the IMF; 
(fi) Extraordinary amortization under provision 6, (6) 
(3) below. 
5. Other currency balances subsequently transferred 
to the Account will be automatically repayable in gold. 
6. Any global imbalance between gold payments to 
and gold withdrawals from the Account will be dealt 
with in the following manner: 
(a) In the event of gold accumulation in the Ac-
count deemed excessive by the participating countries, 
interest rates may be lowered on its deposit liabilities; 
(b) If a shortage of gold threatens to develop in the 
Account: (1) interest rates may be raised on its deposit 
liabilities; (2) demands for gold withdrawals by coun-
tries indebted to the Account (as a result of provision 
4 above) may be met instead by extraordinary amortiza-
tion of their outstanding indebtedness; (3) if the above 
measures prove insufficient to deal with a threatening 
gold shortage in the Account, the countries whose ratio 
of gold to total reserves (defined as their monetary 
authorities' holdings of gold, foreign exchange, and 
deposits with the Account) is highest will agree to sell 
gold to the Account—against equivalent increases in 
their gold-guaranteed deposits with the Account—to the 
extent necessary to meet the gold withdrawals of other 
members. (This would tend to diminish the present 
spread in reserve composition and might, as a limiting 
case, ultimately adjust such composition on the eight 
countries' average.) 
7. Any other convertible currency country may be 
invited to participate, provided that: 
(a) It accepts the obligations specified above; 
(b) It agrees not to use the gold conversion right 
specified under provision 4 above to increase its hold-
ings of gold-metal beyond its traditional ratio to total 
reserves. (Such "traditional" ratio would have to be 
agreed upon, before accession, and might be calculated 
on the basis of a past reference period as well as other 
factors, such as the country's offsetting indebtedness 
in the currency in which a large portion of its total 
monetary reserves are customarily held.) 
8. The pattern of voting rights to be agreed upon 
should be based largely (or even exclusively?) on 
the relative size of each participating country's average 
deposits and contingent commitments under provision 6, 
(6) (3) above. (At the limit, a voting pattern determined 
by commitments alone—see column 5 of table 7—would 
just about equilibrate initially the combined voting 
power of the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland with that of the five EEC participants. The 
actual pattern would vary, however, in the course of 
time, with changes in each country's total resources and 
commitments and in any additional, free deposits with 
the Accoimt.) 
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"SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT" AND "SOCIAL PLANNING": A SURVEY OF 
CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades several currents of 
theory, opinion, and governmental practice have 
come together in a widening stream of support 
f o r the proposition that the progress of the 
countries now at low income levels requires 
"planning". Acceptance of formal planning in 
the countries already at high income levels has 
been more hesitant, but even the countries in 
this group that do not consider such planning 
relevant to their own needs have come to urge 
it upon their poorer neighbours. The central—or 
at least the most readily formulated—objective 
of such planning has been the securing of higher 
rates of increase in the production of goods and 
services, progress being assessed through the 
composite indicator of per capita national 
income. 
The techniques of planning for this objective 
have been worked out mainly by economists 
seeking to allocate scarce resources so as to 
maximize production, and the planning bodies 
that have tried to apply the techniques have been 
in the hands of economists, statisticians and 
engineers. From the beginning, however, it was 
evident that planning could not disregard the 
demands for immediate expenditures relating to 
human welfare made by the more articulate and 
organized sectors of the public, supported by 
the rising bids f o r popular support of rival 
* This paper, submitted as document E/LACCY/BP/ 
L.4 to the Latin American Conference on Children and 
Youth in National Development (Santiago, Chile, 28 
November to 11 December 1965) represents one stage in 
a continuing programme of studies of problems of social 
development undertaken by the Social Affairs Division 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America. Sub-
sequent parts are expected to enter into such topics 
as: social structures of Latin America and applicability 
of "popular participation" in the formulation and ex-
ecution of policies and plans; "regionalization" and 
"localization" of social programmes; approaches to 
urban development and rural development and problems 
of their integration; research and statistics in relation 
to social policy and programming; problems of com-
munication between social scientists, policy-makers and 
the public. Other papers deriving from this programme 
of studies include: "Popular Participation and Principles 
of Development in Relation to the Acceleration of 
Economic and Social Development" {Economic Bulletin 
for Latin America, Vol. IX (1964), pp. 225-256) and 
"Social Service in Latin America: Functions and 
Relationships to Development". 
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aspirants to political leadership and the widen-
ing influence of social standards endorsed by 
the inter-governmental organizations. Experience 
soon indicated, moreover, that achievement of 
the economic objective of self-sustaining growth 
in per capita production would require that non-
economic factors be taken into account. 
Thus, the terms "social development", "social 
planning", "social aspects of economic develop-
ment", "balanced economic and social develop-
ment" and the like began to become current. 
The necessity for incorporation of the "social" 
into comprehensive planning became a common-
place in the resolutions of inter-governmental 
bodies. International meetings on one variation 
or another of this topic have brought forth a 
formidable bulk of documentation, and even the 
conclusions of meetings on quite specialized so-
cial programmes commonly acknowledge the 
desirability of integration into wider plans.^ 
Courses in social planning are organized, ex-
perts in social development go forth to advise 
1 The meetings organized by agencies in the United 
Nations family alone, excluding meetings on planning 
in general and meetings restricted to a single social 
sector, include: Working Group of Experts on Social 
Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America 
(Mexico City, 1960); Working Group of Experts on 
Social Development Planning (Bangkok, 1963); Working 
Party on Economic and Social Development of the 
Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa, 1962); 
European Expert Group on the Problems and Methods 
of Social Planning (Dubrovnik, 1963); Expert Working 
Group on Social Prerequisites to Economic Growth 
(Nicosia, 1963); European Seminar on the Problems 
and Methods of Social Planning, Kallvik, Finland, 
1964.. The Report of this last seminar (SOA/ESWP/ 
1964/4) indicates clearly that interpretations of "social 
planning" and views on the usefulness of the conception 
itself continue to differ widely, even among specialists 
from countries with the most elaborate and well-
established systems of public social action. In addition 
to the documents stemming from these meetings, 
discussions and summaries of current thought concern-
ing social development may be found in the United 
Nations Report on the World Social Situation with 
special reference to the problem of balanced economic 
and social development (E/CN.5/346/Rev.l), United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.4, and in André 
Piatier, Équilibre entre développement économique et 
développement social, Conseil international des sciences 
sociales, Paris, 1962. The latter work, based in part on 
regional papers commissioned by the International Coun-
cil of Social Sciences, contains an extensive bibliography. 
countries, social divisions of national planning 
offices are created, and social programmes lie 
side by side with economic in numerous pub-
lished plans. 
A close look at the present situation, however, 
reveals a remarkably wide gap between aspira-
tions and realities. Neither the conceptual nor 
the practical problems of the incorporation of 
the "social" into comprehensive planning have 
as yet received satisfactory solutions. It cannot 
be safely affirmed that in any of the countries 
now striving for rapid development allocations 
to social programmes, new social legislation, or 
creation of new social agencies are controlled by 
unified conceptions of interrelationships and 
priorities. At the same time, one finds a good 
deal of evidence that these countries are being 
offered more advice on planning than they can 
assimilate or evaluate, including elaborate quan-
titative techniques whose practicability has not 
been tested anywhere, and a considerable num-
ber of promotional schemes for separate lines 
of social action or alternative approaches to 
social action, all put forward as "plans" de-
serving the highest priority. It would seem that 
a good many of the proponents of social plan-
ning have not digested the elementary principle 
that planning involves choice among alternatives, 
and the rejection or postponement of some forms 
of action which, though desirable in themselves, 
cannot be reconciled with others that deserve 
a higher priority. In fact, the popularity of the 
term "planning" has encouraged its extension to 
questions that might more properly be con-
sidered "policies" or "values", agreement on 
which should precede the stage of "planning". 
More solid progress has been made toward 
workable techniques for programming within 
the separate "social sectors", although even in 
this more limited sphere the practical applica-
tion of the techniques now at hand is progress-
ing only slowly. It is arguable that the more 
arnbitious claims for social planning and the 
anxiety of social specialists to attach themselves 
to this popular cause may in some instances be 
diverting their attention from more immediate 
possibilities for improvement in the internal effi-
ciency of the programmes with which they are 
directly concerned. 
The present paper does not pretend to sum-
marize the voluminous literature on planning 
and programming techniques, nor to offer re-
cipes f o r successful planning.^ It attempts a 
2 Planning principles and techniques have been de-
scribed and progress towards their application discussed 
in a number of reports of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning. See "Progress in 
Planning in Latin America" {Economic Bulletin for 
panoramic view of the present status of the 
movement to incorporate the social into plan-
ning, as it has taken shape in the international 
agencies and as it is being applied to the realities 
of Latin America, and suggests certain prere-
quisites f o r progress in this endeavour. It takes 
for granted that the shortcomings and exag-
gerated claims that will be examined do not 
obviate the need for a continuing search f or 
effective solutions. 
A brief look at three questions is first needed; 
1. The meanings and limitations of the term 
"soc ia l " and its derivatives; 
2. The multiple parentage of "social develop-
ment" and "social planning" and the consequent 
differences in approach; 
3. The prerequisites for effective planning 
that can be deduced f r o m present trends in the 
Latin American countries. 
1. Interpretation of the term "sociaV 
In its broadest sense, the term "soc ia l " means 
"pertaining to society" or "collective". In this 
sense, economics is a "social science", all aspects 
of development are parts of a global "social 
process", and all facilities for general use by 
members of the society, f rom schools to sewers 
or f rom railways to race tracks, can be con-
sidered investments in "social infrastructure". 
Such an interpretation is taken for granted in a 
number of recent statements on development 
policy and planning, and points the way toward 
the indispensable unified conception of develop-
ment to which the present paper will return in 
its conclusions. 
When the term "soc ia l " is coupled with "eco -
nomic" , however, the user commonly has in 
mind one of two narrower interpretations, or 
both of them together. "Soc ia l " may refer to 
the human welfare aspects of development: to 
the rising levels of living and more equitable 
distribution of material and cultural goods that 
are expected to accompany or follow the in-
creases in production brought about by "eco -
nomic development".® Alternatively, "soc ia l " 
may refer to the structure of society, and "social 
Latin America, Vol. VIII (1963), 80, 129-146); Part III 
of the Economic Survey of Latin America 1964 (E/ 
CN.12/711/Rev.l); and Carlos Matus, "Planning Sys-
tems and Their Enforcement in Latin America" (ST/ 
ECLA/Conf.20/L.13). Recent studies of sectoral pro-
gramming techniques are cited at appropriate points 
below. 
3 Piatier (op. cit.) points out that this interpretation 
of the social arose largely to fill the gap left by a 
deliberate narrowing of the interests of economists in 
the 19th century, and that as economists now widen 
their interests to include problems of employment, 
poverty, income distribution, education, etc., the content 
of the social, interpreted as a residual, shrinks. 
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development" to the changes in stratification and 
mobility, the widening participation in the na-
tional community, that are either prerequisites 
for economic development or concomitants 
thereof. These two latter interpretations of the 
social imply different—although not incom-
patible—approaches to incorporation of the 
social into planning, and are put forward by 
persons with differing backgrounds—the former 
mainly by social administrators, the latter mainly 
by sociologists. With these two approaches a 
number of terms have come into international 
usage without acquiring precise definitions; the 
use of these terms seems to be unavoidable, but 
the looseness with which they are commonly 
used and the mental images they carry with 
them hardly contribute to the cause of clear 
thinking. 
"Social situation", "social field", and "social 
sector" imply, more often than not, that the 
user has in mind the human welfare interpre-
tation of the social. "Social prerequisites", "so-
cial factors", and "social obstacles" are more 
likely to be associated with the "structural" in-
terpretation while "social aspects" can be found 
prefixed to almost any topic being discussed 
under either interpretation. 
"The "social situation" appeared in United 
Nations usage as a counterpart to the more easily 
envisaged "economic situation", and although 
the "world social situation" has been the subject 
of a series of reports, these have relied upon 
pragmatic criteria for their coverage.* Their 
topics have been determined partly by the organi-
zational structure of the agencies in the United 
Nations family, and partly by the content of the 
parallel conception of "level of living". The 
latter term has been the subject of considerable 
international discussion and has received an 
agreed-upon definition, but has remained a con-
glomeration of "components" measurable in part 
by separate "indicators", both the components 
and the indicators remaining resistant to all 
attempts at integration or synthesis.® In practice, 
* "For the purposes of the present survey, it would be 
futile to engage in elaborate distinctions between 'social' 
and 'economic' on the basis of avowed and unavowed 
motives of national policy-makers. The measures here 
treated are those regarded as 'social' by the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies; in general, they 
are measures that are directly rather than indirectly 
related to human welfare." International Survey of 
Programmes of Social Development (E/CN.5/301/Rev.l), 
United Nations publication, Sales No. 55.IV.8. 
° See International Definition and Measurement of 
Levels of Living: an Interim Guide (E/CN.12/270/ 
Rev.l), United Nations publication, Sales No. 61.IV.7. 
One of the projects of the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development in Geneva calls for the 
construction of a unitary index of the level of living, 
defined as the level of satisfaction of wants assured 
by the flow of goods and services received by the popula-
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the United Nations reports have covered, in 
addition to these components and to the pro-
gramme areas of the international agencies, a 
number of topics to which the economists would 
stake a claim: employment, income and expendi-
ture, consumption, etc. 
The terms "social field" and "social sector" 
have been used still more loosely. At times the 
users seem to envisage a definite number of so-
cial fields, large and small, that lie side by side, 
that can be merged into one big social field and 
fenced off f rom an "economic field" as a pre-
liminary to deciding how much money is to be 
used to manure one field or the other. Or the 
image may be evoked of a social pie divided 
into "social sectors". An examination of the 
topics that are commonly identified as fields or 
sectors raises the question whether the big social 
field can be considered even a convenient ab-
straction. The more comprehensive the attempt 
to distinguish all the social fields or sectors the 
more anomalies appear: the fields overlap one 
another, stand in quite different relationships 
to human welfare, call for quite different kinds 
and combinations of public and private action. 
Some are subject to well-defined techniques of 
sectoral programming; others might conceivably 
be subjected to such programming in the future; 
in still other instances unified programming for 
the "sector" is hardly conceivable. Some of the 
social fields are growing economic crops and 
vice versa; discussions have been heard as to 
whether one or another topic is a social field 
with economic aspects or an economic field with 
social aspects. (The cultivators of the social 
fields now and then show traits that are to be 
met with also among real peasants; they engage 
in litigation over boundaries and try to incor-
porate portions of other fields within their own.) 
The formulation "balanced economic and so-
cial development" has become associated with 
the imagery of economic and social " f ie lds" ; its 
use is likely to carry with it the presupposition 
that there are two distinct kinds of development 
that can or should be balanced. 
The terms "social prerequisites", "social fac-
tors" and the like have their own inadequacies. 
The user is likely to envisage a developmental 
process that is centrally economic, but that will 
run more smoothly if social lubricants are added 
to the machinery or social grit is flushed out of 
it. Under such an interpretation, social specialists 
tion in a unit of time. This project should result in a 
more orderly grouping of components and indicators, 
but it seems questionable whether a unitary index will 
ever be applicable to the realities of countries with in-
complete statistics and wide discrepancies in the in-
comes, values and consumption patterns of different 
population strata. 
complain, they are likely to be called in only at 
a secondary stage, to propose additives or tacti-
cal modifications for economic plans constructed 
without their full participation. 
2. Origins of the different approaches to "social 
development" and "social planning" 
It has already been suggested that the present 
interest in "social development" and "social 
planning" involves a confrontation of the points 
of view of different sectors of opinion and 
different professional disciplines, and that dis-
cussions of these topics sometimes ignore the 
discrepancies in what the different participants 
actually envisage and want. 
Recent years have seen a remarkably rapid 
expansion and diversification in public social 
action throughout the world, coinciding with the 
growth of the inter-governmental agencies and 
the endorsement by their member States of social 
objectives as human rights. Societies in which 
social services have reached a high degree of 
complexity and expansiveness have become 
models and suppliers of expert advisers to coun-
tries in which low income levels and the cultural 
and political isolation of large parts of the 
population from national life place quite dif-
ferent limits on internal capabilities for the 
support of such services and on the likelihood 
of their effective functioning. The diversion of 
resources to the social programmes has met with 
opposition on the part of advocates of concen-
tration on directly productive investments. 
Political pressures have generally been too strong 
for open resistance, but fineincial support of the 
programmes has in practice often been kept to 
a token level, widening discrepancies have ap-
peared between the social rights guaranteed in 
laws and constitutions and the meagre benefits 
to the masses of the people, and the ineffective-
ness and bureaucratization of the relevant pro-
grammes have strengthened the scepticism of 
their opponents. The advocates of the social pro-
grammes have thus been increasingly impelled 
to justify them both in terms of their contribu-
tion to the general developmental process and in 
terms of their internal efficiency. This has led 
them, on the one hand, to a quest for interna-
tionally applicable criteria for the "balancing" 
of social sectoral allocations with each other and 
with economic allocations and, on the other, to a 
quest for sectoral programming techniques, in 
which they have borrowed extensively from 
economic programming. In these approaches to 
social planning the element of promotion has 
inevitably been prominent; the advocates of each 
form of social action have tried to stake a claim, 
in terms convincing to political leaders and 
planners, to a larger share of national resources. 
These trends have coincided with the interests 
of a good many economists, who began to en-
visage the social programmes, or some of them, 
as essential contributions to economic develop-
ment, and thus to evaluate them as "investments" 
with returns potentially translatable into mone-
tary terms; the phrase "investment in human 
resources" became current. A series of economic 
studies indicating that a very large share 
in the generation of economic growth must 
be attributed to an ill-defined but largely 
"social" residual factor, rather than to inputs 
of capital and labour, induced the econo-
mists to turn their attention to this aspect. At 
the same time, speculations began to be heard 
on the possibility of constructing mathematical 
models incorporating all the social as well as the 
economic variables relevant to development. This 
support was received by the promoters of the 
social programmes with gratification mixed with 
a certain uneasiness. They could not accept the 
investment criterion as primary without risking, 
from the human rights point of view, serious 
distortions in the content of the social pro-
grammes and a refusal to allocate any resources 
to forms of social action for which "returns" 
cannot be demonstrated. At the same time, the 
initial attempts to measure returns on invest-
ment in such sectors as education and health 
or to view these sectors as input-output models 
led to such formidable conceptual and practical 
difficulties that some economists have come to 
doubt whether such exercises will ever be useful 
tools in the quest for criteria for social alloca-
tions. The present trend in programming prac-
tice seems to favour the use of non-monetary 
quantitative indicators for the efficiency of 
programmes—and pragmatic processes of suc-
cessive approximations to determine the final 
allocation of resources to a given programme or 
project. 
The above approaches are associated with im-
mediate problems of allocation of public re-
sources to programmes that already exist, with 
their own organizational structures, legislative 
sanctions, clienteles, and forces of momentum 
or inertia; and also with the justification of 
alternative lines of future public action. Both the 
advocates of the social programmes and the eco-
nomic programmers inevitably have placed in 
the foreground extremely simplified quantitative 
targets: increase in the school enrolment ratio, 
in the number of houses constructed, in the per-
centage of public expenditure or of national in-
come devoted to one programme or another. 
A different approach, to which both econo-
mists and sociologists have contributed, involves 
a search for reasons why neither economic nor 
social programmes up to the present have proved 
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predictably effective in the countries seeking 
rapid development. One of the pioneering pre-
sentations of this point of view singles out 
"social adaptation to new functions", "the crea-
tion of new patterns of living", and "the new 
social stratification" as the central problems.® 
From this approach, quantitative criteria for 
allocations to the social programmes or for rates 
of improvement in the components of levels of 
living are of secondary importance compared to 
an understanding of the functioning of the pro-
grammes within a given social structure and 
their potentialities for modifying the structure 
along lines more compatible with healthy de-
velopment.'' This approach has been reinforced 
by the raising of more basic questions as to the 
meaning of a " g o o d society", and by widening 
disinclination to accept the high-production high-
consumption societies of North America and 
Europe as satisfactory models for the rest of the 
world.8 It is obvious that the application to 
public policy of this last approach raises ques-
tions much more complex tiian do the attempts 
to set quantitative targets and determine more 
rational criteria for allocation of resources. The 
legitimate preoccupation of the planners and 
sociologists with the transformation of social 
structures does not imply that they should or 
can manipulate these structures into their own 
image of the good society. Historically, the trans-
formation of social structures has been the task 
of political leadership representing the more 
dynamic elements emerging f r o m the previous 
«"Three Sociological Aspects of Economic Develop-
ment", Economic Review of Latin America, special 
issue, August 1955, pp. 56-65. 
A recent paper proposes the terms "societal develop-
ment" or "nation-building" to express such a point of 
view toward the development process. " . . . 'societal de-
velopment' in countries of low income may be defined 
as the sum total of the measures, policies, operations, 
and other consciously induced changes or practices re-
quired to alter fundamentally the patterns of and 
attitudes toward life, work, and education in order to 
create a dynamic, responsive, and progressive society 
in which conditions of life are improved through the 
application of modern technology and democratic pro-
cesses." (Donald C. Stone, "Education for Development 
Administration", paper prepared for the Conference on 
Administration for Development, November 1965, con-
vened by the Inter-American School of Public Ad-
ministration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de 
Janeiro.) 
®John K. Galbraith's, The Affluent Society (Boston, 
1958) is one of the most influential presentations of 
this criticism. Nevertheless, the universal endorsement 
of "development" as a central policy objective and of 
"planning" as a means to this end has been accompanied 
by remarkably little systematic consideration of the 
traits to be expected or desired in the future society 
that will emerge from the process of development. See 
José Medina Echavarria, "La Filosofía del Desarrollo" 
(mimeographed text of lectures delivered at the Uni-
versidad Nacional de Uruguay, February 1965). 
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structures, and the role of planning in this 
process will presumably continue to be auxiliary. 
Some presentations of the latter approach 
seem to view it as an alternative to the former, 
but it is more reasonable to envisage it as com-
plementary. The need for rationalization of the 
jungle growth of social initiatives now springing 
up will not wait upon the attainment of adequate 
understanding of the social structures. The 
search for quantitative targets and criteria for 
allocation of resources becomes questionable 
only if the targets are viewed as ends in them-
selves rather than limited indications of the 
degree to which the real purposes of the pro-
grammes are being attained. 
3. Prerequisites for effective policy and plan-
ning in Latin America 
The Latin American countries at present, for 
all their obvious differences f rom one another, 
present certain common characteristics—includ-
ing internal contradictions—^that differentiate 
them f rom the more generalized models of "de-
veloped" or "under-developed" countries.® These 
characteristics suggest certain conditions that 
must be demanded of an interpretation of social 
policy and planning likely to be capable of in-
fluencing the course of development in the re-
gion. Although the present state of social 
research is far f rom adequate to support firm 
generalizations, the following highly simplified 
conditions may be advanced: 
(a) Such policy and planning must attempt 
to rationalize the struggles within what have 
been called "conflict societies" in which different 
classes and organized interest groups hold to 
widely separated interpretations of what is 
needed, and in which the real objectives of 
these groups—^whether consciously formulated 
or not—may be in contradiction to the publicly 
agreed upon objectives of development and social 
justice. In Latin America today, these struggles 
are conditioned by the juxtaposition of urban 
minorities that have attained or are determined 
to attain the consumption standards typical of 
®A number of classification systems have distributed 
the countries of the region in groupings according to 
levels of development, degrees of national integration, 
etc. One of the most recent of these exercises, dividing 
the countries of the world into four groups according to 
their ranking by a composite index based on quantitative 
indicators, places one Latin American country in the 
"advanced" category, six in the "semi-advanced", nine 
in the "partially developed" and only one in the lowest 
"under-developed" category. (Frederick Harbison and 
Charles A. Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic 
Growth: Strategies of Human Resource Development, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1964.) The difFerences 
in levels between the countries, however, do not in 
general place them outside the framework described 
fierp. 
Europe and North Amerca with other groups 
having widely differing levels of living, aspira-
tions, and degrees of integration into the na-
tional society. The latter groups include rural 
populations that remain "traditional" and more 
or less isolated from the national society by pre-
vailing systems of land tenure, local administra-
tion and patterns of settlement; but they also 
include rapidly growing groups that are mobile 
geographically and occupationally, that are in-
creasingly moving into urban or semi-urban 
settings, and that are increasingly able to make 
their influence felt in the political process. In 
the ideologies that purport to represent the 
points of view of different groups in the societies 
(and that have been labelled "nationalism", 
"populism" and "modern traditionalism")^" and 
also in the behaviour of individuals, including 
political leaders, administrators and planning 
specialists themselves, one finds an unresolved 
mixture of the traditional with the modern or 
innovating.^^ The most basic hungers for bread 
and shelter combine in their pressure upon re-
sources with hunger for television sets and auto-
mobiles. Reliance upon the State to resolve all 
problems of livelihood and social change co-
exists with extreme apathy or hostility toward 
the public powers. Under these conditions, plan-
ning systems will be called upon, in addition to 
their more technical tasks, to clarify the policy 
alternatives in terms that will make sense to the 
contending interest groups, distinguish real con-
troversies that must be the subject of political 
decision from semantic ones, demonstrate the 
feasibility of the demands in terms of available 
resources and alternatives that must be forgone 
if a given demand is met, and help the less 
organized and less articulate groups to make 
more coherent and realistic demands through 
formalized channels. At best, the planners can 
hardly expect to attain the status of neutral 
and infallible arbiters of the allocation of 
resources. 
(b) Policy and planning must take into ac-
count the pre-existence of extensive social legis-
lation, fixed investment in social capital, social 
institutions with their own clienteles and pres-
sure groups, resistant to planned change or inte-
10 See "The Social Development of Latin America in 
the Post-War Period" (E/CN.12/660) and Kalman 
Silvert, Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in 
Latin America (New Orleans, 1961). 
11 Contradictions of this kind are being explored in 
an analysis of the structure of power now being under-
taken by the Centro de Desarrollo (CENDES), Uni-
versidad Nacional de Venezuela. Some of the preliminary 
findings of these inquiries are summarized in Frank 
Bonilla, Julio Cotler and J. A. Silva Michelena, "La 
Investigación Sociológica y la Formulación de Políticas", 
América Latina, Rio de Janeiro, 8th year, No. 2, April-
June 1965. 
gration. The expansion of public social action in 
the region has been accompanied by the growth 
of devices such as earmarked taxes, autonomous 
agencies, separate social security funds to dif-
ferent categories of insured, that are designed 
to protect specific social programmes or cate-
gories of beneficiaries against changes in the 
allocation of resources; social measures are 
typically governed to the smallest detail by legis-
lation and each extension of the measures makes 
the legislation more complicated and adminis-
tration more costly. At the same time, the social 
structures and the unequal participation in deci-
sion-making by different strata of the population 
have tended to distort the functions of the social 
institutions assessed f rom the points of view of 
development or of social justice. The most im-
portant of these distortions relate to the "redis-
tribution" of incomes and opportunities f o r 
mobility that ensue when the whole society is 
taxed to provide services that are in practice 
within the reach only of certain relatively well-
off and well-organized elements—as has notori-
ously occurred in the instances of secondary 
and higher education, social security and public 
housing. Another distortion is the bureaucratiza-
tion that occurs when the function of providing 
j obs for members of the upper and middle strata 
comes to encroach on the overt functions of the 
institutions. Universalization of the public ser-
vices already declared to be "rights" in many 
of the national constitutions would—at present 
per capita costs—require astronomical sums. 
In addition to these broad problems deriving 
f rom the social structures of the region, two 
kinds of challenges to planning set by the present 
characteristics of the governmental machinery 
deserve emphasis. 
( c ) Policy and planning must, at least in 
their early phases, adapt themselves to a typical 
combination of frequent changes in the higher 
policy-making personnel of the Government with 
the continuing existence of elaborate centralized 
administrative apparatuses lacking in capacity 
for initiative and resistant to change. These ap-
paratuses, in most countries, are over-staffed but 
have few officers, if any, trained in modern 
administrative practices. Frequent changes in 
programme directives may thus exert only a 
superficial influence on the behaviour of the 
personnel actually applying the programmes. 
Planning procedures and models introduced into 
this kind of setting must guard against a real 
likelihood of becoming additional sources of 
rigidity and bureaucratization. 
{d) In the same countries, provincial and 
municipal administrative machinery is typically 
weak, both in staffing and in fiscal resources, and 
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is usually dominated by narrow local cliques. 
This situation throws a heavier burden on the 
central authorities for detailed local decision-
making, and at the same time exposes them to 
strong and persistent localistic pressures for 
allocation of resources, expressed through po-
litical channels. An effective planning system 
must seek means of strengthening the capabilities 
of local administrations to plan for local develop-
ment, and at the same time seek more rational 
and politically practicable criteria for central 
public allocations to local authorities. 
It follows from the above considerations that 
planners in Latin America cannot assume that 
jromotion of quantitative growth as assessed 
)y the conventional indicators, including the 
social indicators, will be equivalent to the pro-
motion of healthy self-sustaining development. 
It is probable that continued growth along 
present lines would run into certain obstacles 
inherent in the social structures that would bring 
it to a halt, or interrupt it through a breakdown 
of national consensus, as seems to have happened 
in some countries of the region formerly the 
most advanced. Furthermore, growth along 
present lines, even if it could be continued in-
definitely, would involve a restriction of the 
benefits of growth to a minority of the population 
—although conceivably a large and growing 
minority—and would condemn other large 
groups to marginality. The key social institutions 
need structural reforms, to enable them not only 
to perform their present functions more ef-
fectively, but to carry out additional functions, 
including the achievement of a more equitable 
redistribution of income and a widening of op-
portunities for productive employment and full 
participation in national life. Moreover, the 
societies in which this objective must be sought 
are not predominantly static or traditional, al-
though static and traditional elements weigh 
heavily within them. Rapid population growth 
and redistribution, the inability of traditional 
ways of life to support the growing population, 
the rapid spread of new-felt needs, including 
the multiplication of felt needs for "modern" 
consumer goods, recreation, etc., among masses 
whose incomes are inadequate to cover their 
primary subsistence requirements, mass com-
munications, etc., mean that the problem is more 
one of canalizing rapid and chaotic change than 
of overcoming traditionalist obstacles. The kind 
of planning needed under these circumstances has 
been labelled "strategic" to distinguish it from 
the "projective" or "indicative" planning that 
some of the high-income countries of Western 
Europe or North America find suited to their 
needs. 
The prerequisites for a workable interpretation 
of social policy and planning, as they are listed 
here, are formidable. They have not yet been 
met by any country in the region, and it is 
enough to state them to see that they will never 
be met fully or neatly.^^ The effort to approxi-
mate more and more closely to them will require 
persistent efforts at several levels—that of the 
quest for wider understanding of the structure 
of society and its relationships to the over-all 
process of development; that of the machinery 
for making and applying policy decisions, nation-
ally and locally; and that of the heterogeneous 
forms of social action, with their own program-
ming techniques and problems of function and 
interrelationships. The ideal of comprehensive 
planning will continue to be confronted by the 
limitations of the human mind, in its capacity 
to grasp simultaneously all the relevant factors, 
and by the limited capacity of governmental 
machinery to translate plans into action. 
In fact, this generalization may be equally ap-
plicable to economic policy. In Latin America, as else-
where, the prevailing characteristic has been the ex-
istence of a heterogeneous patchwork of policies that 
do not embrace the whole of the economic process, and 
that sometimes have mutually contradictory or conflicting 
aims. 
I I . THE SOCIAL SECTORS 
1. Problems of identification and delimitation 
In spite of the inadequacies of the term 
"sector" its use is unavoidable when one turns 
to classify the forms of social action subject 
to public policy. The historical evolution of 
these "sectors", the character and closeness of 
their relation to the unifying conception of 
hiunan welfare, the techniques and objectives 
of programming that are applicable, and the 
degree to which public intervention supplements 
or replaces individual or family provision show 
little resemblance from one to another. 
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The following discussion progresses from the 
sectors that are most incontrovertibly social in 
content and purposes, and in which the relevant 
forms of public action are readily definable and 
subject to unified control, to the sectors in which 
the dividing line between social and economic 
becomes harder to draw, in which the forms 
of public action become more diverse, or in 
which public intervention is of minor importance. 
It then takes up certain lines of social policy 
that cannot be considered "sectors" at all, that 
purport to make sectoral action more unified 
and effective in determined settings, or that 
set forth a strategy for social change through 
concentration on determined lines of action. 
Finally, it returns to the questions: Do the 
terms "social development" and "social planning" 
stand for realities at the level of public action? 
Is it useful to distinguish "social planning" or 
"social programming" as something apart f rom 
sectoral programming on the one hand, and 
comprehensive planning on the other? Does the 
phrase "balanced social and economic develop-
ment" point to really useful principles for the 
allocation of resources to the different sectors 
or to the whole range of social programmes? 
It is natural that programming techniques 
should have appeared and attained a certain 
degree of practical application in a few of the 
sectors prior to any systematic attempt to in-
tegrate these sectors into broader systems of 
planning. These are the sectors in which public 
action has a relatively long history, in which the 
greater part of such action falls under the control 
of a single ministry or other agency, which have 
easily demonstrable relationships to economic 
growth, and which make effective demands for 
large shares of the resources available to the 
State. Two sectors—education and health—stand 
out in these respects and housing is now acquir-
ing a comparable status. Some discussions of 
planning and some published plans in Latin 
America seem to assume that investment in these 
sectors constitutes the whole of the social side 
of planning.'^ They are the only social sectors 
in which programming techniques have been 
taught (education and health) or are expected 
to be taught in the near future (housing) at 
the Latin American Institute for Economic and 
Social Planning.^* 
What are the other social sectors? One can 
seek a provisional answer to the question in two 
directions: by considering the nine components 
1® Summaries of twelve national plans and investment 
programmes in Part III of the Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1964, op cit., indicate that objectives 
classified as "social" are limited to education and health, 
or to these plus housing, in six instances. Other plans 
are quite diverse both in the social topics included and 
in specifications of objectives and indicators. Several 
treat provision of drinking water and sewerage as a 
separate social objective; a few emphasize income re-
distribution and employment; others set targets for con-
sumption of food and consumption of clothing and 
footwear; one plan treats community development as 
a separate sector. 
Experience up to 1963 in the teaching of program-
ming in these sectors is summarized in "Problems of 
the Programming of Social Development" (E/CN.12/ 
661), 17 April 1963. The Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning has also given a course 
in human resources development but this topic, for 
reasons to be discussed later, can hardly be considered 
a "social sector". 
of the level of living agreed upon in United 
Nations usage,^® or by considering the con-
ventional areas of organized public social action 
that are embodied in the administrative structure 
of the United Nations agencies. Education, health 
and housing would be included under either 
approach, along with f o o d consumption and 
nutrition, employment and conditions of work, 
and social security. The list of level of living 
components yields also clothing, recreation and 
human freedoms; the list of areas of social 
action yields social service and social defence, 
in addition to several topics that will be treated 
as integrative approaches rather than sectors. 
It may also be convenient to attach the term 
"sectoral" to any "programme for a specific 
objective—to improve child nutrition, for ex-
ample—or for a defined group of activities—for 
the development, say, of education or the steel 
industry—on explicit or implicit assumption 
about other sectors . . . The 'crash programme' is 
a form of sectoral plan . . . Sectoral plans may 
be set up on private initiative".^® This in-
terpretation may be satisfactory in relation to 
the planning or programming practices of 
specific countries, but it assumes that sectors are 
brought into being by the formulation of pro-
grammes, and that there may be sectors within 
sectors; it does not lead to any consistent de-
limitation of the "social" . 
2. Education 
Education appears to be the most readily 
definable and susceptible to unified programming 
of all the sectors. International meetings on 
educational policy have been frequent,^''^ an 
International Institute for Educational Planning 
has been created, and educational authorities 
have a wealth of detailed technical advice to 
draw on. The greater part of formal education 
in most countries is directly administered by 
the State. T o the extent that local governments 
15 See International Definition and Measurement of 
Levels of Living, An Interim Guide, op. cit. 
16 Michael Kaser, "Planning for Children in the Con-
text of Social and Economic Development Programmes", 
Report submitted to UNICEF Round Table Conference 
on Planning for the Needs of Children in Developing 
Countries (CC/WP-7), 4 March 1964. 
IT In relation to Latin America the most significant 
milestones have been the Conference on Education and 
Economic and Social Development held in Santiago in 
1962 and the Seminar on Problems and Strategies of 
Educational Planning in Latin America, held in Paris 
in 1964. The basic documents of the Conference have 
been published in the Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America (1962), Vol. Vil, pp. 193-213 and 215-240, and 
in UNESCO's América Ixttina: Proyecto Principal de 
Educación, Boletín Trimestral. For selected documents 
of the Seminar, see International Institute for Educa-
tional Planning, Problems and Strategies of Educational 
Planning (UNESCO), Paris, 1965. 
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or private schools replace or supplement the 
efforts of national authorities they are supported 
largely by national public funds and operate 
within a framework of standard-setting national 
legislation. Statistical yardsticks are at hand for 
assessment of the efficiency and output of an 
educational system: age-group enrolment ratios; 
duration of schooling; rates of promotion, re-
tardation and dropouts; pupil-teacher ratios, 
etc. offer the opportunity of constructing sets 
of standards and objectives that are internally 
consistent, easily understandable by the general 
public, and subject to precise calculations in 
terms of costs. Moreover, most of the statistics 
needed for programming are or should be by-
products of educational administration or are 
standard census tabulations. 
Considerable progress has been made in the 
analysis of educational requirements f o r a labour 
force possessing specified levels and types of 
skills, so that economic planners can make con-
crete demands on the educational system and 
understand the indispensability of allocating suf-
ficient resources to it if their long-term produc-
tion plans are to be practicable. By way of the 
conceptions of "human capital" and "human 
resources" (to be discussed later) economists 
have become particularly interested in con-
tributing to educational programming principles 
and techniques. Although their attempts to 
calculate returns on educational investment in 
monetary terms or to incorporate educational 
systems into mathematical input-output models 
have hardly as yet proved usuable programming 
tools,^® success in these endeavours does not in 
any case seem essential for the incorporation of 
economic objectives and economic programming 
principles into workable systems of sectoral 
programming for education. 
Nevertheless, progress in the application of 
educational programming has been halting in 
Latin America, and is probably even more 
limited in the other regions in which educational 
deficiencies are particularly serious. Program-
ming machinery has been set up in the majority 
of ministries of education, the stock of trained 
specialists in educational programming is grow-
ing and a number of national programmes and 
studies leading to programmes have been pub-
lished. One cannot, however, as yet find an 
example of an integrated programme effectively 
18 These questions are the subject of continuing con-
troversy, and the advocates of the more elaborate 
mathematical techniques have been accused of luring 
programmers into a waste of ingenuity on academic 
exercises. Among the best known proponents of, respec-
tively, positive and negative evaluations of these ap-
proaches are the economists Jan Tinbergen and Thomas 
Balogh. 
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applied to the whole of a school system, determin-
ing priorities and controlling educational output 
in accordance with an over-all conception of 
national educational objectives.^' The most 
notorious and often denounced inefficiencies and 
sources of waste in the educational systems 
remain stubbornly resistant to programming. 
Aside f rom the difficulties common to all areas 
of planning and programming, the educational 
systems present rigidities that derive from their 
historical development and their peculiarly close 
relationship to existing social structures. 
In almost every country, public primary and 
secondary education have separate administrative 
apparatuses, in spite of their apparent joint 
control by a single ministry of education; higher 
education enjoys a jealously guarded although 
in many respects fictitious autonomy; vocational 
education usually has its own administrative 
machinery, inside or outside the Ministry of 
Education; while private schools are usually in 
a strong position to defend their own interests. 
Within each of the separate administrative 
divisions are numerous specialized teaching 
groups and auxiliary services, each contending 
to maintain or improve its previous status and 
its share of the educational budget. The existing 
rigidities are protected by detailed legislation, 
which educational authorities find it easy to add 
to but hard to reform and simplify. Meanwhile, 
the difficulties of global programming of the 
sector, coinciding with separate international 
initiatives, contribute to a proliferation of "plans" 
that purport to concentrate resources on specific 
problems, such as the elimination of illiteracy. 
However justified such initiatives may be aa 
promotional devices they can hardly contribute 
to the establishment of an ordered system of 
priorities for the sector as a whole. 
More basic difficulties derive from contradic-
tions between the publicly endorsed objectives 
of education and the real objectives—^whether 
conscious or unconscious—of its customers, the 
families of school children and, at the secondary 
and higher levels, the students themselves. In, 
practice, the complex and rigid administrative 
structures and legislative provisions serve aa 
protective shields against changes not really 
wanted by the more influential "customers" of 
the educational systems. 
The public objectives of education derive 
from two main sources—conceptions of human 
This conclusion is supported by several papers 
presented at the 1964 Paris Seminar mentioned above. 
See, in particular, Maximilio Halty Carrera, "Some 
Aspects of Educational Planning in Latin America", 
and Sylvain Lourié, "Education for Today or Yester-
day?", both published in Problems and Strategies o{ 
Educational Planning, op. cit., pp. 99-100 and 51-70, 
l ights and conceptions of prerequisites for 
Jiuman resource development. These two con-
ceptions imply somewhat different priorities in 
the growth of an educational system, but in the 
main they are compatible and mutually reinforc-
ing. Both support the objective of universal 
primary education of a duration and quality 
sufficient to enable the individual to function 
as a citizen of a national state and a producer 
and consumer in a modern economy. Both sup-
port the objective of gradual prolongation of 
universal schooling, in line with the capacity 
•of a developing economy to support the costs, 
with demands for labour force qualifications 
that are increasingly complex and subject to 
continual change, and with demands for the 
filling of new social and political roles. Both 
support the objective of equalization of op-
portunities for youth to advance into the stages 
of schooling at which it ceases to be universal 
and uniform in content. 
These objectives, however, clash with the 
typical stratification of Latin American society. 
The overt objectives would favour unified edu-
cational systems with equal opportunities for 
promotion from one level to another. The social 
structure, with its leaning toward "adscriptive" 
assignment of educational and other roles, 
favours a compartmentalized educational system 
in which children entering some compartments 
have a good chance of climbing to the very top 
of the educational ladder, while children en-
tering other compartments have no real like-
lihood of progressing beyond the elementary 
level. At the same time, the attitudes and oc-
cupational qualifications imparted in the dif-
ferent compartments are likely to differ widely 
from the attitudes and qualifications envisaged 
by the planners who see education as an in-
strument of economic development and social 
mobility. 
In general, the educational systems of Latin 
America today are in some stage of transition 
between structures appropriate to "adscriptive" 
and to "acquisitive" societies, subject to con-
tradictory pressures, reflecting the aspirations 
of different strata of the population and the 
differing degrees of effective demand for educa-
tion the different strata are able to make.®" 
Under such circumstances, the topic of "popu-
lar participation in planning" is particularly 
20 For discussions of these questions, see Luis Ratinoff, 
"Problemas Estructurales de los Sistemas Nacionales de 
Educación, Esbozo de una Tipología Analítica", Ciencias 
Políticas y Sociales, Mexico, X, 36, April-June 1964, 
pp. 241-255, and Marshall Wolfe, "Social and Political 
Problems of Educational Planning in Latin America", in 
International Institute for Educational Planning, op. cit., 
pp. 35-49. 
relevant to the educational sector but particularly 
hard to apply. Reconciliation of the different in-
terests at best requires protracted consultations, 
compromises, education of the public and con-
sistent initiative at the highest political level; 
it would be naive to expect such reconciliation 
to emerge smoothly f rom the application of 
neutral planning techniques. One obvious task 
in the early stages of programming is to bring 
the contradictions into the open and promote 
national self-consciousness on the realities and 
objectives of the educational system. 
3. HeaUh 
In health, the problem of delimiting the sector 
and fixing quantitative objectives is somewhat 
more complicated than in the case of education. 
The well-known definition endorsed by the 
World Health Organization according to which 
"health" is a "state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being" makes the level of health 
synonymous with the level of living and hardly 
susceptible to a sectoral approach. Even if one 
falls back on the narrower conception of health 
as an absence of disease, progress towards this 
objective depends on advances in many forms 
of social action, including education, housing, 
social security, and improvement of f ood con-
sumption as much as it does on health measures 
in the strict sense. It is legitimate, up to a point, 
to view the level of education as a result of the 
functioning of teachers and schools; the level 
of health, on the other hand, cannot similarly 
be regarded as a result of the functioning of 
doctors and hospitals. 
In practice, it has been necessary to set pro-
gramming objectives in terms of negative in-
dicators—mainly reduction in the rates of 
mortality. The programming techniques that are 
now being applied experimentally in Latin 
America envisage strategies for distribution of 
health resources based on the relative magnitude 
of the different threats to health (assessed 
through comparative death rates), their im-
portance to family and community, and their 
vulnerability to measures that can be included 
in the health programmes.^"^ In principle, 
21A methodology for health programming along the 
lines indicated here has been elaborated in the Centro 
de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES) with the col-
laboration of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and 
is utilized in the courses of the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning. Its practical applica-
tion in the countries of the region is still at an early and 
experimental stage. See Conceptual and Methodological 
Problems of Health Programming (Pan American Health 
Organization, Scientific publications No. I l l , Washington, 
D.C., April 1965); and Informe Final, Grupo de Estudio 
sobre Planificación de la Salud, Puerto Azul, Venezuela, 
Pan American Health Organization, Washington, D.C, 
February 1965. 
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morbidity rates f r o m the different threats are 
just as relevant as mortality rates. In the initial 
stages of programming, however, reliance on 
the latter is made unavoidable hy the inade-
quacies of statistics concerning the former, 
although this introduces a danger of inadequate 
attention to threats that sap well-being and 
productive capacity without contributing very 
much directly to the mortality rate. 
While programmes in the other sectors are 
generally formulated first at the national level, 
health programmers now favour the construction 
of national programmes from below, beginning 
with "programme areas" with populations not 
exceeding 100,000 to 150,000 and with bound-
aries not more than two hours from the nearest 
centre of health care by normal means of trans-
port. Programmes for these areas, considered 
of maximum size for efficient administration 
adapted to local conditions, are to be integrated 
into programmes for regions with populations 
of 250,000-600,000 and capable of supporting 
a wider range of specialized health services. 
The regional programmes, in turn, are to be 
integrated into national programmes and re-
conciled with the total resources available for 
the health sector. 
It can be expected that resistances to pro-
gramming deriving f r o m the social structure 
and the demands of the clienteles of the services 
will prove less formidable in relation to health 
than in relation to education. The difficulties 
deriving f r o m compartmentalization and separate 
vested interests within the services, however, 
are similar in the two sectors. 
The health programmer encounters a relatively 
large fixed investment in health services, an 
investment that derives from many past in-
fluences and initiatives, usually with only in-
termittent attention to priorities. Examples of 
hospitals built in response to local pressures 
or in the course of a national construction cam-
paign and then left without staff or patients are 
easy to find. The stock of different kinds of 
health personnel (doctors, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, auxiliaries, sanitary engineers, etc.) 
is usually unbalanced numerically and badly 
distributed geographically. The hospitals cannot 
be moved at all and the personnel can be shifted 
only to a limited extent to bring them more into 
line with programming objectives. At the same 
time, the device of crash programme (directed 
toward the elimination or control of specific 
diseases) has been more effective and more 
widespread in health than in other sectors, and 
such programmes usually involve the. creation 
of a separate administrative apparatus with its 
own momentum. 
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The first task f or the programmer is thus to 
find ways of using more efficiently the resource^ 
that are at hand, although the composition and 
distribution of these resources may be a long 
way f rom what he would have wished. The 
second task is to channel the additional resources 
that can be allocated to health in directions 
that will eventually bring the whole system more 
closely into line with programming objectives. 
As in the case of education, a command of 
programming techniques will not be sufficient 
f o r this purpose; it will be essential to gain the 
support of the public and the different interest-
groups within the health services and to exert 
pressure in a consistent direction over a long 
period. 
Another problem that is likely to emerge more 
clearly as programming becomes more effective 
and its statistical bases wider and more reliable 
lies in the criteria for assessment of the relative 
importance of threats to health. From the eco-
nomic viewpoint, the importance of such threats 
can be equated with the probable number of 
years of working capacity lost owing to the dif-
ferent causes of disability and death, and the al-
location of resources to health should be planned 
to reduce this loss to a minimum. A youth of an 
age to enter employment represents an important 
investment in terms of costs of his maintenance 
during the years of dependency, his education, 
etc. on which society has as yet realized no 
return. The preservation of his life and health 
is thus of maximum economic importance. This 
importance diminishes according to age in both 
directions, and if the reasoning were carried to 
its logical conclusion, protection of the health 
of persons past retirement age would merit no 
attention, nor would protection of infants in 
whom society has as yet invested nothing. Argu-
ments for a higher priority to child health 
measures commonly ignore this difficulty and 
extend the economic justification to cover all 
age groups. Presumably the allocation of health 
resources will never be able to rely exclusively 
on a criterion such as that summarized above; 
the objective of human resource development 
will have to be reconciled through pragmatic 
compromises with the objectives set by the 
values of the society and the demands of its 
members.^^ 
Some aspects of these questions are discussed in 
"Population and Economic Development", in Hans W. 
Singer, International Development; Growth and Change, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964, chapter 8. Singer em-
phasizes the relation between health and productivity 
and asserts: "If there is anything inimical to economic 
development, it would be an undue concentration of 
international humanitarianism and improvements in 
medical knowledge and technology on the prevention of 
death rather than the creation of health" (p. 77). 
4. Housing 
Housing, considered as a sector of social 
policy, differs f rom the other sectors in many 
important respects: 
(a) The central objective consists in the 
maintenance of an adequate supply of the most 
durable consumer goods used by human beings, 
not in the provision of continuing services or 
in the maintenance of a flow of goods for im-
mediate consumption. In every country, the 
existing stock of housing represents an enormous 
fixed investment. Almost all of this stock, up to 
the past few years, has been accumulated tlarough 
private initiative, determined by market forces 
together with the aspirations and saving capacity 
of individual families, subject only to a certain 
amoimt of regulation by the State. Such in-
vestment, with or without public encouragement 
continues in all countries and represents about 
20 per cent of total investment in fixed capital, 
or from 2 to 6 per cent of the gross national 
product.^® 
(b ) The "housing problem" derives in part 
from population increase and redistribution, 
necessitating the construction of dwellings for 
new families or in-migrant families in specific 
locations; in part f rom the deterioration or 
demolition of existing housing; and in part 
from rising standards according to which much 
of the existing stock is judged unfit for human 
occupation. When population redistribution takes 
the form of rapid and concentrated urbanization 
with a large part of the new urban population 
having incomes both low and insecure, as in 
most of Latin America today, the majority of 
the urban families are unable to meet the heavy 
initial costs of housing responding to modern 
standards, and many of them are unable to 
amortize such costs even on the most favourable 
terms. Under such circumstances the effective 
demand for housing is much smaller than the 
"need" for housing in terms of the numbers 
of families living crowded together or in 
dwellings unfit for occupation. 
( c ) The special characteristics of housing 
make it possible for the problems to be neglected 
and for the housing deficit to increase over a 
long period before pressures for action become 
irresistible. The fact that housing construction 
seems to compete directly for capital investment, 
manpower, land, equipment and materials with 
other more obviously "productive" forms of 
investment, induces economic planners to give 
it a relatively low priority, or to postpone a 
23 See Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963, 
United Nations publication, Sales No. 65.11.0.1., chapter 
VII. 
solution until higher income levels have been 
reached. When the majority of the urban 
population have low incomes and low standards 
f or housing they will be prepared, up to a point, 
to tolerate increased over-crowding in the exist-
ing stock of housing, or will try to meet their 
own needs through improvised construction in 
shanty towns. 
(d ) Certain other characteristics of the hous-
ing sector, however, in addition to the argument 
of urgent htiman need, support a higher priority 
f o r housing within national planning. Planners 
have been slow to envisage the likelihood that 
the solution lies not so much in the allocation 
of additional scarce resources to housing as in 
the reorientation of the heavy investments that 
will continue to be made whether they like it 
or not. The desire for better housing stimulates 
in families a disposition to save that cannot be 
diverted to other forms of investment. Under 
present conditions, inflated urban land prices, 
costly and inefficient construction techniques, 
high costs of credit, lack of effective legal 
protection and technical advice for families 
wishing to invest in houses, mean that a high 
proportion of family savings for this purpose 
are wasted, or that the family is dissuaded f rom 
trying to save. At the same time, the limitation 
of effective demand for housing to relatively 
small upper-income sectors dissuades the con-
struction industry f rom seeking lower-cost mass-
production techniques, and keeps the costs of 
building materials high. The potential stimulus 
to over-all development that could flow from 
efficient construction and building materials in-
dustries with a dependable level of demand is 
not realized. 
(e) The housing programmer has at hand 
a wider range of alternative or complementary 
techniques for improvement of the housing 
situation than one finds in the sectors of educa-
tion or health. Construction of low-cost housing 
f o r sale or rental as a public service is only 
one of these. Other measures include arrange-
ments for low-cost credit through savings and 
loan associations; material and technical aid 
f o r families undertaking self-help construction; 
rationalization of the construction and building 
materials industries; favourable terms for im-
ports of building materials and machinery, etc. 
At the same time, resources can be channelled 
into improvements in the quality of the existing 
stock of housing, arresting deterioration, even 
making the improvised shanty towns more hab-
itable. These last alternatives seem to have re-
ceived remarkable little attention considering 
their potential importance in settings in which 
it is taken for granted that the existing deficit, 
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in terms of dwellings meeting conventional 
standards, cannot be wiped out for many years. 
( / ) Houses once built cannot normally be 
moved and represent a heavy loss of resources 
if abandoned; they also call for á wide range 
of complementary investments in infrastructure. 
A housing programme restricted to quantitative 
objectives for increases in the number of dwel-
lings cannot help having unforeseen repercus-
sions upon the abilities of the cities to function 
efficiently and provide essential services, on the 
forms of local community organization (or the 
lack of such organization), on the mobility of the 
labour force, etc. The need for integration of 
housing with other areas of planning and pro-
gramming relating to the livelihood and well-
being of the people who will live in the houses 
is obvious, but effective solutions have been 
almost entirely lacking in Latin America. Urban 
regulative plans have been unable to control the 
sprawl of the great cities or of smaller centres 
that have undergone rapid growth. Recent 
housing programmes have often selected sites 
for houses according to the cheapness or ready 
availability of land, with no consideration of 
accessibility of sources of employment or 
relative costs of infrastructural investments that 
are the responsibility of other public agencies. 
Ideally, housing programmes need to be in-
tegrated into a national policy influencing the 
redistribution of population and the rates of 
growth of cities and towns according to some 
coherent conception of objectives for balanced 
regional development. The stimulation of devel-
opment in economically stagnant towns and cities 
that already have important fixed investments in 
housing and infrastructure might appreciably 
diminish the pressure for housing investments 
elsewhere. 
Another problem that has not yet been 
squarely faced in programming in the "housing 
sector" derives from the differing characteristics 
and functions of housing in urban and rural 
settings. In the cities, houses are normally built 
by a specialized industry and construction is 
subject to elaborate regulations and standards. 
When the high costs of construction and the 
low incomes of the families needing houses 
combine to prevent the industries from meeting 
the needs, the efforts of the families to con-
struct their own shelter take the notoriously un-
satisfactory form of the shanty towns. The pro-
grammes attempting to rationalize individual 
construction through "aided self-help" may 
bring about more acceptable results, but remain 
expedients made necessary by the gap between 
building costs and ability to pay for housing. 
If urban incomes were to rise sufficiently and 
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building costs were to be brought down, it; 
would presumably be more efficient economically 
if all construction were to be carried out by 
professional builders. 
Up to the present, practically all housing 
programmes have concentrated on construction 
in the urban setting, where the problem is acute-
and the deficit rapidly growing. National esti-
mates of the deficit, however, coirmionly include-
the rural areas, in which typical housing con-
ditions, assessed by the usual yardsticks of 
dwelling space per family, construction materials,, 
availability of potable water, sanitary waste 
disposal, etc. are probably no better than in 
the urban shanty towns. In the rural areas, con-
struction by the family and neighbours, with 
only a limited amount of paid specialized labour, 
remains the rule. The housing problem is chronic 
rather than acute: the inadequacies of the houses-
derive partly from traditional patterns and low 
standards or felt needs for housing, and partly 
from relationships to the land that affect the 
value of the house to the family. Families of , 
workers living on large estates without tenure 
rights, squatters in the pioneering zones, or 
landless workers compelled to migrate in search 
of seasonal labour and shelter themselves by 
the roadside have no incentives to build more 
substantial houses. Houses would not represent 
to such groups a real investment, and in any 
case their investment aspirations usually centre 
on acquisition of land rather than houses. 
Thus far, public rural housing programmes-
have been limited to a token scale, and it seems 
unlikely that resources bearing any relationship 
to the size of the problem can be allocated to 
them in the near future, except in the countries 
in which the rural population is already a mi-
nority. In the long term, it would seem that 
rural housing will require policy and pro-
gramming approaches quite different from urban 
housing, approaches closely dependent on other 
programmes for the raising of rural levels of 
living or resettlement of the rural population. 
Secure land tenure and a reasonable expectation 
of an adequate livelihood from agriculture would 
provide the preconditions for rural family in-
terest in better housing. Once these conditions 
are met, public aid in the form of technical 
advice, loans of simple machinery or tools, and 
provision of some building materials at low 
cost might be sufficient. Another part of the 
problem could be solved through enforcement 
or regulations requiring landowners to provide 
for their workers housing which would meet 
minimum standards. In other instances, re-
grouping of the rural population in nucleated 
settlements or in line settlements along the roads 
may be called for, together with some public 
construction.^^ 
5. Food consumption and nutrition 
One other "sector", that of food consumption 
and nutrition, corresponds to a clearly defined 
human need that is even more basic than the 
three that have just been discussed. Highly 
refined techniques for the quantification of ob-
jectives and measurement of progress toward 
such objectives have been devised, both in terms 
of the intake of nutrients according to the age 
and other characteristics of the individual, and 
in terms of the physical state expected to result 
from a satisfactory diet. The main difficulty in 
this aspect of programming is the high cost 
of the inquiries needed to maintain accurate 
information on national nutritional levels, but 
less expensive techniques, such as the prepara-
tion of food balance-sheets, can throw a good 
deal of light on consumption trends. Food con-
sumption targets have been included in a certain 
number of national plans. Even in the most 
highly planned societies, however, public action 
in this sector is supplementary to the continuing 
responsibility of the individual or the family to 
find the resources to pay for its food (or to 
grow it) , to choose the foods it prefers within 
the limits of its resources and to decide what 
proportion of its income to spend on food. 
Meanwhile the State and to some extent private 
organizations influence food supplies and con-
sumption through measures as diverse both 
in character and in objectives as the following: 
Dietary education and propaganda (which may 
liave as objectives not only improvement of the 
diet but also improvement of the markets of 
domestic producers of certain foods) . 
Legislation setting standards for food quality, 
handling, labelling, additives, etc. 
6. Clothing 
One other "sector" included in the list of 
•components of levels of living can be dismissed 
in a few words. The content of a clothing sector 
is easy to define, but influences of culture and 
changing fashions outweigh the measurable 
aspects of need to such an extent that meaningful 
objectives would be hard to formulate, except 
irom the point of view of targets for consumer 
•goods production and consumption. A few Latin 
American plans do, in fact, include targets for 
24 These problems are discussed in more detail in the 
ECLA secretariat's study of "Rural Settlement Patterns 
and Social Change in Latin America", Economic Bulletin 
Jor Latin America, Vol. X (1965), pp. 1-22. 
per capita consumption of textiles and footwear. 
The range of measures having some impact on 
the family's consumption of clothing is almost 
as wide as in the case of food and as little subject 
to unified policy or programming. Except among 
groups at the very lowest income levels and to 
some extent among school children the question 
of direct public action to support a minimum 
standard of clothing hardly arises, and it is left 
to the family or individual to decide what pro-
portion of income to allocate to this need. 
7. Employment and conditions of work 
Employment and conditions of work figure 
in the list of components of the level of living 
as a single "component", and public action 
concerning them usually centres in a Ministry 
of Labour. In relation to programming, however, 
they present rather diíFerent problems and are 
subject to different instruments of public policy. 
Full employment is usually one of the central 
objectives of over-all planning, and the supply 
of manpower is one of the most important 
determinants of the feasibility of production 
targets. At the same time, employment places the 
individual in a position to earn the income that 
supports his family's level of living. The topic 
is thus too intimately associated with the central 
problems of planning to be satisfactorily in-
terpreted as a "social sector". The measures 
that can be applied to combat unemployment 
and under-employment, to channel employment 
into the occupations with highest development 
priorities, to raise the qualifications of workers, 
to raise average real wages and place a floor 
under minimum wages, or to strengthen the 
organized bargaining power of the workers, can 
be divided only arbitrarily between the "eco-
nomic" and the "social"; the claims of produc-
tion, of human welfare, and of social organiza-
tion must be taken into account simultaneously 
and at each step. While a body of techniques 
for dealing with the more limited problems of 
employment have taken shape under the name 
of "labour management", with emphasis on 
the reduction of frictional unemployment through 
labour exchanges, the arbitration of disputes be-
tween employers and workers, etc., the content 
of labour management covers only a small part 
of the area associated with employment. Other 
approaches to the organization of policy in this 
area will be discussed under "human resources 
development" and "income distribution". 
The topic of conditions of work is more easily 
envisaged as a component of the level of living 
or a sector for social programming. In practice, 
improvements in such conditions depend on 
three main factors: 
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(o ) Attainment of levels of productivity per-
mitting a given branch of production to support 
improved conditions; 
(6 ) Organized bargaining by the wage-
earners ; 
(c ) Laws and regulations supported by in-
spection and enforcement machinery. 
The first of these factors depends on the 
wider production and employment trends and 
policies; the second is part of the problem of 
popular participation in policy and programming 
to be discussed in a sequel to the present paper. 
The third, at least potentially, constitutes an 
area for unified programming, but in the main 
the instruments are quite different from those 
applied in the sectors discussed up to this point. 
Capital investment is of negligible importance, 
and recurrent expenditures for provision of 
services (in this instance, inspection and en-
forcement) are minor. Programmes for im-
provement of conditions of work thus need not 
make important claims for allocation of public 
resources, although their impact on allocation 
of resources in the private sector may be quite 
important, with repercussions both favourable 
and unfavourable to increased production. 
This area of public action commonly depends 
primarily on the enactment of laws and a gradual 
accumulation of piecemeal legislation, com-
plicated and even self-contradictory, responding 
to demands from limited sectors of the public 
or to international recommendations. In Latin 
America, a common consequence is elaborate 
protection for some categories of workers, little 
or no protection for others, and a particularly 
wide gap between the levels of protection af-
forded urban and rural workers. The task of 
sectoral programming in this area seems to be 
principally the reform unification and simplifica-
tion of existing laws, with attention to the 
equalization of rights of different categories of 
workers, the enforceability of the laws, and their 
likely repercussions on the economy. 
8. Social security 
Social security differs from the other sectors 
both in its relationships to human welfare and 
in the kind of claims it makes upon resources. 
The typical social security system consists of 
a range of measures making the individual or 
family "secure" in the long-term maintenance 
of a minimum income (through old-age, in-
validity and survivors' pensions) and in the 
meeting of short-term contingencies such as 
sickness and maternity. It thus has a bearing 
on ability to meet needs in all of the consump-
tion sectors, and a more direct relationship to 
the health sector; in practice, health care is 
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often provided directly through the social 
security system. Social security is also expected 
to serve wider social or socio-economic ob-
jectives, particularly the redistribution of in-
comes, and the maintenance of consumer demand 
and thus of employment levels during periods 
of economic recession. 
Social security in most countries, and almost 
invariably so in Latin America, is financed 
through tripartite contributions from insured 
persons, employers and the State. It has often 
been pointed out that this type of financing has 
a deceptive element, particularly as coverage 
approaches universality, and that the real costs 
are borne by the community at large, whether 
by direct allocation of public funds or by the 
price repercussions of higher labour costs. In 
any case, the funds allocated to social security 
are, aside from the costs of administration, 
transfer payments that affect the character, 
timing, and sources of consumption expenditure, 
but over the long term need not affect its total 
nor diminish the resources available for invest-
ment. In the short term, to the extent that the 
social security system is financed by employer-
employee contributions, it produces compulsory 
savings and adds to the investment resources 
available to the public sector. 
It might be expected that a social sector that 
seems naturally suited to unified administration, 
that has multiple repercussions upon other areas 
of social and economic policy, and that offers a 
potential instrument for the accomplishment of 
many social and economic objectives, would 
be among the first to be subject to coherent 
programming. The wide differences in national 
social security schemes that have hindered agree-
ment on internationally comparable objectives 
and indicators do not seem to affect the prac-
ticability of internally consistent national pro-
gramming. 
In practice, however, the social security 
systems of several Latin American countries 
have grown by accretion to a high degree of 
complexity and costliness without any centralized 
direction or programming, let alone systematic 
co-ordination with other social and economic 
programmes.^® Programming initiatives have ap-
peared only recently, in response to the in-
creasingly glaring deficiences and inequities of 
the systems and have usually taken the form of 
special surveys and proposals for reforms made 
25 Among the major social security systems of the 
region, the Mexican—which is relatively young, unified 
in administration and systematic in extension of cover-
age—is the main exception to this generalization. The 
Mexican system, however, covers only 14.7 per cent of 
the economically active population, compared to 72.9 
per cent in Chile and 51.4 per cent in Argentina. 
by official commissions or international experts.^ 
In the countries in which social security has 
made its largest advances, however, built-in 
resistances to change are formidable and the 
application of programming recommendations is 
likely to be slow.^'' 
The main problems to be faced in social 
security reform, to judge f rom recent surveys, 
are the following: 
( o ) The social security systems typically 
consist of a number of separate institutions or 
funds created at different times, incorporating 
different classes of employees and workers with 
differing obligations and benefits. In Chile, such 
institutions number 41, in Argentina 14 and in 
Uruguay 12. Ministries of Labour and Social 
Security generally have some supervisory respon-
sibilities but little real control over the in-
stitutions. The laws governing the separate in-
stitutions are complicated and hard to interpret; 
usually provisions for new benefits and new 
sources of financing have been added piecemeal. 
The administrative machinery is inevitably ex-
pensive and slow-moving. Benefits usually cor-
respond to the organized bargaining power of 
the different groups that have come under social 
security. The lack of consideration of wider 
social and economic implications has resulted 
in well-known anomalies, particularly in relation 
to retirement pensions; members of some groups 
have gained entitlement to retirement after as 
little as 20 years of work or at ages as low as 50. 
(b) Contributions for the support of social 
security have become extremely high in relation 
to wage levels; employer contributions alone 
commonly are equivalent to 25 or 30 per cent 
of wage costs. Governments have frequently be-
come unable to meet their own sizable obliga-
tions f or contributions to the funds, while eva-
sion of payment by employers and workers is 
common. Consequently the benefits are under-
financed, leading to the bankruptcy of some 
funds and to long delays in benefit payments or 
26 Within the past three years, reports of such surveys 
have been issued by the Technical Secretariat of the 
Comisión Asesora Permanente de Seguridad Social in 
Argentina, by an ad hoc Comisión de Estudios de Segu-
ridad Social in Chile and by an International Labour 
Organisation expert in Uruguay. 
For a recent discussion of these questions, see "New 
Orientations in the Field of Social Security, 1963-64", 
in the Social Survey of Latin America 1963-64, prepared 
by the Department of Social Affairs of the Pan American 
Union (Washington, 1964), paras. 262-317. This document 
concludes that "The errors of the past have been made 
known and corrective measures have been suggested but, 
unfortunately, no country has been able to take the 
politically difiScult path which would result in the loss 
of privileges for those groups which through political 
pressure have been able to gain advantages at the ex-
pense of others" (paragraph 316). 
in granting of benefits to eligible persons. In 
several countries, inflation has eased the burden 
on public funds while leaving the retired groups 
in a chronically desperate situation; the oc-
casional readjustments rarely restore the full 
original value of the pensions. 
( c ) The financial reserves accumulated in the 
early stages of the social security funds have not 
in general been so invested as to produce satis-
factory monetary returns to finance benefits nor 
to serve wider social and economic objectives. 
Excessive expenditures on administrative build-
ings seem to be common and heavy investments 
in urban real estate and upper-income housing 
have been criticized. 
At present, the countries face pressures that 
will in the long run prove irresistible for the 
extension of social security to the groups not 
yet covered—in particular the rural workers, the 
self-employed artisans and shopkeepers, and the 
casual labourers of the cities. The problems of 
financing, administration and equity in pro-
vision of benefits are bound to become even 
more difficult than at present, in view of the 
practical inability of these groups to contribute 
to the costs of their own social security, their 
lack of organization, and their lack of experience 
in coping with administrative procedures.^® An-
other problem of increasing importance under 
prevailing conditions of under-development and 
rapid growth of the labour force is the influence 
of labour protective and social security pro-
grammes upon employment trends. The more 
onerous the costs of these programmes are to 
the employer the stronger his motivation to 
adopt capital-intensive techniques and reduce his 
labour force. 
Under these circumstances, it would seem that 
among all the "social sectors" that of social 
security is in the most urgent need of unified 
programming integrated with over-all develop-
ment planning. 
9. Recreation 
Recreation in the broad sense of use of leisure 
time is, at least in principle, susceptible to some 
degree of public programming. As societies be-
come increasingly urbanized, as normal hours 
of work shorten and vacation periods lengthen, 
as the average age for entry into employment 
moves upward and the average age of retire-
ment downward, recreation makes increasingly 
heavy demands on public as well as private re-
sources, supports increasingly important and 
These questions were discussed at the Seventh Inter-
American Conference on Social Security (Asunción, 
June 1964). 
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varied economic activities, and raises complex 
problems in relation to social values. 
Nevertheless, the few public recreational pro-
grammes that have been formulated are limited 
in scope, usually to the area of athletic sports, 
and no serious attempt has been made to set 
priorities or relate public recreational allocations 
to over-all planning. The alternative forms of 
use of leisure time are so varied and so de-
pendent on individual choice and group cultural 
norms that a quest for objective criteria f o r 
public allocations to them would presumably be 
futile, except in relationship to public objectives 
in other sectors, in particular health and educa-
tion. Economic programming criteria of "effi-
c i ency" in allocation of resources are particu-
larly hard to apply here, and the strength of 
consumer demand for such expensive instru-
ments of recreation as the television set and the 
automobile is already setting the planners diffi-
cult problems. In fact, recreation and the use 
o f leisure time are among the least explored 
of the important areas relating to social policy 
and programming in the Latin American setting. 
10. Human freedoms 
The last of the internationally recognized com-
ponents of the level of living, human freedoms, 
can hardly be considered a social sector that 
lends itself to programming, except in the re-
stricted sense of programmes for the elimination 
•of discrimination based on race, language, reli-
gion, sex, etc. In this sense, the programmes of 
certain Latin American countries for incorpora-
tion of their indigenous populations into na-
tional life might be classified under human free-
doms, but f o r present purposes it will be more 
satisfactory to consider these programmes in 
the context of rural development programming. 
In a broader sense, all measures intended to 
promote wider popular participation in decision-
making—strengthening of democratic local gov-
ernment, creation of local planning bodies, 
participation by organizations representing dif-
ferent sectors of the public in the policy-making 
and planning process—are relevant to human 
freedoms. These measures, however, can best 
he discussed in connexion with the problems of 
formulation of development policies, organiza-
t ion of planning, and changes in social structure 
assumed to be preconditions or accompaniments 
•of development. 
11. Social service 
The term social service, in its more precise 
international usage, covers an area of social 
action that stands in yet another relationship 
to human welfare f rom the sectors previously 
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discussed.^® It refers to "organized activity that 
aims at helping towards a mutual adjustment of 
individuals and their social environment", and 
implies that the concept of levels of living should 
be expanded to include a "component of social 
relationships". It assumes that certain methods 
and techniques, largely those imparted in the 
professional training of social workers, can 
help families and communities function more 
effectively in meeting their own needs, and also 
that these techniques can add considerably to 
the effectiveness of services in the other social 
sectors by helping individuals and families take 
full advantage of them. It is also asserted that 
social service, by "lubricating" the points of 
social friction, can promote productivity and 
bring economic benefits that are important al-
though hardly quantifiable. 
In Latin America social service is now at a 
transitional stage, in which principles and tech-
niques originating in other settings have been 
superimposed on older traditions of charitable 
action, and in which training institutions have 
multiplied in advance of clear agreement on the 
purposes of the training. The problems of adapta-
tion of social service principles to societies 
characterized by mass poverty and accelerating 
social change will not be discussed here. For 
present purposes, it is enough to note that social 
service is not subject to unified administration or 
programming anywhere in the region and that it 
rarely receives any separate sectoral treatment 
in development plans. It is typically dispersed 
through many small agencies—including both 
private agencies dependent on State subsidies 
and public agencies that are more or less au-
tonomous administratively, often with special 
earmarked sources of revenue—and in an aux-
iliary capacity within other social programmes 
including education, health, housing, social se-
curity and labour management. There is a 
29 The term is frequendy used, in the plural, to cover 
all or most forms of organized social action. The recent 
report of a group of experts on development planning, 
for example, refers to "vocational and technical educa-
tion, the spread of elementary and secondary education, 
scientific research, the development of health services, 
family planning, town and country planning, and the 
housing of industrial workers" as "social services which 
are . . . directly related to economic aims". Planning for 
Economic Development (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. 64.II.B.3), paragraph 41. The present discus-
sion, however, follows the interpretation set forth in 
chapter X of the 1963 Report on the World Social 
Situation (United Nations publication. Sales No.: 
63.IV.4), from which the quotations are taken. Inter-
national terminology and conceptions concerning the 
content of this sector are now undergoing change, and 
substitution of the term "social welfare" has been pro-
posed. See Virginia A. Paraiso, "Social Service in 
Latin America: Functions and Relationships to Devel-
opment". 
widespread impression that resources allocated 
to social service are being dissipated on an ex-
cessive number of small-scale activities, fre-
quently originating in imitation of the specialized 
programmes of the higher-income countries. 
Declarations on the desirability of integration of 
social service into over-all planning have be-
come frequent, but as yet there seems to have 
been little systematic discussion of priorities, 
working relationships with other sectors, and 
requirements for more efiScient organization. 
12. Social defence 
Social defence, a term adopted internationally 
to cover the range of measures relevant to pre-
vention of crime and treatment of offenders, is 
probably the most ancient and universal form of 
organized public social action. Until recently, 
it has evolved in partial isolation from the other 
areas of social action, and although at present 
its specialists are increasingly interested in 
identifying their work with the wider issues of 
development, the relationships are not yet clearly 
defined. There seems to be no reason for be-
lieving that the problems of crime and delin-
quency will decrease with development and 
higher incomes, though their character will pre-
sumably change in many ways. Societies cannot 
avoid devoting important resources to social de-
fence, but objective criteria for the size and 
distribution of these allocations are lacking; 
there seems to be no way of determining whether 
increases in the allocations would bring propor-
tionate benefits to the society as a whole. The 
main hopes for reduction in the burden repre-
sented by crime and delinquency have been 
placed in action in the other social sectors, in 
particular in education, in special youth pro-
grammes, in strengthening of the family through 
social services, but the few attempts to measure 
the impact of such programmes on anti-social 
behaviour have been inconclusive. There is pre-
sumably as much room in social defence as in 
the other sectors for improvement of internal 
efficiency through programming, but the possible 
scope of integration with over-all planning will 
require further study. 
13. Sectoral programming: some questions 
In addition to the topics discussed above, it 
would be easy to find others referred to in one 
source or another as "social sectors" or "social 
fields". Enough has been said, however, to indi-
cate the difficulty of envisaging the sectors as 
parts of a whole, however many may be distin-
guished and wherever the dividing lines may be 
drawn. Before we go on to consider various 
approaches that have been offered for integration 
of the sectors or their concentration on strategic 
objectives, it may be worth while to note a trend 
toward inflation of each sector from within. 
This trend can be considered a product of the 
present groupings toward co-ordination and 
planning as tíiey interact with the natural re-
uctance of the sectoral specialists to accept 
subordination within an over-all planning system. 
Recent literature deriving from the different 
sectors, from the broadest to the most specialized, 
indicates a common yearning for the incorpora-
tion of new territory and for more intimate in-
volvement with the whole area of development 
policy. The common introductory formula is in 
the passive tense: such and such a programme 
is "no longer regarded" as "merely" or "solely" 
concerned with the objectives with which it was 
previously identified. A recent document pre-
pared for a meeting of experts on administrative 
aspects of national development planning offers 
a compendium of such formulas: "Housing 
policy no longer involves merely construction 
programmes, but all steps that will enable 
present and future community needs to be satis-
fied in accordance with a master town-planning 
programme and over-all territorial development 
programmes". "The concept of specialized social 
services is gradually giving way to a wider con-
cept of integrated social services, calling for 
social workers trained in many fields and able 
to cope with all community problems and needs". 
"The concept of health is no longer defined as 
an absence of illness, but in a positive way as 
the body of conditions favouring harmonious 
individual and community development, i.e. 
healthy environment, balanced diet, child pro-
tection from the pre-natal period until the teens, 
etc."; and so on for the other spheres of social 
action. 
Such formulas are typically as vague as they 
are ambitious. They fail to indicate who has 
attained the new enlightenment and where and 
to what extent the new conceptions have been 
translated into policies and programmes that are 
being applied. They evade the problem of divi-
sion of responsibilities and some of them sug-
gest that successful application of the new con-
ception in one sector of social action would 
render the others superfluous. If one type of 
professional can really be invested through train-
ing with an ability to "cope with all community 
problems and needs", there should be no need to 
allocate resources for the training of others. 
In practice, at least in Latin America, housing 
programmes are still concerned almost exclu-
sively with the construction of houses, health 
programmes with reductions in mortality and 
morbidity, education programmes with increases 
in enrolment, etc. There is an obvious need for 
the formulation of objectives in each sector that 
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express more adequately its purposes within 
over-all development policy and its relationships 
with the other sectors, but this need can hardly 
be met through formulas that do not correspond 
to administrative or programming machinery 
and that leave each sector assuming undefined 
responsibilities for the meeting of "community 
needs". 
Such attempts to solve the problems of co-
ordination by expanding the area to be covered 
by programming in each sector can be contrasted 
with a disposition on the part of advocates of 
comprehensive economic and social planning to 
belittle the importance of sectoral programming 
outside the framework of comprehensive plans 
and to criticize the common restriction of the 
social side of planning to separate programmes 
in education, health and housing. In principle, 
such criticisms are justified, but in the present 
circumstances of the majority of countries of the 
region efforts to programme action in each sec-
tor can hardly be expected to wait upon the 
achievement of comprehensive planning or global 
criteria for the allocation of resources. All of the 
sectors have their own technical problems of 
programming to solve, and must work out their 
own applications of the principles common to all 
programming—quantification of targets, specifi-
cation of alternative means of reaching them, 
internal consistency, maximum efficiency in the 
use of scarce resources. If one starts from the 
direction of general planning, the task must 
somehow be cut down to manageable propor-
tions and responsibilities for detailed decisions 
decentralized. For this purpose, sectoral pro-
gramming and regional-local programming are 
"both indispensable. 
From the panoramic view of the sectors given 
above, it seems reasonable to conclude that both 
the ways and the degrees in which different types 
of organized social action need to be incor-
porated in over-all planning differ considerably. 
Some of these forms of action (in relation to 
education, housing, food consumption, employ-
ment) are so deeply and complexly involved in 
the basic issues of change and in the struggle 
over allocation of resources that a system of 
general planning in which they are left aside is 
hardly imaginable. In other instances, these con-
siderations are somewhat less compelling and the 
possibilities for action based strictly on human 
welfare considerations greater, although the 
desirability of incorporation into general plan-
ning is still obvious. In still other instances, the 
sectoral aspirations towards incorporation in 
general planning may amount to little more than 
an understandable desire for improvement of 
status and larger appropriations; the claims on 
resources and the potential impact on develop-
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ment are relatively limited; and the justifications 
for the programmes so predominantly cultural or 
humanitarian that a serious attempt to incor-
porate them into a development strategy would 
distort or transform them. Questions such as the 
following might be asked of each programme or 
sector: 
(a) What specific contributions to the goals 
of over-all development planning can be expected 
from the programme? On what reasoning or 
evidence are claims for these contributions 
based? 
(b ) To what extent does the justification for 
allocation of resources rest on the one hand, on 
contributions to development and, on the other, 
on cultural values, conceptions of human rights, 
or demands from the public that cannot be 
ignored in democratic societies? 
(c ) Are there incompatibilities between the 
programme in question and the objectives of 
over-all development planning? Does it call for 
the diversion of resources that could be used 
elsewhere, on a scale seriously affecting the 
financing of other programmes? 
(d) To what extent can the objectives of the 
programme be advanced by the more efficient 
use of resources already allocated to it or con-
tributed by the private sector? What are the 
needs for legislative and administrative reforms? 
(e) What changes in the programme can be 
formulated that would increase its contribution 
to over-all development without damaging its 
ability to respond to its other justifications? To 
what extent would its specialists and adminis-
trators be prepared to accept and co-operate in 
such changes? 
( / ) To what extent can programming prin-
ciples and techniques contribute to the internal 
efficiency of the programme in question in rela-
tion to its own objectives without reference to 
over-all planning? 
(g) How are responsibilities for the area of 
social action in question divided between na-
tional public agencies (readily controllable by 
central planning machinery and receiving funds 
from the national budget), autonomous public 
agencies with their own sources of income, local 
public bodies, private organizations, family or 
individual initiative? What kinds of internal co-
ordinating machinery are needed? To what ex-
tent is the area of social action susceptible to 
decentralization, local planning and administra-
tion, and the calling forth of resources not other-
wise available? 
In relation to public expenditure, the majority 
of the social sectors differ from the economic 
sectors in the greater relative importance of 
recurrent costs, and of a dependable level of 
allocations from year to year. Even in housing, 
efficiency calls for annual allocations foreseeable 
over a period of several years so as to insure 
a smoothly rising rate of construction, rather 
than a crash programme. In the sectoral pro-
grammes applied up to the present, this circum-
stance has hardly been given enough weight, it 
has been easier to concentrate on investment in 
visible projects, such as school buildings and 
hospitals. This kind of investment, if it is not 
to be wasted altogether, results in long-term 
claims for staffing and maintenance, and thus 
sets limits to future programming. It has already 
been emphasized in relation to several sectors 
that programmers can rarely start with a clean 
slate; they must make the best of what their 
predecessors have left. 
III . STRATEGIC OR INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES 
The approaches under this heading purport 
to focus action in several of the conventional 
sectors—economic as well as social—upon a 
broad problem area or a defined element of the 
population, or to organize such action around a 
specific interpretation of priority objectives or 
strategic factors in development. Income and 
wealth distribution, population, human resources 
development, urban development and rural de-
velopment are among the policy areas that are 
most prominently considered for this kind of 
treatment. Their discussion will require a return 
to some questions already raised in relation to 
specific social sectors. 
1. Income and wealth distribution 
During recent years Latin America, like other 
regions, has seen a partial and still incomplete 
transition in dominant currents of thought con-
cerning the relationship of income distribution 
to development. According to the more tradi-
tional point of view, a highly uneven distribu-
tion of personal income in the early stages of 
development is required if a sufficient share of 
the national product is to be diverted f rom 
current consumption to investment. According 
to a common corollary, the domestic financing 
of industrialization supposes a particularly se-
vere squeeze on agricultural incomes. This con-
ception, which in effect justifies existing income 
distribution, remains very influential in practice, 
although public expressions of it are becoming 
fewer and more cautious. The alternative point 
of view, increasingly prominent in the studies 
made by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and in the recommendations of regional 
meetings, declares the present income distribu-
tion an obstacle to development: the receivers of 
high incomes do not in practice invest produc-
tively an adequate proportion of the resources 
in their hands, while their consumption patterns 
exert undesirable pressures on the level of im-
ports and the patterns of domestic production; 
the concomitants of extreme poverty hinder the 
masses of the population from acquiring the 
qualifications and attitudes needed for partici-
pation in a modern economy; and the lack of 
purchasing power of the same masses restricts 
the potentialities for growth of most industries 
producing for the domestic market.^® These eco-
nomic arguments are reinforced by the political 
impracticability of maintaining—or at least 
overtly defending—^patterns of income distribu-
tion that majority sectors of the population have 
come to consider intolerably unjust. 
Income redistribution, in fact, in its wider im-
plications, appears to be one of the central 
themes around which development policy must 
be organized, and a particularly fruitful ap-
proach to the integration of the economic and 
the social. T o a very large extent, the deficiencies 
in the various social sectors already discussed 
must be viewed as manifestations of low income 
levels and maldistribution of income rather than 
as problems soluble by sectoral programmes; at 
the same time, the deficiencies in some of these 
sectors, particularly education, obviously con-
firm and perpetuate the maldistribution of in-
come. From the economic point of view, it is a 
truism that an acceptable income redistribution 
policy cannot be reduced to a more even distri-
bution of poverty; the objective must be to 
channel as much as possible of the national in-
come in directions that will strengthen the pro-
See, in particular, United Nations, Towards a 
Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America, United 
Nations Publication, Sales No. 64.II.G.4, and The Eco-
nomic Development of Latin America in the Post-war 
Period, United Nations Publication, Sales No. 64.ILG.6. 
The 1961 Punta del Este Charter calls for "a more 
equitable distribution of national income, raising more 
rapidly the income and standard of living of the needier 
sectors of the population, at the same time that a higher 
proportion of the national product is devoted to social 
uses". The 1965 Economic Commission for Latin 
America study "The Process of Industrial Development 
in Latin America" (E/CN.12/716) gives particular em-
phasis to the need for redistribution of income as a 
means to the stimulation of industries producing for the 
domestic market. 
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ductive capacity and the incentives to produce 
of the whole population.®^ 
While the fact of extremely uneven income 
distribution in most of the region is apparent 
even f r o m casual observation, the formulation 
of consistent and comprehensive policies re-
sponding to the newer conceptions is hampered 
by a general lack of reliable detailed informa-
tion and of analyses of the socio-economic im-
plications of alternative patterns of distribution 
and techniques of redistribution. Moreover, the 
political pressures and resistances that beset a 
question as central to the societies as income 
distribution place formidable obstacles in the 
way of the application of a unified policy. Up 
to the present measures intended to influence 
income distribution have been adopted piece-
meal. Such measures, when confronted with 
existing social and economic structures, are likely 
to have effects quite different f rom their overt 
purposes. Experience thus far suggests that they 
have more effect in redistributing income within 
the middle strata and improving the relative 
position of some of the better organized urban 
groups than in changing the main features of 
distribution between high, middle, and low. Nor 
does it appear that the isolated redistributive 
measures have realizéd their potential contribu-
tion toward making the economies more flexible 
and dynamic. 
The principal areas of public policy that are 
directly relevant to income distribution can be 
classified as fol lows: 
(a ) Fiscal policy 
A conference on fiscal policy organized by the 
O A S / I D B / E C L A Joint Tax Program discussed 
in some detail the use of fiscal policy as an in-
trument f o r income distribution; there was gen-
eral agreement on the need to increase public 
revenue and to distribute the burden more fairly, 
but a considerable difference of opinion as to 
the techniques that should be used, the priority 
that should be given to income redistribution 
in relation to other objectives of fiscal policy, 
and the effectiveness of fiscal policy relative to 
alternative instruments of income redistribu-
tion.®^ The problem centres on the capacity of 
See Aníbal Pinto, "Some General Aspects of Eco-
nomic Policy", to be published shortly, for a discussion 
of the different relationships between income redistribu-
tion and development in industrialized and in other coun-
tries. In the former, the central objective is the main-
tenance of real demand; in the latter, redistribution is 
conditional upon "the reform of the structure of pro-
duction, which is manifestly rigid and incapable of 
meeting requirements in respect of essential consumer 
goods (especially foodstuffs) and social services". 
32 "The participants were agreed that there was ample 
capacity in most Latin American countries to increase 
public revenue and that among the most important 
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the State to tax the upper brackets of income 
and wealth, under the circumstances typical of 
Latin America, efiSciently and through techniques 
that will also stimulate these groups to use their 
resources more productively. While the alterna-
tives open to fiscal policy and their complex 
implications cannot be discussed in the present 
paper, one proposal made to the Conference de-
serves special attention in relation to the general 
framework of social pol icy: it was proposed that 
the tax systems should be examined in their 
entirety in relation to social objectives for dis-
tribution of the burden among broad income 
groups and that the differing tax instruments 
appropriate to each group should be distin-
guished. The proposal was set forth sche-
matically, so as to correspond in a rough way 





Social Active in national to fiscal 
Group population income revenue 
(1) High 5 40 60 
(2) Middle 35 40 30 
(3) Low 60 20 10 
After tax, on the assumption that fiscal income 
represents 15 per cent of national income, the 
high group would retain 31 per cent of national 
income, the middle group 35.5 per cent, and the 
low group 18.5 per cent plus benefits f rom public 
expenditure on social programmes. The tax in-
struments appropriate to the high group would 
be income tax, tax on assets in whatever form, 
and a tax on expenditure on luxury goods and 
services. The middle group would be subjected to 
taxes on expenditures on "non-wage goods" 
("nearly all consumption goods and services ex-
cept the most essential") and to low rates of 
taxes on incomes, based on payrolls and de-
ducted. The low group would not make a net 
contribution to public finance in view of the 
causes for the insufficiency of such revenue was the 
failure of the tax system to impose effective levies on 
the propertied classes and to collect those in force. While 
the great masses of the population bore considerable 
fiscal burdens, through indirect taxes of various kinds, 
and also through personal taxes deducted at source, the 
benefits accruing from the ownership of capital—whether 
in the form of income, of capital gains or of the spending 
power derived from the ownership of wealth as such 
—largely escaped taxation. Considerations of equity and 
of expediency alike required that any major reform of 
the tax system should ensure that the propertied classes, 
as well as the working classes, paid their due share of 
the conunon burden." (Final Summary and Conclusions, 
"Provisional Report of the Conference on Fiscal Policy 
organized by the OAS/IDB/ECLA Joint Tax Program", 
E/CN.12/638, 15 January 1963.) 
redistributive effect of public expenditure, but 
would be taxed to the extent that its consump-
tion crossed the borderline between "wage 
goods" and "non-wage goods" . 
Another participant, while in general agree-
ment with this approach, felt that an estimate 
of 15-20 per cent of active population in the 
middle income group and of 75 per cent in the 
low group would better reflect the true situation. 
He also indicated the revolutionary character of 
the shift in tax burden proposed by estimating 
that the upper income group now carries 33 per 
cent of this burden and the lower 60 per cent.®® 
At present, under the influence of the Alliance 
for Progress, most countries in the region are 
at some stage of the drafting or application of 
tax reforms intended both to increase public 
revenues and to distribute the burden more 
equitably, although concrete targets such as those 
set forth above have not yet been incorporated 
in public policies. The annual reports of the 
Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American 
Development Bank describe these trends under 
the heading "mobilization of domestic resources" 
in a tone of qualified optimism, stressing the 
importance of changes of attitudes in the social 
strata affected and acknowledging that such 
changes cannot be expected to occur overnight. 
The debates now under way in the legislative 
bodies and the Press indicate that a consensus 
on the desirable limits of income redistribution 
through tax reform is not at hand. In practice, 
the public sector remains heavily dependent on 
indirect taxes that bear upon the low and middle 
income groups, while the upper-income minority 
retains formidable powers to resist or evade 
attempts to increase its own contribution. 
(b ) Measures redistributing wealth and diffus-
ing control over the means of production 
The highly uneven distribution of income in 
Latin America is associated with a high degree 
of concentrated control of the sources of income, 
and compelling arguments have been made that 
effective policies for the redistribution of income 
must include measures for the redistribution of 
wealth. This proposition is most widely accepted 
in relation to the ownership of land, and it 
would be unnecessary to repeat here the justifi-
cations for land tenure reform, now embodied in 
numerous regional policy recommendations ap-
proved by the Governments, although not yet 
widely translated into national practice.®^ Such 
Si Ibid., pp. 140-142 and 211 (proposal made by 
Aníbal Pinto). A similar hypothetical distribution of 
the population into three strata in relation to income 
and consumption patterns may be found in The Process 
of Industrial Development in Latín America, op. cit., 
Vol. I, p. 208. 
For the most recent information on this question 
reform is redistributive only to the extent that 
compensation to landlords falls below the market 
value of the land, and assumes a shift in political 
power depriving this group of the ability to block 
or evade a measure so distasteful to it.®® It has 
been pointed out that the concentration of 
agrarian property in latifundios, in addition to 
its obvious depressive influence on rural wage 
rates and on the possibilities for emergence of 
a class of efficient small farmers, is likely to 
influence f o o d supplies and prices in ways that 
may frustrate the redistributive intentions of 
wage measures outside the agricultural sector. 
Regional thinking on needs for an instrument 
of wider diffusion of property and control over 
the means of production in sectors other than 
agriculture is much farther f rom a consensus. 
The relevant instruments would include anti-
monopoly legislation; promotion of ownership 
of shares in enterprises among the public in 
general or among the workers; expansion of 
the sector of public ownership of large enter-
prises; and a wide range of measures for the 
encouragement of small entrepreneurs, including 
credits and promotion of co-operatives.®® 
( c ) Public services 
A large share of any increase in revenue se-
cured by the public sector is sure to go to educa-
tion, piiblic health, low-cost housing, and other 
services theoretically available to the whole 
population. T o the extent that the low-income 
strata really benefit f rom these services and that 
the revenue system is progressive, these services 
constitute a highly important f orm of redistribu-
tion of income, and one that is particularly cal-
culated to stimulate development by raising the 
productivity of the "human resources". The sec-
toral discussions above have indicated, however, 
how far this objective is f rom attainment. Even 
in countries with high per capita incomes and 
long traditions of providing such services as 
rights, it is believed that the lowest income 
groups are at a serious practical disadvantage 
in using them. In Latin America, many of the 
services seem to involve a redistribution of in-
see Políticas de Reforma Agraria (LARC/65/CONF/3), 
document presented to the 8th Regional Conference of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (Viña del Mar, 
Chile, 13-29 March 1965). 
33 "To pretend that landlords should be fully com-
pensated is as absurd as to expect that taxpayers of 
advanced countries should receive cash compensation or 
bonds by an amount equal to their taxes". (Edmundo 
Flores, "The Economics of Land Reform and Agri-
cultural Development", LARC/65/CONF/15, p. 11.) 
38 See Aníbal Pinto, "Notas sobre la distribución 
del ingreso y la estrategia de la redistribución". El 
Trimestre Económico, 115, July-Sept. 1962, •which con-
tains interesting suggestions on this as well as other 
aspects of the problem. 
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come away from the masses who contribute to 
their support but are unable to take advantage 
of them. In education, moreover, the real 
importance of an uneven distribution of the 
publicly financed service does not lie in a com-
parison of the contributions to educational costs 
and the benefits received by diíTerent classes or 
income strata, even if it were practicable to make 
such a calculation. The distribution of educa-
tional opportunities goes far to determine the 
income-earning capacity of the coming genera-
tion, and a distribution of such opportunities 
that coincides to a large extent with family in-
come and place of residjence is at least as im-
portant as the concentration of wealth in carry-
ing existing patterns of income distribution into 
the future. The advantages of access to higher 
education are typically confirmed by elaborate 
legislation protecting the employment oppor-
tunities of the holders of professional "titles". 
(d) Wage and salary legislation 
Minimum wage laws with varying breadth of 
coverage have been enacted in many countries 
of the region, and laws or decrees periodically 
raising wages and salaries are standard practice 
in the countries with experience of inflation. The 
redistributive effects of these measures have been 
conditioned, first, by their widely differing en-
forceability in different types of enterprises; 
second, by their inevitable limitation to regularly 
employed workers and employees. The over-all 
result, as in the case of other types of redistribu-
tive measures, may have been a strengthening 
of the position of certain groups at middle or 
lower-middle income levels, with advantages 
going to workers in large enterprises in relation 
to workers in small ones, to urban workers in 
relation to rural, to wage workers and salaried 
employees in relation to self-employed groups, 
etc. The more marginal casually employed or 
self-employed workers are likely to be placed at 
a disadvantage in two respects: minimum wage 
laws (often combined with rigid provisions for 
job security) cause employers to turn to capital-
intensive methods; and enterprises subject to 
the laws are commonly able to pass on the costs 
in the form of higher prices that depress the 
purchasing power of the unprotected groups. 
(e) Legislation promoting or regulating collec-
tive bargaining and unionization 
Trade union legislation up to the present, like 
wage legislation, seems to have contributed 
mainly to a strengthening of the position of 
certain salaried groups in relation to others and 
in relation to the casually employed and self-
employed. In general, the groups that have been 
in a strong position to bargain collectively and to 
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exert effective pressure on the public authorities 
have had strong motives to protect their favoured 
position against the threat of competition from 
the growing unorganized and under-employed 
labour force. At the same time, the presence of 
a large unorganized labour reserve has tended 
to limit the power of the unions to influence 
wage levels except in the larger enterprises in 
which wages form a relatively small part of total 
costs.®^ The laws themselves have commonly 
supported the highly uneven distribution of in-
comes between urban and rural workers. Unioni-
zation of the former has been favoured, while 
unionization of the latter has been prohibited 
or placed under severe restrictions. 
( f ) Measures affecting prices of consumer goods 
and services 
This category comprises a wide range of 
measures: control of prices of essential consumer 
goods, favourable treatment of imports of such 
goods, subsidies to producers, direct sales by 
public agencies in order to combat hoarding 
and profiteering by middlemen. Measures of this 
kind inevitably come to the fore in countries 
xmdergoing inflation, with chronic struggles cen-
tring around the prices of a few goods and 
services having the most direct impact on the 
lives of the urban low-income groups—in par-
ticular bread and transport fares. To the extent 
they are enforceable, measures that stabilize 
prices presumably benefit wider strata of the 
urban population than do the measures affecting 
wages. Unless they include a large element of 
public subsidy to the producers of essential 
goods, however, they inevitably increase the 
rural-urban income discrepancy. Controlled food 
prices mean lower rural wages and incomes for 
small cultivators, while controls on the consumer 
goods bought by these groups are likely to be 
much looser. 
(g) Measures for supplementing inadequate in-
comes, protection against loss of earning 
power and other contingencies 
Under this heading fall the various social se-
curity and social welfare programmes that have 
become part of public policy in the high-income 
industrialized countries and that have gradually 
3T"The Process of Industrial Development in Latin 
America", op. cit., pp. 131 et seq., emphasizes the wide 
variations in wage levels within the industrial sector, 
with relatively inefficient industries able to survive 
because they need not meet the wage levels of the 
modern industries, points to a relatively low average 
participation by wages and salaries in the value added 
in the industrial sector, and also suggests the relative 
ineffectiveness of minimum wage laws in the smaller 
enterprises. 
been introduced, at least on a token scale, 
throughout Latin America. Some of them, in 
particular the social security systems that depend 
on employment status and previous contribu-
tions, are subject to the same limitations as the 
other redistributive measures mentioned above. 
They redistribute incomes to some extent within 
the middle and lower-middle strata, but since 
the costs of employer and worker contributions 
to their financing is passed on to the general 
consumer of domestically produced goods and 
services, they leave the uncovered lowest-income 
strata at a greater disadvantage than before. In 
many of the countries, political pressures toward 
the universalization of social security are strong, 
but the wider the coverage the greater the need 
for public subsidies to meet the costs for groups 
that cannot, at their present income levels, con-
tribute very much toward their own "security". 
Family allowances and old-age pensions not 
dependent on employment status or previous 
contributions, and public assistance toward the 
maintenance of a floor under incomes should in 
principle have wider redistributive effects. Argu-
ments for such measures gain weight with the 
degree of urbanization and with the decline in 
relative importance of family economic enter-
prises and of traditional forms of mutual aid in 
the community or extended family. From the 
human resources standpoint, the heavy burden 
the poorest families must bear in order to sup-
port their children and other dependents obvi-
ously depresses their potential productivity and 
limits the future capacity of their children 
to participate in the society. Under present cir-
cumstances of increasing political participation 
by the urban masses and to some extent of the 
rural masses, it can be expected that the concept 
of minimum income maintenance as a right will 
become increasingly influential. Unfortunately, 
the introduction of this concept in countries in 
which half or more of the population falls below 
the poverty line, in which public resources are 
very limited, and in which the existing social 
structure is hardly compatible with a massive re-
allocation of resources to overcome the problems 
of poverty and low productivity, is likely to pro-
duce a widening gap between pretensions and 
realities, and systems of distribution of material 
aid among the lowest-income strata that per-
petuate the traits of passivity and dependency 
inherited from past paternalistic relationships. 
According to one of the basic principles of social 
service, the granting of economic aid should fit 
into a strategy of helping the needy family or 
individual to solve its own problems and regain 
the capacity for self-support. The application of 
this principle in settings of mass poverty and 
marginality poses a challenge that social per-
sonnel in the region are only beginning to face, 
through experiments in aided self-help and com-
munity development. 
(h ) Employment policies 
While many fully employed workers do not 
earn enough for adequate maintenance of their 
large families, it is also well-known that much 
of the low-income population is under-employed, 
subsisting precariously by seasonal labour in the 
countryside or makeshift occupations of low pro-
ductivity in the towns. Present employment 
trends both in industry and agriculture, when 
related to the rapid growth in the labour force, 
present the likelihood of continuing increases in 
the under-employed population and the appear-
ance of open unemployment on a larger scale 
than heretofore. Income redistribution benefiting 
the under-employed and unemployed supposes 
the creation of j obs enabling them to earn in-
come, and attention is now beginning to turn to 
the potentialities of large-scale public works pro-
grammes with the double objective of providing 
such jobs and utilizing the idle labour resources 
to further essential infrastructural investments 
in roads, dams, buildings, etc. Such policies have 
already been applied on a significant scale to 
meet emergency situations, as in periods o í 
drought in the Brazilian Nordeste. The wider 
implications of their adoption on a national scale 
remain to be faced, and some of the arguments 
f o r them seem arguments of desperation: no 
other promising solution for the problems of 
rising under-employment is within reach, so 
labour-intensive public works must be tried.®® 
In any case, such programmes, unless they are 
to be financed entirely by external aid, require 
accompanying progress in the fiscal techniques 
of income redistribution; the public sector must 
obtain large additional resources to pay for 
them. 
The above considerations indicate that an 
effective policy of income redistribution would 
require an assessment of measures in all of the 
social sectors in relation to the equitability of 
their distribution, and their potential impact on 
the income-earning capacity and on occupation 
38 In fact, economists who conclude that the labour-
absorptive capacity of industry cannot be expected to 
match increases in the labour force even if the present 
trend toward transplantation of the most modem capital-
intensive technologies can be reversed commonly fall 
back on one of two "residual" solutions: large-scale 
public works or retention of labour in agriculture. A 
recent statement by Gunnar Myrdal gives heavy em-
phasis to the latter alternative. See G. Myrdal (Agri-
culture and the World Economic Revolution, LARC/ 
65/CONF/16, address delivered at the Latin American 
Conference on Food and Agriculture, Viña del Mar, 
Chile, 18 March 1965). 
65 
opportunities of broad population strata.®® At 
the same time, such a policy would depend 
heavily on effective planning of changes in pro-
duction and in the kinds of services offered; 
otherwise, income redistribution might depress 
the market for luxury goods and services with-
out a corresponding increase in wage-goods and 
in services demanded by the low-income strata. 
More broadly, it would have to be preceded or 
accompanied by basic changes in social relation-
ships and in the distribution of political power. 
This last theme leads back to the indispensability 
of organized popular participation in the making 
and carrying out of social policy. 
2. Population 
The term "population pol icy" in its narrower 
usage refers to a governmental decision to try 
to influence the rate of net national population 
increase. In the past, the objective of such a 
policy was usually to raise the rate of increase 
through encouragement of higher birth rates or 
immigration, but in the low-income countries at 
present the standard objective is to slow down 
population increase through measures affecting 
fertility (" family planning") and sometimes 
through promotion of emigration. 
No country in Latin America as yet has a 
population policy in this sense; in this respect 
Latin America differs from the other major low-
income regions. In discussions of such policies 
two over-simplified positions have confronted 
each other: one sector of opinion has posited 
a drastic reduction in the rate of increase as 
the first prerequisite for development, while 
an opposed sector has argued that the present 
unprecedentedly high rates of increase are no 
cause f or concern in view of the relatively low 
regional population density and the need for 
expansion of internal markets. A more fruitful 
approach, focusing upon the specific implica-
tions of present rates of increase and the result-
ing age distribution among different strata of 
the population, rather than on the unmanageable 
conceptions of "over-population" and "optimal 
population", seem to be emerging. Two aspects 
of the problem have a direct bearing on income 
distribution: 
(o ) The typical low-income family has a large 
number of dependent children. With urbaniza-
tion and the decline of family economic enter-
prises these children become a burden rather 
than an economic asset; uncontrolled fertility 
hampers the family in any effort to rise above 
the subsistence level, and the family is unable 
to equip the children with skills qualifying them 
to become productive members of society. 
(b) As mentioned above, the rate of growth 
of the labour force exceeds the foreseeable 
absorptive capacity of industry and agriculture, 
while the very low qualifications of many en-
trants to the labour force, coming f rom the im-
poverished families just mentioned, limit them 
to the most marginal occupations. Lower rates 
of increase would not solve the problems of 
poverty, but would make the problems somewhat 
more manageable. 
It is likely that public policy in the region 
will graduallly come to support programmes for 
the lowering of fertility, without necessarily 
giving this objective the prominence it has re-
ceived in such countries as India and Japan or 
fixing quantitative targets for the slowing down 
of population growth.^® Recent studies indicate 
an unexpectedly wide diffusion of knowledge 
and acceptance of contraception among urban 
women. Under the most favourable circum-
stances, however, the diffusion of new at-
titudes is likely to be slow among the rural 
masses, and planners cannot expect lower rates 
of increase to ease their problems within the 
near future. Even after birth rates begin to de-
cline, while there will be an immediate allevia-
tion of the dependency burden, the growth of 
the labour force will not begin to slow down 
for another fifteen years, and the effect will be 
secondary for several decades. 
39 The latter requirement relates to the objective of 
"dissemination of technical progress" narrowing the 
income gap between the dynamic and lagging sectors 
of the economy proposed by Aníbal Pinto, "Concentra-
ción del progreso técnico y de sus frutos en el desa-
rrollo latinoamericano" (El Trimestre Económico, 125, 
January-March, 1965). This study warns of the probable 
ineffectiveness of a strategy concentrating on income re-
distribution through measures such as those discussed 
above without simultaneous attention to such causes as 
the concentration of technical progress in a few sectors 
of the economy. 
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iOThe 1961 Charter of the Alliance for Progress 
makes no reference to population policy, but a significant 
shift toward regional endorsement of the desirability 
of lower rates of increase appeared at the fourth meet-
ing of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress (CIAP) in April 1965, when the creation 
of an advisory group for the purpose of seeking ac-
ceptable methods toward this objective was considered. 
See Pan American Union, Population Problems in rela-
tion to Development in Latin America (QAP/197, 31 
March 1965). The policy issues as they relate to Latin 
America are discussed in several of the papers prepared 
for the 1965 United Nations World Population Con-
ference (Belgrade, 30 August-lO September 1965). See, 
in particular, José Antonio Mayobre, Economic Devel-
opment and Population Growth in Latin America (WPC/ 
WP/151) and Victor L. Urquidi, El Crecimiento Demo-
gráfico y el Desarrollo Económico Latinoamericano 
(WPC/WP/118). The proceedings of the First P p 
American Population Assembly, held in Cali, Colombia, 
in August 1965, contain further evidence of the accept-
ance by influential currents of opinion of the need for 
action to limit rates of increase. 
The kind of population policy described above, 
with a single narrowly defined objective to be 
attained by a limited range of technical means, 
cannot by itself be considered a strategic ap-
proach to development, although it may in the 
long term be indispensable to the achievement 
of the more positive social and economic objec-
tives. In practice, of course, the possibility of 
attainment of the narrower objective will be con-
ditioned by progress in all forms of social action 
contributing to higher levels of living, particu-
larly education and measures for strengthening 
of the family, but these measures are not likely 
to be organized around the population objective. 
A broader conception of population policy, 
however, can link the characteristics of the 
population, as revealed by censuses and special 
surveys and analysed by demographers, with 
strategic approaches to the improvement of the 
quality of the population ("human resource 
development"), to its geographical distribution 
and to its ecological relationships with the land 
("urban development", "rural development", 
"regional planning") . As will be suggested be-
low these approaches to policy have up to the 
present not been satisfactorily delimited and re-
lated to one another, and their potential value 
for policy and planning has not yet been realized. 
3. Human resource development 
The content of human resource development, 
according to the more ambitious definition, is 
practically equivalent to that of "social develop-
ment". The most authoritative recent presenta-
tion of this approach states: 
"Human resource development is the process 
of increasing the knowledge, the skills, and the 
capacities of all the people in a society. In eco-
nomic terms, it could be described as the ac-
cumulation of human capital and its effective 
investment in the development of an economy. 
In political terms, human resource development 
prepares people for adult participation in po-
litical processes, particularly as citizens in a 
democracy. From the social and cultural points 
of view, the development of human resources 
helps people to lead fuller and richer lives, less 
bound by tradition."^^ 
Under such a definition, action in any of the 
conventional social sectors could be marshalled 
under human resource development, and even the 
special focus to be expected f rom the name, on 
the raising of human productive capacity, merges 
into a wider preoccupation with socio-cultural 
Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Educa-
tion, Manpower and Economic Growth: Strategies of 
Human Resource Development. McGraw-Hill Series in 
International Development, New York, 1964. 
change and political participation. Human re-
source development, then, can be seen as one 
manifestation of the quest for an operationally 
usable interpretation of development as a single 
process in which economic, social and political 
factors are interwoven. 
In practice, however, the content of the pro-
grammes and proposals going under the name 
of human resource development has been a good 
deal more restricted than the above definition 
might suggest. The proponents of the approach 
have had little to say about the relationships of 
social and political structures to the capacity 
for development of human resources. Although 
some attempts have been made to incorporate 
health and nutrition programmes into human 
resource development, these do not seem to have 
gone beyond the stage of statistical exercises 
based on rather shaky data. The human re-
source specialists have concentrated on the inte-
gration of educational programming and man-
power programming, largely through the prepa-
ration of forecasts of the output of schools and 
training programmes, their confrontation with 
forecasts of needs for manpower with different 
levels of qualification, and the drawing of con-
clusions on needs for changes in educational 
output. The Mediterranean Regional Project of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development represents the most advanced at-
tempt to incorporate the human resource ap-
proach into educational planning, and is of 
special interest to Latin America in view of the 
historical links between the social structures and 
the educational systems of the two regions.^^ 
In Latin America thus far, in spite of the 
attraction of the human resource approach to 
economic planners as a means to quantifiable 
criteria f o r the allocation of resources to educa-
tion and potentially to other social programmes, 
its application has been hampered, in the first 
place, by the inadequacies of census-derived 
manpower statistics as a basis for detailed fore-
casts of needs, and in the second place by the 
structural rigidities and conflicting aims within 
the educational systems that have been discussed 
above. 
In a world in which production techniques 
and the structure of demand are changing as 
rapidly as they are, and in which present trends 
The techniques and experiences of the OECD 
Mediterranean Regional Project were analysed in a 
number of papers presented to the 1964 Paris Seminar 
on Problems and Strategies of Educational Planning in 
Latin America, and the OECD has issued a report 
directed to Latin American audiences on the subject: 
Herbert S. Pames, La Planificación de la Educación 
para el Desarrollo Económico y Social, Paris, 1963. 
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in the industrially advanced countries indicate 
even more revolutionary changes in the future, 
the human resource approach naturally needs to 
be applied with flexibility and caution.^® Educa-
tional output geared to the needs for different 
types and levels of skilled manpower that can 
be forecast from present trends might be un-
suited to the long term requirements of healthy 
economic development, let alone the valid non-
economic purposes of education. The major 
proponents of the human resource approach, 
however, are quite aware of these dangers or 
limitations, and have set forth judiciously 
qualified proposals for target-setting in countries 
at different stages of development.^^ 
One question that deserves careful considera-
tion in relation to the Latin American setting, 
in view of the well-known trends toward exces-
sive complication of planning and administrative 
machinery, is the organizational place of the 
human resources approach in such machinery.'^® 
4. Urban development and rural development 
Development policy in general and all of the 
areas of social action in particular confront 
conditions and trends that differ widely by 
population group or local setting. The most 
obvious distinction is between the urban and 
the rural and among the approaches to planning 
most prominent in recent years, at least at the 
level of studies and regional meetings, are 
schemes for the organization of programmes 
around the central problems of urban develop-
ment (or "urbanization") and of rural develop-
ment. It is intended to explore these questions 
in a sequel to the present study and only a few 
points will here be touched upon in a sum-
mary way. 
(a) Discussion of urban development poli-
"In the course of the future", according to a con-
tributor to the 1962 Columbia University Seminar on 
Technology and Social Change, "intellectual pursuits 
rather than business activities will set the predominant 
tone, and the universities, the research institutes and 
corporations, and other intellectual centers will be the 
major institutions". (Eli Ginzberg, Ed., Technology and 
Social Change, Columbia University Press, New York 
and London, 1954.) 
** See, in particular, chapters 9 and 10 in Harbison 
and Myers, op. cit. 
Harbison and Myers conclude, in reference to the 
world as a whole, that "There is as yet surprisingly 
little experience in the establishment of governmental 
machinery for human resources planning", but recom-
mend the establishment of a "human resource develop-
ment board", a "human resource planning secretariat", 
and planning staffs within the main bodies participating 
in the board. They conclude, however, that "where strong 
general planning organizations exist, there is a com-
pelling reason to put the human resource planning 
machinery under its juiisdiction". (Ch. 10.) 
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cies^® has focused on the rapidly growing great 
cities. Here the central problems are employ-
ment, physical environment and social participa-
tion, all of them conditioned by the related 
phenomena of massive in-migration and the 
growth of the population strata commonly 
labelled "marginal". Broad policy declarations 
setting forth the measures needed to deal with 
these problems abound, but one finds remark-
ably little evidence of progress toward effective 
planning or even toward consistent national de-
cisions on the main lines of policy. The urban 
programmes that have reached the stage of legis-
lative sanction or application are relatively 
narrow, dominated by architectural and space-
planning considerations, and have had only 
limited and erratic influence on city growth. 
(b) In rural development, the central theme 
is agrarian reform. Around it can be grouped 
a wide range of measures needed to enable the 
rural population to participate in national life 
on more equitable terms and to attain more 
adequate levels of living. A viable rural develop-
ment policy needs to tak e^ into account, inter alia, 
the economic base of the rural group, its capacity 
for community and interest group organization, 
its patterns of settlement in relation to the pro-
vision of educational and other public services, 
and its ties to the local centres of administration, 
services and marketing. Up to the present, the 
well-known slowness of most countries of the 
region in arriving at enforceable large-scale 
solutions for the problems of land tenure has 
ruled out the application of really integrated 
rural development programmes. 
( c ) A simple urban-rural dichotomy is quite 
inadequate as a framework for pol icy; it is a 
truism that the problems of neither the cities 
nor the countryside can be solved in isolation. 
The very distinction between urban and rural 
is certain to become increasingly blurred in 
several respects and also to be increasingly com-
plicated by Latin America's unevenness of de-
velopment and contradictions in styles of life. 
The rural areas themselves will be increasingly 
urbanized, in a cultural sense, by the diffusion 
of mass communications and manufactured con-
sumer goods, as well as by the increasing 
mobility of rural people. Meanwhile, the cities 
The term "urbanization policies" has become cur-
rent internationally, but it seems more satisfactory 1o 
restrict "urbanization" to the process of concentration 
of population in urban areas and to classify the policies 
relevant to this process under "urban development". 
UNESCO, Urbanization in Latin America (Paris, 1961) 
is a compendium of studies and policy recommendations 
on the theme, deriving from a 1959 seminar sponsored 
by UNESCO and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America. 
and towns will continue to be "ruralized" by 
migrants. These trends point toward the need 
for (a) understanding of the functions and 
dynamics of the many types of urban and rural 
areas—the great cities; the provincial centres; 
the specialized industrial towns, ports and 
mining centres; the small towns; and the rural-
agricultural nuclei; (b) workable conceptions 
and techniques of regional planning; ( c ) na-
tional objectives for population redistribution 
related to employment objectives and distribu-
tion of natural resources.'*'^ 
See "Geographic distribution of the population of 
Latin America and regional development priorities", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 
March 1963, and "Rural Settlement Patterns and Social 
Change in Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, Vol. X, No. 1, March 1965. 
I V . SOME CONCLUSIONS 
1. National economic policies are in practice 
as likely as social policies to derive f rom isolated 
initiatives and contradictory pressures, and the 
principles that should govern them are subject 
to continuing controversy. Economic policies, 
however, can be referred to a few easily for-
mulated objectives and to a central discipline of 
economics seeking to explain the process of 
economic growth as a whole. Social policies 
have been more heterogeneous in their origins 
and objectives. The discipline of sociology has 
not, during the recent years in which planning 
has gained acceptance, been in a central position 
to influence policy or advise on the translation 
of policies into plans. Initiatives for "social 
planning" or for the incorporation of the "soc ia l " 
into over-all planning have appeared long after 
public action in certain social sectors has reached 
a high degree of complexity, costliness, and in-
stitutional resistance to the requirements of 
planning. In the present discussions of social 
policy and planning by economists, sociologists, 
administrators, and specialists f rom the diíFerent 
social sectors, several interpretations of the term 
"social" , of the relations between the "soc ia l " 
and the "economic" , and of the central objectives 
of social policy can be distinguished. 
2. Uses of the term "social" at the levels 
of development policy, planning and sectoral 
programming require separate consideration. 
Development itself is a single phenomenon, the 
nature of which is obscured when it is interpreted 
as two processes of "economic development" and 
"social development". At the level of develop-
ment policy, however, the specification of social 
objectives (rising levels of living, more equitable 
distribution of incomes, wider opportunities for 
social participation and mobility) distinguished 
f rom economic objectives is indispensable. In 
such formulations the social programmes or areas 
of public social action should be treated as in-
struments rather than as ends in themselves; a 
listing of quantitative targets in the different 
social sectors does not constitute an adequate 
statement of objectives. Ideally the process of 
formulation of social policy objectives should be 
part of a quest for national consensus concern-
ing the future society toward which such policy 
is directed. 
3. At the level of planning to attain the ob-
jectives set forth in development policy directives, 
there does not seem to be an adequate justifica-
tion for a grouping of the so-called "social 
sectors" under a separate conception of "social 
planning" although it may be administratively 
advantageous to group the specialists responsible 
f o r these sectors in a "social" division of the 
agency responsible for national planning. The 
representatives of the sectors are unlikely to be 
willing or able to reconcile their claims upon 
resources within a "social plan" prior to in-
corporation of such a plan into over-all plans. 
The problems of fixing compatible targets and 
distributing resources in order to reach these 
targets can be dealt with satisfactorily only 
within comprehensive planning. The terminology 
in use up to the present and the typical com-
partmentalization of public administration have 
fostered conceptions of the economic and the 
social as two "f ields" competing for resources, 
while the need is for an integrated strategy 
of development in which economic and social 
measures are both focused upon needed struc-
tural changes. At the same time it would seem 
more fruitful to think in terms of compatibilities 
and potentialities for mutual support between 
social and economic programmes than in terms 
of "balanced social and economic development". 
4. At the level of programming, each social 
sector has distinct problems of administrative 
efficiency, personnel training and standards, 
quantification of objectives, research and obtain-
ing of statistics, relations with its clientele, etc. 
A certain amount of real progress can be made 
toward more effective sectoral programming even 
in the absence of coherent over-all policy deci-
sions and planning machinery, but such progress 
has obvious limitations and dangers. It cannot 
be taken for granted that quantitative increases 
in the coverage of action in each sector, meas-
ured through the indicators now available, will 
produce unmixed benefits for the society as a 
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whole or that such increases will justify priority 
for allocations to the sector. 
5. The above generalizations do not imply 
that social allocations can or should be deter-
mined by economic criteria, in terms of calcula-
tions of monetary returns on investment. Even 
aside from the practical difficulties of calculating 
such returns in a meaningful way, and the fact 
that some of the most promising strategies for 
social change do not call for commensurate al-
locations from the public sector, such an ap-
proach would leave out of account large areas 
of the preconditions and the objectives of devel-
opment. Attempts to apply criteria of economic 
rationality to expenditures on social programmes 
cannot be pursued beyond a certain point 
without running into open contradiction not only 
with the ways peoples and nations actually 
behave but also with their deepest value systems. 
No people is so poor that it will be prepared 
to do only the things it can afford according 
to a utilitarian scheme of priorities, and a 
systematic attempt by planners to apply such 
principles, even if practicable, might well involve 
an impoverishment of culture and initiative that 
would frustrate healthy development more than 
the apparent waste of resources. 
6. While policy-making and planning pro-
cesses more coherent than at present are attain-
able and indispensable, social and economic 
programmes cannot be expected to respond ex-
clusively to neutral planning techniques or even 
to completely consistent public policies. A large 
part of the task of the policy maker and planner 
under conditions typical of Latin America will 
continue to be the reconciliation and rationaliza-
tion of pressures from different directions. This 
situation should by no means be interpreted ex-
clusively as a hindrance to dynamic and in-
tegrated policy and planning. Planning tech-
niques cannot be expected to reach infallibility 
and they will continue to be applied by planners 
subject to prejudices and limitations of vision 
deriving from their own social and educational 
backgrounds. Demands expressed through po-
litical channels and organized interest groups 
are essential if plans are to respond to real social 
needs and planners must seek to present their 
conclusions in terms assimilable by political 
leaders and conducive to popular support and 
participation. 
7. Development planning does not gain in 
effectiveness through elaboration of regulations 
and centralized controls. This is particularly true 
of the social programmes with their needs for 
flexible responses to local situations. A large 
share of the responsibility for regional and local 
programming must be devolved upon local ad-
ministration and local organizations in order to 
relieve the central authorities of tasks they can-
not carry out. In Latin America, a good deal of 
recent discussion has centred on this requisite, 
but progress toward institutional forms capable 
of satisfying it has been very limited. In fact, 
the need cannot be met by institutional changes 
alone; if the institutions are to function, local 
social and economic relationships and attitudes 
must change simultaneously. 
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SOCIAL SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICAs FUNCTIONS AND 
TO DEVELOPMENT 
by Virginia A. Paraíso^ 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the region, demands for social 
service programmes and allocations from public 
funds and private resources for the support of 
new and established services are consistently 
mounting.^ These trends indicate general ac-
ceptance of the proposition that social service 
has an essential role in the functioning of society. 
Notwithstanding, social service does not seem to 
have a defined place within the framework of 
development policy in Latin American countries. 
Various reasons have been put forward to explain 
this relative marginality. One refers to the dif-
ficulty in defining what social service is and in 
distinguishing its activities from those of other 
forms of social action. Another lies in the 
doubt of economic planners whether social 
service can contribute significantly to the goals 
of development in view of its approach to social 
problems and needs mainly through the in-
dividual and the small group. Still other reasons, 
chiefly offered by social service personnel them-
selves, point to the non-involvement of social 
service leaders in national politics and higher 
echelons of public administration, including na-
tional planning machinery. Each of the above 
explanations is valid to some extent. It seems 
necessary however to search for more basic rea-
sons in order to clarify the place of social service, 
if any, in national development. 
This paper seeks to define the place of social 
service in national development and its potential 
contribution to that effort.^ It does this first 
by bringing together all the common elements 
of the Latin American conceptions of social 
service and analysing the objectives and function-
ing of the programmes; and second, by clarify-
ing the relationships, if any, between the goals 
of social service and national development and 
enquiring whether the two sets of goals are in 
harmony one with the other. Part I discusses 
the meaning of social service in Latin America; 
Part II indicates how it functions at present; 
Part III deals with its planning within the frame-
work of development policy; while Part IV 
discusses the future role of social service and 
its potential contribution to development and 
sets out what needs to be done so that social 
service can fulfil that role and thus maximize 
its contribution. 
Since no study in depth has as yet been at-
tempted either of the programmes and the 
methods used or their effects, this paper runs 
the risk of making generalizations based on 
factors, the importance of which may have been 
over-emphasized, while other factors not readily 
® Although the author is a stafT member of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, the views ex-
pressed in this article are her own and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the ECLA secretariat. 
l l n Argentina, for example a group of industrialists 
has established an institute to train industrial social 
workers to staff already established social service pro-
grammes and others to be established within industry; 
the major problem of the National School of Social 
Service of Peru (Lima) is to increase its training 
capacity in order to meet increasing demands for the 
services of social workers within housing and rural 
development programmes; British Guiana is expanding 
social service within the judicial and penal system; 
Bolivia has just embarked on social service for miners 
and migrants; a major component of Brazil's slum 
clearance progranmie is social service. 
2 Development is here interpreted as roughly equivalent 
to the complex of social and economic objectives set 
forth in the 1960 Charter of the Alliance for Progress, 
which specifies among the principal goals of national 
development: (1) a substantial and self-sustaining in-
crease in per capita income that will reduce the gaps 
in the level of living between the countries of the region 
and between the region and more industrialized coun-
tries; and (2) a more equitable distribution of national 
income, raising as quickly as possible the incomes and 
levels of living of the more needy while assuring at the 
same time the investment of a major portion of the 
national product for economic development and social 
progress. 
This paper deliberately avoids use of the term "social 
development"; instead it interprets "development" as a 
unified social process. The countries of Latin America 
have been classified under different stages of develop-
ment, but these well-known differences do not preclude 
the existence of common characteristics which demand 
regional interpretation. A presentation of these common 
characteristics and "internal contradictions" can be 
found in ECLA Social Affairs Division study, entitled 
"Social Development" and "Social Planning: A Survey 
of Conceptual and Practical Problems in Latin America" 
(E/LACCY/BP/L.4). See above, pp. 42-70. 
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observable might not have been given due con-
sideration.® The sources utilized indicate the 
difficulty of drawing a picture representative of 
the region. The most that can be expected is 
the identification of common concerns, charac-
teristics and trends and also of some local and 
restricted experiences f rom which wider lessons 
3 There is a dearth of published work on social service 
relating to Latin America. The sources of information 
for this document are largely unpublished annual and 
other reports, case records, student theses, reports of 
experts in social service under the United Nations 
Technical Assistance Programme, interviews with pro-
gramme administrators and planners as well as direct 
service personnel, and direct observation of existing 
programmes. Some articles and monographs were found 
useful but in general, they are limited as sources of 
information on needs and problems specific to social 
service and on planning, administration and evaluation 
of programmes. 
can be derived. It is hoped that this exploratory 
work will start the countries on more thorough 
studies on the potentialities of social service for 
enhancing the quality of life in Latin America. 
The student of international social service 
will no doubt find situations and characteristics 
that are similar to those obtaining in countries 
in other parts of the world. These similarities 
only confirm the sameness of the basic problems 
that beset human society everywhere, the un-
evenness of the phenomenon called development, 
no matter what stage a country has reached, 
and the reality of human inter-action at the in-
ternational level. There are also, however, 
regional, national and local differences that defy 
uniform action and make imperative the search 
for indigenous answers to what may seem, on 
the surface, common human needs. 
Part I 
THE MEANING OF SOCIAL SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Social service defined 
A United Nations Expert Group on the Devel-
opment of National Social Service Programmes 
convened in 1959 defined social service as an 
"organized activity that aims at helping towards 
a mutual adjustment of individuals and their 
social environment". The adjustment is "achieved 
through the use of techniques and methods 
designed to enable individuals, groups and com-
munities to meet their needs and solve their 
problems of adjustment to a changing pattern of 
society, and through co-operative action to im-
prove economic and social conditions".^ This 
definition assigns relationships as the area of 
action of social service, relationships that may 
involve individuals, groups and communities. 
The techniques and methods referred to are 
presumed to be those specifically attributed to 
social work. 
In practice, the term social service includes: 
(a) A set of conceptions concerning human 
needs and approaches to the satisfaction of these 
needs; 
(b) A body of professionals (social workers) 
who have received formal training based on 
these conceptions and approaches, plus wider 
circles of auxiliaries and volunteers who perform 
functions deriving f r o m these conceptions and 
have acquired to some degree a "social work" 
outlook: and 
(c ) Organized institutions that have functions 
based on these conceptions and that employ 
social workers. 
While the three above-mentioned elements 
can be found in all the Latin American coun-
tries, the present situation does not permit clear 
delimitation under any or all of them. The con-
ceptions that form the basis of social service 
represent varying combinations of influences 
f rom Western Europe and the United States 
with older religious and charitable viewpoints. 
The character of professional training of social 
workers and the extent to which such training 
is considered indispensable differ according to 
the relative strength of such influences. Social 
service functions and the employment of social 
workers are diffused through a wide variety of 
public and private agencies, and to a large extent 
appear as ancillary parts of programmes and 
institutions having other primary functions. The 
problem of delimiting social service as a distinct 
sector of social policy and action is further 
complicated by the fact that many institutions 
with social service functions and objectives are 
neither directed nor staffed by trained social 
workers. (There even exists a lack of agreement 
on the minimum qualifications of social 
workers.®) On the other hand, not all the 
* The Development of National Social Service Pro-
grajnmes, ST/SOA/40, United Nations publication, Sales 
No. 60.IV.1, p. 6, para. 6. 
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® For example, there is now a bill under consideration 
by the Federal Congress of Argentina to regulate the 
employment of social workers, including within that 
profession the trabajador social and the asistente social 
both of whom graduated from a school of social work, 
the visitadora social (an earlier name of the asistente 
functions actually performed by social workers 
within wider institutional settings can be legiti-
mately brought within social service conceptions. 
Terminology can also lead to misunderstand-
ings. In the plural, "social services" {servicios 
sociales) refer to all activities with human 
welfare objectives including education, health, 
social security, community development, housing, 
etc.® In an enumeration of the social services, 
social service as a field of policy and action may 
also be listed as "social welfare services" {servi-
cios de bienestar social) or as "social assistance" 
{asistencia social). "Social assistance" is the 
earlier term for social service and from it derives 
the title "social assistant" {asistente social), by 
which the practitioner and professional in social 
work is known in most of the region.'' 
In Latin American usage, the singular f orm 
servicio social refers to both the profession of 
social work® and the substantive area in which 
social work concepts and techniques are applied. 
social but with lower-level training), the visitadora de 
higiene social (a medical aide who had a two-year 
training course mostly in home care of the sick) and the 
educadora sanitaria (a kind of public health aide). This 
lack of agreement in the public mind as to who is 
"professional" exists in varying degrees in all countries 
of the region. 
® According to para. 4 of "Reappraisal of the United 
Nations Social Service Programmes", E/CN.5/AC.12/L.3, 
29 March 1965, "Social welfare" is more commonly 
understood and used in different parts of the world to 
describe what henceforth the United Nations called 
"social service". Accordingly, the Secretary-General in-
tends hereafter in this report and in all subsequent 
references to United Nations activities in this field to 
use "social welfare" and "social welfare programme" 
where previously the term "social service" and "social 
service programme" would be employed. Conversely, 
"social services" and "social services programmes" will 
be used in the broader sense to include activities in 
such fields as health, education, social security, etc., 
besides social welfare..." The reappraisal report, how-
ever, employs the term "social welfare" to embrace a 
wide range of social activities found in different parts 
of the world and does not attempt a delimitation of the 
coverage of the term. At the Latin American Seminar 
on Education for Social Service, Lima, 10-13 November 
1965, in which directors of 28 schools of social service 
in the region participated, there was a perceptible 
tendency to use "social welfare" to indicate the area of 
policy and "social service" to refer to the profession 
of social work. The present paper retains the term "social 
service" (singular) both to correspond with the current 
and more generalized Latin American usage and to 
distinguish the relatively restricted range of conceptions 
and functions indicated here. 
7 The exceptions among the Spanish-speaking Latin-
American countries are Mexico, Panama, Central 
America, Colombia and Bolivia, which use trabajador 
social, indicative perhaps, of stronger North American 
influence in contrast to the stronger European orienta-
tion of South American social service. Brazil uses 
asistente social, the English-speaking countries "social 
worker" and Haiti assistante sociale. 
8 Schools for professional training in social work are 
called escuelas de servicio social throughout the region. 
The use of servicio in preference to trabajo, 
which is the literal translation of the English 
" w o r k " (social work ) , is a particular expression 
of the Latin American spirit. Trabajo evokes the 
image of " labour" , usually manual, and of 
activities the products of which accrue directly 
to the benefit and profit of the doer. On the 
other hand, servicio signifies action in behalf 
of someone other than the doer or his immediate 
family. It conjures up the "helping" image which 
is the essence of servicio social in Latin America. 
Some other components of this concept of social 
service are altruism, philanthropy, self-abnega-
tion, a high degree of emotional commitment to 
the common weal plus a body of religious and 
charitable beliefs concerning one's obligations 
to one's fellow men. The professionalization of 
social work is tending to relegate the religious 
and charitable components to the background 
and to base social service on a more objective 
and rational matching of needs, available re-
sources and expected benefits. This tendency, 
however, is not yet dominant considering that 
many schools of social work are under the 
management of religious institutions strongly 
oriented to the earlier conceptions. What is 
probably more universal is the increasing ac-
ceptance of the methods of social work. Social 
service in Latin America is still, to a high degree, 
a "helping-by-doing" activity. 
As a substantive area, social service includes 
legislation, programmes, services and activities 
that prevent, alleviate and remove conditions 
that limit the ability of specific individuals, 
groups and communities to make full use of 
such facilities and services, as schools, health 
centres, hospitals, churches, public utilities, etc., 
organized for the general public on the assump-
tion that everyone has an equal opportunity 
to benefit f rom them. Social service provisions 
invariably seek to strengthen the actual capacity 
of individuals, groups and communities to make 
use of such facilities and services and more 
broadly, to participate on equal terms in the 
national society. In relation to the social setting 
of Latin America, this definition of the scope 
of action of social service is rather limited. 
2. The medium for social service 
The Latin American medium within which 
social service institutions and personnel must 
function has, in its main features, been often 
described and for the purposes of the present 
work, it will be sufficient to set forth these 
features very briefly.® 
®For detailed descriptions see Report on the iforld 
Social Situation, 1963 (E/CN.5/375/Rev.l), United 
Nations publication. Sales No. 63.IV.4; The Economic 
Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period 
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Three particularly relevant aspects of the 
Latin American situation may be summed up 
as fol lows: (1 ) very high rates of population 
increase with consequent high dependency ratios 
and large primary families; ( 2 ) rapid re-
distribution of population with high rates of 
concentration in urban areas, scattered and 
isolated settlements in the countryside and a 
labour force highly mobile geographically and 
occupationally; and (3 ) low and unevenly dis-
tributed incomes together with lagging growth 
in production and inability of the economies 
to absorb into productive employment a labour 
force growing by nearly 3 per cent annually. In 
a nutshell, for social service these trends mean 
increasing demands unmatched by resources for 
essential services that governments are pres-
sured to provide but can only pretend to do so. 
The above trends also imply a decreasing ability 
and willingness on the part of parents to assume 
the burdens of physical support and of guidance 
of their children f rom infancy to responsible 
adulthood, as well as the wide range of maladjust-
ment associated with traditional societies in 
transition towards modernization. 
The economic growth that has taken place in 
the region, irregular and unbalanced as it has 
been, does not seem to have brought about any 
appreciable improvement in the lot of the masses. 
If anything, it has widened the gap between 
them and the groups whose incomes have bene-
fited f r o m this growth. 
The material manifestations of poverty are 
well known: families housed in one-room dwell-
ings in the older urban slums or in shanty towns, 
rural as well as urban; malnutrition; educational 
services so rudimentary that they give the 
children no real opportunity to overcome the 
many handicaps of the environment, etc. From 
the standpoint of social service, the "culture 
of poverty" that represents the adaptation of 
the people to the precariousness of their situation 
and their lack of opportunities to participate in 
the national society is an even more serious 
challange than the lack of the material amenities 
of living.^" This culture is characterized by 
shifting and unstable family relationships, de-
privation of responsible care for many of the 
superabundant young children and of con-
(E/CN.12/659/Rev.l), United Nations publication. Sales 
No. 64.II.G.6; The Process of Industrialization in Latin 
America (E/CN.12/716/Rev.l), United Nations publica-
tion, Sales No. 66.II.G.4; Statistical Bulletin for Latin 
America, Vol. II, No. 2 (August 1965). 
10 The widely circulated works of Oscar Lewis's Five 
Families (1959), Pedro Martinez (1964) and The Chil-
dren of Sánchez (1961), Random and Basic Books, Inc., 
are family case studies of Mexican families that illustrate 
very well the ways by which adaptation to a "culture 
of poverty" is achieved by people. 
74 
structive occupations for adolescents and unstable 
values in the face of competing ideologies. At 
the same time, the culture of poverty retains 
a remarkable measure of readiness to assume 
burdens of mutual aid and support of dependants 
not met by society, and a capacity to combine 
in new forms of social organization to meet local 
needs. 
Characteristic of the region is the relative 
concentration of organized services and job 
opportunities, especially for the "educated", in 
the big city. Notwithstanding, these resources 
have proved inadequate in the face of rural-
urban influx, so that for a high proportion of 
migrants a move to the city does not represent 
much improvement in the level of living nor in 
the opportunities for achieving such improve-
ment. It has been asserted that the main reason 
for rural-urban migration is social not economic, 
the result of "changes in the images and aspira-
tions which render rural life in poverty less 
satisfactory than urban life in poverty".^^ 
The rural population cannot be ignored in any 
discussion of the Latin American situation. A 
studyi^ by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America speaks of the " . . . rapid population 
growth, combined with apparent incapacity of 
the rural areas to absorb more than a fraction 
of their contribution to this growth, to narrow 
the very wide gap between their levels of living 
and those of the cities, to respond adequately to 
rising urban demands for their products, or to 
participate effectively in national decision-
making". On the role the rural situation plays 
in relation to urbanization and urban margin-
ality, this same paper says: " . . . static or declin-
ing employment opportunities in the countryside 
and the small towns combine with insufficiently 
rapid growth in urban employment openings, to 
condemn a high proportion of the population in-
crement to a marginal position—drifting from 
rural to urban under-employment, increasingly 
finding its way to the peripheral shanty towns 
of the great cities, multiply handicapped in 
education, motivations, even physical health, for 
any effort to escape from its marginality". 
The breakdown of the hacienda, the traditional 
social organization based on land tenure, as a 
result of revolutions, programmes of agrarian 
reform and land distribution, advancement in 
techniques of organization and increased mobility 
towards urban centres is changing the fabric 
and tempo of life. Alternative sources of the 
security and stability, however minimal, provided 
Charles Wagley, Social Research in Latin America, 
Columbia University Press, New York, p. 264. 
12 "Rural Settlement Patterns and Social Change in 
Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
Vol. X (1965), p. 1. 
by the hacienda must be found if social dis-
organization is to be contained within tolerable 
limits. The increasing geographical mobility of 
the population brings with it occupational shifts 
that affect whole families and unattached persons 
(single men going to mines and ranches and 
single women to the cities and small manufactur-
ing centres) in pursuit of job opportunities. In 
the place of origin is left an economically 
dependent, unproductive population consisting 
of women with young children, the aged and the 
incapacitated, all in need of more than a normal 
amount of welfare services which the community 
cannot provide. In addition, there is the natural 
anxiety over the physical health and safety of the 
absent breadwinner, the uncertainty of economic 
contribution to the family maintenance and the 
possibilities of temporary or permanent desertion. 
Even when such possibilities are ruled out, the 
frequent changing of roles for the family 
members during the periods of absence and the 
periods of presence of the breadearner is a 
probable source of conflicts and tensions. This 
is unsettling for the adults but even more so for 
the young; it is equally disrupting to the web 
of community activities. Host communities are 
not exempt from the negative effects of seasonal 
migrations. The seasonal increase in the demands 
for living facilities and services of all kinds 
can never be foreseen nor provided for in its 
entirety. More serious than deficiencies in fa-
cilities and services for the fluctuating population 
are the problems of social and psychological 
order that affect the resident population and the 
migrant. These problems are often manifested 
in hostile attitudes, prejudices, and disguised 
and open conflicts. 
In a static society, the degree of equilibrium 
and adjustment attained would diminish the 
probability of disharmony and conflicts in social 
relationships. The economic and social changes 
indicated above mean that in Latin America 
today, except in very isolated settlements, society 
is far from static. These factors have raised the 
levels of expectations far beyond the capacity 
of the economies or the public authorities to 
meet. Traditional relationships are breaking 
down in all aspects and levels of society; there 
are constant shifts in leadership, a birth of new 
images of what is desirable and a groping for 
substitute sources of security. In this atmosphere 
of change, the family group seems to be the most 
affected and with it, its individual members.^® 
It is assumed that the objective of development 
is to raise the level of living of every family. 
13 Effects of urbanization on the family are discussed 
in detail in Report on the World Social Situation, 1957 
(E/CN.5/324/Rev.l), United Nations publication, Sales 
No. 57.IV.3. 
But this can be done only if the family itself 
contributes sufficiently to the effort. The family 
is seriously handicapped as an agent of progress 
by the fact that its dependency burden is in-
creasing: more children, more numerous and 
complex individual and family wants, and often 
less employment for adult members. Besides, the 
relationships in the family itself are shifting. 
Many heads of families are mothers of young 
children, many young people now question 
parental and adult authority and "wisdom". The 
intensity of the struggle for the material neces-
sities of survival coupled with the stresses on 
human relationships brought about by changing 
roles and values exert more and more pressure 
on the family as the basic unit within which 
the growth of the human resources for develop-
ment takes place. The family members sometimes 
respond to the pressure by socially objectionable 
expedients, such as abortion, desertion and child 
neglect; and sometimes family ties disintegrate 
altogether. 
3. Social service concerns and activities 
From the conditions described above originate 
problems considered in the region as appropriate 
concerns for social service action. Such problems 
can only be understood and dealt with effec-
tively when considered in relation to each other, 
since one problem may be only a symptom of, 
a sequel to, or a corollary of another. Moreover, 
any action that is directed against a specific 
problem may even create another kind of prob-
lem. From this viewpoint, it is possible to ap-
preciate the necessity of a concerted attack on 
the barriers to the satisfaction of the needs of a 
particular society and its members. Such a view-
point permits, besides, a rational perspective on 
social service as part of the totality of social 
policy and as only one of the several possible 
approaches to such problems. 
Table 1 presents some of the various problems 
that are prominent within the particular con-
ditions of the region and about which social 
service is actually doing something. They 
relate to: (1) individual disabilities and han-
dicaps that impede the person from utilizing 
the opportunities for "better life" that society 
provides; (2) debility and disorganization of 
family life; (3) inadequacies and imperfections 
of the existing societal order itself and its in-
stitutions; and (4) public calamities. It is not 
possible to list a problem exclusively imder any 
one of the above classifications. Mass unemploy-
ment and poverty for example, derive from some 
malfunctioning of the economic system or a 
defect in the social structure; the unemployment 
of an individual and the consequent poverty of 
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the family dependent on that individual may be 
due to ill health, in turn caused by biological, 
environmental or social factors, or by lack of 
skills with market value, or by personality in-
stability. Lack of skills can originate f rom in-
dividual deficiencies, or from deficiencies of the 
educational system. The neglect and abandon-
ment of the young is caused by physical dis-
abilities of parents or their lack of preparation 
to assume the responsibility for a family, or 
a system of social relations conducive to parental 
irresponsibility, or the inability of the com-
munity to provide facilities for the partial care 
of children of working mothers, or other factors 
singly or in combination with one another. 
Juvenile delinquency and rejection of adult 
authority by the young can be caused by the 
absence of normal family life and may be a 
consequence of the process of social change 
which society has failed to channelize. Although 
natural disasters are beyond man's control, many 
public emergencies are caused by individual and 
group failings of human beings. 
The "cyc l i c " and "self-perpetuating" nature 
of problems requires that the causes must be 
removed, necessitating thus careful and thorough 
study and appraisal of the total situation. At 
the same time, the urgency and intensity of the 
human stress and suifering that often accompany 
such problems, as well as the threat they represent 
to the individual's survival and the society's 
functioning, means that palliative and remedial 
action have to be taken alongside prevention. 
Vulnerability, disability and dependency, family 
debility and disorganization, and individual and 
T a b l e 1 
SOaAL SERVICE CONCERNS 
Related to: Problems 
1. Individual disabilities 
2. Debility and disorganization of family life 
3. Inadequacies and imperfection of the social 
organization 
4. Public calamities 
Unemployment 
Dependency 
Delinquency, crime and vice 
Promiscuity, vagrancy and mendicancy 
Unstable and difficult personal relationships 
Asocial behaviour 
Social isolation 
Orphanage, neglect, abandonment, maltreatment and exploitation 
of the young 
Juvenile delinquency and vagrancy 
Deviant behaviour 
Personal conflicts and maladjustment 
Unstable relationships and promiscuity 
Dependency and mendicancy 
Marginality 
Vice and criminality 




Lack of organized services 
Group conflicts 
Dependency 
Social and geographic isolation 
Disproportionate migration 
Instability of the labour market 
Widespread and acute economic needs 
Broken families 
Destruction of property and paralysis of economic activity 
Displacement of population 
Disruption of community life 
Crime, delinquency and vice 




group maladjustment and marginality arise from 
situations that lend themselves in varying degrees 
to human intervention. 
Table 2 outlines professional and institutional 
social service activities. 
It is important to note the consensus that the 
inability of the family adequately to meet the 
responsibilities which a rapidly changing society 
imposes on it is the most important single source 
of the problems falling within the sphere of 
action of social service.^'* For example, a 1964 
study by the Dirección Nacional de Menores of 
Bolivia on the causes of behavioural problems 
among youth under its care disclosed that among 
the males 84.7 per cent and among the females 
63.9 per cent result from unsatisfactory family 
relations. Only 8.7 per cent among the males and 
2.7 per cent among the females are the con-
sequences of inadequacies of the material and 
physical aspects of living.^® 
Notwithstanding the identification of the 
family as a particularly vulnerable part of the 
social order, the activities for helping and 
strengthening it are few and are restricted both 
in coverage and s cope .Because of the historical 
lines of growth of social service in the region, 
institutional care of the minor and the infirm 
predominate, with emphasis on large closed in-
stitutions. Increasing attention is now directed 
towards "educative" activities, particularly for 
women and children, via organized groups such 
as mothers' centres, juvenile clubs and com-
munity and social centres. Statements that Latin 
American social service is largely directed to 
casework are misleading. A survey of activities 
will show that only a few agencies work directly 
with the individual in a casework relationship 
(which aims to increase the capacity of the in-
dividual to make more satisfactory personal 
adjustment and social relationships). In fact, 
it appears that social service in Latin America 
is mainly concerned with the basic material needs 
See reports of countries submitted to the Latin 
American Conference on Children and Youth in Na-
tional Development, Santiago, 1965. Also Factores que 
afectan la organización de la familia, Panamerica SIF— 
Doc. 2/60, 1 June 1960 of the Seminario Interamericano 
sobre Fortalecimiento de la Institución Familiar, Caracas, 
Venezuela, 1960. 
15 From the national report of Bolivia to the Inter-
american Seminar on "Normas para la protección del 
menor en programas integrados de desarrollo", Montevi-
deo, 2-10 May 1965. 
16 Legislative provisions for family allowances are 
common. Owing to budgetary limitations, however, no 
country has provided such allowances on more than a 
token scale to the most needy families, usually outside 
the social security systems. Even within social security, 
benefits are often too small to enable large families to 
meet minimum needs. Interviews with programme ex-
ecutives indicate that social services for the family as a 
whole are usually very short of funds and personnel. 
of individuals and primary groups. This is to 
be expected in a situation of poverty where the 
fight for mere survival occupies the centre of 
the arena, and where the needs of the moment 
are so great that until they are met, the individual 
cannot even think of the future. Many of the 
activities in question are no longer considered 
social service in countries with more highly 
developed economies and where specialized tech-
nical services exist.^'' Particularly within housing 
and rural development programmes, there are 
more and more evidences of the use of "self-
help" in social service, of genuine inter-
disciplinary relationships with other fields of 
policy, of the community approach to situations, 
and of action directed to the basic social 
structure and causes instead of single problems. 
There is also a strong conviction among social 
service professionals that their programmes 
should be integrated into national development 
efforts and as an initial step, that they should 
be included in over-all plans of development. 
4. Objectives and methods of social service 
(a) Objectives 
One commonly heard criticism is that the 
objectives of social service in Latin America 
are so obscure that nobody really knows or 
understands what they are. Others go further 
and say that social service has no inherent ob-
jectives, only those derived from other services 
with which it is often associated and therefore 
that social service is simply an auxiliary to such 
services. An examination of the laws and regula-
tions as well as the social decisions that form 
the basis of social service programmes show that 
this is not case. The objectives stated are not 
only clear but can also constitute important 
potential contributions to over-all strategy for 
development. The confusion results from the 
tendency to enumerate specific activities instead 
of the objectives that give reason to the activities, 
as well as the even more generalized failure to 
tie social service objectives to those of national 
development policy. The great number and kinds 
of activities that social service performs to 
realize its objectives also contributes to the con-
fusion. Viewed from the perspective of single 
activities, often addressed to problems that seem 
isolated and lacking a broad social reference. 
Within the Andean Indian programmes and other 
rural development programmes, the social worker serves 
as a home improvement agent, a nurse-aide, a literacy 
teacher, a crafts teacher, etc. As other specialization 
become available, home economics workers for ex-
ample such tasks related to cooking, sewing and other 
household activities are assigned to these more spe-




SOCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA® 
1. Protection of the young Institutions for the care of orphans, abandoned and neglected 
children 
Social rehabilitation services with problem children 
Child placement by adoption and foster home care (limited) 
Rehabilitation of the handicapped 
Organization and supervision of youth groups 
Mobilization of public opinion for legislative action in favour 
of the young 
Supervision of child labour 
Training institutions for the juvenile delinquent 
Day care centres, nurseries, feeding centres 
Supervision of public playgrounds and recreation facilities 
Vacation camps, for the young 
Probation and parole 
2. Promotion of family welfare Economic assistance (in money and in kind) 
Recreation and vacation services 
Rehabilitation of victims of national disaster and armed conflicts 
Counselling, family planning, and preparation for parenthood 
Rehabilitation services for the handicapped including the 
dependent aged, addict, crippled and convict 
Education for family life and home management 
Community centres 
Social group organizations (mothers' clubs, neighbourhood 
associations, etc.) 
3. Promotion of social change and 
and adjustment 
Casework services to improve personal relationships and social 
adjustment 
Informational campaigns 
Mobilization of resources for displaced families and groups 
Social education 
Welfare services with migrants, new communities and unintegrated 
minority groups 
4. Improvement of community life Community centres, social centres 
Social group organization 
Promotion of community betterment action (acción cívica) for 
the establishment of community parks, playgrounds and other 
welfare amenities 
5. Sustainment of economic growth Vocational training for physically and socially handicapped persons 
Employee welfare services (these services are established in indus-
tries, commercial enterprises, government and other economic 
programmes, and may consist of a complex of activities) 
Education for family income management 
Aided economic activities for the handicapped such as sheltered 
shops, work relief, subsidized workshops, etc. 
6. Complementation of other organized 
services 
Services within programmes of health, education, nutrition, com-
munity development, housing, agrarian reform, colonization, 
etc., designed to facilitate the action of these services, comple-
ment their action and intensify their effect (perhaps a complex 
of activities similar to those mentioned above under 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 5) 
«For comparative purposes, there is a detailed description of various types of existing welfare programmes 
in member countries of the United Nations, in Family, Chile and Youth Welfare Services, E/CN.5/AC.12/L.4/ 
Con.3, April 1965. 
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carried out in conjunct ion with activities charac-
teristic of other organized services within ad-
ministrative structures established specifically 
f o r the latter services, the contr ibution of social 
service can easily be obscured and rendered 
imperceptible. Moreover , the object ives o f social 
service are often formulated in terms of aspira-
tions rather than practical targets f o r im-
plementation. 
By analysing available statements of what 
social service is supposed to b e do ing , or is 
expected to b e do ing , there emerges a clear 
picture o f five general object ives directly c o n -
tributing to national development : 1. the progres-
sive improvement of the condit ions of l iving o f 
p e o p l e ; 2 . the development of human resources ; 
3. the orientation of peop le to social change and 
adjustment ; 4 . the mobi l izat ion and creation of 
cormnunity resources f o r development purposes ; 
and 5. the provis ion o f institutional structures 
f o r the funct ioning of other organized services. 
Tab le 3 be low shows the relationship a m o n g 
Tahle 3 
GENERIC OBJECTIVES, SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES 
Generic objectives Specific objectives Activities 
1. The progressive improvement oí 
the conditions of living of people 
2. The development of human 
resources 
(a) Assist the destitute and de-
pendent to meet basic material 
needs (earliest and best under-
stood objective) 
(2>) Provide specialized facilities 
and services 
(c) Help the unemployed in earn-
ing an income 
(d) Provide opportunities for cul-
tural advancement to special 
groups 
(a) To restore the impaired capacity 
of individuals 
(b) To promote better relationships 
and bring about real adjustment 
to one's circumstances 
(c) To motivate people to assume 
responsibility for development 
Food grants to the needy 
Family allowances 
Clothing relief 




Special diets and drugs to the 
needy sick 
Preparation of the ill person and 
his family to cope with the illness 
Nurseries for children of sick 
mothers 
School supplies and meals to desti-
tute school children 
Casework and counselling to in-
dividuals with personal problems 
Work placement service 
Free vocational training and re-
training 





Playgrounds that are organized and 
supervised 
Employee welfare services, etc. 
Rehabilitation of the handicapped 
Training institutions for the delin-
quent 
Probation and parole 
Casework to those who have be-
haviour problems impeding satis-
factory adjustments 
Measures to strengthen the family 
Welfare services for the migrant 
Welfare services for the unin-
tegrated indigenous groups 
Casework services 
Organization of social groups 
Educative activities for citizenship 
for new wants, for new values 
79 
Table 3 (continued) 
Generic objectives Specific objectives Activities 
3. The orientation of people to 
change and adjustment 
4. The mobilization of community 
resources 
5. The provision of institutional 
structures for other services 
(d) To promote wholesome use of 
free time 
(a) To create awareness of the 
necessity for change 
(b) To assist people to adjust to 
new ways of living 
(c) To form public opinion in 
favour of development and as-
sist in decision-making 
(d) To introduce practical aids in 
social setting of deprivation 
and want 
(a) To bring available resources to 
the attention of the uninformed 
and to help them use these 
resources 
(b) To obtain for the needy some 
essential services 
(c) To stimulate the creation of 
welfare amenities for communi-
ties 
(d) To provide means for social 
participation 
(а) To raise level of child care in 
terms of nutrition, health, edu-
cation 
(б) To make other services more 
efFer.tive 
(c) To strengthen the family and 
increase its capacity to dis-
charge its role and complement 
organized public services 
Organization of social groups 
Youth training camps 
Special skills courses 
Commimity activities such as volun-
teer service, etc. 
Casework services with individuals 
Groupwork activities with clubs, etc. 
Community assemblies 
Demonstrations 
Casework and groupwork services 
within housing programmes, co-
operatives, rural development 
Organization and conduct of discus-
sion groups that lead to the 
expression of ideas, the erystalli-
zation of wants and their overt 
expression in the form of demands 
Information and interpretation of 
needs and resources to clients, 
leader groups and general public 
"Self-Help" and mutual aid activi-
ties 
Facilities and services to low-income 
employees (meals, vacations, 
medical care) 
Placement services (for institutions, 
adoption, employment, foster 
homes, etc.) 
Orientation and information 
Co-operative relationships with 
organized services such as health, 
education, housing, as well as 
public utilities, sources of work, 
etc. 
Action for the promotion of social 
legislation 
Pioneering work in the creation of 
new community services such as 
public laundries, sanitary facili-
ties, playground parks for fami-
lies, etc. 
Organization of volunteer services 
in different community pro-
granunes 
Community welfare centres 
Community assemblies 
Feeding centres 
Nurseries and other day care centres 
Community centres 
Counselling 
Provision for special needs occa-
sioned by other services 
Formal education, health and 
nutrition education, vocational 
training, etc., within social 
service institutions 




Social group organization 
Job placement 
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generic objectives, specific objectives and ac-
tivities of social service. Since the table is only 
illustrative, the lists of specific objectives and 
activities do not cover the entire field. 
( b ) Methods 
It is taken for granted that the principal 
methods used in social service are those at-
tributed to social work: that is social casework, 
social groupwork and community organization. 
Other techniques such as social welfare ad-
ministration and social research have essential 
auxiliary roles, but affect only indirectly the ser-
vices to individuals, groups and communities. So-
cial service also uses borrowed techniques which 
constitute the main tools of other services such 
as education, just as these services also use to 
some extent social work methods. The basic and 
auxiliary methods are taught in schools of social 
work and applied after a fashion throughout the 
region. 
Social work from its beginning focused upon 
services to the individual; f rom this were 
evolved the techniques that are now known as 
"social casework" on which the greater part of 
social work in Latin America relies in principle. 
However, in view of the unrealistically heavy 
caseloads (all social workers assumed to be doing 
casework who were interviewed reported at least 
150 cases), and to some extent as a result of a 
weak background in the social sciences, social 
casework techniques are applied rarely outside 
highly specialized clinics for disturbed children 
(in programmes for the treatment of juvenile 
delinquents and in neuropsychiatric wards of 
hospitals). What is labelled social casework else-
where is often only information-giving, in-
struction-dispensing, helping people cope with 
administrative procedures, referral and liaison, 
and other types of "a ide" services, that become 
ends in themselves rather than means. When 
applied, casework techniques enable the in-
dividual to recognize his legitimate needs, to 
appreciate the various alternatives available to 
him, to select one or several from among the 
alternatives, and to perform definite actions that 
will satisfy his needs. 
Younger groups of social workers who want 
to promote rapid social change tend to reject 
social casework as slow and expensive, inap-
propriate in working with masses. Notwith-
standing, the techniques of casework are used 
in the identification, recruitment, motivation and 
commitment of citizen leaders who fill an es-
sential role in any group or community activity. 
Because individuals and groups react more to 
models of human behaviour than to any other 
communication media, and because the direct 
contact between individuals and primary groups 
is more effective in influencing attitudes and 
behaviour than the indirect methods, local leaders 
are important channels for reaching the masses. 
Development requires technological adaptation 
which is made possible only by certain attitudes, 
values and ways of life conducive to techno-
logical change. Before any community can be-
come committed to development, people as in-
dividuals and as social groups must acquire 
those attitudes, those values and that way of life. 
The process of change must always start with 
the individual as a member of a group and at 
times as a potential leader of a group. It is in 
drawing that individual to the cause of develop-
ment that the application of the techniques of 
casework becomes especially relevant to the 
change process. Formal education also influences 
the individual but many individuals as well as 
potential local leaders are outside and beyond 
its influence. 
The current appeal of the social work methods 
called social groupwork and community organiza-
tion emanates from their multiplier effects. As the 
kind and magnitude of handicapping situations 
multiply in the course of Latin America's evolu-
tion, so also does the demand for social service 
expand. In recent years, there has been a con-
scious effort to extend and improve training 
facilities in social groupwork and community 
organization. Social groupwork method, in 
theory, presupposes the existence of group ob-
jectives and uses group inter-action as a means 
of developing the capacities of the members of 
the group as well as the group itself. In its 
present practical application in Latin America, 
it is often no more than mass orientation.^® The 
social structural bases for community life, f o r 
co-operative action and for national development 
are social organizations, particularly local or-
ganizations. Techniques of social groupwork 
have application in the creation of social organi-
tions, in assisting them to formulate group ob-
jectives that harmonize with those of national 
development and to provide channels for the 
maximum utilization of the latent capacities of 
each member for the common welfare. Social 
groupwork goes beyond the period of organiza-
tion into the growth processes of the group, 
promoting at every step democratic relationships 
and dynamic interaction. Such techniques in 
An interesting apparent exception to this general 
statement is a recreation programme described by 
Natalie Kisnerman in Hoy en Servicio Social, Buenos 
Aires, Vol. 1, January, 1955, "Una experiencia con un 
grupo recreativo", in which the groupwork method was 
used as a means of provoking changes in individual and 
group attitudes and of promoting relationships that tend 
to group cohesiveness. 
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Latin America should find an important role in 
national development efforts through social 
groups that are identified with the process of 
change, such as mothers' clubs, youth associa-
tions, parents' organizations, professional and 
other interest groups. 
Community organization as a method relies 
on the bringing together of the different groups 
and classes in a community for the achievement 
of common goals. Community programmes, com-
munity development for example, commonly 
presuppose the existence of organized com-
munities that will lend themselves to further 
strengthening or "development". In Latin Amer-
ica, this is not the case. For community develop-
ment and other such programmes to be effective, 
communities must be created and organized. 
While present application of social service tech-
niques of community organization in the region 
is limited to the neighbourhood level, their 
potential in creating communities, in organizing 
them into cohesive and articulate entities and 
mobilizing them for active participation in all 
kinds of developmental efforts is vast. For ex-
ample, in Ecuador, social service within the 
Acción Andina, whose objective is to integrate 
into national life the Andean Indians, has suc-
cessfully used the community organization 
method to gain acceptance for the other tech-
nical services such as health, education, etc. that 
form part of the Acción and to get the people 
to participate gradually and by stages in all 
kinds of community activities. In new neigh-
bourhoods and in extensive low-cost housing 
settlements, community organization techniques 
can be used to create community solidarity and 
a functional organization for community life that 
can be linked to development objectives. 
The three basic methods of social work—social 
casework, social groupwork and community or-
ganization—have an internal unity and can be 
applied in Latin America singly or in com-
bination with each other during any stage of 
the development process, at the level of the in-
dividual or the group or the community, for 
individual, for group or for community better-
ment. Their techniques can be used in working 
with all elements of the population—children, 
youth and adult alike; with those who "have" 
to make them willing to share and with those 
who "do not have" to help them to receive 
constructively. They are techniques that can be 
applied to create a genuine social participation 
in efforts conducive to common welfare. 
The concepts underlying these methods of 
social work are universal. However, to apply 
them effectively they must be interpreted in the 
light of the value structure, the ideological 
system, the political organization and the reli-
gious and other beliefs of the people. This kind 
of adaptation of the imported techniques is only 
at its initial stage (there is a beginning in Co-
lombia as well as in Brazil). There should be 
accumulating throughout the region a great deal 
of empirical evidence concerning the problem 
of adaptation but documentation of experiences 
is almost absent and whatever recording is done 
is too sketchy and inaccurate to serve as working 
materials for systematic study. Another deterrent 
factor to a more scientific analysis of the methods 
of social work in the region is the tendency to 
"bandwagon hitching". The "news" value of 
popular movements commonly known as com-
munity development has, in extreme cases, 
resulted in claims concerning the application of 
the community organization method even in in-
dividually oriented activities and settings such 
as the pediatric ward of a hospital or an in-
stitution for physically incapacitated children. 
The "spectacular" element diverts attention from 
serious analysis. 
The other techniques applied to social service 
programmes are more properly classified as 
"stafT' techniques related to organization and 
management of social service agencies (social 
administration) and social research applied to 
social work. Social administration has limited 
application and this situation will continue until 
trained social work personnel are utilized on the 
management level of programme planning and 
implementation, which is not yet the case in 
the region. While there are a few programmes 
under the executive direction of social workers, 
these are rare and are exceptions rather than 
the rule.^ ® The application of social research as 
a technique in social service is barely started. 
The weakness of the social research component 
may account for the failure to plan the expansion 
of social service activities in relation to the 
changing needs of the societies. 
19 Heads of schools of social work are in the majority-
social workers; however, in some instances, physicians, 
and other professionals are heads of such schools. 
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Pan II 
T H E FUNCTIONING OF SOCIAL SERVICE^® 
Social service as an organized activity outside 
the family received its first legal basis in Latin 
America in the Laws of the Indies originally 
promulgated between 1500 and 1542 as the 
framework for governing Spain's colonies in the 
Americas. The law encouraged the organization 
of charitable institutions for the poor, the first 
such institution being a hospital established in 
Mexico in 1521. The law also contained some 
provisions that may be considered the precursors 
of social policy for the protection of the mother 
who works for wages and the regulation of fe-
male and child labour. 
During the nineteenth century, a relatively 
extensive range of activities classified as "social 
assistance" {asistencia social) began to be 
organized by private initiative. This was also 
a period of partial secularization of welfare in-
stitutions already established under the auspices 
of the Catholic Church and religious communi-
ties. These institutions included hospitals, 
schools, institutions for the aged and infirm, 
orphaned, abandoned and neglected children, 
the physically handicapped and the mentally 
deficient. Besides shelter and protection, these 
institutions also provided educational, nutrition, 
health and recreation services. 
The concept of an activity outside the family 
to relieve the distress and suffering of the poorer, 
the weaker, the handicapped and the under-
privileged classes, served as the foundation upon 
which social service today is organized. The 
first decades of the twentieth century brought 
in f rom Europe, particularly France, Belgium 
and Germany, and after the Second World War 
f rom the United States, influences that bear 
strongly on the content of social service in the 
region today. The legislative provisions and 
philosophic basis belong to the European herit-
age, whereas the organization is strongly in-
fluenced by United States institutions. Social 
service has helped in the creation of a conscious-
ness of the need for protective laws. Public social 
service programmes and some of the voluntary 
ones have bases in law. These laws, however, 
are often unsupported by adequate and stable 
means to carry them out, and sometimes the 
provisions themselves are so cumbersome as to 
render programme operation ineffectual. Exam-
ples are the many and detailed regulations on 
20 Organización y Administración de Servicios Socia-
les, ESAPAC, Costa Rica, May 1960, gives a com-
prehensive description of the functioning of social ser-
vice in Central America. 
eligibility, beneficiaries, etc., which seem to 
conspire in making programmes legalistic and 
procedural. For this reason, social service, that 
has a "helping" image in the public mind, is 
often accused by its clientele of betraying this 
image through rigid and "unfeeling" proce-
duralism on the part of the personnel. 
People concerned with social service are gen-
erally agreed that social service personnel should 
be trained. Many laws creating social service 
programmes specify that "professional social 
work methods" should be applied and that 
"graduate" social workers should be employed. 
In some countries, the social service profession 
is given recognition and protection by law. In 
other countries it is a career that is struggling 
very hard for professional status, and in some, 
it remains a "vocational" and an auxiliary 
service. In the latter situation, although training 
is considered desirable, "goodwi l l " and the 
desire and ability to " d o g o o d " for the un-
fortunate and less endowed is also an acceptable 
qualification. 
The pioneers of social service have invariably 
come from the upper social class, trained in West 
European countries, particularly France and Bel-
gium, to some extent Spain, and the United 
States. These few had the responsibility of estab-
lishing schools of social work and programmes 
of social service, assisted sometimes by European 
and United States technical advisers. The Latin 
American country that wielded the strongest 
influence in social work education is Chile; it 
is also the country which has the longest history 
of formal training in the field. The con-
tent of curricula as well as programmes reflect 
West European orientation with recent super-
imposition of North American conceptions and 
methods. For the most part, the leaders of social 
service in the countries have influence in society 
and exert strong personal and to a lesser and 
more recent extent, political pressures in the 
national leadership. With rare exceptions, their 
faith lies in the value of the various activities 
for the individual, in the traditional concern for 
"helping" as " d o i n g " and the classical interpre-
tation of "service" with its spiritual and reli-
gious connotations. In recent years, with the 
rapid expansion of local training institutions, 
these schools have become accessible to youth 
f r o m the lower middle strata who are motivated 
not only by their interest to participate in the 
advancement of welfare but who also see, con-
sciously or unconsciously, entrance into the field 
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as a means for social m o b i l i t y T h i s group is 
impatient for change, an impatience intensified 
by recent trends of incorporating schools of 
social work into universities, thus exposing 
faculty and student body to the restlessness that 
characterizes Latin American university groups. 
Currently, two forces interact with each other, 
one tending to hold social service to the beaten 
track and the other tending to push it towards 
new frontiers. 
1. Patterns of organization and administration 
The lists of social problems and programmes 
above suggest the great variety, complexity and 
changing nature of social service. The patterns 
of organization and administration are several, 
modified to greater or lesser degree by the nature 
of the problems, cultural and religious differ-
ences, the availability of economic resources and 
general character of the administrative system. 
These patterns can best be understood through 
a consideration of the relationships between 
national and local levels of administration, be-
tween public and voluntary sectors, among social 
service programmes and between social service 
and other forms of social action. 
The most general characteristic is the exten-
sive use of existing administrative structures of 
a social character which serve as the organiza-
tional setting for social service. There are any 
number of combinations. The setting may be a 
ministry of health and social assistance or of 
labour and social security, or of education and 
social welfare, or of interior and social assist-
ance or of justice and social service and so on. 
Within such structures, social service may be a 
bureau {dirección), a division (departamento) 
or a section, or it may consist of specific activi-
ties scattered in various specialized and func-
tional units of administration, in which case 
they are designed to meet specific needs related 
to the function of the specialized structure. It 
may also consist of a combination of such 
administrative arrangements.^^ 
21 With very few exceptions, professional social 
workers and social work students in Latin America are 
women. This predominance in social work is probably 
more overwhelming in Latin America than in any other 
region. In Chile, there is only one male graduate social 
worker compared to over 2,000 female graduates. In 
30 schools in Argentina there is not one male in the 
total enrolment of about 400. Of the approximately 
4,500 social workers in the country, there is not a 
single male. 
22 In Chile, there is a Dirección General de Asistencia 
Social within the Ministry of Interior and Social As-
sistance but there is also a Sección de Servicio Social 
within the Servicio Nacional de Salud, social service 
programmes within the Ministry of Justice, the Cor-
poración de Vivienda, etc.; in Ecuador, there is a 
Dirección Nacional de Bienestar Social under the 
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Although there are social services under func-
tional government ministries, there are also 
autonomous bodies, self-contained boards or 
commissions exercising a degree of financial 
and operational independence within the, ad-
ministrative system.^ ® Autonomous bodies are 
offshoots of the general tendency to use ad hoc 
groups to meet every newly recognized need. 
They are also half-way attempts at co-ordination 
without offending already existing administrative 
structures by curtailing their responsibility over 
certain areas of action. Because earlier social ser-
vice programmes related to specialized functions 
(delinquency within justice or rehabilitation of 
the physically handicapped within health, etc.) 
are already located in corresponding adminis-
trative structures, the services that usually grow 
around autonomous bodies are those relating to 
more recently organized programmes for family 
and community welfare. In almost all the coun-
tries of the region there had been established, 
under the influence of the Interamerican Insti-
tute for the Child, an autonomous body for the 
protection of the minor. Such bodies (Consejo 
del Niño, Comisión de Defensa Social Pro-
menor, etc.) are expected to co-ordinate as well 
as administer programmes for children. The 
degree of co-ordination thus achieved is relative 
and uneven. The charters of such bodies carry 
provisions for integrative functions in relation 
to public and voluntary programmes although 
such provisions are seldom implemented for 
lack of personnel and as a result of cumbersome 
and inoperable provisions. Autonomous bodies 
have the advantage of comparative freedom from 
the rigidities of bureaucracy but on the other 
hand are more vulnerable to the incursions of 
self-seeking personalities. 
The administration of social service manifests 
the same general characteristics of a highly cen-
tralized top-heavy bureaucracy that have been 
described in relation to other parts of the public 
sector in Latin America; failure to delegate; 
heavy emphasis on written regulations, rules and 
precedents; complexity of paper work; mazes of 
administrative communication; and personnel 
relations relying on strict protocol and arbitrary 
authority from top to bottom. 
Despite this "centralization", there is no real 
unification of standards of service. Each institu-
tion, progranune and unit functions with the 
minimum of communication and while there 
may be some written regulations and procedures, 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security; in Argentina, 
there are social service units in the ministries of health, 
education, justice, labour and autonomous bodies as 
well; etc. 
23 The Junta Nacional de Bienestar Social of Honduras 
is an example. 
implementation is on the basis of personal re-
lationships. The very rigidity and complexity of 
administrative procedures and personnel policies 
contribute to this "compartmentalization". It 
prohibits free communication, mobility and 
favours the formation of "cliques". 
The frequent and radical changes in general 
administrative orientation resulting from po-
litical changes are likely to nullify what might 
have taken years to build. 
It is not unusual to encounter a series of ad-
ministrative "principalities", some of them with 
no staff other than a "chief". This kind of ad-
ministration poses difficulties for co-ordinating 
and makes real integration impossible. As a 
result, social service is dispersed in many small-
scale actions in different units under several 
ministries and autonomous bodies. Seldom are 
there inter-agency co-ordinating or consultative 
bodies and if they exist, rarely do they really 
function as such. For this reason, social service 
lacks the comprehensive coverage of a defined 
sphere of activity that is taken for granted in 
certain other sectors of social policy. 
(a) The national and local levels of adminis-
tration 
Four countries of the region (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) have federal 
systems. In all four countries, social service 
provisions are the responsibility of the state 
government, the extent of central government 
participation being limited to grants of aid and 
formulation of national policy. In the other 
countries the national government is directly 
responsible. 
There is a high degree of administrative cen-
tralization. In developing countries, centraliza-
tion is often a necessary expedient arising from 
the scarce supply of top skills, the dearth of 
local leaders, the absence or undeveloped state 
of local government and the consequent lack of 
local authority for the administration of public 
funds. While theoretically most programmes are 
national in scope, in practice, coverage is re-
stricted to cities and "pilot" areas. 
Where there are local programmes in opera-
tion, their direction and supervision is a direct 
responsibility of the national authority.^^ Local 
citizen boards may be organized but are only 
advisory and in many instances their existence 
is only nominal. The local authority has no par-
ticipation in decision-making nor in programme 
development. Personnel is recruited and con-
trolled from the national office affording little 
leeway for local idiosyncracies. 
The financing of public social service is a 
national responsibility. The cost is usually met 
from appropriations in the national budget. But 
since most social service programmes are part 
of other areas of policy, seldom is there a direct 
allocation to social service. For this reason, it is 
impossible to arrive at an accurate figure as to 
the actual cost of supporting social service. The 
availability of funds from institutional alloca-
tions is unstable, largely dependent on the in-
terest of the general administrator or the weight 
of the pressures that bear on that authority. 
Social service may also be fully or partially 
supported from proceeds of public lotteries, from 
special levies (luxury taxes and taxes on non-
essential consumption items such as liquors, soft 
drinks, movies, or even on sugar, etc.), dona-
tions and confiscations (unclaimed imports, con-
traband, etc.) and incomes from institutional 
properties.^® These sources are fluctuating and 
resistant to rational programming, constituting 
one of the serious .drawbacks to the formulation 
of more comprehensive and responsive pro-
grammes and providing one of the best props 
for bureaucratic administration. 
Initiative for legislation emanates from the 
national level, sometimes from sources unrelated 
to the administration of social service. In federal 
systems, the state or provincial governments also 
enact laws independent of, or complementary 
to, federal laws. All countries of the region have 
formidable bodies of social legislation but these 
laws are not fully enforced for lack of imple-
menting funds, of administrative machinery, and 
of personnel. The Instituto Interamericano del 
Niño which has made the only known exhaustive 
study of an area of social legislation, that relat-
ing to children, concludes that there is much 
overlapping as well as gaps and recommends 
systematic codification.^® The practice of basing 
legislation on imported models whose practic-
ability under local conditions have not been 
tested is, of course, not limited to social service. 
(b) The role of the public and voluntary sectors 
The voluntary sector had always been active 
in the field of social service. It still constitutes a 
strong force in the creation of services and in 
the formulation of public opinion in support of 
social service. Many programmes are adminis-
tered by voluntary groups throughout the region. 
"National" is used here, unless otherwise stated, to 
mean the central government in the unitary system or 
the state (provincial) government in the federal system. 
25 Many of the secularized welfare institutions have 
incomes from properties transferred from Church to 
State during the period of secularization. 
26 Situación de la Legislación Relativa a la Minoridad 
en América Latina, Dr. Rafael Sajón and José Achard, 
IIN, 1965. 
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Such programmes are largely local, serving a 
limited geographical area and independent oí 
similar programmes elsewhere. In this sense, 
such programmes are answers to local needs and 
spring from local initiative. 
The earliest form of voluntary action in social 
service is in the provision of institutional care to 
dependent children and adults. Other areas of 
voluntary action are special services for handi-
capped children, economic grants to the destitute, 
welfare services for the family and recreational 
and cultural facilities and opportunities to the 
youth. Recently activities in family planning 
and in the organization of community living 
have gained importance. There are few volun-
tary organizations of formally national scope 
and the few that exist limit the coverage of their 
programmes to selected localities. The organiza-
tional structure of voluntary action may be 
formal or informal; in the small scale and 
specialized activities, there may be no formal 
organization. At the other extreme, the functions 
may be multiple and the organization cor-
respondingly formal, with legal personality and 
probably discharging in addition certain func-
tions delegated by some government agency.^'^ 
While much voluntary action is supported 
from private contributions and incomes from 
institutional properties, government subsidies 
constitute an important component. In some 
cases, government subsidy provides full support. 
A common complaint of voluntary institutions is 
the relative inflexibility of government subsidies, 
remaining the same year after year, unrelated 
to needs and purposes. On the other hand, pro-
gramme review and budget analysis do not exist 
and therefore the institutions do not account for 
public funds received. Except in rare exceptions, 
there is no government machinery for licensing, 
regulation and standard setting for the volun-
tary sector. In some of the countries there are 
councils of voluntary organizations to which the 
government sends a representative whose in-
fluence is entirely personal and varies according 
to his social and professional prestige. Such 
councils have not yet attained the roles of co-
ordinating, joint-planning and standard-setting 
bodies. Other countries have stronger bodies 
representing public as well as voluntary institu-
tions. Argentina for example, has a National 
Social Aid Council with governmental status to 
which some 8,250 welfare institutions are ac-
credited, a large number of them voluntary. 
The process of creating new services in the 
public sector is slow and complicated. The regu-
In Brazil for example, some state government pro-
grammes "board" out children under government custody 
to voluntary institutions. 
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latory provisions of laws once enacted prohibit 
any kind of experimentation. The voluntary 
sector, being comparatively free from such fet-
ters, has the important role of pioneering in the 
creation of new services and in experimentation 
with new methods of work and organizational 
structures. In the latter role, its contribution has 
been limited for lack of specialized and "develop-
ment oriented" personnel and leadership. Volun-
tary action has been especially useful in the 
establishment and operation of specialized ser-
vices such as the care of crippled children or 
chronically ill people, promotion of family plan-
ning and others that do not find full and im-
mediate government support because of the small 
size of the group to which a certain programme 
is directed or because the service is considered 
controversial and cannot count on the support 
of majority public opinion. 
(c) Co-ordination and co-operation 
The indispensability of co-ordination and co-
operation among programmes of social service 
and between social service and other fields of 
action have been implied in the above pages. 
The programmes today are isolated and the 
activities within programmes are individual-
istic.^® The barriers spring from the absence of 
a unified approach and from the importance of 
personal relationships in the organization and 
administration of programmes. There is also a 
lack of agreement on common goals or of a 
feeling of interdependence; without these there 
can be no compelling motivation to co-ordinate 
and co-operate. Some degree of co-ordination is 
being achieved within broad programmes, be-
tween the component social service and the other 
specializations partly because of the comple-
mentary relationships that exist.^ ® The channels 
are far from adequate. The various co-ordinating 
bodies already mentioned are recent. Their main 
contribution up to the present is sponsorship of 
periodic meetings for the discussion of common 
problems and the exchange of information. 
(d) Programme evaluation 
Programme evaluation is now routine in 
modern administration. Evaluation takes several 
forms. It may be a continuous process of pro-
gramme review and assessment or it may be an 
aspect of supervision. It may be a periodic re-
28 For example, a child welfare programme in a 
Ministry of Health might have no communication with 
a similar programme in a Ministry of Justice, and one 
in a capital city with another in a provincial city. The 
only constant channel of communication is the profes-
sional association of social workers, if such exists. 
29 As in the cases of social service and maternal health 
within health centres, or physical plant administration 
and social service within housing projects, etc. 
view by staff or by independent programme 
evaluators. The preparation of annual budgets 
and other periodic reports are forms of evalua-
tion. In whatever form, programme evaluation 
is not a standard practice in Latin America. 
The preparation of reports is sporadic and in 
compliance with specific requests. Supervision 
is not yet a developed skill and although theo-
retically it is recognized as an educational and 
administrative tool, in practice it does not 
amount to much more than routine inspection 
and physical accounting. Budget preparation is 
the task of people who have nothing to do with 
the implementation of programmes and there-
fore do not have the instruments for evaluation. 
The lack of objective criteria for programme 
evaluations is general and to it may be traced 
the undue importance attached to subjective 
factors of administration. 
There are some models that can be used in 
evaluating administrative structures and pro-
cedures but not for measuring programme con-
tent and impact. The formulation of criteria for 
the latter purpose presents a difficult task for the 
region because of the fragmentation of pro-
grammes, the deficiency of research on the 
nature of programme determinants, the scarcity 
of qualified personnel to conduct evaluation and 
the absence of an evaluation machinery. 
(e) Social •participation 
"Participation" is becoming common usage 
and common belief in Latin America. It is ex-
pressed in different terms: popular participation, 
popular action, popular co-operation, etc.; some-
times it is understood as community development 
(the partnership of people and government for 
bringing about improvements in living condi-
tions), and sometimes as the institutionalization 
of the platform of the political party in power. 
In social service, participation takes the some-
what different meaning of a sharing of responsi-
bility with regard to the content and support of 
an organized service between individuals and 
groups called "clientele", the local community, 
organized interest groups, and the government 
authorities. "Social participation" implies a 
search for procedures insuring that a needed 
service is rendered in a manner that guarantees 
the dignity and self-respect of the individual, 
the group and the local community and permits 
the growth of capacity to weigh alternatives, 
reach decisions and initiate and maintain action. 
"Paternalism", a real deterrent to social partici-
pation, is often attached as a label to "helping" 
services. It is one of the challenges to social 
service in Latin America whether it can, in so-
cieties of relatively rigid class and cultural 
barriers, apply basic principles concerning the 
inherent value of the individual irrespective of 
the handicaps that his environment might have 
imposed on him; whether the needy can be ac-
cepted in terms of their culture and their cir-
cumstances instead of on the basis of the stand-
ards of an outside group; and whether the 
"help" is to "enable" and not to "disable". 
Ideally, the "client" (individual or group) 
should be able to understand and make respon-
sible use of the organized services; the com-
munity should be able to make coherent demands 
for such services and help in their organization; 
the public in general through its organizations, 
the Press, political channels, etc. should provide 
both support and informed criticism of their 
functioning. Through mothers' clubs, juvenile 
groups, neighbourhood councils, direct contact 
with individuals and "educative" activities de-
signed to change attitudes and ways of doing, 
the first kind of participation is taking shape to 
some degree in the region. Organized groups for 
self help and mutual aid, whether for earning 
a living or procuring shelter or land or to meet 
some other need, are growing steadily and are 
beginning to "participate" in the second sense 
in social service activity. As to the third aspect 
of social participation, citizen committees are 
common, and in most countries volunteer ser-
vices exist. Nevertheless, the potential is far from 
being tapped to the maximum. The general 
public remains passive, leaving the respon-
sibility to a small part of the population mo-
tivated by personal, social or professional in-
terest. Deliberate efforts to expand and organize 
volunteer services are being made at the national 
and regional levels.®® 
2. Social service personnel 
There is a misconception that professional 
social workers are the only personnel needed in 
social service. The objectives of social service 
programmes require a variety of the "helping" 
specializations as well as many kinds of adminis-
trative staff and aides, especially in the care of 
young children and infirm aged. A great many 
volunteers are also utilized in varying degrees. 
Social service personnel may be classified into 
three categories: (o) the professional, which 
comprises personnel with formal training in 
social work and other disciplines; (b) the non-
professional specialized service personnel includ-
ing volunteers; and (c) the administrative and 
general service personnel. The professional cate-
so During the year 1965, the USAID conducted a 
series of training courses for volunteers; the Interna-
tional Secretariat for Volunteer Service had a regional 
conference in Argentina, and courses for volunteers are 
being conducted in Chile, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and 
other countries under government and voluntary auspices. 
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gory includes, among others, the full-fledged 
professional social and the sub-professional level, 
which is gaining favour and which is called in 
some countries "technician in social service", in 
others "auxiliary in social service" and in still 
others by three of four different names. 
(a) The professional social worker 
In general, the term "professional" social 
worker refers to one who has completed an ap-
proved curriculum of training in an educational 
institution for that purpose. There are also many 
who claim a professional status based on work 
experience, short orientation courses, on-the-job 
training and on social prestige. The social work 
profession has great emotional appeal as a re-
sult of which it is often exploited for personal 
aggrandizement. Thus, society personalities and 
candidates for elective positions alike lay claims 
to the status of "social worker". The social work 
profession is increasingly popular despite resist-
ance to its acceptance on equal footing with the 
older and more established professions. There is 
no country in the region where a trained social 
worker is out of employment because of lack of 
job opportunities. The demand is always beyond 
the limits of supply. In Argentina, it is claimed 
that about 80 per cent of the 4,500 graduate 
social workers are employed. The remaining 20 
per cent who are not working are not seefang 
work because of family responsibilities. Chile, 
with about 2,500 professionals, also reports a 
very high percentage of employment. A majority 
of the 217 professionals of Uruguay hold more 
than one job. Applications for admission to 
schools of social work with rare exceptions out-
number the capacity of the schools by two to 
one, in some cases by four to one. The National 
Social Service School of Peru, for example, re-
ported that at the start of the school year 1964, 
there were over 500 applicants for only 50 
vacancies. 
Throughout the region, there is a strong move-
ment towards professionalization and the defini-
tion of status by law. In some of the countries, 
the professional organization has legal person-
ality and the qualifications, responsibilities and 
privileges of the professional are defined.®^ The 
regulation of social work as a profession may 
be accused as clannishness which would not be 
without basis. However, the valid purpose is to 
ascertain the competence of the social worker, 
to establish uniform standards of practice, to 
provide leadership, and to ensure mobility to 
the professional within the country. 
Chile's Colegio de Asistentes Sociales is an example 
of a highly developed professional organization with legal 
personality and protection similar to a trade union. 
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The functions proper to social workers are to 
assist and to stimulate individuals, groups and 
communities towards innovation, adaptation and 
qualifications for life in society. They perform 
these by helping to prevent the loss of capacity, 
to restore lost capacity and to rehabilitate im-
paired capacity. These functions are constant. 
What vary are the activities which are the overt 
manifestations of these functions. The activities 
of the social worker are specific to the purpose, 
coverage and institutional structure of the pro-
gramme, the users of the service and the social 
environment. The activities may differ from one 
social worker to another and from one period to 
the next. As was stated above in relation to the 
generic objectives of social service, the activities 
are often stated as if they were the essential 
functions. 
(b) The training of social work professionals 
Professional training in Latin America started 
during the second decade of this century with 
the establishment of the first school in Chile. 
Since then the increases in the number of schools 
of social work has not been matched by any 
other profession. Argentina and Brazil have 
30 and 36 schools respectively. Only a few of 
the smaller countries have one school. Paraguay 
with barely 2 million people has two and 
Uruguay with 1.8 million people has three. In 
Chile, according to the Instituto de Investiga-
ciones Estadísticas de la Universidad de Chile, 
social work accounts for 3.3 per cent of all 
university enrolments, compared to engineering 
(9.2 per cent), law (8.7 per cent), medicine (6 
per cent), economics-administration-commerce 
(6 per cent), architecture (3.1 per cent), poli-
tical science (2.3 per cent), agriculture (2.2 per 
cent), sociology (0.6 per cent), etc. 
Most of the schools are autonomous, some are 
dependencies of functional ministries, while 
others are affiliated to or are integral parts of 
universities. The school that is not plagued by 
financial problems is an exception. The direction 
is usually vested in a professional social worker 
although there are exceptions. University schools 
as a rule have more liberal curricula and more 
competitively selected faculty in conformity 
with general university requirements. In all in-
stances, there is a very high dependence on part-
time faculty. In extreme cases, there can be more 
than 30 faculty members, each giving one or two 
courses and having contact with the school only 
for the duration of the class period. While this 
system makes available the services of top-level 
practising professionals, it deprives the school of 
steady and dedicated leadership and the students 
of continuing guidance from the faculty. 
Prevailing curricula vary in relation to the 
intensiveness and unity of the social work and 
social science content. There is a tendency to 
overload the curriculum with too many isolated 
courses with consequent inability to impart an 
integral view. Currently, there is a pronounced 
trend to bring curriculum structure closer to 
that of United States schools with emphasis on 
methods of social work and of basic social 
sciences. Nevertheless, the traditional "skills" 
content (paediatrics, first aid, etc.) is still 
retained to a large extent so that curriculum revi-
sion has resulted so far in lengthening the dura-
tion of the period of study and in further in-
creasing the number and diversity of courses. 
Although curriculum structures are similar 
from school to school such similarity does not 
imply uniform standards of instruction. In 
the first place, faculty for social work courses 
are not trained in the techniques of teaching. 
Often they are themselves recent graduates only 
beginning to acquire work experience. In ad-
dition, they are products of basically ineffective 
teaching systems and with rare exceptions, do 
not have breadth of perspective. The teachers of 
the social science courses usually have no con-
ceptual orientation to social work and therefore 
teach social sciences as they would to students 
preparing for careers in those disciplines. 
Social work teaching is based on knowledge 
and methods developed in other settings. Teach-
ing material consists largely of translations of 
foreign social work literature. So far there has 
not been any systematic effort to adapt such 
texts to regional needs, to develop original 
conceptual formulations, or to identify the 
mainsprings of a truly Latin American social 
work philosophy. These are essentials of any 
profession. 
Weaknesses that social work education shares 
with most other professional training in the re-
gion includes emphasis on information and 
memorization instead of the fostering of an 
ability to generalize from experience and to par-
ticularize from principle, and emphasis on theory 
as theory instead of on skill in applying theory 
to practice. 
Another persistent problem area in social work 
education is supervised field work, by which the 
student learns to apply to practical situations 
the concepts learned in the classroom. This as-
pect of social work training distinguishes it from 
other disciplines in which classroom instruction 
is considered suflicient. Such field work is carried 
out in existing social service programmes. The 
training capacity of organized social service 
programmes is limited because few of them are 
staffed with personnel with ability to train. Their 
unquestionable value lies in their liaison role 
between the school of social work and the com-
munity and in the introduction of the student 
to the real world of work he will face after 
leaving the classroom. 
Social work training has until recently been 
preoccupied with the formation of direct service 
personnel. The number of competent personnel 
for higher level functions is small and their 
preparation is only accidental. There is an ex-
treme scarcity of methods specialists for con-
sultant positions, teachers, executives, planners 
and researchers. Some schools have started basic 
and postgraduate courses in administration, 
supervision and social work methodology for 
graduates at the professional level with a 
minimum number of years of work experience. 
The dependence on teachers who do not have 
adequate preparation, however, detracts very 
much from the value of these courses. In ad-
dition to training within the countries, inter-
national and regional training opportunities are 
made use of in a limited way. Both have high 
prestige value and both have stimulating effects 
on profession and programmes. They also in-
troduce problems of adaptation for the pro-
fessional returning to work in his country after 
training abroad. 
(c ) The training, of sub-professional personnel 
At present, the main stimulus for the training 
of sub-professional personnel who can function 
as "multipliers" for the professional worker, 
comes from rural development programmes that 
have been unable to recruit more than a few 
professionals. Social work professionals are not 
all agreed as to the need to train sub-professional 
personnel. Resistance arises from two aspects of 
professional insecurity: first, the differentiation 
between the training of the professional and the 
sub-professional is only slight and this arouses 
fear that eventually, the latter would supplant 
the former. Second, in the programmes, the 
delineation between functions and statuses of the 
two levels of personnel are vague. Notwith-
standing, practical experience with the sub-
professional worker in some countries, although 
limited, has been quite satisfying. Experimenta-
tion is still in progress as regards the appro-
priate content and duration of training courses 
at this level. 
(d) The training of non-professional personnel 
Historically, social service has always used 
volunteer service. This still constitutes an im-
portant although unreliable resource in pro-
gramme implementation. At the beginning, any-
one who had goodwill and time to spare could 
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do volunteer work. The most common use of 
volunteer service is in activities needing the 
support of social prestige such as fund-raising, 
collection of donations in kind and promotional 
work. Volunteers are also used for activities that 
do not require special skill or continuity of 
application such as temporary care of children, 
reading to the confined, supervision of recrea-
tion, preparation and distribution of supplies, 
etc. The training of volimteers has been spear-
headed by the private sector through courses in 
leadership. Although it is generally agreed that 
leadership training is useful as preparation for 
public participation in community programmes, 
there is a danger that the current tendency to-
wards mass training courses to professionalize 
leadership will produce too many who want to 
direct and leave only a few who feel humble 
enough to perform the needed community work. 
This in itself would hinder participation in com-
munity improvement efforts. Leadership and 
special skills training for volunteers should 
balance each other. 
An obstacle to effective implementation of 
programmes is the total absence until recently 
of training facilities in specializations for non-
professional service personnel. Training courses 
for personnel in child care institutions and day 
care centres and in institutions for juvenile 
delinquents, most of which were supported by 
UNICEF funds, have been conducted with satis-
factory results. The next step would be to explore 
training possibilities other than ad hoc arrange-
ments and to expand such facilities to include 
personnel for recreational and use-of-leisure-time 
programmes and for specialized services for 
severely retarded and handicapped persons. 
3. Social service within other institutional 
settings 
Social service activities often exist within other 
institutional settings as a unified functional and 
administrative division or as an integral part 
of other administrative units. In Latin America, 
one may find social service in industrial and 
commercial enterprises, in programmes of health, 
education, housing, social security, community 
and rural development and in public adminis-
tration, particularly the army, air force, navy, 
police, ministries and autonomous bodies. The 
functions assigned to social workers in these 
settings are combinations of those of social work 
and of other fields of action. There is also a gap 
between the alleged functions and the practice 
due mainly to difficulties in the application of 
social work techniques to the different activities 
which social service personnel undertake. An 
examination of social service within such settings 
however, indicates that it retains the inherent 
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generic objectives already described, should 
make its voice heard in the planning of its con-
tribution in such settings and should not be 
limited to miscellaneous auxiliary activities. 
(a) Social service within industry and commerce 
Most countries of the region have laws, usually 
as part of a labour code, requiring industrial 
and commercial establishments with a minimum 
number of workers to provide "professional" 
social service (meaning a service staffed by per-
sonnel trained in social work) to their em-
ployees. Some countries, Brazil for instance, 
have national councils of industry and commerce 
to which each enterprise contributes a regular 
quota depending on the size of its operations, 
towards the provision of social service. The ad-
ministration of the service is the responsibility 
of the national council. In other countries such 
as Ecuador and Argentina, each enterprise sets 
up its social services according to its own norms. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each 
system. Where administration is a responsibility 
of a national council, management is likely to 
take a disinterested attitude and may fail to pro-
vide the necessary resources for effective func-
tioning such as suitable locale, equipment and 
supporting staff. It may even set up barriers to 
prevent the workers from using the service. On 
the other hand, management-established and 
administered social service arrangements have 
been suspect to workers and unions as pater-
nalistic "tools" of capital. 
The assumption is that a worker can attain a 
higher level of productivity if his personal, 
family, work and community relationships are 
satisfactory, if his family's basic needs for 
health, education and culture are met to a 
reasonable degree and if he understands the 
value of his role within his work organization. 
While no evaluation studies have been made 
so far of the contribution of social service in 
improving productivity in industrial and com-
mercial enterprises, some managements mention 
among the benefits derived, improvement in 
attendance and punctuality, decrease of errors 
and accidents in work, improved level of pro-
ductivity, decreased work disputes and more 
stable loyalty to the enterprise. At the same time, 
the resources that industry and commerce 
allocate to social service have permitted a more 
rational development of programmes than in 
many governmental or voluntary agencies. Gen-
erally, the staff is able, since these enterprises 
pay better salaries. There is a more permissive 
atmosphere for experimentation fostered by ade-
quate and sometimes superior facilities. 
There is no evidence that social service enters 
into the initial planning of enterprises. On the 
contrary it is usually among the last of the ser-
vices to be organized. While the activities are 
almost always directed and supervised by a 
trained person, administrative responsibility in-
cluding planning of the services (with few ex-
ceptions such as some enterprises in Brazil) is 
generally vested in a general or labour relations 
executive. 
(b) Social service within health programmes 
The earliest social service programmes in 
Latin America were established within the health 
setting. Thus the greater part of public social 
service programmes today constitutes a division 
of health administration and is usually super-
vised and directed by medical professionals. This 
pattern of organization is part of the heritage 
from Western Europe, particularly France, but 
it also has a historical basis in the Laws of the 
Indies of colonial times. It should not be sur-
prising therefore that Red Cross first-aid volun-
teers, nurses and even doctors are often referred 
to as social workers [trabajador social or visi-
tador social). 
Social service activities are constant com-
ponents of the service complex in hospitals, 
sanatoria and health centres. The Servicio Na-
cional de Salud of Chile, for example, employs 
at least 50 per cent of all social workers in the 
country. The function of social service in a 
health setting is mainly supportive and com-
plementary, intended to render health and medi-
cal services more eíFective and better utilized. 
On one hand, the aim is to help the sick in-
dividual and members of his family understand 
the nature of the illness and how to cope with 
the situation. In the process, new needs may 
crop up, attitudes may change and latent ca-
pacity may be released. On the other hand, social 
service interprets to health personnel the fears, 
handicaps and aspirations of the individual and 
his family so that these factors may be taken 
into account in the course of treatment. It also 
mobilizes for both patient and health service 
other resources to help improve the therapeutic 
relationship. 
(c) Social service and education 
Many countries in the region have social ser-
vice programmes within their educational sys-
tems. The earliest and most widely established of 
such programmes are at the university level 
(bienestar social universitario) and are respon-
sible for the administration of fellowships, eco-
nomic grants and loans to financially deserving 
students, as well as case work and. counselling 
services to students with personal adjustment 
difficulties. 
At the secondary and primary education level, 
social service is very recent. The beginnings of 
school social work appear mostly in the opera-
tion of school feeding programmes. The use of 
social service in connexion with the problems 
of "drop-outs", of irregularity of attendance, of 
anti-social behaviour and unsatisfactory scho-
lastic performance is still at an initial stage. Its 
present contribution lies in helping students and 
parents in meeting minimum needs of food, 
clothing, school supplies and fees, and in com-
bating other hostile factors in the environment 
that impede the learning process. 
On the other hand, social service programmes 
use educational methods and include some educa-
tional activities in their complex of operations, 
e.g., primary and vocational training within in-
stitutions for children and youth. Other educa-
tional activities frequently classified in Latin 
America as social service rather than as part of 
the educational system are free and ungraded 
vocational courses, literacy classes, adult educa-
tion activities and special classes for mentally 
retarded and physically handicapped children 
and adults. 
(d) Social service and housing 
The function of shelter is directly related to 
other human needs mainly originating from the 
nature of living in a family. The house is the 
framework of family life and unless it meets the 
needs of that life, a house cannot be considered 
to fulfil its central purpose. This conception of 
housing has paved the way for the participation 
of social service in housing programmes. 
In practice, the functions of social service in 
housing may consist of providing empirical data 
to housing planners and administrators concern-
ing "target" families to be taken into account 
in planning the lay-outs of housing develop-
ments, in the design of the houses and the 
determination of costs and amortization rates; 
of defining and applying eligibility requirements 
in the allocation of houses; of educating families 
in the use of modern housing, of fomenting 
neighbourhood and community spirit; and of 
stimulating the community to create or seek the 
creation of needed services and opportunities. 
In some countries of the region, among them 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, the services of 
social workers are utilized in organizing "self-
help" groups for housing construction as well 
as for other types of co-operative action in the 
improvement of housing conditions. The latter 
include maintenance, repairs, enlargement and 
beautification of existing houses to meet new 
needs of the families. These activities are found 
to be particularly realistic in situations of scarce 
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public resources to finance new houses and 
limited or non-existent capacity to pay for a 
new house on the part of the family. 
Social service programmes within housing 
projects are varied. The most rewarding ap-
proach seeks to stimulate community solidarity 
through social groups integrating all the elements 
of the community with the subsequent establish-
ment of a community centre from which all 
services brought into being by such a project 
can radiate. This approach provides motivation 
and stimulus to the community to work together 
for mutual benefit. It is an arrangement which 
fosters co-operation among technical services 
and facilities through their provision within the 
community framework. The activities that can 
be associated with community centres are 
numerous. They can even become the starting 
point of local self-government. 
The provision of services in shanty towns and 
in the older slum areas of cities is minimal in 
relation to the magnitude of the need. Within 
the few shanty town eradication programmes 
(Rio de Janeiro has probably the most exten-
sive of such programmes), existing social service 
assists in determining the number of people 
affected through community surveys and in pre-
paring them for the transfer, in providing and 
mobilizing services to minimize the traumatic 
«ffects of change and in helping people to re-
establish themselves in new locations and new 
human groups. 
(e) Social service and community development 
To the present, the demarcation line between 
-community development and social service is not 
clearly understood particularly because the im-
plementation of "localized" community develop-
ment projects within social service, educational, 
housing and other programmes is very much in 
the hands of social work personnel. 
The role of social workers in community de-
velopment programmes in Latin America has 
two aspects: (1) the performance of social work 
functions in an interdisciplinary relationship 
within the framework of the community develop-
ment programme; and (2) the application of 
social work techniques for the achievement of 
the goals of community development. Both as-
pects pose important issues for social work 
theorists and professionals; for example, whether 
the focus of action in community development 
should be content or process, and whether the 
approach should be through the individuals or 
small groups or the community as a whole. 
Among the new movements in Latin America 
exemplified by "Cooperación Popular" of Peru, 
' 'Acción Comunitaria" of Venezuela and "Pro-
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moción Popular" in Chile possible elements for 
a distinction between community development 
and social service may be identified. Social ser-
vice calls for the focusing of existing resources, 
organizations and power structures upon the 
solution of specific problems. It is carried out 
within existing formal institutions and its goals 
are determined by such institutions. Within these 
limits it helps people to identify problems, to 
understand what they are and to decide what to 
do about them. The conceptions of community 
development that are now evolving assume that 
solution of the major social problems will involve 
some sort of reorganization of existing systems 
and a re-structuration of established relation-
ships based on "grass roots" efforts. The newer 
national initiatives in Latin America link com-
munity development with the national political 
process. They are revolutionary in the sense that 
they aspire to involve the public directly as an 
organized and thinking participant in the de-
velopment process. Social service leaders face 
the challenge of finding ways to adopt their 
techniques of work to the objectives and 
approaches of such community development 
initiatives. 
( f ) Social service and rural development 
Rural development (including programmes of 
agrarian reforms, colonization, and rural com-
munity development) is the most recent setting 
for social service. The activities assigned to 
social service in rural development programmes 
are directed to and function through groups and 
communities rather than through individuals. 
Information campaigns [divulgaciones), com-
munity centres and leadership training are im-
portant techniques. As more technical services 
become established, some of the initial activities 
are transferred to more specialized programmes, 
e.g. to home economics, agricultural extension, 
health education, nutrition, etc. 
In the majority of cases, the over-all adminis-
tration of rural development programmes is the 
responsibility of a general administrator whose 
specialization is almost always another field such 
as education, sociology, anthropology, eco-
nomics, or agronomy. The technical direction 
of social service is generally in the hands of a 
social worker. StaflBng has so far presented one 
of the most difficult problems. Training oriented 
to rural social services is very recent and is 
found in only a few schools of the region (some 
schools of Ecuador and Brazil). These schools 
are still in a stage of experimentation as to the 
content and structure of a rural welfare oriented 
curriculum. Since in many countries there are 
more city jobs than trained personnel, only a 
dedicated few accept positions for rural areas. 
The reasons are several: "fear" reactions of 
urban women (those who have received training 
in social work are mostly urban women) to 
rural living, the paucity of opportunities for 
cultural and professional advancement in rural 
communities, the inferiority of educational facili-
ties for children and the professional isolation 
of the rural social worker. In some instances, 
the worker lives in the city and commutes to the 
rural area. This practice shortens the actual 
working hours, but more serious is the non-
identification of the worker with the community. 
(g) Social service and social security 
The first and one of the most readily identified 
activities of social service in the public mind is 
the meeting of basic needs in times of unem-
ployment, sickness and incapacity, disasters, and 
other periods of stress. Social security systems 
today are supposed to stabilize individual and 
family incomes, thus replacing the "economic" 
assistance function of social service. However, 
in the Latin American situation, social security 
systems do not cover the really needy and this 
is a very large group. 
Actual experience demonstrates, moreover, 
that social security has not made social service, 
in the old sense of economic aid, unnecessary 
for some covered groups. The levels of contri-
butions have often proved to be too high and 
burdensome for the family, so that the economic 
advantage for the family of belonging to the 
system is more apparent than real. Social service 
within a social security system is an alternative 
way of using social security resources where 
benefits are low. More systems are moving in 
the direction but its desirability is doubtful. 
In practice, all social security systems in Latin 
America provide for their members social service 
activities of more varied character. The main 
activities of social service within social security 
systems are to assist the system in the determina-
tion and control of eligibility to benefits (al-
though this is really an administrative not neces-
sarily a social service activity), to assist the 
families in taking advantage of available benefits 
and choosing among alternative uses of the 
benefits, and to organize for the system and the 
families additional resources to supplement in-
adequate benefits. In discharging the first func-
tion, social workers interview members or visit 
them in their homes, helping them to fill out 
often very complicated forms and guiding them 
through confusing and complex procedures. In 
relation to the other functions all the standard 
social service techniques are brought into play. 
Most recently, social service within social se-
curity is going into community organization 
activities, mainly the creation of community 
centres. 
(h) Social service and personnel administration 
Within personnel administration in the army, 
navy, air force, police, technical ministries (spe-
cially those with widely scattered projects re-
quiring deployment of workers fax from their 
families as in the case of public works) and 
autonomous bodies, social service is frequently 
provided to the employee and his family. In both 
private and public settings, it is sometimes 
criticized as paternalism. Social service in public 
personnel administration as in private industry 
is expected to promote work efiSciency by help-
ing the worker make a more satisfactory adjust-
ment to his social environment (family and com-
munity) and to his work environment (relation 
with co-workers and superiors). When social 
service is considered a partial substitute for 
money earnings, thus depriving the employee 
of choices in the use of income, it is in itself 
contrary to the goals of social service. If, on 
the other hand, it is really an additional benefit, 
it has an income redistributive function. 
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Social service was conceived primarily as an 
expression of goodwill, not as a discipline. The 
motive was to "do good", at once a source of 
self-gratification and an expression of kindness to 
the less fortunate. Subjective factors characterize 
its growth. The forces behind its evolution from 
the individual "good deed" to the organized 
service are strong personal needs for prestige 
and power and for manifesting philanthropic 
and religious zeal. The decisions underlying 
action derived from the humanitarian appeal, the 
urgency and the spectacular nature of the needs 
to be met. The earlier programmes therefore 
were directed against the readily visible handi-
caps of the seriously disabled, economically de-
pendent, weak and vulnerable. This also ex-
plains the parochialism that still characterizes 
social service. It follows also that the allocation 
of resources to programmes depended and still 
depends to a large extent upon the weakness or 
strength of the personal factors involved and to 
a lesser degree on the magnitude of the need and 
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its vulnerability to action. Within programmes, 
the distribution of the available resources among 
the component activities (direct service, ad-
ministrative overhead and infrastructure) like-
wise depends upon the personal preferences of 
the seat of authority. 
Interest in over-all planning of social service 
is recent but clearly in evidence. The statements 
and declarations made at regional seminars and 
meetings such as the United Nations-UNICEF 
sponsored Seminar on the Planning of Social 
Welfare for Central America held in Costa Rica 
in May of 1964,^^ those sponsored by the Insti-
tuto Interamericano del Niño in Quito, in Octo-
ber of 1964 and in Montevideo in May of 1965, 
and the 11th Panamerican Congress of Social 
Service in Lima in November 1965, as well as at 
national meetings and professional group discus-
sions support the idea of subjecting social ser-
vice to the discipline of national planning. Up to 
now, these assertions are only assertions. The 
stage of systematic investigations and analyses of 
the problems that need to be resolved before 
planning of social service can be integrated in 
national planning is now within view. 
(a) The meaning of planning in social work 
Planning is a word that has always been in the 
vocabulary of social work. Ideally, when an 
application for social service is received (whether 
from an individual, a group or a community), 
it is determined whether or not the nature of 
the request falls within the scope of action of 
the service. If it does, the application is accepted 
as a "case" and a "planning process" is initiated. 
This planning process is directed to the solution 
of a problem or a complex of problems presented 
by the "case". The stages of this process 
consist o f : 
(1) Prognosis, which involves the collection 
of information through direct contact with 
persons and groups and available records related 
to the case and the need, concerning the re-
sources that can be made to bear on the problem, 
and other relevant factors; the analysis of the 
available data; the formulation of provisional 
objectives and targets. 
(2) Social diagnosis, which involves the de-
finition of the problem, a projection of the 
32 Among the recommendations of that seminar ap-
pear: "Que dentro de la estructura nacional de pla-
nificación, exista una estructura para la planificación 
del bienestar social, que cuente con profesionales de 
este campo", and "Que se haga una planificación ade-
cuada de programas de bienestar social conforme a las 
necesidades y las posibilidades de cada país. . . " Pla-
neamiento para el Bienestar Social, Informe del Semi-
nario Regional sobre Bienestar Social para Centro 
América y Panamá, Costa Rica, May 1964. 
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requirements for meeting the problem, the match-
ing of the requirements and the resources 
available and a lining up of the various possible 
alternatives for action. 
(3 ) Decision-making, which involves the 
selection or choice of one or more among the 
alternatives. The active participation of the 
"case" in the making of the final decision as to 
the nature of action to be taken is essential. In 
fact, the decision should be left to the "case", 
the social worker's responsibility being to en-
hance the "cases" capacity to make decisions 
compatible with his welfare. 
(4) Action or treatment, which is the im-
plementation of the choice that was made. This 
requires the co-operative action of the "case" 
and social service. It may also involve other 
services and the action of other individuals or 
groups. 
(5) Follow-up evaluation of the results of the 
action taken. This follow-up may take place 
during or after the chosen action has been com-
pleted. It is an action in which the "case" must 
take part actively. It may result in modifications 
to improve the effectiveness of the plan of action. 
An analogous process should take place in 
the setting up of a programme as well as in the 
preparation of a calendar of activities for a 
definite period of time. While the planning 
process may vary in the sequence of the various 
stages, the essential elements remain the same. In 
every instance, a problem must be recognized, 
the needs and resources assessed and arranged, 
the alternatives or choices that present them-
selves must be ordered, a decision must be made 
and action must be taken. Follow-up is an im-
portant stage in the process. This Icind of plan-
ning may be carried out on one level or on 
several levels separately, in stages or simultane-
ously. In principle, it should be the base of 
all social service action. Generally, it is micro-
cosmic in approach. 
Planning in the above sense is part of the 
content of social work training. It provides the 
reason for the inclusion in the social work cur-
ricula of courses in community surveys, inter-
views, recording, statistics and other tools of 
data collection and of the social sciences neces-
sary in social diagnosis. 
(b) Social service in the context of national 
planning 
Within the context of development planning, 
experience in relation to social service is nil. In 
no country in the region is social service now 
a part of national plans. Some countries at-
tempting comprehensive national planning have 
included in their national plans sectors in health, 
education and housing and more recently and 
rarely, community development. Mere inclusion 
in national plans however does not represent real 
integration into planning, nor is it a guarantee 
of better functioning.®^ A social service sector 
in a national plan would render social service 
more effective only if certain requisities in plan-
ning and implementation were met. 
Some countries have established planning 
units in functional departments of public ad-
ministration.®"* With the exception of one or two 
countries, even when there is a social service 
content in the wider programmes, e.g. in health, 
these activities are not necessarily included in 
the sectoral programming. In general, the "plan-
ning" of social service is autonomous and 
isolated and often the responsibility of persons 
who have insufficient understanding of the basic 
concepts, objectives, techniques and functioning 
of social service. What has up to now been called 
planning or programming of social service pro-
grammes is more in the nature of directives and 
administrative decisions made in the upper 
echelon of the organizational hierarchy. This 
practice constitutes a barrier to the formulation 
of planning techniques that would facilitate the 
integration of social service into national plan-
ning. In fact because integration would con-
siderably decrease its value as a soirrce of 
personal prestige, resistance should be expected 
even when such integration is overtly endorsed. 
The non-inclusion of social service in national 
development plans has not prevented Latin 
America from acquiring examples of all kinds of 
services known to social worL Nevertheless, there 
are weighty considerations that support the 
bringing of social service under the umbrella 
of development planning. Models from more 
advanced countries excite people to desire and 
compel governments to provide services that the 
countries do not need and probably cannot 
afford. The Charter of the Alliance for Progress 
endorses the provision of social benefits to the 
more needy sectors of the population in order 
to attain an equalization of opportunities. Unless 
social service is viewed as an integral component 
of development, and unless it is brought within 
the discipline of national planning, two pos-
sibilities present themselves. At one extreme 
because of dramatically strong appeals and pres-
33 Report of the Reunión Técnica sobre la Integración 
de los Planes Sectorales de Educación en los Planes 
Generales de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Pan 
American Union, Document H.6, 25 January 1965. 
34 The Ministries of Health and Social Welfare of 
Peru and Paraguay, for example, have such planning 
units headed by physicians with training in national 
planning techniques. 
sures, resources could be diverted to social 
service to an extent that would hamper invest-
ment for rapid economic growth. At the other 
extreme, resources could be withheld to a degree 
that would detract from the smooth functioning 
of existing services and the meeting of the most 
urgent new needs, with consequent widening 
of the gap in levels of living between the various 
sectors of the population and the further in-
capacitation of people to participate in develop-
ment, thus defeating its very objectives. If 
national planning is a process by which the 
different needs of the population and the re-
sources that can be applied to those needs are 
ordered, matched and brought to bear upon 
each other, it is logical that social service, which 
offers techniques for confronting some of the 
major national needs, should come within that 
process of rationalization. 
Apart from the problem of formal incorpora-
tion of social service into national plans of 
development, sectoral programming of social 
service informed by a broad conception of 
national needs and priorities is necessary. The 
existent proliferation of social service activities 
and the consequent seemingly irrational disper-
sion of already limited resources allocated to 
social service dilute the impact of such activities 
and also prevent their measurement and evalua-
tion for purposes of increasing efficiency. The 
restriction of the planning process in social 
service to "cases" and its localization within 
the boundaries of institutions and programmes 
leads to considerable waste of funds as well as 
trained human resources. The preceding descrip-
tion of the functioning of social service in the 
region pictures a situation in which much energy 
and effort seem expended in processes with poor 
yields. This is due in part to a tendency to aspire 
to unattainable ideals instead of applying avail-
able capacities for more practical and attainable 
goals. 
(c ) Some problems of planning social service 
One of the fundamental problems related to 
the over-all planning of social service originates 
from two seemingly contradictory requisites. On 
the one hand, such planning requires a clear 
understanding of the totality of the social scene. 
The sum total of the different settings of the 
"cases" that traditionally are the immediate 
concern of social service action does not con-
stitute that social scene. To arrive at that "clear 
understanding", social service must incorporate 
into its approaches the macrocosmic view, into 
its methods, those of investigation and analysis, 
and into its skills, the utilization of the findings 
of other disciplines, particularly the basic social 
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sciences. In other words, social service must 
emerge f r o m "parochialism". 
On the other hand, the nature o í social service 
subjects it to a compulsion to arrive at certain 
practical lines of action in view of the strong 
demands, the urgency of needs, and its proximity 
to such needs and demands. Whoever has the 
responsibility of making decisions within each 
programme has to face a recurring apparent 
dilemma between preparation f or action through 
systematic and scientific studies and action that 
responds immediately to demands. So far, the 
usual choice has been to attempt practical aid 
immediately on the basis of what is known, 
however inadequate. In the long term, these 
two requisites must be reconciled, although re-
conciliation can never be easy nor complete. In 
fact, the need to struggle toward such a recon-
ciliation is one of the basic principles of social 
work practice that has been only partially ab-
sorbed in the region. 
Professional social workers of the region 
strongly favour over-all planning of social service 
but are handicapped by their lack of oppor-
tunities to acquire training or experience in 
planning techniques. The scientific attitude has 
not been sufficiently internalized to enable them 
to develop objective criteria for the determination 
and measurement of needs, the analysis of re-
quirements, the forecast of benefits and the 
establishment of priorities. From the standpoint 
of the economic planner, as expressed in the 
Regional Seminar on Social Welfare in Central 
America and Panama, such criteria should be 
quantitatively and qualitatively defined.®® Until 
planning techniques applicable to social service 
as a whole are formulated, the integration of 
social service into development planning is hardly 
conceivable. This task logically belongs to social 
work professionals in collaboration with special-
ists in other fields of social policy and with ex-
perienced planners. Until a sufficient number 
of these professionals can free themselves f rom 
absorbing and exacting direct services to cases, 
the principles and the tools for over-all planning 
in social service will remain an aspiration. 
Social service in the region, even in the few 
instances in which there is supposed to be a 
programme of national scope, is based on local 
action designed to meet local needs. Herein lies 
one of the greatest potential contributions of 
social service to development—the direct contact 
with people that places social service personnel 
in a favoured position to know at first hand 
their aspirations and their fears, their latent 
capacities, and the specific approaches that might 
enlist their participation in the developmental 
process. 
The great number and diversity of actual 
and potential demands upon social service in 
relation to the resources available, present a 
challenge to planning. The targets of social 
service action, even when locally based, are 
ambitious to the extent that they represent the 
real demands and expectations of people. More-
over, such demands may differ f rom legislative 
provisions and official directives and may even 
be in direct conflict with one another. The pres-
sures of conflicting interests—both from its 
sources of support and its clientele—tend to 
make social service oriented to the present in 
contrast to the orientation of development policy 
toward future benefits. 
The bases of programmes are fragmentary 
policy provisions scattered in a great bulk of 
social legislation. These provisions do not form 
a consolidated framework of guiding principles 
for action. Such lack of a unified national social 
policy as a basis for programming, however, is 
not unique to social service. Various analyses 
have pointed out the same weakness in social 
sectors such as education, health and housing 
which have been formally incorporated into 
national plans.®® In the Seminar on the Plan-
ning of Social Welfare for Central America and 
Panama previously mentioned,^ economists were 
cited to the effect that there does not exist a true 
social policy in the region but only a series of 
governmental directives. According to this 
source, to formulate a social policy it is neces-
sary to have a diagnosis of the actual situation, 
a profound knowledge and understanding of its 
defects (which is parallel to social service con-
cern with social pathology) , an agreement on 
objectives, and a perspective of current tendencies 
clarifying the disparity between what is desirable 
and what is feasible and thus permitting an ap-
preciation of the necessary steps to achieve the 
set objectives. In this same Seminar, administra-
tors of programmes asserted that there are 
multiple social policies but no instrument to 
co-ordinate these policies. This same divergence 
of opinion as to the real existence of "social 
policies" in the region was observed in the above-
mentioned seminars sponsored by the Inter-
american Institute for the Child and seems to 
derive f rom the varied interpretations of 
35 Planeamiento para el bienestar social, op. cit., 
pp. 10-12. 
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36 See, for example, "Some aspects of educational 
planning in Latin America" by Maximilio Halty Carrere 
in Problems and Strategies of Educational Planning. 
Lessons from Latin America, International Institute for 
Educational Planning, UNESCO, Paris, 1964. See also 
report of the Departamento de Planificación of Colombia 
to the Interamerican Conference on Children and Youth 
in National Development, E/LACCY/NR/L.2, p. 4. 
"pol icy" . If one considers that unified social 
policy should define the value premise f or action, 
a set of objectives, a focus of emphasis, a seat of 
ultimate responsibility and leadership for the 
translation of the policy into action and the 
degree and nature of participation by the public, 
then in this sense there is no unified and defined 
social policy in Latin America. There is no 
clear evidence of decision on the above aspects 
although there are trends identifiable from the 
many social provisions that exist. For example, 
some countries have codes that define the status 
of and the conditions of protection of minors 
and of women, while others have laws that place 
the emphasis on the family. These codes ex-
press values on which policy is based. Some 
countries have legal provisions establishing cen-
tralized seats of responsibility, and others define 
sets of objectives without specifying value pre-
mises. Very commonly, a statement of values in 
a legal code is not accompanied by provisions 
for its attainment, and administrative specifica-
tions for implementation are not matched by 
provisions for financial support. A general 
characteristic of the abundant social provisions 
of the region (many of which remain buried in 
the statute books) is specificity to defined 
pathological aspects of society, for example, the 
destitute dependent child, the low-income worker, 
the dependent aged, the criminal, the delinquent, 
etc.®'^  There is yet to be formulated a social 
policy that unifies all these aspects into an in-
tegrated basis for social welfare action. 
It has been pointed out that there is no 
definite administrative structure for the plan-
ning of social service. Executives of administra-
tive units in which social service is located and 
those of voluntary programmes take initiatives 
and make decisions that are based on some sort 
of analysis of needs, resources and expected 
results but which are highly coloured by personal 
and subjective factors. Experiences in technical 
assistance in social service indicate that decisions 
related to planning seldom involve professional 
social service personnel. The justification put 
forward to explain this phenomenon is the 
scarcity or total absence of personnel (among 
the professionals) trained in planning. T o sum 
up, the placing of social service within the frame-
work of development has up to the present been 
frustrated b y : (1 ) the general absence of a 
unified social policy on which to base social 
service planning; (2 ) the absence of a concept 
of over-all planning within social service; ( 3 ) its 
traditional local and individual approach to 
needs and problems; (4 ) the inadequacies of its 
37 See Situación de la Legislación Relativa: La Mino-
ridad en América Latina, Rafael Sajón, José Achard, 
Instituto Interamericano del Niño, Montevideo, Uruguay. 
techniques for planning purposes; and (5 ) the 
inadequacies of administration and administra-
tive structures f o r its planning, including the 
paucity of planning competence among social 
service personnel. 
( d ) Need-cost-benefit desideratum 
Planning involves an assessment of need, 
cost and benefit in relation to one other. In social 
service, this aspect of planning is particularly 
difiScult because to date there is no formula f or 
the quantitative measurement of need, or of 
benefit related to both need and cost. Need has 
been measured through the number of people 
affected but a simple numerical count leaves out 
the important factor of degree of intensity of 
deprivation and resulting incapacity, which is 
highly individual. In the same way, benefit can 
be quantified if the coimting is based on the 
number of people served or benefited. Again, 
the degree of satisfaction caused by the benefit 
is individual and defies ordinary means of 
measurement. 
The problem becomes still more difficult if 
one seeks the optimum relationship among the 
three factors. How intense should a need be to 
justify expenditure and how much benefit would 
be considered a satisfactory return on a given 
expenditure? Is the cost of a social service 
activity solely a consumption expenditure or can 
it be considered as investment? If it is in part 
an investment in "human resource development" 
can the return on such investment be quantified? 
Planning implies an assessment and balancing 
of costs and personnel requirements. In some 
social service action requirements are modest 
but the majority require some expenditure on 
infrastructure, rising levels of costs for continu-
ing operation, and trained personnel. There are 
many instances when the changing levels of 
these requirements are not considered in advance, 
resulting sometimes in elaborate and costly 
buildings and equipment that lie idle because of 
lack of funds for operating expenses and lack 
of personnel. In other instances, the personnel 
are hired but find they have no facihties nor 
funds for carrying out their duties. It is im-
portant that the different kinds of requirements 
should be budgeted for and that their provision 
should be balanced and timed in accordance 
with their relative roles in the process of im-
plementation. In the case of personnel, this con-
sideration should affect training policy both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Finally, in the planning of social service, it is 
well to bear in mind that " to apply economic 
rationality to expenditures on social programmes 
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cannot be pursued beyond a certain point with-
out running into open contradiction not only 
with the ways people and nations actually behave 
but also with their deepest value systems"; that 
" n o people is so poor that it would be prepared 
to do only the things it can afford according to 
a utilitarian scheme of priorities"; therefore 
the "demands of the public should be considered 
if plans are to respond to real social needs and 
to receive popular support and participation" 
The search must go on for more objective tech-
niques of measuring needs, of defining needy 
sectors of the population and of relating benefits 
to costs and needs but such techniques should 
admit of dimensions other than the economic. 
38 See "Social Development" and "Social Planning': 
A survey of conceptual and practical problems in Latin 
America, supra, p. 42. 
Part IV 
AREAS FOR FUTURE ACTION: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Latin America today, a large proportion 
of the population cannot satisfy primary needs. 
Public services for welfare and culture are 
seriously deficient, as are the different sectors of 
production. The symptoms of instability are 
widening: large strata of the population are 
excluded f rom full participation in the national 
societies, but are not quiescent. Some zones have 
come under military control or have been 
evacuated as a result of violent unrest. There is 
a feverish human movement f rom rural to urban 
zones, f rom one region within a country to 
another, f rom one country to the next. Social 
values are neither well-structured nor stable. As 
a consequence of the technological and social 
transition in which the region is immersed, pat-
terns of organization and relations are ambiguous 
and confused and do not serve as clear and 
sound norms for human behaviour. The manifes-
tations of personal maladjustment and social 
disorganization are increasing in number and in 
variety. Under these circumstances, social service 
limited to increasing the capacity of individuals, 
groups and communities to make full use of 
organized services is obviously not contributing 
to society the maximum potential of its know-
ledges and techniques. 
The potential contribution of social service 
to the development of Latin America lies in 
helping people to make the maximum use of 
what society offers and of their own capacities; 
in creating institutional forms which society 
needs but does not provide and new combinations 
of existing services to make them more relevant 
to changing needs; in motivating people for 
change and in preparing them to initiate action 
that will make them active participants of that 
phenomenon; and in assisting individuals and 
groups to cope satisfactorily with the attendant 
demands that the process of development exerts 
on the human factor. The full realization of such 
a contribution will depend upon the remodelling 
of concepts along with reforms in legislation and 
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administrative structure adequately supported 
by competent personnel and research. 
1. Conceptual growth and adaptation 
The conceptual framework of social service 
in Latin America originated in more highly 
industrialized countries where it responded to 
very different social conditions and relationships. 
The borrowing of this conceptual basis as well 
as the associated techniques was inevitable when 
social service was at its beginning in the region. 
Within a different cultural and social milieu, 
concepts assume other meanings, techniques ap-
plied produce different effects, and institutions 
established, even though called by identical 
names, work in different ways. The transplanta-
tion of these concepts and techniques is further 
affected by the human, economic and institutional 
resources available for their functioning. For 
them to acquire meaning at all, they must 
harmonize with the political aspirations of the 
people and the needs toward which these aspira-
tions are directed.®^ The growth of social service 
in Latin America should have been accompanied 
by an evolution in concepts and techniques, 
bringing it closer to regional value premises, 
to problems and needs as they are understood 
and to existing social institutions and resources. 
There has been some progress toward this 
objective. In the daily task of trying to apply 
what was learned in school f rom foreign ex-
perience and foreign textbooks, social workers 
adapt and experiment. These efforts are limited 
39 Social Research in Latin America (Wagley, 
Charles) cites illustrations in law courts, public ad-
ministration, education, etc. In this respect, social 
service is not an isolated case. He says on page 27 
that, although Latin America has borrowed extensively 
from Europe and the United States, the similarity is 
only "formal and superficial". "Latin American nations 
have profoundly modified, adopted and reinterpreted 
European customs and institutions. A Latin American 
constitution may read like its U.S. counterpart but it 
does not function in the same way . . . " . 
in their effects on theory and practice for 
several reasons: they are undirected and un-
systematic; they are not recorded, classified and 
tested and do not therefore become incorporated 
into the body of systematic knowledge and 
practice. Most social workers are quite unaware 
of the potential contributions to professional 
growth that they can make through their own 
experiences. Some, too insecure to deviate from 
the traditional, camouflage their experiences in 
the familiar terms of the classroom or keep these 
to themselves. In many instances, the social 
worker has no time to generalize and sift his 
thinking; the typical scene in a social service 
office can be likened to a market place of women 
elbowing their way through a crowd of sick, 
hungry and dejected people many of them with 
squalling babies in their arms. Despite such 
barriers, growth in harmony with reality must 
take place. 
The differences in terminology under which 
social service is known {asistencia social, servi-
cio social, bienestar social) are of minor im-
portance; in the public mind, all such terms 
evoke the same image. This image is still that 
of a more fortunate person giving alms or free 
service to the less fortunate, of someone visiting 
the sick and spreading artificial cheer, of some-
one who can "pull strings" to give the shelterless 
a house, the hungry food, the crippled alms. 
It is not an image of a service that aims to 
capacitate man as an individual and as a member 
of a group and of a wider society to recognize 
his legitimate needs and to choose one way 
or several ways towards the satisfaction of his 
needs. The adoption of one term is not sufficient. 
There must be a clarification of the purpose 
of social service and a definition of its functions 
within operational limits. This clarification 
and definition must be subsequently demon-
strated in activities, if distorted images are to 
be dispelled." 
The basic principles and methods of social 
work need to be tested in local settings for their 
applicability. The principle that society is respon-
sible for the removal of obstacles to self-realiza-
tion and social participation and the parallel 
principle of equal opportunity, for example, 
suffer modifications in interpretation under dif-
ferent political systems and beliefs and the degree 
of affluence of any particular society. One of 
the national reports to the Latin American Con-
40 Quotations aie taken from interviews carried out in 
the course of a study on "Los servicios públicos en una 
población de erradicación, CE/LACCY/89/L.2/Add.2 
prepared by the Social Affairs Division of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America for the Latin American 
Conference on Children and Youth in National Develop-
ment, Santiago, Chile, 28 November to 11 December 1965. 
ference on Children and Youth in National 
Development generalizing from a description of 
services provided to delinquent youth in local 
institutions mentions "the common anomaly of 
civilization by automatically guaranteeing to 
deviants an opportunity for training whereas 
the rest of their age group who are well-behaved 
and well-adjusted have to compete among them-
selves for places available to but a small propor-
tion of their number".^^ This does not imply 
that youth in institutions in Latin America 
receive favoured treatment in general; the 
resources of many such institutions are inade-
quate even for minimum custodial functions. It 
does suggest that social service provisions bor-
rowed from more affluent settings are likely to 
be implemented mainly in favour of problem 
groups that are easily identified and small enough 
so that services can be provided for them without 
an unmanageable claim on resources. The wider 
needs are likely to be disregarded both because 
of their magnitude and because they do not 
correspond to the borrowed provisions. 
Even the nature of basic human needs must 
be re-interpreted to fit varying conditions of 
mass poverty and deep-rooted patterns of at-
titudes toward need and dependency. Food is 
a basic need, but this does not mean that any 
food will be acceptable to appease hunger; the 
assumption that an outside agency knows better 
than the local people what they need to eat is 
likely to be rejected by the people themselves, 
who often use food aid in ways unforeseen by 
its providers. 
The meaning of interdependence in society 
will differ where alienation from traditional 
sources of security and well-being is widespread. 
Its implications need to be considered in con-
ditions such as those described by a social worker 
in a housing project who classified the population 
into three groups: those who have steady jobs 
and incomes, who feel secure and feel individual-
istic, caring only about their own interests; those 
who have some income and some kind of job, 
who feel partially insecure, who care about the 
well-being of the community and participate 
actively in communal affairs because they see 
community solidarity as a potential resource to 
meet their insecurity; and those who have 
nothing, not even aspirations, who care for 
nothing because they have nothing to lose and 
believe they have nothing to gain. 
Schools of social work should take the lead 
in striving for conceptual growth and adapta-
tion by providing the essential atmosphere for 
•41 Case study of countries' policy and planning ap-
proach to the needs of children and youth, E/LACCY/ 
CS/L.2, presented by the Government of Jamaica. 
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searching discussions and the facilities for 
systematic study and formulation. The pos-
sibilities of a regional exchange of personnel 
among schools of social work should be ex-
plored. 
2. Social legislation 
Legislation is an important link in the growth 
process of social service. As stated previously, 
there is no scarcity of legislation, but existent 
laws contain expressions of unrealistically high 
standards impossible of realization because of 
limitations on resources and discriminatory 
provisions resulting from interest group pres-
sures.'*® Gaps and duplications in coverage are 
frequent. Provisions with good intentions are 
sometimes so interpreted that they become in-
struments of exploitation. Social service should 
consider it within its innovating function to re-
examine all legislation affecting its areas of 
concern for the purpose of formulating recom-
mendations for amendment or repeal and of 
proposing the enactment of needed laws. In 
fact, professional groups should spearhead social 
action for legislative reform including the 
codification of relevant laws so that they become 
declarations of consistent social policy. There 
should be a constant testing of the effect of laws 
on the aspects of life to which they are directed. 
The making of laws is not solely a function of 
legislators. Government and voluntary agencies, 
the professions, social scientists and the general 
public should share this function at different 
stages. The whole process of law enactment for 
social welfare needs systematization and demo-
cratization. 
3. Administrative evolution 
Some of the most serious weaknesses of social 
service discussed above lie in the administrative 
arrangements for its functioning. Its fragmenta-
tion into small-scale isolated activities makes 
evaluation of programmes difficult and measure-
ment of general impact impossible. It prevents 
concentration of resources in the areas of highest 
priority, and fosters the growth of rival cliques 
and vested interests. These features constitute 
barriers to programme co-ordination and joint 
planning. While there are certain advantages to, 
the practice of attaching social service to func-
tional administrative units, there seem to be 
weightier arguments for the creation of an ad-
ditional separate policy entity to take care of 
the major responsibility for defining objectives 
and functions, formulating, enforcing, and unify-
ing norms of service, co-ordinating action in 
These views are also held in Sajón and Achard, 
op. cit. 
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both government and voluntary sectors, and 
undertaking over-all planning including the al-
location of welfare resources. At present, there 
is a lack of uniformity in the standards of 
service from agency to agency and existing de-
finitions of such standards remain buried in 
official documents with imperceptible effects on 
implementation. 
Many of the existing social service pro-
grammes are included in other sectoral pro-
grammes. Some, however, do not contribute 
directly and are only remotely related to the 
objectives of the other sectors of social action 
while still others of broader application cut 
across several sectors. The administration of 
such programmes should also be a responsibility 
of a social service administrative entity. 
Whether programmes are administratively uni-
fied under one entity or distributed among other 
sectors, social service should be planned at the 
local, regional and national levels where account 
is taken of the types of programmes, the kinds, 
magnitude and cost of requirements including 
personnel, the nature of resources that can be 
allocated, the limits of responsibility and the 
relationships to other forms of action. Some 
of the advantages of linking the planning of 
social service to over-all development planning 
have been mentioned. While national develop-
ment planning has gained general acceptance in 
Latin America, most countries have established 
planning machinery and the majority have 
national plans, a trend promoted by the require-
ments of the Alliance for Progress; up to now, 
planning techniques and machinery are still 
undergoing evolution as the planners try to apply 
the lessons that can be learned from the short-
comings or inapplicability of earlier planning 
initiatives. Completed national plans generally 
fall short of full implementation. Social service 
policy makers and planners need to take a 
realistic view of the state of general planning 
in their respective countries and to consider 
their opportunities to participate in the evolu-
tion of such planning without exaggerated ex-
pectations concerning the amount of support the 
planning process will be able to give them. 
An important step forward would be the es-
tablishment, within the national planning ma-
chinery if this is able to assume such a responsi-
bility, of a system of over-all evaluation of 
government and voluntary programmes, or at 
least of agencies receiving total or partial 
financial support from public funds. Even when 
there is an evaluation unit in the central plan-
ning body, each functional unit of administra-
tion should set up machinery for periodic as-
sessment of changes in the nature and magnitudes 
of needs and the impact of the service on such 
needs. Criteria for evaluation must be clearly 
stated. Such a step would require progressive 
attitudes and analytical points of view supported 
by administrative procedures conducive to free 
communication, flexibility, group instead of in-
dividual decision-making and hierarchical mo-
bility. A well formulated general norm of service 
and evaluation procedures in support of agency 
regulation and licensing should weed out the 
voluntary programme that serves solely for 
propaganda and self-aggrandizement, permitting 
thus a more rational distribution of funds to as-
sure the meritorious voluntary programme of 
adequate and stable support. 
Other changes should include a unification of 
planning and operational functions, a more 
rational and stable basis for financing of pro-
grammes, and a functional rather than a re-
strictive accounting system equally applicable 
to public and voluntary agencies expending 
public moneys. Budget preparation is an im-
portant instrument for programme planning 
and assessment. Functional (sometimes called 
"performance") budgeting has been experi-
mented with successfully in several countries 
outside the region. It provides flexibility in the 
allocation of funds and takes into account the 
dynamics of programme growth. The periodic 
examination of budgets and the use of perform-
ance as the criterion for budget estimates and 
the subsequent financing operations emphasizes 
action and achievement rather than administra-
tive positions and the corresponding hierarchical 
system. The applicability of performance budget-
ing to social service administration is worth 
testing. It might open a way to the formulation 
of criteria for measuring needs and results 
qualitatively and quantitatively, bringing social 
service closer to fulfilling the major pre-
requisites of its planning at the national level. 
No programme can count on success without 
the participation of those who benefit directly 
from it. A strong local administration capable 
of formulating its needs into demands that can 
be reconciled with wider planning and of sharing 
responsibility in the implementation of pro-
grammes as "a watchdog" to guarantee ef-
fective action, is a resource of immeasurable 
value. In addition to "enabling" individuals, 
groups and communities to benefit and partici-
pate in organized programmes as well as to 
achieve outside such programmes social mobility 
and change, social service should support the 
development of a strong local administration. 
Several means of effecting co-ordination are 
now under experiment. The commonest of these 
are inter-ministerial commissions, technical com-
mittees and study groups within the governmental 
system, and councils of agencies, either limited 
to voluntary agencies or including both the 
public and voluntary sectors. Whether they are 
effective or not will depend upon individual 
and agency attitudes and the recognition of the 
element of interdependency as an essential con-
sideration for survival. 
Improvements in programme planning, im-
plementation, co-ordination and co-operation, 
and evaluation require changes in organizational 
structure and administrative procedures, but 
above all in the general administrative orienta-
tion. Such requisites may be diflicult to realize 
for some time to come. Schools of social work 
should recognize this likelihood and train their 
students to struggle and survive in "muddled" 
situations. At present, training is often carried 
out in illusionary setting. 
4. Preparation of personnel for social service 
A programme can only be as good as the 
people who plan and execute it. A technically 
and substantively weak programme can some-
times be implemented with some degree of ef-
fectiveness if the personnel are capable. The 
preparation of personnel for social service is 
imeven and at times internally inconsistent. The 
training of social workers has advanced ahead 
of programme development and thus lacks clear 
objectives related to programme needs. There 
seems to be little relation between training and 
actual functions and between training and 
practice. A necessary pre-condition is the de-
finition of the functions for which personnel are 
to be trained. In Latin America, the functions 
of the three distinct levels of personnel—^profes-
sional, sub-professional and non-professional— 
have not so far been clearly defined and de-
limited. As they become defined, these functions 
should become one of the determinants of the 
content of the training programmes. Otherwise, 
personnel will continue to find their training 
inapplicable in the face of reality. 
There is need to re-orient some aspects of the 
training of professional social workers so that 
they would be more able to function in human 
and professional relationships; such relationships 
constitute the central focus of their activities. A 
deeper understanding of their role in relation 
to their functions is the legitimate source of 
motivation and morale. Such understanding is 
possible only if the principles they are taught as 
basic harmonize with the culture values and 
beliefs that they hold, or if the teaching is able 
to transform the values and beliefs. The need 
to enlarge the understanding of social problems 
and of human needs indicates that the social 
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science and research content of the curricula 
must be strengthened. The focus should be on 
action-oriented types of research and on the use 
of the findings in social work situations leaving 
the responsibility for basic research to social 
scientists. Today, what is often called training 
in social research is participation in researches 
conducted by sociologists in which the social 
worker is merely an interviewer with no respon-
sibility for hypothesis formulation or analysis 
of findings. This does not constitute an adequate 
training in research methodology. 
The present training in social work, with rare 
exceptions, is urban-oriented. There is now an 
unmet need for professionals who can work 
with people in the countryside and with trans-
planted rural people in urban areas. The matter 
of training in rural social service is becoming 
more and more urgent and schools of social 
service should study ways of meeting this need. 
Aside from the inclusion of subject matter 
dealing with rural society in social work cur-
ricula, two possibilities may be considered: (a) 
a decentralization of training from large cities 
to towns that function as "community centres" 
for the rural hinterland; and (b) specialization 
within a co-ordinated urban-rural perspective. 
The latter has the advantage of a generic basic 
formation which prepares the professional for 
work in either setting. 
The entrance of social service into new work 
areas associated with massive displacement of 
population as a result of spontaneous migrations, 
or in some zones, of rural conflict and repres-
sive military action, as well as the widening 
horizons of its co-operation with rural develop-
ment programmes and reforms indicate a need 
to encourage the training of more men for 
social service. The traditional functions of the 
social worker and the relatively low pay scales 
have made of this profession an almost ex-
clusively feminine career. With the new and 
broader functions of social workers, reinforced 
by material and status incentives, the profession 
should become more attractive to men. 
Social workers today are in general strongly 
desirous of training in planning techniques. It 
is unlikely that the majority would have, during 
their professional life, functions directly related 
to development planning. However, social service 
leaders responsible for programme administra-
tion should have competence in planning tech-
niques and a few should be prepared to a degree 
that will qualify them to maintain a dialogue 
and collaborate with other planners. Such com-
petence should be acquired as a specializa-
tion requiring basic preparation in economics 
and other disciplines related to development. The 
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material on planning now included in courses 
of social welfare administration should be suf-
ficient for the time, until there is further evidence 
that a more specialized training at this level is 
necessary, to prepare the rank and file of social 
workers to contribute to planning. Such con-
tribution consists: (1) in providing planners 
with information about sectors of population 
and the social needs that should be considered 
the targets of national and iegional development 
and sectoral plans; (2) in indicating the ac-
tivities that are likely to satisfy some needs and 
to appeal sufficiently to people to merit active 
public support; (3) in assessing the local re-
sources that can be used towards the implementa-
tion of plans; (4) in bringing to the attention 
of planners the rejection or support of the people 
for specific parts of the plan, in interpreting such 
reactions and attitudes particularly their prob-
able overt manifestations and in suggesting 
practical measures to overcome rejection or to 
modify the objectionable parts of the plan; (5) 
in interpreting to people in terms of their re-
cognized needs and available resources the 
"role" implications of the plan; and (6) in 
helping people to articulate not only their needs 
and limitations but also their choices of alterna-
tives and their hopes. These contributions derive 
from the close contact which social workers have 
with people, their intimate acquaintance and 
understanding of human behaviour and the 
potentialities of the techniques in which they 
have been trained. 
Training opportunities for top-level and spe-
cialized personnel should be developed: for 
teaching in social work, planning, research, 
administration and methods specialists. The es-
tablishment of training institutions for this level 
of personnel is essential if social work is to 
acquire leadership capable of original thinking 
and of participating with other professions in 
policy formulation, over-all planning and high 
level administration. In view of limited resources 
in terms of trained manpower for teaching at 
this level, as well as in financial resources and 
training materials, regional co-operation would 
be more practical, economical and effective than 
national efforts. A regional professional staff 
exchange programme should be another promis-
ing arrangement for sharing resources for higher 
level personnel, as well as for direct service. The 
"Social Workers for America" plan of Argen-
tina has possibilities along this line although 
conceived for other purposes and on different 
premises. 
Social service in Latin America has arrived 
at a stage at which it both needs—and can con-
tribute—a core of leaders able to make full use 
of a Regional Institute for Executive Develop-
ment in Social Service that would concentrate 
on the top-level training of teachers, administra-
tors, planners, method specialists and researchers 
in social service. The courses would be intensive 
and in series, each focusing on one of the 
above specializations so that the participants in 
each course would have a high degree of homo-
geneity as to level of basic preparation and 
specialization. Regional training arrangements 
up to the present, such as the course for ad-
ministration of social welfare programmes under 
the auspices of the Organization of American 
States in Buenos Aires and the Centro Regional 
de Educación Fundamental en América Latina 
of UNESCO in Patzcuaro, Mexico (CREFAL) 
for community development are interdisciplinary 
and do not provide the type of preparation 
needed by high level personnel in social service. 
Such an Institute would also be a centre for 
documentation, for the development of training 
materials for all levels of personnel, for the 
revision and unification of criteria in social 
service and for growth and adaptation of social 
work concepts and methods. 
The regional trend toward increase in the 
number of schools in itself will not solve the 
problem of personnel deficiency and might even 
perpetuate uneven and low standards of training. 
Consolidation of training facilities to a degree 
that will permit better selection of students, the 
development of careers in education for social 
work, and economy in the use of other resources 
would be a more constructive trend. In the final 
analysis, fewer but better staffed, equipped and 
financed schools and the consequent improvement 
of quality of the graduates would pave the way 
to the acceptance of social work on a profes-
sional level with the corresponding entitlements 
to prestige and pay. The formulation and en-
forcement of minimum requirements in terms 
of physical and teaching facilities, financing, 
faculty and curriculum might help toward such 
consolidation.^^ Schools should however be given 
This condition is not only applicable to schools of 
social service. Similar trends are affecting institutions 
in many areas of specialized professional training. For 
example, in his inaugural speech at the "Conferencia 
Latinoamericana sobre Agricultura y Alimentación" 
(Eighth Regional Conference of FAO), the Director 
General said: "Most of the countries in Latin America 
have not, as yet, any clear idea of the trained personnel 
which their development plans and programmes require, 
though such knowledge is essential to ensure that their 
plans and programmes can be implemented effectively 
without waste. At the same time, however, one can 
notice in many countries a proliferation of training 
institutions which would not seem to respond to any 
pre-established plan. This can only lead to a dispersion 
of efforts with the result that, instead of building up a 
few institutions of the highest standing, a number of 
small ones is established which are ill-equipped to cope 
with the Droblems. We would insist, therefore, on the 
leeway to experiment on adaptations to local 
needs, particularly because the routes of develop-
ment are not clear, the needs in terms of skills 
are undefined, thus underscoring the importance 
of a broad span of capabilities that can be 
applied to an equally wide variety of situations. 
\^ile nationally unified standards are desirable 
there is no need for inflexible and rigid models 
of training. 
Since the functioning of social service does not 
depend solely on social workers, attention should 
be given to the training of sub-professional 
workers and other types of institutional per-
sonnel. Social workers should promote the train-
ing of such personnel to assure themselves of 
the availability of competent collaborators. There 
is much resistance among social workers against 
the training of lower level auxiliary personnel. 
A clear delineation of functions and respon-
sibilities should overcome that resistance. 
Schools are not the only possible means for 
personnel qualification. Social service started be-
fore training and there are still many untrained 
persons performing social work functions. More-
over, social service must be dynamic to be func-
tional. Inservice training and supervision are 
instruments for professional growth. Schools of 
social work should take the leadership in the 
establishment of consistent, continuous and pro-
gressive in-service training programmes within 
each institution or as co-operative efforts of 
several institutions for all levels of social service 
personnel. 
5. The need for social research and statistics 
If social service has not contributed to the 
body of knowledge about society and social 
problems, it is because it has not developed a 
system of reporting, collection and analysis of 
data concerning its activities. This is due to the 
absence of an orientation towards research and 
of the ability to analyse and conceptualize from 
empirical data, a weakness in the training pro-
gramme that is generally recognized by school 
directors. The report of one of the countries in 
the region states about social service: "We 
regret that the chapter about the legal and social 
protection of children is rather vague but this 
vagueness is due to an almost complete lack of 
documentation. Most of the social services feel 
there is so much work to do and they are so 
short of personnel, that they cannot bother to 
prepare any reports. We do not think this is a 
real excuse. All work and certainly social work 
need for countries to assess carefully their requirements 
in this field and to proceed with the development of 
their educational systems on the basis of such assess-
ment." LARO/65 /CONF/5 , p. 6. 
in.^  
should be organized and any organization with-
out data is impossible. 
Documentation should be an important part 
of this training."^'' A study undertaken by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America calls 
attention to the difificulty of obtaining data about 
social service. The statistics on assistance ren-
dered are recorded in a form that cannot be 
classified nor analysed to get a complete picture 
of what constitutes the service, much less to 
evaluate the benefits, the deficiencies, the dupli-
cations and the gaps, if any exist.^ ® 
An initial step towards a more systematic 
collection of social service data for purposes of 
programme implementation, evaluation and re-
search is the revision of existing reporting forms, 
reducing their number, simplifying them and 
concentrating on statistics and information that 
are classifiable and can be interpreted. 
The need for basic and operational research 
is so great and the areas in which such research 
is wanting so diverse that the problem is where 
to start. In the first place up to the present, 
findings of basic research have little, if any, 
impact on social work concepts and practice. In 
the second place, basic social research on Latin 
America is still rudimentary. Merely as an illus-
tration, a few of the areas of basic research 
that aifect directly social work practice are 
here mentioned: 
1. The impact of technological and organiza-
tional changes on the family in Latin America. 
2. The measurement of the levels of living 
of different population groups in the regions. 
3. The identification of felt needs and aspira-
tions of such groups and of their basic attitudes 
concerning ways of meeting such needs. 
4. The various ways in which individual, 
family and social satisfactions are fulfilled and 
the outlooks of different social strata in Latin 
America relative to these. 
5. The convictions that shape attitudes and 
behaviour. 
6. Incentives to family life and the relative 
importance of various patterns of family life. 
Social workers should be trained to make use 
of the findings of basic research in their practice 
as well as in the formulation of social work con-
ceptions. At the same time, they should provide 
social researchers with information as to the 
areas of basic research that would have bearing 
Background document E/LACCY/NR/L.4, August 
1965, of the Latin American Conference on Children 
and Youth in National Development, Santiago, Chile 
(ECLA/UNICEF/ILPES) (mimeographed). 
See "Los servicios en una población de erradica-
ción", op. cit. 
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on social service. This is an essential co-operative 
relationship between the social researcher who 
tends to direct investigations to general social 
phenomena and the social worker who should 
translate into action and practical achievements 
the results of such investigations. 
In operational research, which should be 
within the competence of social workers, the fol-
lowing topics are suggested for priority, because 
they would provide important basic information 
for programme planning and implementation: 
1. Contributions of social service in the pro-
mulgation of social legislation. 
2. Differences between the written law and 
its operation in social service. 
3. Effects of legal provisions on the operation 
of programmes and their compatibility with so-
cial work principles. 
4. Social welfare needs of people in rural 
and urban settings. 
5. Inventory of existing social service facili-
ties and measurement of their adequacy. 
6. Identification of elements that can be used 
as bases for comparative measurement of costs 
and effects. 
7. Identification of elements that can be 
used as bases for determining priorities and 
allocations. 
8. Identification of areas of relationships that 
social service is replacing with its activities, and 
an evaluation of the effects of such replacement, 
i.e. institutions for children on parent-child re-
lationships, subsidized workers and communal 
restaurants on family relationships, mothers' 
clubs on mother-child and husband-wife rela-
tionships, etc. 
9. Effects of programmes on the lives of 
beneficiaries—relationships, attitudes, behaviour 
and general ways of life. 
10. Effects of local authority or its weakness 
on the development and administration of 
programmes. 
Many other operational and. organizational 
aspects of the functioning of social service can 
be the subject of studies that can be made by 
social workers themselves within the limits of 
their daily work activities. Besides the practical 
value of such endeavours, they also serve as 
"morale" builders and as incentives for free and 
objective communication among professionals. 
6. International and regional co-operation 
The United Nations and its specialized 
agencies have technical assistance programmes 
in various fields some of which are directly or 
indirectly concerned with social service. These 
are mostly centred around the family, children 
and youth, rural development, and social work 
training. The Organization of American States 
(OAS) has training projects for the preparation 
of higher level personnel and finances a regional 
institute for the child as well as regional 
seminars on specific subjects. Several organiza-
tions of voluntary nature from outside the region 
also administer social service programmes using 
local staff to some extent, while many govern-
ments, including those of the United States, the 
Netherlands, Israel, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France and the United Kingdom, offer 
fellowships for study abroad. 
Certain problems arise from international co-
operation. Financing from international assist-
ance usually ties programmes to rigid interna-
tional standards not adapted to local conditions. 
Requests for technical assistance are generally 
formulated by interest groups for certain spe-
cializations without previous analysis of the 
total situation and without benefit of over-all 
planning. Experts sent to countries normally 
contribute to the concentration of interest and 
action in the particular field of specialization, 
and thus may unintentionally promote uneven 
development. There is also little co-ordination in 
international action at the national level, coin-
ciding with the lack of co-ordination among 
national agencies already described. 
International and regional co-operation can 
contribute to a rational development of social 
service in several ways. The work of interna-
tional bodies in the formulation of concepts and 
standards is very useful if the countries are 
helped to use these formulations judiciously, as 
sources of ideas about desirable lines of policy 
and as encouragement to indigenous efforts. 
International assistance can also be used to force 
governments to look more closely at their ways 
of thinking and patterns of action for the pur-
pose of achieving better unification of purpose 
and co-ordination of action. International assist-
ance could itself set an example in co-ordination 
by establishing more eifective channels of com-
munication at the national level. 
National research both basic and operational 
can be encouraged and financed. Regional train-
ing facilities and opportunities for the prepara-
tion of higher level personnel such as the previ-
ously mentioned Regional Institute for Execu-
tive Development in Social Service can be 
developed through matching arrangements simi-
lar to those under which the Organization of 
American States (OAS) is presently conducting 
the courses for administrators of social pro-
grammes. While technical assistance in social 
work training is potentially valuable, the orien-
tation should be changed from the creation of 
new schools to the consolidation and strength-
ening of existing schools. Governments should 
be encouraged to conduct, using technical as-
sistance if necessary, an evaluation of existing 
institutional arrangements for social service as 
a preliminary to requests for more specialized 
types of expert assistance. The relative pro-
ductivity of regional conferences and seminars 
against that of small working groups should be 
considered. The former have in recent years 
become popular and frequent in all the sectors 
of social policy and have set forth numerous 
recommendations concerning broad social ob-
jectives. At the present stage, however, it may 
be that smaller meetings focused on carefully 
defined problems and limited to technically 
qualified participants, would have more real im-
pact on social action at the national level. Some 
countries have advanced more quickly in certain 
techniques of social service than others; tech-
nical assistance should also promote a system 
of social service personnel exchange that would 
open up heretofore untapped training oppor-
tunities within the region itself. A valuable 
contribution which international and regional 
co-operation can make is the fostering of pro-
fessional communication among countries and 
the consequent promotion of development-con-
sciousness and better imderstanding of the pre-
requisites of development among social service 
leaders and professionals. 
The traditional approach of social service 
assumes the existence of economic and social 
structures that offer real opportunities for self-
support and participation to its clientele once 
they have been helped to overcome their special 
problems, whether these are economic, psycho-
logical or social relationships. 
Under conditions of mass under-employmeni, 
exclusion of the masses from effective participa-
tion in the national society, absence of really 
effective educational and other basic services, in 
which half or more of the national population 
belongs to the "culture of poverty" the limita-
tions of such an approach are obvious. 
The objectives endorsed by the Government 
themselves in such documents as the Charter of 
the Alliance for Progress suppose rapid and far-
reaching changes in economic and social struc-
tures, and the policy-makers in social service 
need to consider how they can adapt their tech-
niques to helping the people with whom they 
deal to take an active part in bringing about 
changes rather than in adjusting to intolerable 
existing situations. 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA 
The present paper is concerned with some of 
the results of a broad study of the distribution 
of income in Argentina, sponsored jointly by the 
National Development Council (Consejo Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo de la República Argentina 
—CONADE) and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America. The first major part of the study, 
dealing with the collection of the basic statistical 
data and the elaboration of a series of estimates 
of the distribution of income by size, has now 
been completed. A discussion of the sources of 
data and the methodology followed is presented 
here, as these are somewhat different from those 
commonly underlying income distribution esti-
mates, and are likely to be of some general 
interest. In addition, the preliminary numerical 
results are presented, to give a picture of the 
distribution of income which has prevailed in 
Argentina in recent years. This article is limited 
to these aspects of the study, and does not enter 
into any detailed analysis of the results thus far 
obtained. The co-operation between CONADE 
and ECLA in this area is continuing, and the 
study is currently being extended to an analysis 
of this type, aiming at an evaluation and inter-
pretation of the data in the context of the 
specific economic and social conditions prevail-
ing in Argentina. This further study is being 
carried out as one part of a study of income 
distribution in Latin America being undertaken 
by the ECLA secretariat, the results of which 
will be made available in future publications. 
The statistical investigation was organized in 
three broad areas: (a) the construction of the 
system of national accounts and supplementary 
information, including the estimation of the 
functional distribution of income, for the period 
1950-63; (6) the estimation of the economically 
active population, by sector, for the same period; 
and (c) the estimation of the distribution of in-
come, by size, for each of the years 1953, 1959, 
and 1961.^ It is the procedures followed, and the 
results obtained, in the third of these areas 
I T h e study was carried out under the direction of 
Mr. Alberto Fracchia. A paper discussing some aspects 
of the investigation was presented by Mr. Oscar Altimir 
at the Segunda Reunión de Centros de Investigación 
Económica which took place in Mendoza, Argentina, in 
December 1965, and the discussion of methodology is 
largely drawn from that paper. 
The provisional results of the first part of the pro-
gramme, (o) above, were published in Cuentas Nado-
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which is here discussed, but it should be em-
phasized that this work was carried out within 
the framework provided by the first two sets of 
estimates. In order to carry out the work within 
this framework, sources were utilized which have 
been relatively little explored in estimations of 
this type, and it was possible to obtain income 
distributions, by size, for each of the major 
socio-economic groups which make up the 
economy. 
1. Sources and methods 
All estimates of the different types of income 
aggregates, and the breakdown of these aggre-
gates in various ways, are of course subject to 
some margin of error; and the possible size of 
this margin of error is heavily dependent upon 
the source materials used, and their adequacy 
with respect to the particular estimate being 
made. This is an especially important factor in 
making an estimate of the distribution of per-
sonal income by size. The area of personal 
income and its distribution is often a sensitive 
one, and the sources which must be used are 
often designed primarily for some other purpose. 
(a) Conventional sources and their applicability 
in Argentina 
The construction of income distributions by 
size was developed primarily on the basis of 
data derived from income tax returns. Improve-
ments in the estimates, both with respect to their 
quality, and with respect to their coverage, were 
to a considerable extent automatic, as income 
taxation was expanded to an ever larger pro-
portion of the population, and as tax systems 
became more efi&cient and the returns themselves 
therefore a more reliable source of information. 
More recently, sample surveys designed to obtain 
information regarding incomes and/or consumer 
expenditure patterns have become a common 
source of data for the estimation of income 
distributions. 
A central characteristic of the information 
obtained from these sources is that, in each case, 
the estimate obtained is an estimate of the total 
income received by the individual, although of 
nales de la República Argentina (CONADE, Buenos 
Aires, April 1964). The publication of the detailed results 
of all three parts of the statistical investigation is now 
in process. 
course the definition of income may vary and 
require adjustment if the results are to be strictly 
comparable. Both in the case of income tax 
returns, and in income or consumption surveys, 
the individual is required to report his aggregate 
income from all sources. Other possible sources 
of data, by contrast, generally give the income 
received from only a single source, and hence 
can provide only partial coverage for the esti-
mation of the distribution of income. For ex-
ample, a widely available source is provided by 
data on wage and salary payments, compiled by 
companies or by social security systems. But as 
such data are only partial, they have only 
occasionally been utilized in the making of in-
come distribution estimates, and nearly always 
only as a supplementary source. The use of such 
partial sources as the basic data upon which to 
construct an estimate has been rare. 
Although the use of these partial sources 
presents special problems of this sort, an addi-
tional factor which has probably weighed im-
portantly against their use, it is worth noting. 
It has been primarily in the highly developed 
Western countries that income distribution 
studies of an empirical nature have originated 
and have been expanded in scope. In these 
countries the widespread coverage of income 
taxation, and the relatively minor degree of 
evasion, have made it possible to use income tax 
returns as the basic source of data for estimating 
the distribution of income. In addition, sample 
survey techniques have attained a relatively high 
degree of reliability in the same countries, even 
regarding questions touching such a sensitive 
area as that of incomes and expenditures. As a 
consequence, estimates of the distribution of in-
come in those countries, based on these sources, 
have reached a level of statistical reliability 
which can make unnecessary the extensive inves-
tigation of possible alternative sources of data. 
And the methodology, once established and be-
come traditional, with the experience and dis-
cussion which has been accumulated, exerts a 
considerable influence over the course followed 
when any new investigation is undertaken. 
It is probable, however, that in the less de-
veloped countries the prospects for obtaining a 
reasonably accurate estimate of the distribution 
on income, based on these conventional sources, 
are much less favourable than in the indus-
trialized countries. This proved to be the case 
in Argentina. Personal income tax returns 
covered too small a proportion of the population, 
and of total income, to be considered represen-
tative; and the limited experience with sample 
surveys had revealed difScuIties which indicated 
that at best this could be used as only a sup-
plementary source for the estimates. 
With respect to tax returns, information is 
available on an annual basis, but income is 
tabulated net of personal deductions, and would 
require special tabulations to obtain the total 
personal income declared. A much more serious 
shortcoming, however, is the scant coverage 
and the evidence of evasion for the period con-
sidered. The non-taxable minimum income is 
sufl&ciently high to exclude a large part of the 
population from coverage, and among those 
groups with higher incomes evasion is so wide-
spread as to render unreliable and unrepresen-
tative those returns actually filed. 
For specific instances, the following give an 
idea of the situation. In the case of wage and 
salary earners, the non-taxable minimum income 
is, according to the year, from 60 to 90 per cent 
larger than the average personal income of these 
groups, and thus the tax only applies to a small 
stratum with relatively high incomes. For the 
entrepreneurial and rentier groups the non-
taxable minimum is only 25 to 40 per cent, 
according to the year, of their average personal 
income, and thus the tax should apply to the 
bulk of these groups. In spite of this, however, 
only about one-quarter of these groups files a 
return, an indication of the extent to which 
evasion limits the coverage of the tax. 
In over-all terms, table 1 shows the extent of 
coverage of income tax returns in Argentina, in 
comparison with the similar coverage in a num-
ber of other countries. While in many of these 
countries the coverage is sufficient to provide a 
firm basis for income distribution estimates, it 
is clear that this is not the case in Argentina. 
With respect to the possible use of sample 
surveys, a nation-wide survey designed speci-
fically to obtain information on income levels 
from the different sectors of the population had 
never been attempted. The only surveys which 
existed were partial in their coverage: those de-
signed to determine the consumption pattern of 
working class groups in various zones, for use 
in the construction of cost of living indices; 
those undertaken for use in market research 
studies, also of only local scope and of doubtful 
reliability; and the survey of social stratification 
undertaken by the Instituto de Sociología de la 
Universidad de Buenos Aires, which was limited 
to the metropolitan area. Taking into account 
the high degree of under-declaration of income 
which is evident in this last survey, and the lack 
of much accumulated experience in the country 
in surveys of this type, it was reasonable to 
suppose that the undertaking of a national 
sample survey of income levels, in the best of 
cases, could not be accepted as the only source 
of information for the estimation of the distri-
bution of income. In addition, if the study had 
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Table 1 
TAX RETURN COVERAGE IN ARGENTINA A N D OTHER COUNTRIES, 1950-61 












Federal Republic oí Germany 1950 83 73 
Denmark 1952 , , , 61 
Finland 1952 88 83 
Norway 1950/51 64 73 
Sweden 1952 . . . 80 
Netherlands 1950 97 77 
United Kingdom 1952/53 90 80 
United States 1950 89 77 
Canada 1951 45 65 
Australia 1951/52 80 68 
New Zealand 1951/52 75 
Argentina 1953 10 18 
1959 9 10 
1961 5 9 
SOURCE: Argentina: prepared on the basis of tax data. Other countries: Statistics of the 
distribution of personal income {E/CN.3/L.42, 13 September 1957), p. 10. 
been based upon such a survey it would have 
been limited to the single year in which the 
survey had been conducted. 
(b) The estimation of partial distributions 
within a national accounts framework 
While neither tax data nor a sample survey, 
therefore, was relied upon as the basis for the 
study, all available information from these 
sources was used, both as a possible check and, 
as is discussed below, as an aid in estimating 
some aspects of the distribution. To this end 
the investigation was co-ordinated with the work 
being done in Argentina by the OAS/IDB/ECLA 
Joint Tax Programme.^ 
The basis data for the income distribution 
estimates were collected from a number of partial 
sources, and this not only raised the problem 
of aggregation mentioned earlier, but offered the 
possibility of structuring the distribution along 
economic and social lines, so that the composi-
tion of the income distribution could be readily 
described. That is, by selecting the partial 
sources so that each represented a meaningful 
socio-economic group in the country series of 
partial distributions within these groups could be 
2 Those aspects of the investigation undertaken by the 
Joint Tax Programme which were of particular use in 
the income distribution estimations were the survey of 
consumption expenditures of urban families, undertaken 
in 1963, and the special tabulations of income tax in-
formation for 1959. 
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obtained; and when these were aggregated to 
estimate the distribution of income in the 
economy as a whole, the place of each of these 
partial groups in that total distribution could be 
specified. An articulated distribution of this sort 
provides very considerable advantages from an 
analytical point of view. It makes it possible to 
specify with relative precision the important 
factors in determining the distribution of income 
which exists, as well as the changes which occur. 
The problem of ensuring that the different 
partial estimates did not overlap, on the one 
hand, and that they included all personal in-
come on the other, was met by structuring the 
investigation within the framework of the system 
of national accounts. As was noted earlier, the 
first part of the statistical study was concerned 
with reworking the national accounts estimates. 
An integrated system of accounts was estimated, 
composed of a number of different sectors, and 
within each sector the functional composition of 
income was estimated. This included, for ex-
ample, the separation of corporate and non-
corporate income, so that entrepreneurial income 
in each sector is known. These estimates then 
provided the partial totals as a control for the 
partial income distribution estimates, and these 
partial estimates summed to the total personal 
income in the economy, as estimated in the 
national accounts. 
In selecting in the socio-economic groups for 
which partial income distribution estimates were 
to be made, a major factor of course was the 
availability of data. Within this limitation, an 
effort was made to organize the groupings so as 
to give them the greatest possible meaning in 
economic and social terms. Four broad divisions 
were made along fimctional lines: wage and 
salary earners, entrepreneurs, retired persons 
and rentiers. The first two groups account for 
the great bulk of the population, and within 
each of these there was a further breakdown 
along sectoral lines. In all, data was collected 
and the distribution of income estimated for 
some 25 different socio-economic groups. These 
groups are listed, and the primary data sources 
shown for each, in table 2. It should be noted 
here that for most groups the primary sources 
served only for the estimation of the principal 
income of each income recipient. Further adjust-
ments had to be made to arrive at a distribution 
based on the family as the income unit, and in 
the process the number of socio-economic groups 
for which separate estimates were made was 
reduced to 15. 
For wage and salary earners the most impor-
tant source of data was the different registers 
of the social security system. The income classi-
fications from this source were made on the 
basis of a stratified sample of companies (by 
size, type of productive activity, etc.) taken from 
each of the different retirement funds. In the 
case of large public or semi-public enterprises, 
data were obtained directly by asking such 
enterprises to process their salary scales; or a 
sample of wage and salary recipients was ex-
tracted from their roles. In the case of the 
different public administrations, special compila-
tions were made on the basis of budgets and 
investment accounts. 
The registers of the social security system do 
not adequately cover those wage and salary 
earners at the higher levels, and for this reason, 
where the registers served as the source of data, 
an adjustment had to be made in that part of 
the distribution. For this purpose a survey was 
made of a representative sample of private com-
panies. The withholdings which these companies 
had made from salary payments to their per-
sonnel, for payment of income taxes, were com-
piled, and this provided an estimate of salary 
payments in the upper levels, and a basis for the 
required adjustment. 
Agricultural workers and domestic servants 
were not covered by the social security registers 
or by companies. In these cases salary differen-
tials, both by job classification and by geo-
graphical area, were estimated with the greatest 
possible disaggregation. Since there is relatively 
little variation in wage payments in these sec-
tors, it was then assumed that, within each of 
these small segments, there was no dispersion 
of wages. 
For the dififerent entrepreneurial groups, the 
distributions were estimated in so far as possible 
on the basis of a special processing of the 
economic censuses available. This could be done 
for socio-economic groups which totalled two 
thirds of the total entrepreneurial sector. Within 
each group, enterprises were classified first on a 
legal basis, to eliminate corporations from the 
calculations and restrict the results to entre-
preneurial income. The non-corporate firms were 
then classified according to their size, with the 
greatest disaggregation operationally feasible. In 
the case of agriculture, the classification was first 
by major crop, and, within each crop group, by 
size of the farm. Within each of these small 
groups, the census information covering pro-
duction and costs was then tabulated, and an 
estimate of profits for the group as a whole was 
thus obtained. These estimates, it should be 
noted, correspond to, and are derived from es-
sentially the same sources, as the estimate of this 
type of income appearing in the national 
accounts. 
The resulting distributions, however, diverge 
from the accuracy possible in estimating the 
distribution of wage and salary income on two 
counts. First, the entrepreneurial income esti-
mated for each small group is for the group as 
a whole, and to obtain an estimated income 
from each entrepreneur, it was assumed that 
there was no dispersion within the group, that 
each firm earned the same profit. This assump-
tion tends to reduce somewhat the dispersion of 
the distribution of each of these socio-economic 
groups, and therefore of the whole distribution. 
This factor is probably not of substantial im-
portance. Such group entrepreneurial earnings 
were estimated for approximately 1,500 different 
small groupings of enterprises, and in no case 
did such a grouping include more than 5 per 
cent of the entrepreneurs in the respective socio-
economic group. 
The second divergence results from the fact 
that while wage and salary estimates were made 
independently for each of the three years for 
which the income distribution was estimated, 
such an estimate could be made for entrepre-
neurial income only for the year in which the 
economic census was available. For other years, 
it was necessary to extrapolate the census data 
relating to each of the small groupings of estab-
lishments. This procedure implies the main-
tenance, through time, of the productive struc-
ture formed by these small groups, and is not 
dissimilar to extrapolations of this sort made in 
the calculation of national accounts estimates. 
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Table 2 
ARGENTINA: PRIMARY SOURCES OF DISTRIBUTION BY LEVELS OF PRINQPAL INCOME 



















1. Wage-earners 66.4 
Agriculture 9.4 X 
Fisheries 0.1 X 
Mines and quarries 0.5 X X 
Industrial workers 18.2 X 
Industrial employees 2.4 X 
Electricity, gas and waterworkers 0.8 X X X 
Construction 4.7 X 
Commerce 5.1 X 
Financial institutions 1.0 X 
Transport and warehousing 4.8 X X 
Communications 1.0 X X 
General Government 10.0 X 
Domestic service 5.2 X 
Other services» 3.2 X 
Entrepreneurs^ 21.6 
Agriculture 5.7 Extrapolation of the 
1960 census 
Mines and quarries 0.1 1953 census and 
extrapolation 
Industry 3.1 
Construction employers 0.1 X 
Commerce employers 4.7 1953 census and 
extrapolation 
Transport and warehousing 0.8 X 






1953 census and 
extrapolation 
X 
X Similar categories 
of economic 
censuses 
3. Retired persons and pensioners 11.3 X 
4. Rentiers 0.7 X Adjusted tax 
returns 
Percentage of the total of returns 
covered by each source 100.0 48.2 4.0 10.9 14.6 14.9 7.1 0.3 
® Including those relating to home ownership. 
•> Including employers and independent. 
® Including industry, construction, commerce, finance, electricity and other services. 
What little empirical evidence exists in this con-
nexion does not invalidate this assumption for 
the period 1953-61. 
The use of economic census data to estimate 
entrepreneurial income is one of the most sig-
nificant methodological aspects of the study. The 
entrepreneurial group is of considerable impor-
tance in numerical terms in Latin America (in 
Argentina 21.6 per cent of all income recipients 
are in this category), and tends to dominate the 
upper income levels. Yet data covering income 
of the group is often scarce and of doubtful 
reliability, and is the principal weakness in most 
income distribution estimates. The use of census 
data offers two advantages in this respect. First, 
economic censuses are often imdertaken at a 
relatively early stage in a country's development 
of statistical estimates and their techniques are 
therefore likely to be better known and the re-
sults more reliable than is the case with sample 
surveys covering income and expenditure data. 
Second, the income estimates are derived in-
directly, on the basis of data covering the other 
aspects of the firms' operations, and are hence 
likely to be more reliable on this score as well; 
the tendency to understate income is circum-
vented by not directly inquiring about this 
variable. 
As noted, not all entrepreneurial income could 
be estimated in this way. For about one-third 
of this group, and for the rentier group as well, 
the distribution was estimated essentially on the 
basis of data provided by the consumer survey 
of 1963; and the distribution was extrapolated 
to the other years covered. Even here, however, 
the fact that the investigation was structured 
within the national accounts framework made 
important adjustments possible. The aggregate 
income for each socio-economic group was 
known, and only the distribution within each 
group is assumed unchanging in the extrapola-
tions, as estimates of the totals were independ-
ently available for the different years. 
( c ) The estimation af an aggregate distribution 
of family income 
Once the basic data sources for each of the 
socio-economic groups were organized, and a 
consistent set of estimates made, within the na-
tional accounts framework, it was necessary to 
reorganize the data in the form desired. The final 
aim was the construction of an income distribu-
tion based upon the family as the income unit, 
and several adjustments were required to arrive 
at this concept. 
The first "distribution" obtained was on the 
basis of occupations, as this was the form in 
which it was available in many of the basic 
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sources, and the form in which it is assembled 
in the national accounts estimates. That is, within 
a given sector the number of jobs is generally 
known; but this need not coincide with the num-
ber of individuals as the same person may hold 
two positions simultaneously, either within a 
single sector, or in two different sectors. 
This is not too uncommon in Argentina, some 
6-7 per cent of all income recipients holding a 
secondary occupation. The first adjustment, 
therefore, was to eliminate these secondary oc-
cupations from the calculations. This was done 
on the basis of information obtained from the 
surveys covering consumer expenditures, unem-
ployment, and social stratification.® The resultant 
distribution of principal income was the first 
real income distribution estimated. It had the 
individual income recipient as the income unit, 
but it included only income from the principal 
source for each person; secondary occupations 
are not included. In spite of this incomplete 
coverage, this distribution is the most adequate 
for some analytical purposes. 
The adjustment from the distribution of prin-
cipal income to that of personal income was a 
relatively minor one, and was made largely on 
the basis of data obtained from the consumer 
survey. The income unit—^the individual income 
recipient—is the same in the two distributions, 
and the adjustment consisted in distributing the 
income from secondary occupations (not in-
cluded in principal income) among the different 
income groups. These secondary incomes are only 
a small part of the total, and their distribution is 
not basically different, so that the resulting dis-
tribution of personal income is nearly identical 
to that of principal income. This distribution of 
personal income is then conceptually comparable 
to income distribution estimates often made else-
where: it is the distribution of all personal in-
come, with the individual income recipient as 
the income unit. 
The adjustment to the distribution of income 
on a family basis was a much more substantial, 
and a more complex one. The income total re-
mains the same—it is still personal income—but 
the number of income units is sharply reduced. 
While the average size of the family is not par-
ticularly large in Argentina (3.7 persons per 
family), a high percentage of families have more 
than one income recipient. The total number of 
3 These surveys were: the survey of consumption ex-
penditures of urban families undertaken by the OAS/ 
IDB/ECLA Joint Tax Programme in February and 
March 1963; the survey of employment and unemploy-
ment undertaken periodically by CONADE; and the 
survey of social stratification in Buenos Aires under-
taken in 1960-61 by the Instituto de Sociología de la 
Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
income recipients, the unit for the principal and 
personal distributions, is nearly 50 per cent 
greater than the number of families; that is, 
nearly half of all families have two income 
sarners. Thus the adjustment required was a 
substantial one, and affected not only the aggre-
gate distribution, but the composition by socio-
economic group as well. 
There were two aspects of the adjustment: one 
was the distribution of families among the dif-
ferent socio-economic groups; the other was the 
distribution of income within each group on a 
family basis, i.e., the estimation of how those 
income earners who were not family heads were 
distributed among family units. For the first 
aspect of the adjustment the socio-economic 
classification was determined by the status of 
the family head, and the distribution of family 
heads was estimated on the basis of an analysis 
of the 1960 population census. It was at this 
point that the number of socio-economic groups 
for which separate estimates were made had to 
be reduced, as the census data did not permit 
the continuation of the more detailed classifica-
tion. Separate distributions on a family basis 
were finally made for some 15 socio-economic 
groups, those shown in table 4. The second 
aspect of the adjustment, the grouping of in-
come on a family basis within each socio-
economic group, was again made largely on the 
basis of data obtained from the consimier survey, 
and in a manner similar to that employed in 
making the adjustment from principal to per-
sonal income. 
The data required to make these adjustments 
were available for only a single year, and hence 
had to be extrapolated to the earlier years for 
which income distributions were made. This 
means that the economic and social structure 
underlying the adjustment from the distribution 
of personal income to that of family income, as 
well as from principal income to personal in-
come, is assumed to have remained unchanged 
during the period 1953-61. The rather different 
distribution of family income in 1961, as com-
pared with the distribution of personal income 
in 1961, is significant; but the change in the 
distribution of family income from 1953 to 1961 
is basically a mirroring of the change during 
those years in the distribution of principal in-
come, for it is only at this level that independent 
estimates can be made. 
From the point of view of the source of in-
come, the classification among the different 
socio-economic groups is a less pure concept 
when the family is used as the income unit. In 
this case the classification is determined by the 
principal source of income of the head of the 
family, but the family may also include a mem-
ber who derives an income from some other 
source, or the head of the household himself 
may have a secondary income from some other 
source. Thus, the distribution within any socio-
economic group cannot be strictly regarded as 
a distribution of the income originating in that 
group. For this reason, as was noted earlier, the 
distribution of principal income is better suited 
for some analytical purposes. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of income on the basis of the family 
is an important one, and the best suited for 
most general purposes. Interest in 'income dis-
tribution estimates is ultimately based on a 
desire to know how economic welfare is dis-
tributed in a society, and it is the family which 
is the basic unit determining such welfare. 
As the sources and methods described briefly 
above differ from those commonly used in the 
making of income distribution estimates, so are 
the possible errors of a somewhat different sort, 
and this should be noted. First there is the 
"error of estimate" inherent in deriving any 
statistical measure, and which is generally 
thought of as the kind of error which might 
exist in the compilation of the basic statistical 
data in the present study. It is probable that 
errors of this sort are very small where direct 
statistical data of the sort required were avail-
able. The collection was done on a disaggregated 
basis so that the data were quite specific, and 
carrying the work out within a national accounts 
framework made possible control checks at 
various points. 
However, some aspects of the estimations 
depended not only upon the collection of direct 
data, but also upon certain hypotheses under-
lying the way these data were combined, or the 
way in which adjustments were made. Such pro-
cedures give rise to the possibility of errors of 
what may be termed a probabilistic type; that 
is, the hypotheses were deemed most probable, 
or best suited to the case, but no direct data 
were available to verify them. For example, one 
case of this sort was the calculation of entrepre-
nurial income on the basis of economic census 
data. As noted, the net income of a small, 
homogeneous group of producers was estimated 
and then it was uniformly distributed among the 
producers concerned. It is known that this is 
not the true distribution of income among these 
producers and that this gives rise to some margin 
of error. It is justifiable as being the most "prob-
able" distribution (in the absence of specific 
information) and as covering a sufficiently small 
group as to make it improbable that dispersion 
within the group would appreciably affect the 
final distribution estimate. Other examples of 
this sort are the assumptions made in estimating 
the distribution of those entrepreneurial groups 
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where data were not available from an economic 
census, and in making the adjustments from one 
income concept to another. These assumptions 
can be justified in the same terms, but the pos-
sible margin of error is no doubt larger here 
than in a case such as averaging income among 
a small group. 
On the whole, it is felt that the procedures 
followed have made possible an estimation which 
gives a reasonably accurate picture of the dis-
tribution of income prevailing in Argentina, both 
at an aggregate level, and for the individual 
socio-economic groups studied. The estimate can 
clearly be regarded as superior to any which 
might have been obtained on the basis of income 
tax data or upon the basis of a sample survey, 
taking into accoimt the conditions prevailing 
in the case of Argentina. 
2. PreliminaTy results 
As was stated earlier, an analytical study of 
the data made available by the CONADE/ECLA 
programme is currently being undertaken. It is 
nevertheless of some interest to present here 
some of the principal statistical findings of the 
programme. These give a general picture of the 
income distribution structure which has pre-
vailed in Argentina in recent years, and also 
suggest some of the possibilities for analysis 
which exist within the framework of a statistical 
study of the present type. 
The income distribution estimates were made 
for each of the three years 1953, 1959 and 1961. 
In part the choice of the individual years and 
the length of the total time period covered was 
dictated by considerations of data availability, 
but within this limitation years were selected 
which might be expected to give a representative 
picture of the period and of the changes which 
had occurred; 1953 was selected as economic 
census data were available for that year, and 
it was considered a representative year for the 
early 1950's. Both a population census and an 
agricultural census were undertaken in 1960 and 
that year therefore offered a second benchmark 
from the point of view of data availability, the 
two years on either side being selected as they 
offered advantages from the point of view of 
analysis; 1959 was a year of substantial changes 
in the economy, mostly following from the price 
stabilization programme undertaken toward the 
end of the preceding year, and it was of interest 
to know how these changes affected the income 
distribution structure; 1961 was the most recent 
"normal" year for which the distribution could 
be estimated. 
The aggregate distribution of income, by size, 
is shown in table 3 for each of the three years, 
and for each of the three income concepts, prin-
cipal, personal, and by family. Figure I shows 
the Lorenz curves for the distribution of prin-
cipal income for each of the three years to 
illustrate graphically the changes in relative 
equality which occurred. Figure II shows Lorenz 
curves for each of the income concepts for a 
single year—1961—to illustrate the extent to 
which equality varies from one concept to an-
other. The changes from year to year are best 
observed from principal income since, as was 
discussed above, the other two income concepts 
were estimated from this one by assuming un-
changing family and secondary income struc-
tures throughout the period. For the same 
reason, the relation between the different con-
cepts shown for 1961 is essentially the same in 
the other year. (See table 3 and figures I and II.) 
Table 3 







0-20 21-40 41-60 Total 91-95 96-100 Total 
1953 
Principal income 6.0 9.9 14.0 29.6 19.0 13.9 8.9 28.6 37.5 
Personal income 5.6 10.1 13.6 29.3 19.1 13.1 9.5 29.0 38.5 
Family income 7.4 10.7 13.6 31.7 18.1 13.1 9.5 27.6 37.1 
1959 
Principal income 5.6 9.0 12.1 26.7 17.0 12.7 10.4 33.2 43.6 
Personal income 5.5 9.0 12.0 26.5 17.4 12.5 9.9 33.7 43.6 
Family income 6.8 9.5 12.3 28.6 16.9 12.2 10.8 31.3 42.1 
1961 
Principal income 5.3 9.3 13.2 27.8 18.4 13.5 9.3 31.0 40.3 
Personal income 5.3 9.3 13.1 n.i 18.5 13.2 9.0 31.6 40.6 
Family income 7.0 10.3 12.9 30.2 18.0 12.7 9.8 29.3 39.1 
®The share of each income group is approximate since 
figures giving the Lorenz curves. 
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the percentages were read directly from the 
Mgiare I 
ARGENTINA: LORENZ CURVES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRINCIPAL INCOME, 1953, 1959 AND 1961 
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ARGENTINA: LORENZ CURVES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRINQPAL INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME 
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® The principal income and personal income distribution curves are virtually the same. 
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The figures show a somewhat uncommon in-
come distribution structure in Argentina. There 
is a considerable concentration of income in the 
highest income groups, but at the same time, the 
lowest income group has a greater share of the 
total than is generally the case in other countries. 
It is within the top 30 per cent of all income units 
that the great dispersion is found. Taking the 
distribution of family income in 1961 to illus-
trate the point, this group received 61.6 per cent 
of all income; the top 5 per cent alone received 
29.3 per cent of all income; and the top 1 per 
cent of families received 14.5 per cent of all 
income. 
The fact that the lowest income group received 
a larger share than is often the case is important 
in this context. In conjunction with the fact that 
average income levels are significantly higher 
in Argentina than in most other countries of the 
region, this means that, despite the considerable 
concentration of income at the top, the poorest 
sectors of the population have incomes, in ab-
solute terms, much higher than those generally 
found elsewhere. There is not, to the extent this 
is sometimes the case, an important segment of 
the populace which lives at the margin of the 
economy. 
As can be seen from table 3 and figure II, 
the distribution of personal income does not 
vary from that of principal income. The dis-
tribution of family income, however, is notice-
ably more equal than that of either of the other 
two distributions. The difference is especially 
marked in the lowest income groups, these 
having, in relative terms, substantially more in-
come when the distribution is by family than 
when it is calculated on the basis of the in-
dividual income recipient. This of course is to 
be expected, and results from the fact that a 
large percentage of those with low individual 
incomes are not family heads, but rather a 
second income earner in a family group. 
With respect to the changes which occurred 
during the period, the over-all changes in the 
degree of inequality can best be seen from figure 
I. The least inequality in the distribution of 
income was experienced at the beginning of the 
period, the Lorenz curve from 1953 being sig-
nificantly flatter than that of either of the later 
years. The Lorenz curve for 1959 shows an im-
portant increase in the degree of inequality, 
while that for the latest year, 1961, shows an 
intermediate situation, rather closer to the 1953 
distribution than to that of 1959. 
How the different income groups shared in 
these changes can be seen from table 3. The 
sharp increase in inequality shown by the 1959 
estimate was characterized by a substantial in-
crease in the share of income received by the 
top 10 per cent of the distribution, at the expense 
of all other groups. Each group below the top 
10 per cent had a smaller share of the total in 
1959 than it had received in 1953, and the loss 
was relatively evenly distributed among those 
groups. 
From 1959 to 1961 the direction of this shift 
was reversed, the top 10 per cent losing and all 
other groups gaining, but the gains and losses 
were less evenly spread. Within the top 10 per 
cent, the top half lost less, in relative terms, 
than did the lower half of the group. Among 
those who gained, the lowest 60 per cent of the 
distribution gained less than did the groups be-
tween them and the top 10 per cent. 
As was noted, 1959 can be regarded as an 
abnormal year, so it is of more interest, in some 
respects, to compare directly the two relatively 
normal years at the beginning and end of the 
period. Comparing directly 1953 and 1961, a 
significant increase in inequality occurred, and 
the shift occurred in the same group: the top 
10 per cent increased its share of total income, 
and all other groups lost. The relative gains and 
losses were not, however, evenly shared. Nearly 
all of the gain was accounted for by the top 
5 per cent of all income recipients. While the 
5 per cent just below that top group gained, the 
gain was a much smaller one. Among the groups 
which lost, the lowest 60 per cent of the distri-
bution lost considerably more, in relative terms, 
than did the other groups. 
Thus, from the early 1950's to the beginning 
of the 1960's a significant deterioration occurred 
in the distribution of income in Argentina. The 
lowest 60 per cent of all income recipients de-
creased their share in total income. The next 
higher groups lost, but the loss was small. The 
top 10 per cent achieved a substantial increase 
in its share of the total, and this gain was largely 
concentrated in the upper half of that group. 
The analysis in detail of these changes, and 
their relation to developments in the economy, 
particularly to the problem of inflation and the 
various measures taken in trying to control it, 
is perhaps the most significant aspect of the 
study currently being undertaken. 
Several limitations to the figures should be 
mentioned. First, as with nearly all income dis-
tribution estimates, these relate to current in-
come, and do not include any allowance for 
capital gains and losses. Given the rapid inflation 
which characterized the Argentine economy 
throughout the period, a meaningful estimate of 
this factor is not feasible. Second, and also com-
mon in such estimates, the figures do not in-
clude any allowance for imputed income derived 
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from owner occupied dwellings. If this adjust-
ment could be made it would probably improve 
slightly the relative position of the upper in-
come groups, where home ownership is most 
common. It would probably also improve some-
what the position of the agricultural sector, as 
housing is almost always either owned or pro-
vided rent free, although it should be noted that 
such housing is often of very poor quality. 
Finally, in calculating entrepreneurial income, 
depreciation was calculated at cost of origin 
and, given the rapid inflation, this underesti-
mates real costs and hence overestimates the 
income of this group. Since entrepreneurs domi-
nate the upper income groups, this overestimates 
the share received by those with higher incomes. 
A complete recalculation on the basis of replace-
ment costs is being undertaken to eliminate this 
bias. On the basis of a very approximate cal-
culation it appears that this change is likely to 
reduce the share of the top 10 per cent in total 
income by about one percentage point. This is 
a significant change, but it does not alter the 
general structure of the distribution. 
In addition to the aggregate distributions, it 
is of interest to present some of the distributions 
by socio-economic group, both to illustrate the 
type of detailed data made available by the 
study, and to demonstrate some of the possibili-
ties for specific analysis which result from a 
study structured in this way. For the distribution 
of income, by family, for 1961, there is pre-
sented in the appendix a detailed breakdown of 
the data for each of the 15 socio-economic 
groups for which a distribution was estimated. 
For purposes of analysis, this data can be 
organized in a variety of ways, depending upon 
the particular aspect of the problem being 
studied. For many specific questions, for exam-
ple, it will be best to deal directly with the distri-
butions of the individual groups. No detailed 
discussion of this sort will be attempted here; 
rather, an aggregate way of organizing the data 
will be presented. This will best illustrate, to the 
degree possible in a brief discussion, the type 
of integrated information provided by the inves-
tigation, as well as revealing many of the general 
features of the income distribution structure in 
Argentina. 
Table 4 combines the detailed data included 
in the appendix in such a way as to give a very 
general picture of the structure of the distribu-
tion of income, by family, for a single year, 
1961. The aggregate distribution has been di-
vided into deciles, with the first column showing 
the average income, in relation to the national 
average, received by the families in each decile. 
Each of the other columns corresponds to one 
of the socio-economic groups for which estimates 
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were made, and the figures show the percentage 
composition of each income decile. For example, 
the first figure shows that 36.17 per cent of all 
families in the lowest income decile were agri-
cultural workers. Thus, the table shows the com-
position of the entire income structure, or, looked 
at from the other point of view, the location of 
each socio-economic group in the aggregate in-
come distribution. In addition to the ten decile 
groupings, the last two lines of the table separate 
out, and show the composition of, the top 5 per 
cent and the top 1 per cent of all families, as 
these highest income groups are of special in-
terest for some purposes. (See table 4.) 
The broadest conclusion which can be drawn 
from the table is that the over-all inequality in 
the distribution of income results to a large 
extent from differences in income levels of wage 
and salary earners on the one hand, and the 
entrepreneurial group on the other. The income 
of the retired group is broadly in line with that 
of wage and salary earners, and while the rentier 
group is concentrated in the highest income 
levels, the group is not large enough to affect 
substantially the aggregate distribution. 
The entrepreneurial group accounts for nearly 
one-third of all families in the lowest income 
decile, due to the substantial numbers of small 
farmers, and, to a much lesser extent, small 
producers in the industrial sector. With that 
exception, it accounts for well under 20 per 
cent of the families in the remaining deciles of 
the lowest one-half of the distribution. At that 
point the participation of the entrepreneurial 
group begins a steady rise, and in the top in-
come decile accounts for significantly over two-
thirds of all families; in the top one per cent, 
over 85 per cent of the families obtain their 
income from some form of individual enterprise. 
The reverse of course is true of wage and 
salary earners' families. They dominate the 
lower part of the distribution, then steadily 
decline in relative importance, and account for 
only slightly over one-quarter of the families in 
the highest income decile; in the top one per 
cent, wage and salary earners' families are less 
than ten per cent of the total. 
The implications of this fact for analysis are 
numerous. It should first be stressed that large 
incomes in Argentina result only to a small 
extent from returns on property, in the sense 
of income obtained without direct participation 
in the production process. The influence of the 
rentier group is small. It is the control of 
property for use in the production of goods 
and services, combined with some (unknown) 
proportion of managerial income which yields 
ARGENTINA: FAMILY UNITS, PERCENTAGE SHARE OF EACH INCOME GROUP BY 































= 100) mining communi-
cations 
ment 
1 10% 29.5 36.17 5.69 6.47 0.22 0.29 6.99 5.71 61.52 
2 10% 41.1 17.65 21.48 14.23 2.54 3.68 9.83 2.45 71.86 
3 10% 48.5 11.54 26.65 11.02 3.80 8.03 13.03 0.55 74.62 
4 10% 54.5 7.35 28.12 8.25 4.27 10.40 16.31 0.26 74.96 
5 10% 60.5 3.81 29.09 6.65 4.86 10.82 17.76 0.16 73.15 
6 10% 69.7 1.31 29.51 4.47 5.7 11.29 20.15 0.1 72.53 
7 10% 80.1 0.09 28.93 3.75 6.52 10.87 16.59 0.07 66.82 
8 10% 96.3 0.01 27.43 2.50 7.23 9.45 15.31 0.0 61.93 
9 10% 129.1 0.0 22.86 1.36 8.04 6.89 16.64 0.0 55.79 
10 10% 390.7 0.0 7.85 0.61 7.44 2.29 7.44 0.0 25.63 
5% more 588.4 0.0 4.56 0.57 6.33 1.04 4.35 0.0 16.84 
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total Pensioners Rentiers 
1 10% 18.58 8.88 0.04 0.02 3.83 0.30 31.64 6.80 0.01 
2 10% 8.08 2.42 0.28 0.04 2.71 2.58 16.11 12.02 0.01 
3 10% 4.96 2.76 2.44 0.07 1.98 4.18 16.39 8.96 0.03 
4 10% 3.88 2.48 4.43 0.1 1.5 5.03 17.42 7.57 0.04 
5 10% 4.91 2.42 5.07 0.18 1.47 5.77 19.82 6.96 0.06 
6 10% 7.25 1.2 5.8 0.42 1.23 6.73 22.63 4.70 0.11 
7 10% 7.59 1.8 7.72 0.66 1.55 7.63 26.95 6.06 0.15 
8 10% 7.76 2.8 8.63 1.29 1.40 8.74 ' 30.62 7.12 0.31 
9 10% 8.85 4.73 8.21 2.83 0.84 11.19 36.65 6.68 0.87 
10 10% 12.10 13.81 17.38 7.30 1.22 16.66 68.47 2.96 2.94 
5% more 12.23 19.29 24.67 6.45 1.56 14.26 78.47 1.11 3.58 
1% more 17.25 30.23 24.93 1.95 1.45 9.30 85.11 0.0 5.77 
high incomes. The upper income groups are 
dominated by the independent entrepreneur. 
There are large numbers of these independent 
businessmen in Argentina, and they not only 
dominate the upper brackets in the income 
distribution, but still form the basis of the 
production process as well. In 1961, some 28.6 
per cent of all families were headed by a self-
employed person. In the same year, the enter-
prises operated by these individuals produced 
approximately two-thirds of the gross domestic 
product. Despite the considerable growth of 
incorporated enterprises in recent years, these 
produced only 20 per cent of the gross product 
in 1961, and the Argentine economy, considered 
as a whole, can still be characterized as one 
resting on the basis of large numbers of relatively 
small independent producers.'^ 
This feature can be usefully stressed in ana-
lysing various economic problems: decisions 
in a private sector of this sort are likely to differ 
* This structure varies markedly from one sector to 
another. In agriculture, for example, private corpora-
tions accounted for only about 3 per cent of total 
production in 1961, while in industry, mining, and 
construction they accounted for 37 per cent of the total. 
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in important respects from those reached in an 
institutionalized private sector where decisions 
are made to a greater extent by hired profes-
sional managers of relatively large corporate 
enterprises. Mention will be made here of only 
two ways in which this is rather directly linked 
to the problem of income distribution. In both 
cases this applies largely only to the non-
agricultural sector; the agricultural sector is 
discussed briefly later. 
First, this type of economic structure has 
often been associated with a tendency toward 
high unit mark-ups, and low sales volume per 
individual enterprise. It is essentially this which 
produces the sort of income structure observed: 
a large number of individual producers, with 
relatively large incomes. It has as its counterpart 
relatively high prices, especially in those lines 
where large scale production might result in 
substantial economies of scale. The size of the 
market is thus restricted below what it might 
be in more favourable circumstances, and the 
lower income groups in particular remain ex-
cluded from the market for many products. This 
of course is an important obstruction to growth, 
particularly of the industrial sector, and also 
tends to reinforce the factor which brings it 
about: market limitations encourage small-scale 
operations. 
Second, it is likely to require rather different 
sorts of changes to bring about greater equality 
in an income distribution structure of this sort. 
The more conventional policy measures may well 
prove ineffective. In particular, this is likely 
to be the case with respect to direct taxes. The 
difiSculties encountered in enforcing income taxa-
tion in Argentina are probably due largely to the 
fact that the upper income groups are largely 
self-employed, for the possibilities of understat-
ing income by this group are numerous. Even in 
countries where evasion is not considered a 
serious problem, this group is often given a 
preferred status by the tax laws, partly to 
promote "small business", but partly, also, in 
implicit recognition of the difficulties of effective 
enforcement. The income distribution structure 
may effectively change only with the breaking 
of the high unit cost, small scale type of opera-
tion which currently prevails. Problems of this 
sort, within the specific framework of con-
ditions in Argentina, are among the more in-
teresting topics for further investigation. 
In addition to the broad split between wage 
and salary earners and the entrepreneurial group, 
there are significant differences in the composi-
tion, by socio-economic group, of the various 
income levels. On a decile by decile basis the 
changing composition can be seen from a 
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careful study of table 4. It is useful, however, to 
show the major changes more clearly by con-
sidering a smaller number of income groups, 
and only the principal socio-economic group in 
each. This is done in table 5. 
No particular social significance should be 
attached to the income groupings shown, as 
these have been made solely on the basis of the 
income changes shown in the first column of 
table 4. The lowest 20 per cent of all families 
(category 1) have incomes markedly below the 
groups just above them, although the second 
decile is already a transitional group and might 
have been put in category 2. There then follows 
50 per cent of the population (category 2) 
within which the degree of inequality is relatively 
small; again the seventh decile is a transitional 
group. As noted earlier, it is within the top 30 
per cent that the inequality is concentrated, and 
here incomes rise rapidly. Only the top two 
deciles have an average family income above 
the national average; the other eight deciles are 
all below that average. But the top decile has 
an income nearly four times the national aver-
age; the top 5 per cent of all families nearly six 
times the national average; and the top 1 per 
cent well over fourteen times the national aver-
age. This highest 30 per cent (categories 3 and 
4) has been split into two groups, separating 
out the top 5 per cent of all families (category 
4 ) . As will be noted from the table, while the 
lowest income group (category 1) shown re-
ceived only about 7 per cent of the total income, 
the other three groups received approximately 
equal shares of the total, with a very different 
population size. 
The table lists only those socio-economic 
groups which accounted for an important part 
of each income category, and it can be seen 
at a glance that the composition of the four 
broad income groupings is quite different. Re-
tired persons are an important part only of the 
lowest group (the rentier group is not an im-
portant part of any category), but that lowest 
group is dominated by the agricultural sector. 
Agricultural workers account for 26.9 per cent 
of aU families in the lowest group, and in-
dependent farm families account for an ad-
ditional 13.3 per cent. The sector as a whole 
thus accounts for slightly more than 40 per cent 
of the families in this lowest income group; 
and, as can be seen from table 4, in the lowest 
income decile alone well over half of all families 
are found in agriculture. 
This heavy concentration of agricultural 
families in the lowest income groups is not pri-
marily the result of low average income levels 
for the agricultural sector as a whole. The 
ARGENTINA: PRINCIPAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS IN DIFFERENT INCOME CATEGORIES 
(Percentages of all families) 
Income category 
1. Lowest income group 
0-20% of all families 
7.1% of aU income 
2. Middle income group 
21-70% of all families 
31.3% of all income 
3. Upper-middle income 
group 
71-95% of all families 
32.2% of all income 
4. Highest income group 
96-100% of all families 
29.4% of all income 
Principal socio-economic groups^ 
Wage and salary earners 66.7% 
a) in agriculture 26.9% 
b) in industry 13.6% 
c) in construction 10.4% 
d) in government 8.4% 
Wage and salary earners 72.4% 
а) in industry 28.5% 
б) in government 16.8% 
c) in transportation 10.3% 
Wage and salary earners 54.0% 
а) in industry 22.3% 
б) in government 14.9% 
Wage and salary earners 16.8% 
Entrepreneurs 23.9% 
in agriculture 13.3% 
Entrepreneurs 20.6% 
Entrepreneurs 38.6% 
a) professionals 11.8% 
b) in agriculture 9.0% 
c) in commerce 
Retired persons 9.4% 
Entrepreneurs 78.5% 
a) in commerce 24.7% 
b) in industry 19.3% 
c) professionals 14.3% 
d) in agriculture 12.2% 
SOURCE: Table 4. 
a Only the principal activity is shown here. For the complete composition of each socio-economic group, 
see table 4. 
average income per family in the agricultural 
sector is only about 20 per cent below the average 
for the economy as a whole. It is, rather, pri-
marily the result of a very unequal distribution 
of income within agriculture itself. Agricultural 
workers, who account for somewhat less than 
half of all families in the sector, are heavily 
concentrated in the lower income categories; 
and there is a large number of small farmers 
also in the lowest groups. At the other extreme, 
there are substantial numbers of large scale 
farmers and cattlemen in the highest income 
brackets. 
Industrial workers, construction workers, and 
government employees are also important groups 
in the lowest income category, but their im-
portance is quite secondary to the dominance of 
the agricultural sector in this range. 
The most important socio-economic groups 
in the middle income range are all wage and 
salary earning groups. Industrial workers are 
much the most important here, followed by 
government employees and transportation work-
ers. While wage and salary earners dominated 
the lowest income group as well, it will be noted 
that, within that broad category, the group com-
position has changed. 
In the upper-middle income category, wage 
and salary earners are still the most important, 
but the entrepreneurial group has increased its 
share substantially and, within this income cate-
gory, as income levels rise this is increasingly 
the case. Industrial workers and government em-
ployees are still the important groups in the wage 
and salary area, while professional persons are 
the most important single self-employed group. 
In the upper income category no single wage 
and salary group is important, this income 
category being dominated by the self-employed. 
Several groups are individually important among 
the latter, but perhaps the most important point 
to note here is that, although there are sub-
stantial numbers of large scale farmers and 
cattlemen in this highest income bracket, even 
in Argentina the most common source of high 
incomes is not the agricultural sector. As is 
shown in the table, most of the highest incomes 




ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME, BY FAMILY, 1961 
Table I : Summary, all families 
Table II : Summary, -vfage and salary earners 
I la: Agriculture and fishing 
l i b : Industry, utilities and mining 
l i e : Construction 
I ld: Commerce and finance 
He: Transportation and communications 
I l f : Government and other services (excluding domestics) 
I lg: Domestic service 
Table III ; Summary, self-employed 
n i a : Agriculture and fishing 
I l lb: Industry, construction and mining 
IIIc: Commerce 
I l ld : Transport and storage 
I l l e : Services 
I l l f : Professional services and others 
Table IV : Recipients of property income 
Table V : Retired persons 
Table I 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME, BY FAMILY, 1961 
Summary, all families 
Units Ammmts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 2 326 0.04 0.04 25.5 0.0 0.0 
From 15 601 to 20800 11064 0.19 0.23 207.1 0.02 0.02 
From 20 801 to 26 000 16 956 0.30 0.53 408.2 0.04 0.06 
From 26 001 to 32 500 23 554 0.42 0.95 702.9 0.08 0.14 
From 32 501 to 39000 36 896 0.65 1.60 1 317.9 0.14 0.28 
From 39 001 to 45 500 89 711 1.59 3.19 3808.9 0.41 0.69 
From 45 501 to 52 000 173 894 3.08 6.27 8 540.6 0.92 1.61 
From 52 001 to 65 000 403 430 7.14 13.41 23 760.0 2.57 4.18 
From 65 001 to 78000 627 Oil 11.09 24.50 45 413.4 4.91 9.09 
From 78001 to 104 000 1330576 23.54 48.04 120 668.9 13.04 22.13 
From 104001 to 130 000 968 283 17.13 65.17 113175.5 12.23 34.36 
From 130 001 to 162 500 689468 12.20 77.30 101112.5 10.93 45.29 
From 162 501 to 260 000 732 277 12.96 90.26 149 439.4 16.15 61.44 
From 260 001 to 390 000 255 373 4.52 94.78 80 939.3 8.75 70.19 
From 390 001 to 520 000 101 934 1.83 96.61 450 088.8 4.87 75.06 
From 520001 to 800 000 97 230 1.73 98.34 62 212.5 6.72 81.78 
From 800 001 to 1200000 44187 0.79 99.13 44187.3 4.78 86.56 
From 1200001 to 2000 000 29177 0.52 99.65 45144.7 4.88 91.44 
From 2 000 001 to 3000 000 9 394 0.18 99.83 23 373.7 2.53 93.97 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 6 283 0.11 99.94 24 441.2 2.65 96.62 
From 5 000 001 to 10000 000 2173 0.04 99.98 14 729.0 1.60 98.27 
Over 10000 000 977 0.02 100.00 16446.2 1.78 100.00 
TOTAL 5 652 200 100.00 925 143.5 100.00 
SOIJHCE: CONADE/ECLA study of income distribution in Argentina. 
122 
Table V 
A R G E N T I N A : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F P E R S O N A L I N C O M E , B Y F A M I L Y , 1961 
Summary, wage and salary earners 
Units Arrutunts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 479 0.01 0.01 5.1 — — 
From 15 601 to 20 800 479 0.01 0.02 8.7 — — 
From 20 801 to 26 000 659 0.02 0.04 4.1 — — 
From 26 001 to 32 500 3 020 0.08 0.12 89.0 0.02 0.02 
From 32 501 to 39 000 6 574 0.18 0.30 236.6 0.05 0.07 
From 39 001 to 45 500 46184 1.28 1.58 1908.5 0.44 0.51 
From 45 501 to 52 000 135 226 3.74 5.32 6 641.8 1.52 2.03 
From 52 001 to 65 000 291257 8.06 13.38 17118.3 3.92 5.92 
From 65 001 to 78000 451 111 12.49 25.87 32530.2 7.45 13.40 
From 78 001 to 104000 994 402 27.53 53.40 89178.8 20.41 33.81 
From 104 001 to 130 000 697 330 19.30 72.70 80 682.1 18.47 52.28 
From 130 001 to 162500 429342 11.88 84.58 62 762.9 14.37 66.65 
From 162 501 to 260 000 420 242 11.63 96.21 83851.4 19.19 85.84 
From 260001 to 390 000 86 944 2.41 98.62 27 173.7 6.22 92.06 
From 390 001 to 520 000 23 057 0.64 92.26 10 552.2 2.42 94.48 
From 520 001 to 800 000 17 065 0.47 99.73 10 305.2 2.36 96.84 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 5 253 0.15 99.88 5 086.4 1.16 98.00 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 3 034 0.08 99.95 4 326.9 0.99 98.99 
From 2000 001 to 3 000000 853 0.02 99.98 1964.7 0.45 99.44 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 582 0.02 100.00 2 406.5 0.55 99.99 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 7 — 52.5 0.01 100.00 
Over 10000 000 
TOTAL 3 613 100 100.00 436 896.6 100.00 
SOURCE: CONADE/ECLA study of income distribution in Argentina. 
W A G E A N D S A L A R Y E A R N E R S : A G R I C U L T U R E A N D F I S H I N G 
Units Amounts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 133 0.03 0.03 4.8 0.02 0.02 
From 39 001 to 45500 33 056 7.43 7.46 1352.2 4.67 4.69 
From 45 501 to 52 000 110202 24.77 32.23 5 433.0 18.77 23.46 
From 52 001 to 65 000 113 419 25.49 57.72 6 714.4 23.19 46.65 
From 65 001 to 78 000 78 747 17.70 75.42 5 858.8 20.24 66.89 
From 78 001 to 104000 96 721 21.74 97.16 8 085.9 27.94 94.83 
From 104001 to 130000 12502 2.82 99.98 1477.7 5.10 99.93 
From 130 001 to 162 500 89 0.02 100.00 12.9 0.04 99.97 
From 162 501 to 260 000 12 , . . 2.4 0.01 99.98 
From 260 001 to 390 000 15 • . • 4.8 0.02 100.00 
From 390 001 to 520 000 2 • • • 1.0 • • • 
From 520001 to 800 000 2 • • • 1.0 • • > 
From 800001 to 1200 000 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 
From 3 000001 to 5 000 000 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 
Over 10 000 000 
TOTAL 444 900 100.00 28 948.7 100.00 
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Table l i b 
W A G E A N D S A L A R Y E A R N E R S : I N D U S T R Y , U T I L I T I E S A N D M I N I N G 
Units Amounts 
Range 
NumbeT Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 129 0.01 0.01 1.4 • . . 
From 15 601 to 20 800 129 0.01 0.02 2.3 ... 
From 20 801 to 26000 129 0.01 0.03 2.8 ... 
From 26001 to 32 500 257 0.02 0.05 7.5 0.01 0.01 
From 32 501 to 39 000 900 0.07 0.12 32.2 0.02 0.03 
From 39 001 to 45 500 1542 0.12 0.24 65.1 0.04 0.07 
From 45 501 to 52 000 2 827 0.22 0.46 138.0 0.09 0.16 
From 52 001 to 65 000 52 051 4.05 4.51 3 065.8 1.90 2.06 
From 65 001 to 78 000 160 907 12.52 17.03 11504.9 7.12 9.18 
From 78 001 to 104000 373 864 29.10 46.13 33 722.5 20.88 30.06 
From 104 001 to 130000 284 029 22.10 68.23 32 919.0 20.38 50.44 
From 130 001 to 162500 192 137 14.95 83.18 28090.4 17.38 67.82 
From 162 501 to 260 000 174916 13.60 96.78 33951.2 21.02 88.84 
From 260 001 to 390 000 27 889 2.17 98.95 8 458.7 5.24 94.08 
From 390 001 to 520000 6426 0.50 99.45 2 991.3 1.85 95.93 
From 520001 to 800000 3 984 1.31 99.76 2 437.8 1.50 97A3 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 1799 0.14 99.90 1 676.1 1.04 98.47 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 900 0.07 99.97 1 305.7 0.80 99.27 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 257 0.02 99.99 627.4 0.39 99.66 
From 3 000001 to 5 000 000 127 0.01 100.00 532.2 0.33 99.99 
From 5000001 to 10 000 000 1 . . . 7.5 0.01 100.00 
Over 10 000 000 
TOTAL 1285 200 100.00 161539.8 100.00 
Table l i e 
W A G E A N D S A L A R Y E A R N E R S : C O N S T R U C T I O N 
Range 
Units Amounts 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 34 0.01 0.01 0.3 
From 15 601 to 20800 34 0.01 0.02 0.6 
From 20 801 to 26 000 135 0.04 0.06 3.1 0.01 0.01 
From 26 001 to 32 500 807 0.24 0.30 23.6 0.07 0.08 
From 32 501 to 39000 706 0.21 0.51 25.8 0.08 0.16 
From 39001 to 45 500 2455 0.73 1.24 103.8 0.32 0.48 
Trom 45 501 to 52 000 6 726 2.00 3.24 328.2 1.03 1.51 
From 52001 to 65 000 49 571 14.74 17.98 2 899.9 9.07 10.58 
Trom 65 001 to 78 000 90868 27.02 45.00 6 497.1 20.31 30.89 
Trom 78 001 to 104000 107 514 31.97 76.97 9 783.8 30.59 61.4S 
From 104 001 to 130 000 42 071 12.51 89.48 4 922.3 15.39 16.B1 
From 130 001 to 162 500 21927 6.52 96.00 3 207.4 10.03 86.90 
From 162 501 to 260 000 10224 3.04 99.04 2 159.3 6.75 93.65 
From 260 001 to 390 000 1581 0.47 99.51 513.8 1.60 95.25 
From 390 001 to 520 000 605 0.18 99.69 233.6 0.89 64.14 
From 520 001 to 800 000 437 0.13 99.82 267.7 0.84 96.98 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 303 0.09 99.91 280.8 0.88 97.86 
From 1200001 to 2000000 168 0.05 99.96 241.1 0.75 98.61 
From 2 000 001 to 3000 000 67 0.02 99.98 162.8 0.51 99.12 
From 3000 001 to 5 000 000 67 0.02 100.00 232.9 0.88 100.00 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 
Over 10000 000 — — 
TOTAL 336 300 100.00 31 988.0 100.00 
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Table D d 
W A G E A N D S A L A R Y E A R N E R S : C O M M E R C E A N D F I N A N C E 
Umts Amounts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 
From 39001 to 45 500 
From 45 501 to 52 000 57 0.02 0.02 2.9 0.01 0.01 
From 52 001 to 65 000 2 340 0.82 0.84 133.1 0.25 0.26 
From 65 001 to 78 000 22 375 7.84 8.68 1 687.1 3.16 3.42 
From 78 001 to 104 000 57480 20.14 28.82 5 380.1 10.09 13.51 
From 104 001 to 130 000 56167 19.68 48.50 6 476.0 12.15 25.66 
From 130 001 to 162 500 48 946 17.15 65.65 7 009.1 13.15 38.81 
From 162 501 to 260 000 57 563 20.17 85.82 11 627.7 21.80 60.61 
From 260 001 to 390 000 21 776 7.63 93.45 6 870.3 12.89 73.50 
From 390 001 to 520 000 8 762 3.07 96.52 4013.8 7.52 81.02 
From 520 001 to 800 000 5 423 1.90 98.42 3 341.1 6.21 87.29 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 2169 0.76 99.18 2197.0 4.12 91.41 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 1541 0.54 99.72 2165.3 4.06 95.47 
From 2000 001 to 3 000 000 457 0.16 99.88 998.6 1.87 97.34 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 342 0.12 100.00 1400.2 2.63 99.97 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 2 • • • 15.0 0.03 100.00 
Over 10 000 000 
TOTAL 285 400 100.00 53 317.3 100.00 
Table H e 
W A G E A N D S A L A R Y E A R N E R S : T R A N S P O R T A T I O N A N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N S 
Units Amounts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 SOI to 39 000 
From 39 001 to 45 500 
From 45 501 to 52 000 
From 52 001 to 65 000 3 258 0.78 0.78 189.3 0.36 0.36 
From 65 001 to 78 000 32 497 7.78 8.56 2 307.3 4.39 4.75 
From 78 001 to 104000 138079 33.06 41.62 12510.0 23.80 28.55 
From 104001 to 130000 108059 25.87 67.49 12 459.2 23.70 52.25 
Prom 130 001 to 162 500 70 842 16.96 84.45 10 399.6 19.79 72.04 
From 162 501 to 260 000 52881 12.66 97.11 10 221.9 19.45 91.49 
From 260 001 to 390000 8730 2.09 99.20 2 728.1 5.19 96.68 
Prom 390 001 to 520 000 2 757 0.66 99.86 1215.0 2.91 98.99 
Prom 520 001 to 800000 501 0.12 99.98 328.9 0.63 99.62 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 34 0.01 99.99 34.0 0.06 99.68 
Prom 1200 001 to 2 000 000 30 0.01 100.00 48.0 0.09 99.77 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 14 — 35.0 0.07 99.84 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000000 14 — 56.0 0.10 99.94 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 OOO 4 — 30.0 0.06 100.00 
Over 10000000 
TOTAL 417 700 100.00 52 562.3 100.00 
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Table nf 
WAGE A N D SALARY EARNERS: GOVERNMENT AND OTHER SERVICES (EXCLUDING DOMESTICS) 
Units Amounts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions T, 

























15 601 to 
20 801 to 
26001 to 
32 501 to 
39 001 to 
45 501 to 
52 001 to 
65 001 to 
78 001 to 
104001 to 
130 001 to 
162 501 to 
260 001 to 
390 001 to 
520001 to 
800 001 to 
1200 001 to 
2 000 001 to 
3 000 001 to 


















2 000 000 
3 000 000 
5 000 000 
10 000 000 
10 000 000 


























































































































WAGE AND SALARY EARNERS: DOMESTIC SERVICE 
Units Amnunts 
Range 
Number Percentage Cum^dative 
percentage 
Millions „„,„„ Cumulative 























15 601 to 
20 801 to 
26 001 to 
32 501 to 
39 001 to 
45 501 to 
52 001 to 
65001 to 
78 001 to 
104001 to 
130 001 to 
162 501 to 
260 001 to 
390 001 to 
520 001 to-
800 001 to 
1200 001 to 
2 000 001 to 
3 000 001 to 


















2 000 000 
3 000 000 
5 000 000 


















































TflTAI 53 200 100.00 ino.nn 
Table m 




Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 1847 0.11 0.11 20.4 0.0 0.0 
From 15 601 to 20 800 10 585 0.65 0.76 198.4 0.04 0.04 
From 20 801 to 26 000 16 099 0.99 1.75 388.5 0.09 0.13 
From 26 001 to 32 500 20 336 1.25 3.00 608.0 0.14 0.27 
From 32 501 to 39 000 29295 1.80 4.80 1043.9 0.24 0.51 
From 39 001 to 45 500 40 208 2.48 7.28 1 759.3 0.41 0.92 
From 45 501 to 52 000 32 726 2.02 9.30 1 608.3 0.37 1.29 
From 52 001 to 65 000 58 304 3.60 12.90 3 490.3 0.81 2.10 
From 65 001 to 78 000 106 Oil 6.54 19.44 7 870.3 1.84 3.94 
From 78 001 to 104 000 235 196 14.53 33.97 22 501.9 5.27 9.21 
From 104 001 to 130 000 223 705 13.82 47.79 27 048.4 6.33 15.54 
From 130 001 to 162500 210 440 13.00 60.79 31 080.6 7.28 22.82 
From 162 501 to 260 000 256 020 15.81 76.60 54 458.5 12.75 35.57 
From 260 001 to 390 000 150 206 9.27 85.87 47 987.0 11.24 46.81 
From 390 001 to 520 000 73 096 4.51 90.38 31 941.8 7.48 54.29 
From 520 001 to 800 000 76 381 4.71 95.09 49 474.3 11.58 65.87 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 37 246 2.30 97.39 37 415.1 8.76 74.63 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 24 809 1.63 99.02 38 683.4 9.06 83.69 
From 2 000 001 to 3 0 0 0 000 7 845 0.48 99.50 19 669.0 4.60 88.29 
From 3 0 0 0 001 to 5 000 000 5 297 0.33 99.83 20 418.7 4.78 93.07 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 2 029 0.12 99.95 13 649.0 3.29 96.36 
Over 10 000 000 919 0.05 100.00 15 576.2 3.64 100.00 
TOTAL 1618 600 100.00 426 890.3 100.00 
SOURCE: CONADE/ECLA study of income distribution in Argentina. 
Table IHa 
SELF-EMPLOYED: AGRICULTURE AND FISHING 
Range 
Units Amounts 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 5,466 1.15 1.15 101.7 0.11 0.11 
From 20 801 to 26 000 8 460 1.78 2.93 208.1 0.23 0.34 
From 26 001 to 32 500 12 643 2.66 5.59 373.0 0.41 0.75 
From 32501 to 39 000 14402 3.03 8.62 501.2 0.55 1.30 
From 39 001 to 45 500 23860 5.02 13.64 1040.3 1.15 2.45 
From 45 501 to 52 000 19 535 4.11 17.75 945.5 1.04 3.49 
From 52001 to 65 000 42 539 8.95 26.70 2 531.1 2.80 6.29 
From 65 001 to 78000 42 634 8.97 35.67 3 257.2 3.60 9.89 
From 78 001 to 104000 52473 11.04 46.71 4 790.8 5.29 15.18 
From 104001 to 130 000 71201 14.98 61.69 8 707.9 9.62 24.80 
From 130 001 to 162 500 53 471 14.25 72.94 8 213.1 9.07 33.87 
From 162 501 to 260 000 62 312 13.11 86.05 13,671.3 15.10 48.97 
From 260001 to 390 000 31227 6.57 92.62 9 808.4 10.83 59.80 
From 390 001 to 520 000 7 652 1.61 94.23 3 151.9 3.49 63.29 
From 520 001 to 800 000 13118 12.76 96.99 7 532.4 8.32 71.61 
From 800001 to 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 751 1.21 98.20 5 947.7 6.57 78.18 
From 1 2 0 0 001 to 2 000000 4 6 1 0 0.97 99.17 6 740.3 7.44 85.62 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000000 2 1 3 9 0.45 99.62 5 169.1 5.71 91.33 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000000 1426 0.30 99.92 5 219.7 5.77 97.10 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 333 0.07 99.99 2 030.0 2.24 99.34 
Over 10000000 48 0.01 100.00 600.0 0.66 100.00 
TOTAL 475 300 100.00 90540.7 100.00 
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Table m b 
SELF-EMPLOYED: INDUSTRY, CONSTRUCTION AND MINING 
Units Amounts 
Rang e 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 1787 0.73 0.73 19.7 0.02 0.02 
From 15 601 to 20800 5018 2.05 2.78 94.8 0.10 0.12 
From 20 801 to 26 000 6512 2.66 5.44 153.7 0.16 0.28 
From 26 001 to 32 500 6144 2.51 7.95 186.2 0.19 0.47 
From 32 501 to 39 000 11212 4.58 12.53 409.2 0.42 0.89 
From 39001 to 45 500 12 387 5.06 17.59 540.1 0.55 1.44 
From 45 501 to 52 000 6 659 2.72 20.31 336.3 0.34 1.78 
From 52 001 to 65 000 2 3 9 9 0.98 21.29 148.5 1.15 1.93 
From 65 001 to 78 000 21028 8.59 29.88 1579.2 1.62 3.55 
From 78 001 to 104000 33 513 13.69 43.57 3 237.2 3.32 6.87 
From 104 001 to 130 000 12 093 4.94 48.51 1470.5 1.50 8.37 
From 130 001 to 162500 16 744 6.84 55.35 2533.4 2.60 10.97 
From 162 501 to 260 000 32 634 13.35 68.70 7 404.7 7.59 18.56 
From 260001 to 390 000 21224 8.67 77.37 6 604.9 6.77 25.33 
From 390001 to 520 000 13 660 5.58 82.95 5 995.4 6.14 31.47 
From 520001 to 800 000 16157 6.60 89.55 10437.4 10.70 42.17 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 10 747 4.39 93.94 10 449.3 10.70 52.87 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 8127 3.32 97.26 12 449.3 12.76 65.63 
From 2000 001 to 3 000 000 2840 1.16 98.42 6924.2 7.10 72.73 
From 3000 001 to 5 000 000 2 252 0.92 99.34 8141.8 8.34 81.07 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 1029 0.41 99.75 6 935.5 7.11 88.18 
Over 10 000 000 634 0.25 100.00 4531.1 11.82 100.00 





Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 
From 39001 to 45 500 
From 45 501 to 52 000 68 0.02 0.02 3.5 — . • . 
From 52001 to 65 000 304 0.09 0.11 18.3 0.02 0.02 
From 65 001 to 78000 2 467 0.73 0.84 179.6 0.16 0.18 
From 78 001 to 104 000 59 910 17.73 18.57 6 080.9 5.39 5.57 
From 104 001 to 130 000 57 544 17.03 35.60 6 778.7 6.02 11.59 
From 130 001 to 162 500 64550 19.10 54.70 9805.1 8.69 20.28 
From 162 501 to 260 000 57 004 16.87 71.57 11 355.2 10.07 30.35 
From 260 001 to 390 000 24 869 7.36 78.93 8 249.0 7.31 37.66 
From 390 001 to 520 000 20 206 5.98 84.91 9 409.9 8.34 46.00 
From 520 001 to 800 000 25140 7.44 92.35 16 989.6 15.06 61.06 
From 800 001 to 1200000 14 360 4.25 96.60 14 708.9 13.04 74.10 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 7 670 2.26 98.86 12498.3 11.08 85.18 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 1960 0.58 99.44 5 329.2 4.72 89.90 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 1172 0.36 99.80 5 297.4 4.70 94.60 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 489 0.14 99.94 3 410.7 3.02 97.62 
Over 10 000 000 187 0.06 100.00 2 680.0 2.38 100.00 
TOTAL 337 900 100.00 112 794.3 100.00 
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SELF-EMPLOYED: TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 
Range 
Units Amounts 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 
From 39 001 to 45 000 
From 45 001 to 52 000 
From 52 001 to 65 000 174 0.24 0.24 10.6 0.04 0.04 
From 65 001 to 78 000 276 0.38 0.62 20.3 0.08 0.12 
From 78 001 to 104 000 1407 1.94 2.56 129.9 0.51 0.63 
From 104 001 to 130 000 4 285 5.91 8.47 509.5 2.00 2.63 
From 130 001 to 162 500 6 322 8.72 17.19 940.1 3.69 6.32 
From 162 501 to 260 000 19 582 27.02 44.21 4 206.2 16.53 22.85 
From 260001 to 390 000 21 357 29.45 73.66 7 058.5 27.74 50.59 
From 390 001 to 520 000 9251 12.76 86.42 4277.7 16.81 67.40 
From 520 001 to 800 000 7 352 10.14 96.56 4933.9 19.39 86.79 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 1660 2.29 98.85 1 686.7 6.63 93.42 
From 1200001 to 2 000 000 660 0.91 99.76 1 073.4 4.22 97.64 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 116 0.16 99.92 293.1 1.15 98.79 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 36 0.05 99.97 141.0 0.55 99.34 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 22 0.03 100.00 168.2 0.66 100.00 
Over 10 000 000 




Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 60 0.06 0.06 0.7 0.01 0.01 
From 15 601 to 20 800 101 0.10 0.16 1.9 0.01 0.02 
From 20 801 to 26 000 1127 1.12 1.28 26.7 0.20 0.22 
From 26 001 to 32 500 1549 1.54 2.82 48.8 0.36 0.58 
From 32 501 to 39 000 3 642 3.62 6.44 131.1 0.97 1.55 
From 39 001 to 45 500 3 883 3.86 10.30 175.5 1.30 2.85 
From 45 501 to 52 000 6 348 6.31 16.61 317.4 2.35 5.20 
From 52 001 to 65 000 10020 9.96 26.57 611.2 4.53 9.73 
From 65 001 to 78 000 17 223 17.12 43.69 1231.4 9.10 18.83 
From 78 001 to 104 000 19 979 19.86 63.55 1 818.1 13.46 32.29 
From 104001 to 130 000 11971 11.90 75.45 1 388.6 10.28 42.57 
From 130 001 to 162 500 12 042 11.97 87.42 1 754.5 12.99 55.56 
From 162501 to 260 000 5 925 5.89 93.31 1 236.5 9.15 64.71 
From 260 001 to 390 000 2123 2.11 95.42 653.9 4.84 69.55 
From 390 001 to 520 000 2123 2.11 97.53 930.3 6.89 76.44 
From 520 001 to 800 000 1036 1.03 98.56 663.0 4.90 81.34 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 775 0.77 99.33 673.5 4.98 86.32 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 332 0.33 99.66 465.6 3.45 89.77 
From 2000 001 to 3 000 000 170 0.17 99.83 403.4 2.99 92.76 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 101 0.10 99.93 378.8 2.80 95.56 
From 5 000 001 to 10000 000 40 0.04 99.97 234.6 1.74 97.30 
Over 10 000000 30 0.03 100.00 365.1 2.70 100.00 
TOTAL 100 600 100.00 13 510.6 100.00 
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Table IIK 
S E L F - E M P L O Y E D : P R O F E S S I O N A L S E R V I C E S A N D O T H E R S 
Units Amounts 
Range Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions T, t Cumulative 
of pesos ^«'^centage p^.^^^tage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 39 0.01 0.01 1.4 
From 39 001 to 45 500 78 0.02 0.03 3.4 . . . 
From 45 501 to 52 000 116 0.03 0.06 5.6 0.01 0.01 
From 52 001 to 65 000 2 868 0.74 0.80 170.6 0.20 0.21 
From 65 001 to 78 000 22 383 5.78 6.58 1602.6 1.84 2.05 
From 78001 to 104000 67 914 17.53 24.11 6445.0 7.40 9.45 
From 104 001 to 130 000 66 611 17.19 41.30 8 193.2 9.42 18.87 
From 130 001 to 162 500 57 311 14.79 56.09 7 834.4 9.00 27.87 
From 162 501 to 260 000 78 563 20.27 76.36 16584.6 19.06 46.93 
From 260 001 to 390 000 49 406 12.75 89.11 15 612.3 17.94 64.87 
From 390 001 to 520 000 20 204 5.21 94.32 8 176.6 9.40 74.27 
From 520 001 to 800 000 13 578 3.50 97.82 8 918.0 10.25 84.52 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 3 953 1.02 98.84 3 949.0 4.54 89.06 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 3 410 0.88 99.72 5 456.0 6.27 95.33 
From 2000 001 to 3 000 000 6 211 0.16 99.88 1 550.0 1.78 97.11 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 310 0.08 99.96 1240.0 1.43 98.54 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 116 0.03 99.99 870.0 1.00 99.54 
Over 10 000 000 20 0.01 100.00 400.0 0.46 100.00 
TOTAL 387 500 100.00 87 012.7 100.00 
Table IV 
A R G E N T I N A : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F P E R S O N A L I N C O M E , B Y F A M I L Y , 1961 
Recipients of property income 
Range 
Units Amounts 
Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 
From 26 001 to 32 500 
From 32 501 to 39 000 
From 39 001 to 45 500 
From 45 501 to 52 000 15 0.06 0.06 0.7 
From 52 001 to 65 000 56 0.22 0.28 3.3 0.02 0.02 
From 65 001 to 78 000 61 0.24 0.52 4.4 1.03 0.05 
From 78 001 to 104 000 607 2.39 2.91 55.2 1.34 0.39 
From 104 001 to 130 000 1140 4.49 7.40 133.4 0.83 1.22 
From 130 001 to 162 500 1247 4.91 12.31 182.4 1.14 2.36 
From 162 501 to 260 000 5 956 23.45 35.76 1257.9 7.85 10.21 
From 260 001 to 390 000 5 975 23.52 59.28 1 941.3 12.12 22.33 
From 390 001 to 520 000 2 936 11.56 70.84 1 335.9 8.34 30.67 
From 520001 to 800 000 3112 12.25 83.09 2 053.9 12.82 43.49 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 1666 6.56 89.65 1 666.0 10.40 53.89 
From 1200 001 to 2000 000 1334 5.25 94.90 2134.4 13.32 67.21 
From 2000 001 to 3 000 000 696 2.74 97.64 1740.0 10.86 78.07 
From 3000 001 to 5 000 000 404 1.59 99.23 1 616.0 10.09 88.16 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 137 0.54 99.77 1 027.5 6.41 94.57 
Over 10000 000 58 0.23 100.00 870.0 5.43 100.00 
TOTAL 25 400 100.00 16 022.3 100.00 
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SOURCE: CONADE/ECLA study of income distribution in Argentina. 
Table V 




Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Millions 
of pesos Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Up to 15 600 
From 15 601 to 20 800 
From 20 801 to 26 000 198 0.05 0.05 4.6 0.01 0.01 
From 26 001 to 32 500 198 0.05 0.10 5.9 0.01 0.02 
From 32 501 to 39 000 1027 0.26 0.36 38.4 1.08 0.10 
From 39 001 to 45 500 3 319 0.84 1.20 141.1 0.32 0.42 
From 45 501 to 52 000 5 927 1.50 2.70 289.8 0.64 1.06 
From 52 001 to 65 000 53 813 13.62 16.32 3148.1 6.94 8.00 
From 65 001 to 78000 69854 17.68 34.00 5 008.5 11.05 19.05 
From 78 001 to 104000 100 371 25.41 59.41 8 933.0 19.70 38.75 
From 104 001 to 130 000 46108 11.67 71.08 5 311.6 11.72 50.47 
From 130 001 to 162 500 48 439 12.26 83.34 7 086.6 15.63 66.10 
From 162 501 to 260 000 50 059 12.67 96.01 9 871.6 21.78 87.88 
From 260 001 to 390 000 12 248 3.10 99.11 3 837.3 8.46 96.34 
From 390 001 to 520 000 2 845 0.72 99.83 1258.9 2.78 99.12 
From 520 001 to 800 000 672 0.17 100.00 379.1 0.84 99.96 
From 800 001 to 1200 000 22 19.8 0.04 100.00 
From 1200 001 to 2 000 000 
From 2 000 001 to 3 000 000 
From 3 000 001 to 5 000 000 
From 5 000 001 to 10 000 000 
Over 10 000 000 
TO T A L 395 100 100.00 45 334.3 100.00 
SOURCE: C O N A D E / E C L A study of income distribution in Argentina. 
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RECENT ECLA ACTIVITIES 
CONFERENCE ON THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA^ 
(Santiago, Chile, 13 to 22 December 1965) 
In accordance with resolution 2311, adopted 
by the General Conference of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) at its thirteenth session, the 
Director-General of UNESCO, in co-operation 
with the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) and in consultation with the 
other specialized agencies of the United Nations 
and with Latin American organizations, con-
vened the Conference on the Application of 
Science and Technology to the Development of 
Latin America, at Santiago, Chile, from 13 to 
22 December 1965. The Conference was at-
tended by delegations from Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
the United States of America, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, and by observers from Canada, the 
Holy See, Israel and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Others represented at the 
Conference included the United Nations, ECLA, 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), the United Nations Tech-
nical Assistance Board and the Special Fund, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the , Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the Permanent Secretariat of the 
General Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration (SIECA) and a number of non-
governmental organizations. 
At the inaugural meeting speeches were made 
by His Excellency Mr. Eduardo Frei, President 
of Chile; His Excellency Mr. Juan Gómez Millas, 
Minister of Education of Chile; Mr. Manuel 
Balboa, Acting Executive Secretary of ECLA, 
i S e e the report of the conference ( U N E S C O / 
C A S T A L A / L . l ) . 
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and Mr. Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, Deputy Director-
General, UNESCO. At the closing meeting there 
were further speeches by Mr. Gómez Millas and 
Mr. Balboa, and a speech by Professor A. Mat-
veyev. Assistant Director-General for Science, 
UNESCO. The Chairman of the Conference was 
Mr. Juan Gómez Millas (Chile), the Vice-
Chairmen were Mr. José Salvador Gandolfo 
(Argentina), Mr. Victor Bravo Ahuja (Mexico), 
and Mr. Roberto Solorzano Marin (Nicaragua), 
and the Rapporteur was Mr. Oswaldo Proafio 
(Ecuador). 
In view of the great range of problems to 
which science and technology can be applied 
in relation to economic and social development, 
the Conference concentrated mainly on natural 
resources and their utilization, human resources 
and training of scientific and technical person-
nel, the application of science and technology 
to the industrial development of Latin America, 
and scientific and technological policies and 
instruments for their realization. These questions 
were discussed by four special committees set 
up for this purpose. 
As a result of the discussions of the four 
committees, a number of recommendations were 
approved, and were subsequently ratified by the 
Conference. Their text is given below. 
FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS ON THE APPLICATION OF 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA 
Among the great regions of the world, Latin 
America has one of the highest birth rates. The 
increase in population should therefore be paral-
leled by a high development policy, so as to 
avoid the impoverishment resulting from the 
stagnation of resources and productivity revealed 
in the statistics of the last few years. 
Consequently, this state of affairs must be 
modified by a drastic activation of the economy. 
Modern forms of progress are closely linked 
to the application of scientific knowledge, basic 
and applied research, and technical transforma-
tion of rural and industrial activities, in order 
to obtain a greater output of processed materials 
from natural resources, and so raise the prospects 
of domestic and foreign markets. 
With the object of improving teaching and 
training programmes and also promote the ex-
pansion of these countries in the near future, the 
attention of Governments is drawn in particular 
to certain fundamental concepts: 
I. The place of science and technology in modern 
society 
Science and technology in modern society have 
become a productive force. The following con-
clusions may be drawn from this fact: 
(i) The application of science and technology 
to development must be considered as part of 
the general problem of development. 
(ii) Science and technology become one of 
the most important preoccupations of Govern-
ments. 
(iii) Investment in science and technology 
should be considered as productive investment. 
(iv) The status of scientists and engineers 
deserves serious attention. 
(v) The importance of creating the right 
image of science and technology and its role in 
the minds of politicians, administrators, business-
men and the general public. 
II. Inter-relation between science and technology, 
and education and training 
(i) The importance of education for the de-
velopment of science and technology. This close 
connexion goes as deeply as into problems of 
illiteracy. 
(ii) When planning development of education 
it is necessary to foresee the creation of facilities 
for the employment of educated people. 
(iii) The content of technical education is 
defined by the requirements of science and 
technology. 
(iv) Science penetrates the humanistic content 
of education. 
(v) The role of universities in technological 
and scientific research in Latin America should 
be increased. 
III. Relation between applied research and 
fundamental research 
It is impossible to achieve the aims of the 
application of science and technology to de-
velopment without proper attention to the de-
velopment of fundamental research. 
IV. Priority activities in the field of science and 
technology and technological training 
(i) Education and training of scientists, en-
gineers and technicians. 
(ii) Natural resources research and use of 
natural resources. 
(iii) Science policy problems. 
(iv) Statistics and information. 
(v) Study of existing technology and its 
adaptation to local conditions. 
(vi) Standardization work of all kinds. 
(vii) Agricultural education. 
V. International and regional co-operation 
Problems of exchange of experience, the 
rational use of existing resources, the utilization 
of local experts and problems of regional in-
stitutions. 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THEIR UTILIZATION 
It is recommended: 
Collection and assembling of data 
1. That States with sovereignty over the great 
regions of Latin America from the standpoint 
of ecological differentiation—such as the Andean 
region, the dry tropical region and the humid 
tropical region—employ with top priority the 
necessary means for studying their natural re-
sources, enlisting the co-operation of such re-
gional and international scientific, technical and 
financial institutions as they may wish to call 
upon for this purpose. 
2. That States draw up qualitative and quan-
titative inventories of their own natural resources 
as soon as possible and promptly remit the cor-
responding reports to UNESCO so that the latter 
circulate them in turn to the international spon-
sors and to the member states with a view to 
enabling the latter to make use of these data in 
planning their agricultural, forestry, industrial 
and commercial development, as well as in plan-
ning their scientific and technological develop-
ment, and as a basis for discussion and agree-
ments at future international conferences such 
as the present one. 
3. That the Governments of the Latin Ameri-
can States should pay special attention to the 
need to assess marine resources, and to that end 
deems it advisable: 
(a) As an immediate measure, to initiate or 
intensify direct and expeditious prospection 
programmes based on the use of ultrasonic 
devices; 
( i ) At the same time, to improve the fishery 
statistics services, recording not only the catches 
of each species but also the effort employed in 
making them; 
(c) As an immediate measure, to improve or 
set up, as the case may be, biostatistical services 
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in connexion with the unloading of catches, with 
a view to providing the appropriate machinery 
for assessing the effects of exploitation on the 
dynamics of resources; 
{d) To improve or create services to study 
the chemical composition and nutritive value of 
the various components of marine resources 
with a view to determining their correct treat-
ment for marketing purposes and also promot-
ing the development of new consumer products. 
(e) To investigate the influence of meteoro-
logical conditions, and especially solar radiation 
and other natural conditions, on the periodical 
but irregular migrations of various species of 
fish along the coasts of the Andean countries. 
4. That the utmost support be given to the 
activities of the Member States of UNESCO 
within the framework of the International Hydro-
logical Decade, and that action be taken to 
intensify hydrological studies, together with steps 
to set up National Committees for the Inter-
national Hydrological Decade, where they do 
not yet exist. 
5. That the countries of Latin America co-
ordinate their efforts in preparing a cartographic 
plan that is uniform in quality and scope and 
meets the requirements as regards the various 
natural resources; that this task be given high 
priority; and that a centre for cartographic 
documentation and aerial photographic material 
be established that would permit die supply of 
up-to-date information in this connexion. 
6. That the Latin American States: 
(a) Give top priority in the field of geological 
activity to intermediate-scale geological survey-
ing of their territories, using the most advanced 
methods existing at the present time; 
(h) Make large-scale geological surveys of 
high priority regions selected in view of the 
fact that they may contain mineral deposits or 
important water resources, or need to be 
surveyed for the purpose of special develop-
ment projects. 
7. That the Latin American States prepare 
their maps of the present and potential use of 
the soil, specifying therein, on the basis of 
studies of the environment, which crops are to 
be recommended for each ecological unit; in 
this way, it will be possible to regulate the 
establishment of an economically sound agricul-
ture, or the use of the land for other, non-
agricultural, purposes, for in each case the plants 
would be cultivated in the most efficient manner. 
8. That the Latin American countries establish 
the necessary legislation to require private un-
dertakings to furnish government bodies with 
all geological information obtained in prospec-
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tion and exploration work, and all other in-
formation relating to natural resources. 
Institutes 
9. UNESCO invite Member States to make a 
list of their institutes and organizations at 
present working in the field of natural resources, 
with a brief description of their functions, 
achievements and technical stafif and equipment. 
In the light of a study of this information, 
UNESCO should give advice on the course of 
action to be taken. 
10. Countries which do not possess the neces-
sary institutes for research on natural resources 
or in which it would not be possible at the 
present time to set up an institute to deal with 
a given specific subject, might for the time 
being make use of well-developed institutes in 
some other country of the region. This institute 
would thus provisionally act as a regional centre, 
until such time as the country or countries in 
question were able to set up their own research 
bodies. All this would be without prejudice to 
studying the possibility of setting up regional 
institutes for research in specific problems 
relating to the areas for which they were set up. 
11. The countries of the region arrange to 
create fully co-ordinated systems or networks 
of forestry experimentation centres for studying 
rapid-growing species in relation to their eco-
logical adaptation and to carry out surveys on 
volumetric growth. These centres might also 
serve to investigate the ordered management of 
natural spontaneous forest areas, according to 
species, having good technological and forestry 
characteristics. 
Collaboration between organs 
12. Countries in which the organization of 
the political and administrative institutions 
makes it possible, and in which it is advisable, 
group together, into a single state body at the 
highest governmental level, all the state agencies 
concerned with the research, evaluation, con-
servation and/or planning of the utilization of 
one or more natural resources. 
The body, the establishment of which is 
proposed in the preceding articles, be charged 
to formulate and carry out government policy 
in the matter of natural resources (inventory, 
conservation, evaluation and planning of utili-
zation) . 
Staff 
13. Member States: 
(a) Should organize centres for the training 
of intermediate-level technical experts; 
(6) Should organize regional, national and/or 
international centres for graduates; 
(c) Should encourage the training of teach-
nical experts and research workers at all levels, 
and especially intermediate levels, by means of 
instruction provided at workplaces and/or re-
search centres; 
(c?) Organize special intensive courses for the 
further training of existing technical stafif; 
(e) Ensure that technical assistance con-
tributes effectively to the training of technical 
experts at the national level. 
14. In all the Latin American States, instruc-
tion concerning the conservation of the soil and 
other natural resources as an economic objective 
essential to the welfare of the community, be 
included as a subject at the various educational 
levels. 
In the Latin American States, in addition to 
the entities responsible for matters relating to 
natural resources, associations be created, if 
they do not already exist, their purpose to be 
not only to contribute to assisting in studying 
the conservation of such resources, but also 
to serve as means of publicity, enabling the 
people to become aware of the importance of 
these resources for their own welfare and so en-
courage their conservation. These associations 
should be aflSliated or maintain close relations 
with international organizations devoted to the 
conservation of natural resources, because of 
the valuable co-operation the latter are in a 
position to provide, both in the form of informa-
tion and of technical assistance. 
The States of the region promote the legisla-
tion necessary for the establishment of con-
servation measures appropriate to the importance 
of the problem. 
15. There be organized in each country an 
intensive campaign of erosion control, to be 
developed through the large-scale use of com-
munication media such as the radio, television, 
the Press, posters, etc., schools and other agen-
cies capable of educating the public, especially 
farmers and peasants, in elementary measures of 
soil protection such as the maintenance and ex-
tension of wooded areas, reforestation, contour 
ploughing, terracing, etc., and the establishment 
of government services for the recovery and 
improvement of land ravaged by erosion, sali-
nification, lowering of the water table, etc. 
16. There be held, in Latin America, a 
Symposium on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, similar to those held by the 
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Asia 
and the International Union for the Conserva-
tion of Nature and Natural Resources, under 
the auspices of UNESCO and FAG in Arusha, 
Tanganyika, in September 1961. 
The symposium might be organized in three 
stages (three years): 
(1) The sending of highly qualified specialists 
to the various Latin American countries with a 
view to promoting interest and participation in 
the symposium; 
(2) The holding of a symposium to discuss 
the present situation and suggest future measures 
for the conservation of nature and natural re-
sources; 
(3) A meeting of one or two representatives 
from each country with a view to complementing 
the decisions approved during the second stage. 
17. The countries of the region be recom-
mended to establish reserves of natural resources 
in each large ecological unit in their countries. 
In doing so, they should give top priority to 
the idea of preserving a sample to serve in mak-
ing basic qualitative and quantitative studies of 
the general relationship between living beings 
and their physical environment. 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRAINING OF SCIENTIFIC 
AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
It is recommnded that: 
Technological level in the main branches of 
industry in Latin America 
1. The training of engineers and professional 
workers in the applied sciences includes, in 
addition to the necessary technical training, in-
structional guidance concerning the economic 
and social responsibility involved in the exercise 
of their functions, in order to produce personnel 
capable of directing the technological process. 
2. In the universities and technological in-
stitutes, systems of research and development be 
promoted, by means of pilot units dealing not 
only with the technical but also with the 
economic aspects involved in any process of 
industrial transformation. 
3. (a) Steps be taken to organize or intensify, 
as the case may be, the advanced training of 
entrepreneurial managers and technical experts, 
both in the universities and in undertakings; 
(6) The curriculum of engineering studies 
include the subjects directly related to economic 
development and courses for graduates be or-
ganized giving importance to economic engineer-
ing subjects. 
Selection of techniques and their adaptation to 
local conditions 
4. (a) That for each country the most suit-
able technology be adopted for increasing pro-
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ductivity, reducing costs and improving quality 
by the technical organization of labour designed 
to create the most adequate relationship between 
man and the machine. 
{b) That the Governments continuously regu-
late the employment pattern of the working 
population by means of new activities. 
(c) That since engineers and the specialists 
in the applied sciences are the motive force for 
social-economic development, they should be 
educated to realize that they are fulfilling the 
high social function of enhancing the status of 
dignity of the man of the Americas. 
5. The Governments of the Latin American 
countries give priority to the development of 
plans and projects destined to make available, 
within a short time, efficient electrical supply 
services in the rural areas. To this end the 
methods of financing most suitable to each 
particular case should be studied and organized. 
6. Governments encourage the utilization and 
supply of electrical power and the construction 
of additional installations, in order that the 
resulting development may encourage industrial 
decentralization. 
Local technological integration and technical 
contributions from abroad as instruments for 
the introduction of modem technologies in 
industry in the region 
7. The creation of technical research institutes 
be encouraged and the existing ones promote 
their close co-operation with the universities 
with a view to stimulating the study of natural 
resources and developing research on relevant 
technological processes, as well as basic studies 
on standardization. 
8. Efforts tending to the national industrializa-
tion of raw materials be intensified. In some 
cases this process should be done by stages, 
beginning with intermediate industrialization 
and ending with the full utilization of the raw 
materials in the elaboration of manufactured 
products. 
9. Technical research institutes be organized 
administratively on an independent or autono-
mous basis, or in the form of foundations, or in 
the most convenient way, in close relation with 
the universities, thus affording them greater free-
dom in the choice of their technical staff, and 
the determination of their system of work and a 
wages policy for research best suited to the 
institute. 
10. That suitable facilities be established for 
technological research institutes to enable them 
to receive research workers and exchange in-
formation with other institutes in the region, 
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for purposes of training, refresher courses and 
specialization. 
Role of regional co-operation in raising the 
technological level of Latin American industry 
11. Each coimtry in Latin America promote 
the development of techniques relating to the 
utilization and integral industrialization of food 
products, beginning with those relating to the 
fertility of the soil, up to the commercialization 
and adequate employment of the finished pro-
ducts, endeavouring to achieve, in the process, 
complementation between the countries of the 
region. 
12. At the regional level, international agen-
cies and the Governments of the member coun-
tries intensify the organization of conferences, 
commissions and agencies for the study of those 
economic sectors which might benefit from tech-
nological exchange, and to help promote greater 
co-operation between the industries of the region. 
13. International organizations having re-
sponsibility for economic and social develop-
ment promote technical co-operation with na-
tional and regional bodies dealing with these 
problems. 
14. That a list of Latin American scientists 
and technologists be drawn up, with the ad-
ditional use of the information possessed by 
Pan-American professional bodies with the 
specific purpose of improving the selection of 
Latin American experts by Governments and 
international organizations providing technical 
and/or financial assistance for the study of the 
problems of the region. 
Latin American Centre for the Application of 
Science and Technology to Development 
15. A centre be organized with the profes-
sional staff necessary for carrying out studies 
on the problems indicated below. 
In order to stress its Latin American char-
acter, consideration should be given to the 
creation of an Advisory Committee composed 
of personalities representative of the various 
countries and the various activities connected 
with the aims of the Centre and belonging to 
the region. 
16. The Centre should approach the con-
sideration of problems arising from the applica-
tion of science and technology to the development 
of the region. In its activity it should not neglect 
the repercussion of its recommendations on the 
social and economic field and to that end should 
co-ordinate its action with other specialized 
organs in the region. 
17. That the work of the centre should be 
organized with the following ends in view: 
A. Study 
(o) To identify the major technological 
problems that hamper development, in ac-
cordance with the need of finding technical 
solutions to fit the specific characteristics of the 
area. 
{b) To evaluate the work that is actually 
carried out by the various scientific organiza-
tions in the region, from the point of view of a 
solution to the technological problems affecting 
development. 
(c) To analyse the existing technical teaching 
systems, bearing local conditions in mind and 
formulating recommendations on how to improve 
the systems of teaching in Latin American 
countries. 
(d) To study the measures enabling national 
and international resources to be channelled to 
the technological development of the region. 
B. Information 
Information services should be organized with 
the following main objectives: 
(o) To compile inventories of qualified per-
sonnel in the fields of applied sciences and tech-
nologies within the area. 
(6) To compile inventories of the training 
and applied research establishments in the region. 
(c) To collect and distribute technological 
information. 
{d) To organize a Documentation Service 
specializing in the field of activities of the Centre. 
C. Promotion 
{a) To make recommendation to the Govern-
ments, universities and institutes of the Latin 
American countries and to the regional organi-
zations, with the intent that they consider the 
influence of the development of Latin America 
as a whole in framing their scientific policy. 
(6) To seek co-ordination of the efforts of 
technological research institutes in the region 
with the object for avoiding the overlapping of 
work. 
(c) To further applied scientific and tech-
nological research projects of a regional nature. 
id) To organize regional courses for grad-
uates in the various fields of technology and the 
applied sciences. 
(e) To administer a programme of fellow-
ships. 
( / ) To organize the exchange of research 
workers and professors, both among the coun-
tries of the region and with other countries. 
ig) To organize regional courses on subjects 
which, though new to the region, are important 
for it. 
(h) To promote the translation and publica-
tion of textbooks and books of other kinds on 
such subjects as may be considered necessary. 
(i) To encourage constant contacts between 
universities, technical institutes and other tech-
nical training institutes, and between them and 
industry in the region. 
( / ) To promote the organization of informa-
tion services in the countries of the region. 
(A) To organize the exchange of information 
and experiences among the different information 
services in the region. 
(I) To organize activities likely to facilitate 
the publication and distribution of technological 
material in the region. 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POLICIES AND 
INSTRUMENTS FOR THEIR REALIZATION 
It is recommended that: 
National science policy and economic and social 
development 
1. Each Latin American country define and 
adopt a science policy, on the basis of an analysis 
of its economic and scientific situation, with a 
view to promoting the rapid expansion of the 
scientific and technological research essential to 
the achievement of sound and continuous eco-
nomic and social development and to the solution 
of the serious and pressing problems affecting 
the region. 
2. To that end, national bodies should be 
established consisting of scientists and tech-
nologists representing research institutions (Re-
search Council, universities, academies, govern-
mental technical institutes and agencies) which, 
attached to the Government and in close contact 
with the bodies responsible for drawing up 
economic development plans, would make it 
possible to direct scientific and technological 
development, establishing priorities, providing 
the appropriate resources and integrating such 
development with government action so that its 
influence is reflected in all the relevant decisions 
of the various ministries or departments. 
3. To enable them to operate effectively, 
steps be taken to organize or carry out the neces-
sary basic studies and the systematic and up-
to-date compilation of data and information 
concerning national scientific activity and the 
human and material resources employed in it 
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and for that purpose an appropriate service be 
set up, to work under the authority of the body 
mentioned in (2) or the respective national re-
search council. 
Infrastructure of institutions for the execution 
of scientific and technological research 
4. Governments of Latin American countries 
which have not yet set up national councils for 
scientific and technological research or equivalent 
bodies take steps to establish them, with due 
regard to the existing scientific infrastructure, 
for the purpose of promoting and co-ordinating 
research in the light of the country's science 
policy based on its development plans. 
5. The national councils for scientific and 
technological research operate in close co-
ordination with the universities and other institu-
tions of research and higher education in the 
respective countries, assisting, within the mea-
sure of their possibilities and according to es-
tablished priorities, all those that have achieved 
high standards in their scientific work. 
Research workers in science and technology: 
numbers, qualifications, status and careers 
6. Governments in the region devote special 
sums to subsidize, in universities and other 
scientific and technological institutions, research 
on subjects which the State regards as having 
priority for the promotion of economic and 
social development. As far as the universities 
are concerned, these sums should be independent 
of and supplementary to the sums normally al-
located to them in the budgets. 
7. Member countries establish a compre-
hensive national plan of fellowships in the coun-
try and abroad for young peop e showing in-
terest in the university careers which it is desired 
to promote in accordance with the objectives 
referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
8. Latin American universities and other 
leading scientific and technological institutions 
take steps to create—in a co-ordinated form 
wherever this is called for—documentation and 
study centres for the application of the results 
of research done by them, and, in general, of 
the scientific and technological information 
likely to influence the development of their re-
spective countries. 
National expenditures for scientific and tech-
nological research 
9. Governments, bodies responsible for science 
policy and national research councils, in each 
country, devote the closest attention to problems 
relating to the training of qualified research 
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workers, establishing appropriate fellowship pro-
grammes for the purpose and creating suitable 
incentives to direct young people with aptitudes 
for research in general and for research in 
particular in the special branches most needed 
for the scientific, economic and social develop-
ment of the nation. 
10. Steps be taken to encourage full dedica-
tion to research in universities and other 
scientific and technological institutions respon-
sible for the training of scientists and technical 
experts. To this end, adequate conditions should 
be created as regards both status of the research 
workers and the availability to them of means 
necessary to the performance of their work. 
11. Consideration be given to the question 
of the training and professional status of tech-
nical experts collaborating in scientific research 
and constituting an indispensable source of as-
sistance in that work. 
12. Each Latin American State allocate to 
scientific and technological research the largest 
possible sums so as to permit the adequate 
expansion of such research and its execution at 
the level required by the present world situation. 
These sums should amount to a given percentage 
of the national income or gross national product, 
the optimum figure varying according to the 
conditions of each country. Without, however, 
ignoring the differences existing between the 
countries of the region as regards both economic 
development and scientific progress, it is con-
sidered that for Latin America as a whole, a 
figure of between 0.7 and 1 per cent of the gross 
national product should be established as a 
minimum target to be attained as soon as 
possible. 
13. Appropriate procedures be adopted in 
each country to facilitate the achievement of the 
objective indicated above and to ensure the 
financing of the activities of the national re-
search councils, and of research within the 
universities and other institutions. These pro-
cedures might consist in instituting special taxes 
or charges, the proceeds from which would 
be applied to these ends, or in making arrange-
ments for devoting to them a given percentage 
of the resources of the national budget, either 
as a whole or in accordance with the allocations 
made to the different sectors of the administra-
tion, in which case the percentages should vary 
according to the nature and needs of each. 
14. National funds (sometimes known as 
"reserve" funds) be set up for research from 
private or budgetary funds, with a view to 
guaranteeing the availability of the necessary 
resources and permitting their better utilization. 
Auxiliary services 
15. There be established in each country, in 
order to provide scientific and technological 
research with the infrastructure necessary for 
conducting it at the level and at the rate required 
in accordance with international standards, the 
appropriate auxiliary services such as services 
for documentation, library work, analysis, data 
collection, standardization, metrology, patents, 
etc., the lack of which often creates serious ob-
stacles to the work of Latin American research 
workers. 
16. Means of action be instituted or ex-
tended in the case of libraries and documenta-
tion and information centres, this being essential 
to the development of original research and the 
utilization of the sources of data and knowledge 
permanently available in the international sphere. 
In establishing the above-mentioned services, 
and in order to allow them to pursue their ap-
propriate activities, efforts should be made to 
achieve the greatest possible measure of co-
ordination at the national level and full co-
operation between the countries of the region. 
17. Standardization be promoted in the coun-
tries of the area and efforts be made to achieve 
full co-ordination of their work in this connexion 
also, in view of its importance to technological 
advancement and the progress of industrializa-
tion. In this connexion it should be noted that 
standardization is an important aspect of the 
process of applying technology to economic 
development, for all of which reasons the com-
petent institutions should be given the means 
and support required for the appropriate for-
mulation of standards. 
Latin American co-operation in science and 
technology 
18. All Latin American countries intensify 
and increase their efforts to achieve the fullest 
co-operation in the field of science and tech-
nology. This will involve, above all, the exchange 
of information and experience and the reciprocal 
granting and utilization of the facilities which 
each of them can provide for the training of 
research workers or the carrying out of re-
search work. 
19. Decisive steps be taken to promote the 
formulation and execution, by institutes, scien-
tists and technologists of different countries in 
the region, of joint research programmes on sub-
jects of common interest, and especially on those 
capable of making a rapid and effective con-
tribution towards expediting economic and social 
development and mastering the grave problems 
afflicting its peoples. 
Latin American Council for Science and Tech-
nology 
20. That the Director-General of UNESCO, 
through the Science Co-operation OfiBce for 
Latin America, with its headquarters in Monte-
video, convene annual meetings to be attended 
by representatives of the institutions in each 
member State of the region for the policy in 
the matter of science and technology or in 
charge of research programmes, together with 
those people competent in this matter, for the 
following general purposes: 
(а) To exchange experiences as regards the 
integration of scientific and technological de-
velopment plans within the national and sectoral 
plans for economic and social development; 
(б) To propose to Governments appropriate 
measures to expedite the development of science 
and technology, as deemed necessary in the light 
of such exchanges; 
(c) To propose to UNESCO and other re-
gional and international organizations appro-
priate measures for co-operation; 
{d) To examine the problems relating to 
scientific, engineering, research and statistical 
education as recommended in Chapter III of 
the Report. 
21. To ask the Director-General of UNESCO 
under the terms of Resolution 2.112 and Project 
2.112.4 contained in the Approved Programme 
and Budget for 1965-66 (13C/5), that he make 
the necessary arrangements for the holding of 
these meetings. 
22. That in the first meeting of representa-
tives, the establishment is studied of a Latin 
American Council for Science and Technology 
as an instrument for co-ordinating the region's 
plans for scientific and technological develop-
ment and which can also act in advisory capacity 
to UNESCO with regard to its scientific and 
technological programme for the region. 
International and regional co-operation 
With regard to the international agencies, 
the Conference: 
23. Pointed out the need for intensifying and 
extending their action in Latin America in the 
field of technical assistance and of assistance 
for scientific development, both by giving advice 
on the formulation of national science policies 
and by establishing appropriate structures in 
the various countries. 
24. Emphasized also, the necessity for pursu-
ing such action in a planned and co-ordinated 
manner in order to avoid overlapping and to 
ensure that the best use is made of efforts and 
resources. It is gratifying, in this connexion, 
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to mention this present Conference as an ex-
ample of the good results achievable through 
co-operation between international agencies. 
25. Expresses, in conclusion, its keen ap-
preciation of the work accomplished, in their re-
spective spheres of competence, by the UNESCO 
Science Co-operation 0£5ce for Latin America 
with its headquarters in Montevideo, and the 
UNESCO Science Policy Division, which has 
made a decisive contribution in formulating a 
theory and spreading appropriate concepts con-
cerning science policy and organization which 
are of the utmost interest to the developing 
countries. 
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
It is recommended: 
1. That continued and increased assistance 
be given by the international agencies in the 
planning, financing and establishment of a 
science policy, for the creation of the adequate 
groups of personnel of high technical level re-
quired, in the all-round development of the 
resources of the countries, and in the systematic 
development of the agricultural and industrial 
potential of the Latin American countries; that 
this co-operation be channelled at the national 
level through support of national programmes 
and at the regional level through the co-opera-
tion of the interested countries of the region; 
and lastly, that international co-operation should 
include decisive support for the fundamental 
sciences which are the basis for the application 
of science in solving specific problems. 
2. That the Director-General of UNESCO 
intensify his negotiations with the United 
Nations Special Fund in order to get that body 
to extend its economic support to finance the 
development of the fundamental sciences and 
basic research and to collaborate, in particular, 
in the establishment of reinforcement of univer-
sity science faculties or scientific research in-
stitutes. 
GENERAL RESOLUTION 
It is recommended: 
1. That the concepts expressed at the in-
augural meeting of the Conference on the 
Application of Science and Technology to the 
Development of Latin America by H.E. Eduardo 
Frei, the President of Chile, to the keen satis-
faction of the participants, and especially the 
following passage, be given wide currency. 
"Now is the time to create great regional 
scientific centres in Latin America where, with 
the backing of all, we can make progress in 
discovery, research and the training of our 
rising generations. Not one of our countries 
would have enough human and economic back-
ing to carry out such a scheme alone. If there 
is a field in which the need of integrated co-
operation is obvious, it is precisely this one; 
and I cherish the hope that scientists and tech-
nologists, who by the very nature of their studies 
have a wider and clearer vision, at the same 
time more open and more profound, will be 
able to understand, better than anyone else, not 
only the possibility but the urgent need for 
integration in this field." 
2. That the Latin American Governments, the 
respective scientific research councils, the uni-
versities and other higher institutions for re-
search and education, and the scientists and 
technologists, strive to contribute to the scientific 
and technological integration of Latin America, 
this being indubitably calculated to act as an 
effective impetus towards the integration in all 
areas to which the countries of the region aspire. 
n 
MEETING OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION^ 
(Santiago, Chile, 27 September to 4 October 1965) 
In accordance with ECLA resolution 251 
(XI ) , adopted on 15 May 1965, the secretariat 
convened a meeting of Latin American govern-
ment experts in the field of economic integra-
tion, which was held at Santiago, Chile, from 
27 September to 4 October 1965. The meeting 
was attended by 59 experts from Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
2 See the report of the meeting, document ST/ECLA/ 
Conf.21/L.5/Rev.l (Spanish only). 
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Uruguay and Venezuela, member States of the 
Commission, and by representatives of IDB, 
the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress (ICAP), the Panel of Nine, the 
Latin American Free-Trade Association 
(ALALC), SIECA, FAO, and by senior officials 
of the Latin American Institute for Economic 
and Social Planning and of ECLA. 
There were extensive discussions of a policy 
to accelerate and broaden the economic integra-
tion of Latin America, which was the main 
theme of the meeting. In particular, the follow-
ing points were dealt with. 
1. Trade policy; tariff reduction and liberali-
zation of trade; a common external tariff; 
preference margins. 
2. The treatment to be accorded to the rela-
tively less developed countries, and the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. 
3. Arrangements and instruments needed to 
facilitate a harmonious development within the 
framework of Latin American integration, in the 
light of the diversity of conditions in the in-
dividual countries. 
4. Technical and financial assistance. 
5. Agreements for specific industrial 
branches. 
6. Agricultural integration. 
7. The institutional structure. 
The experts also introduced other points: the 
connexion between the process of forming a 
common market and the need for countries to 
carry out the structural reforms necessary for 
the acceleration of their economic development; 
problems arising from the inadequate infra-
structure of the Latin American countries, as 
regards transport and communications; publiciz-
ing of the meaning and aims of the economic in-
tegration movement; broadening the geographi-
cal basis of integration, in particular by linking 
up ALALC and the Central American common 
market. 
The discussions were based mainly on a num-
ber of documents already submitted to the 
Commission,® together with two documents 
specially written for the meeting: Aspectos 
fundamentales de la política de integración de 
América Latina (ST/ECLA/Conf. 21/L.3) , pre-
pared by the ECLA secretariat, and La integra-
ción de América Latina, prepared by IDB. 
The participants agreed on the need to ac-
celerate and broaden the integration process in 
order to achieve a Latin American common 
market as soon as possible. For this purpose, 
in the light of the questions discussed, it was 
generally agreed that it would be necessary to 
adopt certain practical decisions with the fol-
lowing aims: 
(1) To accelerate tariff reductions and reci-
procal trade liberalization, to unify tariff treat-
ment of the rest of the world, while working out 
the necessary measures of area preference, to 
3 A contribution to economic integration policy in 
Latin America (E/CN.12/728); Proposals for a Latin 
American common market presented by Felipe Herrera, 
José Antonio Mayobre, Raúl Prebisch and Carlos Sanz 
de Santamaría (E/CN.12/730); Evaluación de las nego-
ciaciones de la ALALC (E/CN.12/717). 
provide technical and financial assistance and 
promote investment programmes in various 
branches of economic activity and in infra-
structure; 
(2) To strengthen the preferential treatment 
of the relatively less developed countries in 
various respects relating to trade measures and 
to specific programmes of technical and financial 
assistance and industrial development; 
(3) To consider the special problems arising 
in the countries where the market is too smaH 
to support certain economic activities; 
(4) To reach specific decisions to put into 
effect a broader concept of the principle of 
reciprocity, to ensure an equitable distribution 
of the benefits of integration among the member 
countries; 
(5) To establish more satisfactory arrange-
ments regarding saving clauses, and a system 
of technical and financial assistance to facilitate 
the application of adjustments that the broaden-
ing of the market may make necessary in order 
to avoid harmful effects on national economies; 
(6) In view of the great value of agreements 
for industrial branches in permitting more rapid 
progress towards integration, to accelerate the 
conclusion of such agreements within the frame-
work of an over-all integration policy, either 
for the region as a whole or for groups of 
countries; 
(7) To determine suitable machinery for 
stimulating agricultural integration, in order 
to make the most rational use of the region's 
resources; 
(8) To reach a decision on the establishment 
of an effective institutional structure for the 
administration and execution of the integration 
process; 
(9) To study practical formulas for linking 
up the two existing integration areas; 
(10) To co-ordinate at the regional level the 
work of analysis, research and programming 
carried out by the various bodies engaged on 
integration activities, in particular ECLA, IDB 
and ALALC, in order to avoid duplication, make 
better use of resources, and reinforce the 
activities and future development of ALALC. 
This is not to say that there were no dif-
ferences of opinion on the proper time for the 
decisions in question, the technical features of 
the specific formulas for putting these basic 
proposals into effect, or the conditions needed 
for the application of each of the measures 
concerned. 
In addition to the useful exchange of views 
between the experts, the meeting can be regarded 
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as having played a valuable role in that it 
reaffirmed the need for ECLA, IDB and the 
secretariats of the two existing integration agen-
cies, ALALC and SIECA, to work together and 
co-ordinate their activities, and led to sub-
stantial progress in broadening and strengthen-
ing the co-operation and collaboration between 
ECLA, IDB and ALALC, 
i n 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL ACCOUNTS^ 
(Santiago, Chile, 8 to 17 November 1965) 
The Working Group on National Accounts 
met at Santiago, Chile, from 8 to 17 November 
1965 under the joint auspices of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the United 
Nations Statistical Office, with the co-operation 
of the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations. 
This Group is one of a number of similar work-
ing groups which have met or are going to meet 
in the various regions of the world during 1965 
and 1966 in order to discuss the proposed ex-
tension and revision of the United Nations 
System of National Accounts (SNA) and its 
adaptation to conditions in the developing coun-
tries. 
Fifteen participants from Argentina, Bar-
bados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guate-
mala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Uruguay attended the meeting, 
together with representatives of the Inter-
American Statistical Institute (IASI), and of-
ficials of the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning and of ECLA's 
Statistical Division and Economic Development 
and Research Division. 
The main items dealt with were the following: 
1. The world programme of extension and 
revision of the SNA. 
2. Objectives and basic structure of the re-
vised and extended SNA. 
3. Structure and concepts of the revised SNA 
and its adaptation for use in Latin America. 
(o) Real accounts and supporting tables at 
current prices. Production and capital expendi-
tures, including input-output. 
(6) Financial accounts and supporting tables; 
incomes and outlay and capital finance. 
(c) Special account; the key segment. 
{d) Consolidated accounts for the economy 
as a whole. 
(e) Real flows at constant prices; concepts 
and tables. 
4. The classification and definitions 
regard to Latin American circumstances. 
with 
4 See the report of the meeting (E/CN.12/740). 
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5. Orders of priority in developing the new 
system in the light of the requirements and basic 
statistics in the region. 
The basic documents considered at the meeting 
were the report of the expert group which had 
met in New York in December 1964 in order 
to present a basic framework for a new extended 
and revised SNA (E/CN.3/320), a document 
which included specific proposals for an adapta-
tion to Latin American conditions of the frame-
work proposed t y this group (ST/ECLA/ 
Conf.22/L.2), and a document with additional 
suggestions presented by the ECLA secretariat 
(ST/ECLA/Conf.22/L.4). 
Points of major concern 
In the course of the discussions the partici-
pants stressed the increased requirements in the 
field of national accounts resulting from the 
advances in economic and social analysis in the 
region, especially in relation to planning ac-
tivities. Subjects such as national accounting at 
constant prices, input-output and commodity-
flow methods, information relating to the ex-
ternal sector, the treatment of the public sector, 
the detail of financial transactions, and the 
inclusion of gross instead of net flows, appeared 
to be the questions of main interest, in terms 
both of the broad aspects of the new proposals 
and of certain specific points. 
The group also stressed the need to publish 
as soon as possible the detailed manual on the 
SNA in its revised and expanded form. It was 
indicated that one aspect of the revision which 
had so far been neglected was the working out 
of statistical systems on demography, the labour 
force, and other social concepts relating to 
national accounts. It was considered highly 
desirable to organize working groups at the re-
gional level, in order to make a more detailed 
study of certain conceptual aspects, and to con-
sider questions of the comparability of the 
national accounts figures of different countries, 
as well as the practical problems in the field of 
basic data for national accounts. 
The meeting took note of the considerable 
advance represented by the new proposals, and 
formulated specific suggestions for taking them 
into account in the content and arrangements of 
future work. The Working Group expressed the 
general view that the United Nations Statistical 
Office and ECLA should not fail to impress upon 
national Governments that they should promote 
primary statistical research on essential eco-
nomic, demographic and social aspects. 
The aims and basic structure of the revision 
and expansion of the SNA 
The Group noted with approval that the new 
system consisted of real accounts—production 
and capital expenditure—and financial accounts 
—income and outlay, capital finance, revaluation 
and balance-sheet. In the real accounts, industries 
(enterprises), general government and house-
holds including private non-profit institutions 
were distinguished from one another; and the 
establishment or similar unit was used in classi-
fying their economic activity. The other major 
classifications utilized in the real accounts dealt 
with the commodities produced by industries, 
consumer goods and services, and government 
services (purposes). The use of two units of 
observation—^the establishment and the com-
modity—in the production accounts is an ap-
propriate solution to the problems arising from 
the occurrence of assorted (primary and second-
ary) production in the case of a number of 
establishments. In the financial accounts, the 
enterprise or similar unit was utilized as the 
statistical unit; and the institutional sectors 
were further sub-divided in the light of dif-
ferences in their financial and other economic 
behaviour. 
Real accounts 
In discussing the basic aspects of the lay-out 
of document E/CN.3/320, it was considered that 
the definition of production limits was not fully 
suited to the characteristics of production in 
Latin America. It was agreed that the concept 
should be broadened. 
The national accounts system in force com-
prised total primary production and the traded 
portion of the other goods and services. In the 
revision proposed in document ST/ECLA/ 
Conf.22/L.2, the concept was enlarged upon to 
include production of all other goods provided 
that a certain proportion of the output was 
traded. It was considered, however, that the 
limits should be widened even further, to in-
clude all the processing done by primary pro-
ducers and similar to that effected by goods-
producing enterprises and generally forming 
the basis of transactions in a monetary economy. 
It was felt that such an extension in the 
boundary of production could enhance the 
analytical values of the national accounting data 
although it would raise some practical problems 
of application. The Group proposed that where 
pertinent, a distinction should be drawn between 
the two categories of production—for the market 
and for own use—in the tables and accounts of 
the Latin American adaptation of the system. 
In discussing the two institutional sectors 
included in the production account, it was con-
sidered advisable to treat government and house-
holds and private non-profit institutions as pro-
ductive institutions providing services and not 
only as final units. 
It was decided to adopt the following criterion: 
(a) Treatment of the government 
"The government has two separate activities 
within the accounting system, that of a producer 
of goods and services and that of consumer of 
those goods on behalf of the community. In 
connexion with the first activity, it should ob-
viously be included in the production account, 
by branch of activity, as an additional enter-
prise, which combines the services of factors 
of production and inputs with a view to ob-
taining the units of a product called administra-
tive, defence or educational services. With respect 
to the second activity, the government should 
appear as a collective consumer or representative 
of the community, purchasing all those services". 
(b) Treatment of production activities of house-
holds (domestic service) and private non-
profit institutions 
"Here the distinction is much clearer and 
more precise; the production accounts by branch 
of activity will equal the value of the service and 
costs incurred, and the commodity accounts will 
show the distribution of those services. This 
treatment permits a clear distinction to be made 
between production accounts and production 
reclassification accounts, and it also makes it 
possible to establish a clear and comprehensive 
relationship between the "B" system production 
accounts and the consolidated expenditure and 
product account." 
With respect to the elimination of the im-
putations suggested in document E/CN.3/320, 
the Working Group agreed that for the imputa-
tion of the charges for banking services it would 
be desirable to maintain the existing treatment. 
In the matter of the suggested elimination of 
the imputations of government rents, some 
participants wished to retain the imputations as 
in the present SNA, whereas others were in 
favour of the proposal in document E/CN.3/ 
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320. The rents paid for the use of structure or 
equipment were to be treated as payments for 
non-factor services and therefore as part of the 
cost of production. On the other hand, rents 
for agricultural land were to be considered 
payments for the use of property and therefore 
part of the operating surplus of the agricultural 
producer. The Group accepted these proposals, 
though some participants had reservations. 
In the discussion on the calculation of imports 
and exports, it was generally agreed that it 
would be more appropriate to take them into 
account at the moment when they crossed the 
frontier. 
With respect to the problem of unfinished 
constructions, the Group accepted the proposal 
to consider these as increases in stocks. It was^  
agreed that the criterion to be adopted in con-' 
sidering a building as completed was that it 
should be ready for occupation. It was recom-
mended that in presenting data this concept 
should be separated from the total of stock 
variations. 
With respect to own-account construction 
some experts were in favour of including this 
item in construction only when it represents 
a major activity of the bodies concerned. Other 
experts felt that the treatment of secondary 
production was not in line with the suggestion 
that only own-account construction should be 
separated in each sector. Arguments of a certain 
weight were advanced relating to the desirability 
of including this activity in the sector concerned 
—particularly in the case of the agricultural 
sector—because of the practical difficulties of 
separating it from agricultural activities proper. 
This view implies maintaining the present treat-
ment of this item. 
The participants also discussed such questions 
as the definition of capital formation in the rural 
parts of the economy, the calculation of de-
preciation, and other questions of detail. 
Financial accounts 
The Group considered that the proposed 
composition of the financial accounts, based on 
an institutional classification of financial trans-
actions, provided a highly useful analytical tool. 
One specific point raised was how to regard 
the definition of the item on pension funds and 
social security agencies in the light of con-
ditions in Latin America. The Group felt that 
general government should be sub-divided in 
order to establish a closer relationship between 
the sub-sectors and the various levels of govern-
ment administration, that the extra-budgetary 
funds of central government should be deline-
ated separately, and that local government should 
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be sub-divided into state or provincial govern-
ment and municipalities. It was suggested that 
non-financial enterprises and private non-profit 
institutions should be classified by activity. 
The Group accepted the basis of recording 
employed in the accounts and tables of the 
new system. It was considered that though 
combination, instead of consolidation, of the 
transaction of the units of an institutional sector 
was in general desirable, consolidation should 
be utilized in the case of the monetary system 
and general government. The Group noted that 
the paid-received basis of recording was utilized 
in the case of financial assets and liabilities, and 
the payable-receivable basis in the case of other 
types of transactions. 
It was also thought desirable to extend the 
definition of national residents; to treat the 
retained earnings of banks, insurance companies 
and similar institutions as the savings of these 
units, and not of households; and to preserve 
the distinction between current and capital 
transfers in the case of the Latin American 
countries, although a more precise definition 
of the two types of transfers was needed. 
Special sector accounts 
The Group considered that the proposal to 
establish two accounts for special sectors of the 
economy was of fundamental importance for 
the countries of the region, since by its means 
questions relating to two basic sectors—^the tra-
ditional rural sector and a key sector comprising 
activities of exceptional significance in the 
structure and dynamics of any given economy— 
which were difficult to analyse imder the con-
ventional accounting system, could be dealt 
with in depth. 
The prevailing opinion was that the " D " ac-
counts should include a special account for the 
public sector. Other types of " D " accounts 
mentioned as incorporating analytical pos-
sibilities of interest in relation to Latin American 
conditions were distinctions between the urban 
and rural sectors; traditional and modern 
sectors, etc. 
The Group also discussed the desirability of 
supplementing the set of accounts for each 
sector with the corresponding accounts for the 
rest of the economy, so that in the " D " accounts 
the totals for the economy as a whole could be 
obtained in each case. 
The consolidated "A" accounts for the 
economy as a whole 
The Group considered that the " A " accounts of 
the system presented a valuable summary of the 
domestic and foreign transactions of an economy 
and of the major national accounting aggregates. 
It was however considered that some additional 
important aggregates should also be presented, 
and consequently the Group recommended the 
following changes: (o) the entries on domestic 
factor incomes to be sub-divided into com-
pensation of employees and operating surplus, 
(b) the entry on saving to be sub-divided into 
public and private saving, and (c) a sub-total for 
national income at factor costs to be shown in 
Account 2, national disposable income and its 
appropriation. 
Real flows at constant prices 
The Group supported the proposal to include 
in the SNA a consolidated system of accounts 
at constant prices, despite the conceptual and 
methodological difficulties it would entail. The 
Group felt that the inclusion of this system 
would further serve to accentuate the need for 
the international agencies to give priority to 
devising the concepts and methods required to 
solve those problems. 
With respect to the alternatives for estimat-
ing value added in the various industries at 
constant prices, it was noted that the method 
of double deflation sometimes resulted in negative 
figures of value added in constant prices. This 
may be the result of the change in the mix of 
raw materials inputs in favour of raw materials 
which fell relatively sharply in price from the 
base period, or in the mix of commodities made 
in favour of products which rose relatively 
sharply in price since the base period. In these 
circumstances it was necessary to turn to other 
approaches for making the constant-price es-
timates. In one view, deflation of gross output 
only had conceptual, as well as practical, ad-
vantages over the double deflation approach to 
estimating value added in the various industries. 
Orders of priority in the revised SNA 
In discussing the problem of priorities for the 
various accounts and tables, the Working Group 
agreed that only two levels of priority should be 
demarcated. The first was defined on the basis 
of two criteria: the degree of urgency with which 
the information was needed for economic analy-
sis, and the availability of statistical coverage. 
Other accounts and tables were relegated to a 
second category of priority. It was not possible 
to establish intermediate priorities which might 
differ essentially from one country to another. 
The establishment of priorities should be 
accompanied by an effort to improve basic 
statistical data, in which international agencies, 
in particular ECLA, the United Nations Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance and the Inter-
American Statistical Institute should co-operate 
more closely with the Latin American countries. 
It was felt that principles should be laid down 
in relation to the length of the intervals at which 
the various accounts and tables should be pre-
sented. For example, input-output data might 
be published once in so many years, whereas 
in the case of certain other measurements it was 
better to present them every quarter. 
LATIN AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
(Santiago, Chile, 28 November to 11 December 1965) 
A Conference on Children and Youth in Na-
tional Development, jointly sponsored by the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
ECLA and the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning, was held at 
Santiago, Chile, from 28 November to 11 De-
cember 1965, in co-operation with a number of 
specialized agencies (the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD)) . At the opening meeting 
5 See the report of the conference in document ST/ 
ECLA/Conf.20/L.20/Rev.l. 
speeches were made by His Excellency Mr. 
Eduardo Frei, President of Chile, and Mr. 
Espíritu Santos, the First Vice-Chairman of 
the Conference, who also spoke at the closing 
meeting, together with Mr. Manuel Balboa, 
Acting Executive Secretary of ECLA. At the 
first working meeting Mr. Henry Labouisse, Ex-
ecutive Director of UNICEF, indicated the 
general lines that the Conference's debates should 
follow. 
The Conference was attended by sixty-nine 
participants, observers and consultants from the 
following countries: Argentina, Austria, Bo-
livia, Brazil, British Guiana, Canada, Chile, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Re-
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public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Nether-
lands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the United States of America, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
In addition to the sponsors of the Conference, 
the following were also represented: the UNICEF 
Executive Board, the United Nations Bureau 
of Social Affairs, the above listed specialized 
agencies, and the Latin American Demographic 
Centre (CELADE), together with the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
Inter-American Children's Institute. 
The officers of the Conference were to have 
been: Mr. Adolfo López Mateos, former President 
of Mexico, Chairman; Mr. Espíritu Santos and 
Mr. Roberto Maldonado, Vice-Chairman; Mr. 
Fernando Cardoso, Rapporteur, and Mr. Albert 
Reynolds, Secretary. Mr. López Mateos was 
unable to take the chair because of ill health, 
and it was taken instead by Mr. Espíritu Santos. 
The work of the Conference was divided into 
two parts, each lasting a week. During the first 
part the Conference discussed the problems and 
needs of children and young people in Latin 
America, and ways and means of dealing with 
them; during the second, it studied the ex-
periences of certain countries in the planning 
field, in relation to the place of children and 
young people in national development, and the 
bases for a national policy for the younger 
generation. 
The main conclusions and recommendations 
of the Conference, in subject order, are given 
below. 
The work of development, which is a perma-
nent responsibility for all the peoples of the re-
gion, should not be regarded simply and solely as 
a future commitment, but should make practical 
use for its implementation of those who represent 
the process of growth, namely, the younger 
generations. The participation of young people in 
the work of development will guarantee the con-
tinuity of the efforts already made to speed up 
the rate of progress. 
In this way, a national policy can be evolved 
in which children and young people are regarded 
as an integral part of the development process. 
According to the tenets of such a policy, na-
tional and international aid should complement 
each other in such a way as to give first attention 
to the basic needs of children and youth by im-
proving their environment and physical con-
dition, developing their personality and economic 
skills, and giving them the sort of education 
that will equip them to take an active and 
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creative part in life while respecting the rights 
of others and serving the cause of peace. 
Obstacles to development that affect children 
and youth 
The current factors in Latin America that are 
reducing the ability of the rising generation to 
take a more effective part in national develop-
ment can be examined from two standpoints: 
that of the family bringing up its children and 
that of the social factors related to the help 
that society gives the family in that task. 
As it grows up, the child needs affection, 
suitable conditions in which to develop physi-
cally, mentally and emotionally, employment op-
portunities and social acceptance. Its parents' 
inability to satisfy these requirements in full 
measure stems from the shortcomings of their 
own childhood (which are irremediable) and 
the inadequacies of the social system that pro-
vides for them, which can be improved upon. 
Any progress in this respect will make for less 
tension between the different groups, peoples, 
regions and countries in future. 
An analysis of the demographic structure 
shows that the regional population is young, 40 
to 45 per cent being under 15 years of age, and 
has a rapid growth rate, reaching about 3 per 
cent annually in many of the Latin American 
countries. The lower age groups thus form an 
increasingly large proportion of the over-all 
population, with the result that each economically 
active person has more dependants. The rate of 
growth gives rise to three types of problems: (o) 
few countries have succeeded in raising the gross 
national product sufficiently above the 3 per cent 
mark to make an appreciable improvement in 
the living level of families that have larger 
numbers of children because of the drop in 
mortality; {b) the inflow of capital is not large 
enough to create satisfactory employment op-
portunities in which the talents of the younger 
generations would be put to good use; (c) the 
countries' inability to expand the desired social 
services so as to cover all children and young 
people. 
The same process of development leads to 
mass migration from the country to the towns 
since the population exodus provoked by rural 
conditions is aggravated by the lure of urban 
life. 
Although a certain amount of migration is 
necessary for industrial growth, the creation 
of new employment opportunities is lagging 
behind the influx of people from the country-
side and with over-all population growth, and 
therefore leads to mass urban under-employment 
with particular adverse effects on children and 
young people as regards family and social life, 
environmental sanitation, health, nutrition, hous-
ing, social welfare services, education and 
vocational training. 
The rural exodus has created problems in the 
towns without improving the positions in the 
countryside where more than half the child 
population of the region is still to be found 
and where the need to transform the existing 
pattern of agriculture means that a new genera-
tion of farmers had to be trained. One of the 
crucial aspects of the situation in rural areas 
is the fact that they are not integrated into the 
national economy. 
In the diíFerent social sectors, the main ob-
stacles to the improved development of the rising 
generations are as follows. 
The family. The large family which acts as a 
protective shield is disappearing. This is all to 
the good when a less rigid family nucleus takes 
its place. But it also makes for irresponsibility 
on the part of the father. It is the mother, with 
her extremely limited prospects of earning a 
living, who has to provide for the children, and 
can no longer depend upon the support that used 
to be forthcoming from the family. Society 
must make every effort to strengthen the family 
and to stave off, as far as possible, the unpro-
tected feeling which a child is apt to have when 
it lacks a complete family. 
The preschool child. This is a particularly 
vulnerable stage of life and one of great im-
portance in the formation of the human person-
ality. The care of the pre-school child has tra-
ditionally been left in the hands of the family, 
but as a result of the changes mentioned above, 
the family should be supplemented by other types 
of attention, and more particularly by day-care 
services to look after the children while their 
mothers are working and by pre-school education 
in kindergartens. 
In the countries that have collected data, the 
number of children enrolled in pre-school es-
tablishments as a proportion of the total number 
in the same age group varies from 1 to 5 per 
cent. 
In this connexion, it was suggested that it was 
preferable to give families financial aid to enable 
them to keep their children at home rather than 
to set up more institutions specializing in child 
care. 
As it is harder to provide organized services 
for children in rural areas, more emphasis 
should be laid on information and aid pro-
grammes for the parents, particularly the 
mothers. 
Health. The fact that it has not yet been 
possible to extend health services to the whole 
population affects young children in particular, 
mainly because of the lack of maternal and 
child health services, environmental sanitation 
and water supplies in suburban and rural areas. 
The progress made in providing medical at-
tention for mothers and infants, while far from 
complete, has as yet not been matched in regard 
to children, since the child mortality rate in 
many Latin American countries is up to twenty 
times as much as that of the high-income coun-
tries. In this large and vulnerable group, pre-
ventive action would avert the need for much 
more costly services later. 
Food and nutrition. Malnutrition is wide-
spread among young children; it is one of the 
main factors responsible for the high death rate 
in this age group and where it does not cause 
death, it can be a source of irreparable damage 
to physical and mental development. Weaning 
is the most dangerous period; the most common 
deficiency is that of proteins, with vitamins and 
minerals ranking second. In rural areas much 
can be done by education, and by advice on local 
food production and its use by the family. In 
suburban and urban areas the processing and 
marketing of low cost protein-rich foods should 
be promoted and, where necessary, the sale of 
such products subsidized. The co-operation of 
ministries of health, agriculture, education and 
trade is a vital factor in this development. 
Education. By dint of the great efforts made 
by the Latin American countries within the 
framework of the UNESCO Major Project for 
the Extension and Improvement of Primary 
Education in Latin America, enrolment in pri-
mary schools increased by about 50 per cent 
in the space of ten years although the goal of a 
complete primary education for every child has 
not yet been attained. The problems of repetition, 
retardation, dropping out and absenteeism add 
considerably to the cost of education and reduce 
the social and economic development returns on 
the investment. Unless the child completes at 
least four years of primary education, the 
financial and educational investment is virtually 
lost. 
Major obstacles to the improvement and ex-
tension of primary education in Latin America 
include the persistence of traditional educational 
structures unsuited to a changing society; in-
adequate budgetary provision for primary educa-
tion, resulting in extremely low salaries for 
teachers and an almost complete lack of teaching 
materials; a large number of primary schools 
not providing the full cycles; inadequate teacher 
training, particularly in rural areas; over-
crowded classrooms and the shortened school 
day. 
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In order to solve these problems, institutional 
obstacles and other barriers outside the formal 
educational system will have to be overcome. 
In the case of the latter the co-operation of 
various ministries and services will be needed. 
It is important in primary education and even 
more so in secondary education to forge closer 
bonds between the curricula and school structure, 
on the one hand, and on the other the different 
needs of a developing society, and, in particular, 
the occupational structure as visualized in the 
development plan. 
The fact that large population groups will 
be unable to benefit from the formal school 
system in the years to come means that other 
solutions should be envisaged such as night 
schools, correspondence courses, teaching by 
radio and television and by youth corps, uni-
versity students, the armed forces, trade unions, 
etc. 
Youth and employment. Modernizing eco-
nomies face two manpower problems simul-
taneously: the shortage of people with eco-
nomically strategic skills and the vast surplus 
of unproductive labour. This situation is partly 
due to the growing number of young people 
seeking employment, and partly to the limited 
education and training they are given before 
entering the labour market. It is estimated that 
a substantial proportion of the workers in the 
15-19 age bracket are school drop-outs, and 
most of them have not had more than three 
years of primary schooling. Moreover, the ab-
solute number of young people who are illiterate 
continues to increase. 
Vocational and technical training for the few 
young people who reach the necessary level is, 
on the whole, unsatisfactory; courses are too 
long; curricula are not always geared to in-
dustrial, agricultural and social needs; facilities 
are few and far between; and students receive 
little vocational guidance. There is also a general 
dearth of employment services to help young 
people find jobs. 
Consequently, programmes and measures 
should be undertaken to improve the current 
quality of education. It was proposed that schools 
should provide vocational guidance services for 
children and adolescents, in close co-operation 
with employment services. It was also pointed 
out that it would be desirable to organize in-
tensive low-cost courses for training large num-
bers of young people, possibly with the collabora-
tion of the enterprises themselves. 
Child labour accounts for 2 to 11 per cent 
of the economically active population in the 
different countries. The aforementioned measures 
for extending school attendance represent some 
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of the practical ways in which this problem can 
be approached. 
Within the context of each country's over-all 
employment policy, due importance should be 
attached to the creation of employment op-
portunities for young people. Among the sug-
gestions made by the participants for tackling 
this question were land reform, the creation 
of urban centres midway in size between rural 
communities and the big towns, the adaptation 
of modern technology to the conditions pre-
vailing in Latin America and, in particular, the 
choice of the optimum combination of the 
available capital and labour when new enter-
prises are set up. 
Legal protection. In most countries there are 
detailed laws for the protection of children, 
young people and mothers. The immediate need 
is to create the conditions in which the existing 
legislation can be applied, although it may be 
necessary to enact stronger laws to ensure that 
fathers discharge their responsibilities. More 
trained personnel are required for the legal work 
of protecting minors. Many countries are felt to 
be lacking in the institutions needed for im-
plementing the existing legislation, including re-
habilitation centres for dealing with vice of 
different kinds, prostitution and juvenile de-
linquents. 
National policy in relation to children 
and youth 
Each country should frame a national policy 
with respect to children and youth as part of 
its economic and social development. 
The policy should cover all children in both 
urban and rural areas, i.e. infants, children at 
the pre-school and school levels, those of school 
age who do not go to school, and young people. 
It should also apply to handicapped children. 
A policy of this kind should aim at meeting 
requirements in the following fields: 
(a) Protection—measures aiming at the re-
duction of child mortality and morbidity; the 
elimination of communicable diseases, poor 
sanitary conditions, malnutrition and illiteracy, 
and the general improvement of conditions for 
children. 
(fe) Preparation for living—^the development 
of the child into a useful and constructive 
member of society. Here the need is for educa-
tion, vocational guidance and training and good 
employment prospects. 
Protection of the family, and especially of the 
mother, should be one of the main features of 
a national policy for children and youth, since 
the family plays a highly important part in the 
child's development. 
Apart from providing for the material needs 
of children and young people, the policy in 
question should aim at consolidating and 
strengthening the fundamental values of society 
for the rising generations, inspired by a pro-
found understanding of their needs and a sense 
of universal brotherhood. 
A national policy of this kind should state the 
principal problems that confront the younger 
generations and the prospects of obtaining re-
sults within a certain space of time. It should 
enlist the support of the whole nation, that is, 
of the public and private sectors alike. 
As regards population policy, it was agreed 
that this should be formulated with the best 
interests of the family in mind so as to provide 
for the needs of children and young people. A 
policy of this kind depends on the complex of 
problems in each country, and should not be 
regarded as a substitute for the driving force 
needed in national development processes. 
Methods of planning 
The problems connected with children and 
youth in national development, and the mea-
sures and efforts to solve them, have a bearing 
on several social and economic sectors. In view 
of this, the Conference considered that the needs 
of children and young people could be met 
without establishing a special sector for that 
purpose in national planning systems. On the 
contrary, the problems associated with them cut 
across the different planning sectors, and some 
sort of co-ordinating machinery should be set 
up as part of the plan to ensure that the pro-
grammes carried out by the different ministries, 
departments and services are directed towards 
a common goal. Planning groups should also 
launch programmes and policies to meet the 
needs of children and young people who are 
outside the existing system of administration, as, 
for instance, those not going to school. 
In the formulation and application of plans 
and policies concerned with young people, their 
substance will naturally be decided by the Gov-
ernments concerned. 
Whatever the particular stage of development 
reached by a country, it is recommended that 
regular and systematic assessments be made of 
the situation of children and youth, in order 
to single out the key problems, evaluate the 
results of previous action and choose the areas 
in which development efforts should rationally 
be concentrated. With the aid of an appraisal 
of this kind, the countries can see how far their 
policy objectives in this field have been attained. 
Apart from inter-ministerial co-ordination of 
sectoral children and youth programmes, bal-
anced progress in the protection of children and 
their preparation for adult life requires that 
more importance should be attached to the plan-
ning of related aspects in the agencies and 
ministries, where such procedures have not yet 
become a matter of routine. Thus, planning 
units have been set up in health and education. 
As this practice is extended to other activities, 
it will become possible to provide on a co-
ordinated basis, the special care that children 
and young people require. 
Some of the most effective ways in which to 
influence the situation of children and young 
people are the indirect measures, many of them 
of an economic nature, which conduce to better 
living conditions for the family. Examples of 
these are income redistribution, family allow-
ances, food price policies and, first and foremost 
the creation of new employment opportunities. 
In addition, an endeavour should be made to 
mobilize the groups and movements, whether 
public or private, that are concerned with filling 
the gaps in the care of children and young 
people. In this respect, it is recommended that 
campaigns to improve the material and cultural 
conditions in which children and young people 
are living should make use of youth groups, 
mass communication media, and organized 
bodies such as trade unions, religious denomina-
tions and the armed forces. 
Lastly, special quantitative and qualitative 
data have to be collected and processed for the 
preparation and execution of development plans 
that pay due heed to children and youth. How-
ever, the fact that such information may not 
be available should not be used as a pretext for 
postponing action. As possible guidelines for 
such action, the following measures are sug-
gested: the removal of the glaring inequalities 
in the educational system, the elimination of 
bottlenecks in each country, the choice of simple 
rather than complicated programmes; the es-
tablishment or improvement of services to com-
plement those already in existence; selection of 
low-cost programmes; and, lastly, mass cam-
paigns to reach the majority of children and 
young people. 
Training 
The training of staff for the planning, or-
ganization, application and evaluation of pro-
grammes for children and young people should 
be one of the first points to be given attention. 
The training courses on the problems of 
children and youth provided by the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning and by other United Nations bodies 
may well be strengthened and greater use made 
of national institutions and universities. 
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Research 
The improvement of plans of action requires 
systematic research on economics, social affairs, 
teaching, vocational training and statistics. The 
present report makes a number of suggestions 
on possible lines of work which, while not 
exhaustive, are sufficient to prevent the wrong 
methods from being used to deal with the evils 
that must be remedied or eradicated. Basic re-
search is needed, together with field experiments 
whose validity would be tested by practical 
means. Organizations, universities and institutes 
working in the region are asked to explore the 
possibility of helping to bridge the gap in re-
search on children and young people. 
International organizations and external 
co-operation 
The organizations that had sponsored and col-
laborated in the Conference were requested to 
make a concerted effort to help the countries 
to strengthen their national development pro-
grammes in all matters bearing upon children 
and youth. It was hoped that they would co-
operate in personnel training, research, the pro-
vision of advisory services in planning and in 
the execution of programmes forming part of 
national development plans. The fact that in-
ternational banks are making larger investments 
in social programmes was welcomed. 
It was recommended that the planning com-
mission or equivalent body should, with the 
approval of the Government, act as a liaison 
office for the external co-operation extended to 
each country. 
The bilateral, international and non-govern-
mental organizations co-operating with the Latin 
American countries were asked to consider the 
desirability of granting high priority to require-
ments and possible action in respect of children 
and youth. 
NINTH SESSION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE» 
(Guatemala, 25 to 31 January 1966) 
The ninth session of the Central American 
Economic Co-operation Committee was held at 
Guatemala from 25 to 31 January 1966. It was 
attended by delegations from Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
the member countries of the Committee, and by 
an observer from Panama. The session was 
also attended by various United Nations special-
ized agencies—the ILO, FAO, IMF and IBRD— 
and a number of Central American organizations 
(the Organization of Central American States 
(OCAS), the Permanent Secretariat of the Gen-
eral Treaty on Central American Economic In-
tegration (SIECA), the Advanced School of 
Public Administration for Central America and 
Panama (ESAPAC), the Central American Re-
search Institute for Industry (ICAITI), the 
Central American Higher Council of Universities 
(CSUCA), the Central American Air Traffic 
Corporation (COCESNA), the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE), the 
Institute of Nutrition for Central America and 
Panama (INCAP), the Central American Mone-
tary Council (CMC), the Federation of Cen-
tral American ChamlDers of Commerce), and 
by other international organizations (the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the Inter-
® See the report of the meeting in document E/CN.12/ 
AC.58/3. 
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American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress (ICAP), the Panel of Nine, the Inter-
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences 
(HAS) and the Joint Central American Pro-
gramming Mission). There were also present 
officials of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the Bureau of Technical Assistance 
Operations (BTAO) and ECLA. 
At the opening meeting statements were made 
by Mr. Carlos E. Peralta Méndez, Minister for 
Economic Affairs of Guatemala, who was sub-
sequently elected Chairman of the session and of 
the Committee; Mr. Carlos Manuel Castillo, 
Director of the Mexico Office of ECLA, and Mr. 
Abelardo Torres, Minister for Economic Affairs 
of El Salvador and the outgoing Chairman of 
the Committee, who spoke on behalf of the 
delegation. Mr. Manuel Acosta Bonilla, Minister 
for Economic Affairs of Honduras, was elected 
Rapporteur. At the closing meeting statements 
were made by Mr. Pedro Abelardo Delgado, 
Secretary-General of SIECA, by Mr. Bernal 
Jiménez Monge, Minister of Finance and of 
Industry and Trade of Costa Rica, and by the 
Chairman of the Committee. 
During the debates the following main items 
were dealt with: 
1. Evalution of the Central American eco-
nomic integration programme: 
(a) Present situation and future prospects oí 
the programme; 
(b) The economic policy of the Common 
Market during the next phase of in-
tegration; 
(i) The operation of the Common 
Market, 
(ii) Trade policy, 
(iii) Industrial policy, 
(iv) Agricultural integration, 
(v) Regional programmes by sectors; 
(c) The institutional framework for integra-
tion; 
(d) Balanced development within the Com-
mon Market. 
2. Activities since the eighth session of the 
Central American Economic Co-operation Com-
mittee: 
(а) Technological research and vocational 
training; 
(б) Technical assistance; 
(c) Subsidiary organs of the Committee. 
3. Other matters: 
(а) Draft Central American Treaty on Uni-
form Legislation Concerning Migration; 
(б) Central American Institute for Edu-
cational Loans. 
These items were discussed on the basis of the 
following documents submitted by the secretariat: 
Evaluación de la integración económica en Cen-
troamérica (E/CN.12/CCE/327/Rev.l and E / 
CN.12/CCE/327/Rev.l/Add.lO; El crecimiento 
económico de Honduras y el desarrollo equili-
brado en la integración económica (CCE/IX/ 
D T . l ) ; Possibilities of integrated industrial de-
velopment in Central America (United Nations 
publication, Sales No. ÓS.ILG.IO); Carreteras, 
•puertos y ferrocarriles de Centroamérica (E / 
CN.12/CCE/324); La productividad, el costo 
de la mano de obra y el costo de producción en 
el Istmo Centroamericano (E/CN.12/CCE/335), 
together with a number of reports giving an ac-
count of the activities undertaken since the 
Committee's eighth session by ICAITI, ESAPAC, 
the Technical Assistance Board, FAO, ILO and 
the subsidiary organs of the Committee. 
General situation and prospects of the Central 
American Economic Integration Programme 
In the course of the general debate and the 
Committee's proceedings, it was made clear that 
the aims established for the first stage of the 
programme had been largely realized as far as 
the operation of the basic Common Market 
mechanisms was concerned, in terms of the 
figures for trade, and the rapid growth of the 
economic sectors, especially industry. It was 
admitted, however, that the Central American 
economies had not been developing in unison, 
partly because their export trade was carried 
on in different conditions but also because some 
countries had not been able to make as much 
use as others of the opportunities afforded by 
the expansion of the market. Moreover, it was 
emphasized that the prospects for the area's 
traditional exports were so bleak as to make it 
doubtful whether they would continue to spur 
on the economy of the Central American eco-
nomies as effectively as in recent years. Con-
sequently, the Committee considered that at the 
present stage of the programme the joint action 
of the member countries should be concentrated 
on activities that would conduce to a co-
ordinated expansion, on a regional basis, of the 
directly productive sectors, and on providing 
the area with the physical facilities and the 
services it needed. 
The Committee once again stressed the im-
portance of maintaining the maximum fluidity 
in trade, making the tariff instrument more 
flexible, eliminating the obstacles that in some 
cases were still hampering trade, and reviewing 
the uniform common tariff in line with the 
changing needs of development policy. However, 
the experience of recent years showed that the 
transformation of the Central American pro-
ductive systems could not be based solely on 
tariff policy and regional free trade. 
Aspects that should receive special attention 
in the immediate future, the Committee con-
sidered, included a more precise definition of 
industrial policy, and the setting up of the neces-
sary machinery to permit prompt use of the 
financial and promotional instruments available, 
with a view to the allocation of industrial ac-
tivities among the countries with due regard for 
economic considerations and an equitable sharing 
of the benefits of integration. 
Both industrial and agricultural development 
policies must be based on the rational and co-
ordinated exploitation of the area's natural 
resources. The Committee drew attention to the 
need to intensify survey work that the five coun-
tries had undertaken jointly, on an organized 
basis, with some technical and financial external 
help. That activity should be combined with 
the active promotion of new export lines, and 
the opening up of other markets abroad for 
Central American products. In that connexion, 
the Committee felt that there should be an im-
mediate speeding up in the work and preparatory 
studies relating to the formulation of a common 
trade policy towards other countries and groups 
of countries, in order to establish closer economic 
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links and defend its position more effectively in 
world markets as regards its traditional export 
products. 
The Committee considered other questions 
that were becoming increasingly important to 
the unification of the national economies. They 
included the differences in the tax systems, and 
other elements tending to distort flows of goods 
and capital between the countries. In addition, 
greater mobility of manpower and capital was 
needed for a complete merging of the individual 
economies, as well as a unification of social 
security policies and labour legislations, not 
only to level out production costs, but also to 
increase the participation of the labour sector 
in the benefits of integration. 
The institutional organization of integration 
During the discussions problems were raised 
in the Committee, in connexion with several 
different agenda items, relating to the institu-
tional organization of integration, and in several 
of the resolutions adopted not only was the 
existing concern on that point voiced, but specific 
institutional formulas to solve such problems 
were put forward. However, the Coromittee de-
cided not to examine the question separately, 
preferring to refer it for consideration to a 
forthcoming special session of the Economic 
Council to be convened specifically to deal with 
this item. 
Subsidiary organs of the Committee 
The Committee, in reviewing the activities 
between the eighth and ninth sessions, took note 
of the work of its subsidiary organs, the Trade 
Sub-Committee, the Agricultural Development 
Sub-Committee, the Transport Sub-Committee, 
the Electrification Sub-Committee, the Housing 
Sub-Committee and the Statistical Co-ordination 
Sub-Committee (E/CN.12/CCE/304, E/CN.12/ 
CCE/319 and E/CN.12/CCE/322), together 
with the reports of the working groups on 
agricultural and industrial statistics. The Com-
mittee took note of the reports concerned and 
of the resolutions contained therein. 
The Committee took note with satisfaction of 
the reports submitted by ICAITI and ESAPAC 
and of the statements by the directors of those 
bodies. 
Resolutions adopted 
There was also a detailed discussion of the 
other items of the agenda, and the following 
resolutions were adopted: 134 (CCE) Function-
ing of the common market; 135 (CCE) Foreign 
trade policy; 136 (CCE) The industrial policy 
of the common market; 137 (CCE) Agricultural 
policy; 138 (CCE) Unification of tax systems; 
139 (CCE) Regional sectoral programmes; 140 
(CCE) Central American telecommunications 
network; 141 (CCE) Balanced development of 
Honduras under the economic integration pro-
gramme; 142 (CCE) Study on balanced de-
velopment; 143 (CCE) Technical assistance; 
144 (CCE) Central American Treaty on Uniform 
Migration Legislation; and 145 (CCE) Central 
American Institute for Educational Loans. 
The Committee also decided to hold its tenth 
session in Tegucigalpa, at a date to be set in due 
course in consultation with the Central American 
Governments, and to express its appreciation to 
the ECLA secretariat in recognition of its con-
tribution to the achievements of the ninth session. 
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ACTIVITIES OF THE LATIN AMEKICAN INSTITUTE FOR 
ECONOMIC AM) SOCIAL PLANNING 
SEVENTH MEETING OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL 
(New York, 16 and 17 December 1965) 
The Governing Council of the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning held 
its seventh meeting in New York on 16 and 17 
December 1965. At this meeting the Director 
General's report ( INST/41/Rev. l ) was sub-
mitted, giving a detailed account of the activities 
undertaken by the Institute in the field of train-
ing, economic research, advisory assistance ac-
tivities, preparation of projects and social pro-
gramming during the year 1965, and an outline 
of work in progress and the work programme 
for 1966. 
Below are reproduced some of the introductory 
paragraphs of the report. This text, in addition 
to giving a broad outline of the main activities 
of the Institute, also summarizes the evolution 
of planning to date, describes the present ap-
proach to planning, and indicates the lines that 
will be followed in the future. 
Summary of the report of the Director General 
Planning in Latin America is not simply an 
attempt to introduce up-to-date techniques tried 
out in other countries. On the contrary, it 
emerges concomitantly with powerful move-
ments of opinion centring on the urgent need 
to undertake sweeping structural changes at the 
national level. As planning advances, the coun-
tries of the region are making increasing efforts 
to integrate their economies. Moreover, once 
the first stage involving the institutional organiza-
tion of planning and the preparation of plans 
is accomplished, problems are brought into focus 
which relate more to the operational phases of 
planning and its relationship with the direction 
of economic and social policy, e.g., unemploy-
ment and under-employment, income distribu-
tion, inflation, the stagnation of the industriali-
zation process through import substitution, the 
need to remove fiscal and external disequilibria, 
and the need to modernize and adapt public 
administration systems. 
Planning should come to be a competent in-
strument for dealing with these problems; con-
seauently. it has been the subiect, in recent 
years, of growing demands to serve as an instru-
ment for guiding and co-ordinating development 
policy. 
The burden of these requirements has fallen 
essentially on the countries' public administra-
tion, which is generally ill-equipped to meet 
them. This entails the need to train numerous 
highly skilled teams at all levels of economic 
and social policy; the gathering of a great deal 
of objective information and the analysis there-
of ; and, above all, budgetary and administra-
tive reforms that would permit the translation 
of policy guidelines into programmes and 
projects, the establishment of mechanisms for 
co-ordinating the State machinery itself, and the 
incorporation of the private sector in the work 
of devising and implementing plans. 
The evolution of planning in Latin America 
has conditioned the Institute's activities. Thus 
in 1962 its work was confined essentially to 
training—and to a certain extent—advisory 
services; but in the last few years it was neces-
sary to expand and improve the training pro-
gramme to cover practically aU the Latin 
American countries and a far wider range of 
planning specialties and sectors; it was also 
necessary to contribute to the establishment and 
work of advisory groups that provide technical 
assistance to the Governments of ten countries 
of the region, and to carry out a large number 
of specific advisory missions to a further five 
countries. 
When the institute was first set up, its re-
search activities were confined to those related 
to teaching. As its staff and functions became 
more firmly established, it was able to intensify 
this type of research and extend it to new fields 
and, in particular, to tackle major economic and 
social development planning projects in other 
spheres, through two teams of researchers set up 
for the purpose. 
As a result of these activities, a printing pro-
gramme has been launched covering the printing 
and circulation by a well-known Latin American 
publishing firm of studies and handbooks on 
l.'iR 
economic development and planning and of 
documents describing other research carried out 
by the Institute. This programme includes the 
publication of six volumes in 1966, four of which 
are in the final stages of editorial process. 
The above activities have been supplemented 
by the holding of several seminars—on educa-
tional planning, fiscal accounting, natural re-
sources and organization for planning—at which 
there has been an exchange of ideas and ex-
perience among noted specialists from Latin 
America and other parts of the world, and In-
stitute personnel. 
The Training Programme has been expanded 
along three main lines. First, the number of 
trainees has been increased; secondly, the geogra-
phical area has been extended as regards both 
the number of countries in which the courses 
take place and the nationality of participants; 
and thirdly, a wider range of specialties has 
been covered in the sphere of economic planning 
and the social sectors have been introduced as 
a lasting concern of the Institute. 
The Institute provided training for 433 pro-
fessionals in 1962, and 546 in 1965, a total of 
2,060 participants having attended all the courses 
held in the last four years. Moreover, intensive 
courses were held in six countries in 1962, and 
in eight countries in 1965, besides those or-
ganized in other countries of the region by 
national institutions to which the Institute gives 
support, in line with the promotion policy in-
dicated in earlier reports. During the past four 
years the specialties covered by the Basic Course 
have included general, public sector, industrial, 
agricultural, transport, budget and human re-
sources programming, some of which have been 
introduced in the intensive courses held in the 
various countries. Furthermore, special courses 
on educational and health planning have taken 
place every year since 1962, the number of 
participants attending the latter having increased 
from 47 in 1962 to 109 in 1965. 
In addition to these quantitative trends, an 
intensive effort has been made gradually to re-
organize the Institute courses with a view not 
only to improving the teaching efiSciency and 
technical level, but more especially to adapting 
each course to the conditions of development and 
planning problems with which it is concerned, 
according to the country, area and specialty 
covered. 
The advisory services carried out by Institute 
staff members in the various countries have 
shown how far the training of national ofiBcials 
has helped to strengthen the planning machinery 
and have also brought into focus the need to 
introduce gradual improvements and changes in 
the training programmes. One of the most deeply 
felt needs is the provision of opportunities for 
additional training and research to a limited 
number of participants of outstanding ability 
and promise. These participants—as provided 
for in the programme prepared for next year— 
could remain at the Institute engaged in research, 
advisory and other activities, or even in the 
capacity of assistant professors. 
The training activities of the Institute and of 
other national and international bodies in Latin 
America have aroused universities of the region 
to an awareness of the need to modernize the 
teaching of economics and to adapt it to national 
development requirements. In response to this 
need, the Institute began in 1964 a more system-
atic rapprochement with universities, and par-
ticularly with faculties of economics. Some head-
way had been made in this direction in previous 
years through the incorporation of professors 
and assistant professors of schools of economics 
to the Institute's courses and also through the 
organization of intensive training courses in 
conjunction with universities in several countries. 
In the last few years the Institute has been 
co-operating directly with the Faculty of Eco-
nomics and Administration of the University 
of Concepción, Chile, in the reorganization of 
its curriculum. It has also begun to co-operate 
with universities in Uruguay and Peru. This 
contribution consists in helping to define the 
type of professional it is wished to train, to 
prepare concurrent curricula with that end in 
view, to specify in detail the content of the sub-
jects taught and to reorganize teaching tech-
niques and systems of promotion. 
As regards advisory assistance, the Institute 
helped to establish planning advisory groups in 
nine countries, including the group covering the 
five Central American countries. This involved 
activities designed to support the action of the 
OAS/IDB/ECLA Ad Hoc Committee on Co-
operation in the constitution of those groups, the 
definition of their functions and work pro-
grammes, assistance in their specific undertak-
ings and, in general, an intensive effort to help 
in the formulation of plans and the initiation of 
planning processes. 
In addition, the Institute has helped nearly 
all the Latin American countries to establish 
performance budgeting, which is considered a 
key instrument of administrative reform and of 
the efficient operation of the planning process. 
. Experience has shown, moreover, that it was 
necessary to establish these activities on a con-
tinuing basis and to adapt them to the new 
requirements imposed by the progress made in 
planning in other strategic sectors. In order to 
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meet these needs, the Advisory Services Division 
was established in 1965, consisting of a team 
of ofiScials whose attention would be permanently 
centred on this work; the necessary financing 
was obtained from the United Nations Special 
Fund with the firm support of countries of the 
region. On this new basis, advisory assistance 
is given through the team of experts in this 
Division, in consistence with predetermined needs 
and programmes. The first projects of this nature 
were undertaken in Bolivia and the Dominican 
Republic, in 1965, by groups sent there by the 
Institute to provide over-all assistance in critical 
phases of the planning process. 
In other countries the initial steps were taken 
to integrate frontier zones (in co-operation with 
the Inter-American Development Bank—IDB) 
and to provide specific and specialized advisory 
services in such fields as natural resources, the 
application of decision-making techniques to 
economic policy problems, fiscal organization 
and social development. 
Another sphere in which the Institute is 
beginning to extend its radius of action is the 
promotion of project preparation within the 
context of planning. The extensive work of 
training and basic research accomplished in 
previous years and the valuable experience 
gained by the advisory groups in this sector have 
made it possible to start sending missions to 
countries of the region in order to strengthen 
their machinery for the formulation and pre-
paration of projects with a view to helping to 
make their planning efforts operationally feasible. 
These activities were carried out in Ecuador, 
as a co-operation with IDB as that country's 
financing agency, and in Uruguay. In essence, 
this action represents a direct effort to deal with 
the shortage of projects and improve their com-
patibility with the development programmes that 
are in course of preparation. The experience 
gained, linked to the efforts that are being made 
in relation to natural resources, the development 
of particular areas, administrative reorganization 
and sectoral programming, should help to clarify 
the nature of the difficulties hampering projects 
and facilitate the drawing up of specific pro-
grammes and policies designed to solve them. 
Increasingly, the Institute's activities are based 
on research. The training and advisory pro-
grammes have been taking shape in accordance 
with the results of the research that is constantly 
being carried out on specific development and 
planning problems in Latin America. These 
efforts have resulted in the preparation of studies 
and handbooks—shortly to be printed—benefit-
ing from experience in the field and presenting 
the theorical and analytical elements of the 
various branches of teaching. Other results are 
the techniques and procedures that have been 
applied in advisory services as planning has 
gradually entered the operational phase. These 
techniques relate specifically to the problems in-
volved in the implementation of plans, the short-
age of projects, the investigation and develop-
ment of natural resources, administrative re-
forms and regional aspects of planning. 
Basic research, moreover, has been focused on 
three main fields: economic integration, social 
development and an effort to interpret the Latin 
American economic development process. The 
aim of the last two types of research, which from 
the start have been closely related, is to arrive at 
a synthesized socio-economic interpretation. 
In the first of these fields, preliminary versions 
have been issued of the following studies: La 
integración económica y los planes de desarrollo 
and Efectos de un programa regional de susti-
tución de importaciones sobre la brecha del 
sector externo de América Latina. Moreover, a 
methodological study has been prepared for the 
course on planning techniques with the purpose 
of demonstrating the potential effects of a 
number of hypotheses of integration and growth 
rates on the principal variables contained in the 
plans. 
In the social sphere, research activities are 
focused on a long-term study project in which 
an over-all interpretation is sought of Latin 
America's development process. This research 
was devised and initiated in 1965 and a trial 
presentation of its basic hypothesis is entitled 
El proceso de desarrollo en América Latina {una 
tentative de interpretación sociológica). Some 
preliminary documents have been completed for 
purposes of this research: Las élites empresa-
riales en América Latina, Las clases populares y 
el desarrollo social, and La incorporación de los 
sectores obreros al proceso de desarrollo. Another 
study indicates some of the effects of over-all 
development on cultural development in its 
broadest sense. This research is embodied in 
the document entitled Filosofía del Desarrollo. 
The interpretation of Latin America's eco-
nomic development—^the subject of one of the 
major research projects—is based on the pre-
liminary text used in the training programme, 
which combines information on the framework 
of past regional development with an examination 
of development theories, a quantitative analysis 
of the development process and an attempt to 
interpret the latter in relation to Latin America. 
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The provisional version is embodied in the study The Governing Council also adopted a number 
El desarrollo económico. of recommendations addressed to the Latin 
Resolutions adopted American Governments, the Committee of the 
™ „ . „ -1 J -J J • ^  I- Whole of ECLA, and the Director General of 
Ihe Governing Louncil decided, inter alia, t • r .1 j- • t 
to adopt the report of the Director General and ^ ^ P^JP»®^ of ensurmg the 
to transmit it for information to the Committee continuity of the Institute s activities, and in-
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